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Spanish agriculture: the long Siesta, 1765-1965 is the first major study 
in English of Spanish agrarian history. James Simpson examines how 
traditional agriculture responded to population growth and the inte-
gration of commodity markets, emphasising both Spain's regional vari-
ations and its context in Europe. Simpson argues that decisive changes 
in farming techniques only occurred at the Start of this century ~ leading 
n:!~i~~.2~J>.r:~dll_c~Vityand the start or,~~fl:I!lll~~og!;!LP~J.?l': 
ment ~_S)11!~!:£llJ>.!.~ULm_L~9l0~~d 1940~~_~n1~"E~"suming in the .• ~ 
19508. He rejects arguments that slow giowtI1can be eJg?laiu!!ifTiY:tmor 
fes-OUJ:~~S or ineffiCIent farmers .. Indeed, farmerS were" quick to change 
when they had market opportunities (as was the case with olive oil, 
oranges and rice). By contrast, change was slower in those areas such 
as cereals where traditional technologies remained profitable. Simpson 
concludes that there were strict limits on absorbing labour in Spain's 
dry lands, and labour was retained in agriculture because of govern-
ment policies. 
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Introduction 
One point emerges very clearly from the diversity of experience of the 
developing countries: rapid growth in agriculture and in GDP go 
together. Where the pursuit of industrialization - the favored targets 
of planners in the 1950S and 1960s - has been successful, agricultural 
progress has not been sacrificed. Success in agriculture strengthens and 
helps sustain the momentum of the whole economy. 1 
. " th~!'L~l<~llQ ... basJ~ reas~lls.. v.v:bythe.,agrlculwFal .. sectorofl\ny , ) 
coun~. cannot contribute. s':lbs!a.ntiall:y.tQ~C9nQ~ic;.ci!'~'lY.ll1~1:~~. ! 
agriculture using only~a~~t}2~Lf~~t9r,~.cw:m~t .d,~.I~B~.!J,},Q.s!f$~e¥q ~ 
a~~~!~1!:~Q!t2.t~~~.&3J~~~ .c?nTPb~n.>, .. Onc~ there jl 
are investment opportumnes and effiCIent mcennves, farmers Will turn 
sand to gold. 2 
In their seminal article of 1961, Johnson and Mellor outlined five areas 
where agriculture could contribute to economic development, namely 
by increasing food supply in pace with domestic demand, obtaining 
foreign exchange through exports, transferring labour to 'manufactur-
ing' and 'other expanding sectors of the economy', making a net contri-
bution to the capital required for overhead and industrial investment 
and finally, providing a market for consumer goods for the emerging 
industrial sector. 3 With Kuznets, the development process is viewed as 
one of structural transformation, where agriculture's share of GDP and 
of the active labour force declines. However, structural transformation 
in itself depended on improving agriculture's performance, and in all 
cases of successful economic development, labour productivity in agri-
culture has needed to increase significantly. This can be illustrated by 
three very different historical cases, those of England, the United States 
and Japan. 
For many historians, the role of agriculture is considered crucial in 
the success of the Industrial Revolution in England, even if the timing 
1 World Bank (1982, p. 4). 
2 Schultz (1964, p. 5). 
3 Johnson and Melior (1961, pp. 571-81). 
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of the changes is highly controversial. In particular, labour flowed 
out of domestic agriculture to such an extent that by 1840 only 28.6 
per cent of male labour was employed in the sector. The changes 
normally associated with the agrarian revolution in England, namely 
new crops, more intensive rotations and more efficient agrarian insti-
tutions (enclosures and an efficient tenurial system) produced a 
growth in total factor-productivity in the sector which, according to 
one author, 'at times exceeded that of manufacturing and the rest of 
the economy - most notably during 1800-31'. As a result, by 1840 
there was no productivity gap between agriculture and the rest of the 
economy.4 
In the United States, the role of agriculture in the development pro-
cess was somewhat different. Employment in the sector did not peak in 
absolute terms until 1907, when it still accounted for 35 per cent of the 
active population. 5 However as the urban population of America grew 
from 10 million in 1870 to 42 million in 1913, farmers not only proved 
capable of feeding them, but also contributed about half of all the 
nation's exports.6 Furthermore, agriculture created important backward 
and forward linkages with the rest of the economy (agricultural machin-
ery, fertilisers and meat-packing, flour milling, tobacco processing). 
These changes are reflected in labour productivity in agriculture, which 
grew by between 0.5 and 0.7 per cent a year over the nineteenth century, 
with the second half of the century witnessing an annual growth of 
between 0.8 and 1.2 per cent.7 
Japan has traditionally been seen as the classic example of agriculture 
contributing to economic development through the transfer of savings, 
taxes and labour. Indeed, in their pioneering article, Johnson and Mellor 
referred to Japan as 'probably the clearest example of a country where 
agriculture contributed significantly to the financing of development'. 8 
Rising output and a· stagnant workforce led to an average per capita 
growth in labour productivity of 1.8 per cent between 1880 and 1935.9 
However, Franks has argued that the process of structural transform-
ation and resource transfer was more complex, and less strictly uni-
directional than is usually portrayed. 10 As in the United States, growing 
4 Crafts (1985, p. lIS and table 3.4). For criticism of Crafts' estimates and conclusions, 
see especially Mokyr (1989, pp. 305-12) and Alien (1992, chapter 13; 1994, pp. 1I9-
22). 
5 US Bureau of the Census (1975, DC Series DI-I0). 
6 Ibid, (Series A57-72). 
7 Weiss (1993, tables 2 and 3). 
8 Johnson and Mellor (1961, pp. 577-8) 
9 Hayami (1975, p. 30). 
10 Franks (1992, p. 103). 
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agricultural output became increasingly dependent on industrially pro-
duced inputs and urban demand. Furthermore, in the case of Japan, 
rural households frequently turned to manufacturing employment 
during periods of low demand in agriculture. Farmers therefore were 
'responding to, and themselves affecting, changes in market conditions 
for labour and goods, in available technology, and in the institutional 
organisation of industry and commerce' .11 
The problem facing developing economies is not, therefore, one of 
simply transferring resources from agriculture to other sectors, but also 
one of raising agricultural output and productivity. If this was achieved 
to a greater or lesser extent in the three countries discussed above, the 
story in many of the more backward European countries, not to mention 
those of the Third World, is that agricultural output often struggled to 
grow faster than population growth until well into the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, farmers rarely adopted immediately the new technologies 
made available to them by industrialisation, labour did not leave the 
countryside for the cities or emigrate in sufficient numbers to reduce 
the farming populations, and agriculture performed few of the functions 
outlined by Johnston and Mellor. Spain is a case in point. Nadal, in his 
classic study of Spain's failure to industrialise prior to 1913, noted that 
low agricultural productivity resulted in costly food and weak domestic 
markets for manufactured goods. Industry was starved of capital as the 
wealthy diverted their capital to the purchase of land, and if a cheap 
and abundant workforce existed in the cities, this was not in itself suf-
ficient for industrialisation.12 Another leading Spanish historian, Tort-
ella, has written of the 'serious retardation of Spanish agriculture, 
especially until around 1900', being reflected in its low productivity. 13 
He argues that the agricultural sector was weak in its demand for con-
Sumer goods, achieved only modest transfers of labour and capital to the 
urban sector and, in particular, failed as a market for industrial inputS. 14 
If a number of historians have recently questioned whether labour 
productivity in Spanish agriculture was actually as low as suggested in 
the works of such authors as Nadal or Tortella, and if the industrial 
sector itself has also been partly blamed for the country's slow develop-
ment, few would question the fact that Spanish agriculture's contri-
bution was weak over most of the two centuries between 1765 and 
11 Ibid. (p. Ill). 
12 Nadal (1984, pp. 82-6). 
13 Tortella (1987, p. 42). 
14 Tortella concludes that 'agricultural stagnation explains to a large extent the relative 
retardation of the Spanish economy during the period under study [1830-1930]' (1987, 
pp. 55-9)· 
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1965.15 However, this book is not about 'backward' peasants who allo-
cated resources inefficiently and failed to respond to market opportunit-
ies. Rather, it is about the difficulties in raising labour productivity faster 
in traditional agriculture. The book starts in 1765 when Spain's growing 
population, as elsewhere in Europe, was beginning to put pressure on 
resources to an extent which had not been experienced since the six-
teenth century. Significantly, it is also the year when the tasa, or maxi-
mum price at which wheat could be sold, was abolished in Castilla. The 
books ends with the situation in the mid-1960s - a time when traditional 
agriculture was beginning to change rapidly, producing a significant 
growth in both labour productivity and transfers of resources to other 
sectors of the economy. I argue that although natural resources were 
not especially favourable for agriculture in Spain, this is not enough in 
itself to explain the slow growth of the sector. Also to blame were 
government policies, the weakness of urban demand for farm products 
and in attracting agricultural labour, the difficulties in achieving export-
led growth, and the technical restrictions to both improving yields in 
dry-farming and introducing more labour-intensive crops. 
The book is divided into five parts. In the first part (chapters 1 and 2), 
I present new estimates of agricultural output and productivity. These 
challenge the findings of some recent research which sees Spain's agri-
cultural sector as having changed significantly from the mid-nineteenth 
century. Instead, I argue that although population pressure and insti-
tutional reforms had stimulated changes in the nation's agriculture, until 
the turn of the twentieth century agricultural output grew little faster 
than population growth. In the early twentieth century, the speed of 
change quickened and labour productivity increased, but most of these 
gains were subsequently lost in the 1930S and 1940s. Only from the 
mid-1950s was the process of modernisation of traditional agriculture 
renewed, leading to a rapid growth in productivity and major structural 
changes in the Spanish economy. 
The second chapter shows the considerable diversity in Spanish agri-
culture implying that no single factor can adequately explain the slow 
growth of the sector. Four major regions are established, with labour 
productivity being higher in the North and Mediterranean than in the 
Interior and Andalucia. Agriculture in the North was based on very 
small farms, with adequate rainfall permitting labour-intensive systems 
of mixed husbandry. Although the population was adequately fed, the 
l5 For more optimistic visions of agricultural productivity, see GEHR (1983a) and Prados 
de la Escosura (1988, ch. 3). 
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low level of integration in product markets produced low disposable 
incomes. By contrast, irrigation helped the Mediterranean farmers 
specialise in high-value fruits, nuts and vegetables for urban and inter-
national markets. Both Andalucia and the Interior, which accounted 
for four-fifths of the nation's agricultural area, suffered from summer 
droughts. In Andalucia agriculture was dominated by large estates and 
extensive farming systems based on cereals and olives, whilst in the 
Interior farms were small with a very high dependence on dry-farming 
and cereals. The problems facing Spanish farmers were therefore very 
different, and the speed of change in traditional agriculture would vary 
significantly according to the region. 
In Part 11, the mechanics by which traditional agriculture was able to 
raise output until the late nineteenth century are discussed (chapters 3 
and 4). Given Spain's initial low population density, outward move-
ments in the demand curve caused by population growth from the 
second half of the eighteenth century were met by extending the area 
cultivated and using existing technology, rather than introducing more 
intensive cropping methods. The process was aided by changes in prop-
erty rights, which both strengthened individual ownership through the 
abolition of institutions such as the Mesta, tithes and entail, and 
extended it through the sale of large areas of land to individuals - land 
that had belonged to the church and municipalities. Finally, commodity 
markets were also liberalised which, together with transport improve-
ments, led to greater market integration and in turn, to an increase in 
farm specialisation. 
The extension of the area cultivated and improvements in market 
integration between 1700 and 1900 allowed farmers not only to feed a 
population which virtually doubled in size, but also to meet the increas-
ing international demand for products such as wine and olive oil. Yet 
there were also major limitations to agriculture's performance. There 
was, for example, little evidence of improvements in land or labour pro-
ductivity. The large sale of church and municipal property, whilst far 
from reinforcing the structure of an independent peasantry such as 
existed in France, also failed to break fully the links that many had with 
the land, which might have speeded up rural outmigration, a process 
which in England had been stimulated by the Enclosures. The small 
improvements in living standards over the period were caused by events 
mainly outside agriculture, in transportation and the manufacturing 
sector. 
By the late nineteenth century Europe's farmers were enjoying an 
increasing supply of new inputs, including chemical fertilisers, labour-
6 Introduction 
saving harvest machinery and improved irrigation technologies. Pan III 
shows that the likely response by farmers to these new opportunities 
depended on market opponunities for the different crops and on factor 
prices. The fact that traditional farming methods often proved the most 
profitable implied that productivity growth would remain slow prior to 
the 1936-9 Civil War. 
In northern Europe, artificial fertilisers removed the need to keep high 
densities of livestock to improve soil fertility. However, chapter 5 shows 
that the experience in Spain, as in other regions of the world where 
dry-farming was practised, was that existing cereal strains responded 
poorly to artificial fertilisers, and marginal physical returns to more 
intensive tillage were therefore low. Instead, farmers used fertilisers to 
bring into cultivation more land, and yields stagnated until improved 
seed strains were introduced on a large scale in the 1960s. By con-
trast, on irrigated land, crops were much more responsive to fertilisers, 
and Spanish farmers proved to be some of Europe's pioneers in their 
use. 
About four-fifths of Spain's agricultural land suffered from seasonal 
droughts and low crop yields at the turn of the twentieth century. By 
contrast, the relatively high labour productivity in parts of the 
Mediterranean owed much to a combination of a warm climate, irri-
gation systems, artificial fertilisers and abundant labour which permitted 
the production of high value crops. The obvious contrast between 
Spain's secano (dry lands) and its irrigated market gardens and orchards 
was not lost on contemporaries, and many believed irrigation was the 
answer to the country's low productivity in agriculture. Chapter 6 
shows, however, that the commercial success of new irrigation projects 
depended not only on the construction of reservoirs and canals, but also 
on the development of water management systems and the introduction 
of a wide range of complementary inputs, including new crops, scien-
tifically selected and produced seeds, and artificial fertilisers. The chap-
ter shows that, in spite of its potential, the contribution of irrigation-fed 
agriculture remained small before the 1936-9 Civil War. 
Low cereal yields and the limited area irrigated implied that improved 
labour productivity in dry-farming areas could best be achieved through 
mechanisation. Chapter 7 shows that the diffusion of labour-saving 
machinery in Spanish cereals was slow, not so much on account of far-
mers' ignorance of the new equipment, but rather because, as 'rational' 
farmers, they were reluctant to mechanise at a time when they had a 
cheap labour supply, the price of draught energy was high, and the links 
between the agricultural and industrial sectors were still weak. By con-
trast, where new mechanical technologies offered real advantages to pro-
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ducers, such as in olive oil processing, the diffusion of new techniques 
was rapid. 
Part III argues, therefore, that farmers were responsive to changes 
in factor prices and new production opportunities when these proved 
profitable. Part IV links this notion of 'rational' farmers with Spain's 
low agricultural productivity and poverty on the eve of the 1936-9 Civil 
War by looking in greater detail at commodity markets, and the 
demands for institutional change. Chapter 8 argues that not only were 
Spanish diets poor in calories, but the consumption of meat and dairy 
products was significantly below the European norm. This was partly 
caused by weak urban demand - the relatively slow growth of cities 
in Spain reduced their ability to stimulate agricultural specialisation. 
However, demand was not the only problem for, whilst northern Euro-
pean farmers reacted to falling international prices of cereals in the late 
nineteenth century by shifting resources into livestock products, this was 
not a realistic option in most of Spain because of summer drought. By 
contrast, in the North - a region where natural resources were ideal 
for livestock production - the small scale of many herds and the weak 
integration of markets limited specialisation. In general, labour was slow 
to leave agriculture prior to the twentieth century, and this can be 
explained by the capacity of agriCUlture to absorb the growing rural 
population. Only with the reorganisation of Spanish viticulture after 
phylloxera, and with growing urban wages, would labourers begin to 
leave agriculture in significant numbers. 
Although by the late nineteenth century Spain was uncompetitive in 
the production of cereals and livestock produce, conditions on large 
areas of the secano were ideal for vines and olives. In chapter 9 I argue 
that a number of barriers existed to export-led growth in these com-
modities. International markets were limited to areas of production, or 
those with large numbers of Mediterranean immigrants. Producers of 
both crops suffered from product adulteration and cheap substitutes. 
These limits to demand have to be contrasted with supply which was 
more elastic, given the abundant supplies of suitable land, cheap labour 
and low entry costs for producers, both in Spain and elsewhere in the 
Mediterranean. Already by the turn of the twentieth century, inter-
national wine markets were suffering from overproduction. If the situ-
ation was better for olive oil producers, the limitations of the inter-
national market were clearly present by the late 1920S. Consequently, 
the incentive to shift resources out of cereals and into vines and olives 
was limited during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Given the low productivity of much of Spain's dry lands and the lim-
ited possibilities for changing the crop mix, chapter 10 looks at the role 
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of government in helping farmers and influencing production decisions 
in the half century prior to the Civil War. With cereals, government 
policy was directed towards tariff and price intervention - policies which 
benefited the larger farmers but which led to high consumer prices and 
did not significantly improve the incomes of many small producers. 
Cooperatives, which might have helped the smaller farmer, were not 
encouraged, in marked contrast to countries such as France where the 
family farm was politically much more powerful. Therefore, whilst dis-
couraging rural outmigration and appearing to encourage the family 
farm, successive governments did little to improve the lot of those who 
chose to remain. Finally, I argue that the ill-fated agrarian reform of the 
1930s, which aimed at dividing up large estates, would have provided 
only a temporary solution to low rural incomes and would not have 
improved labour prodUctivity. 
With technical change leading to modest productivity gains, wider 
economic growth and development was also taking place within Spain 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century. However, the 
limits to productivity growth in agriculture were clearly visible. If far-
mers were efficient in their allocation of resources, labour productivity 
remained low over large areas of the country, and consumers faced some 
of Europe's highest food prices - and some of Europe's poorest diets. 
The limited changes in agriculture from the early twentieth century 
were halted and then reversed during the 1930S and 1940s. The wide-
spread shortages of commercial fertilisers and machinery in Spain after 
the 1936-9 Civil War resulted in many farmers reverting to traditional 
techniques. However, from the mid-1950s, agriculture began to change 
beyond all recognition. Part V looks at these changing fortunes and, in 
particular, considers how the three key bottlenecks to increased 
agricultural output - legacies of the earlier period - were eventually 
overcome. First, the rural exodus to the cities and northern Europe cre-
ated labour shortages in the countryside, leading to an increase in real 
wages, and was a stimulus to mechanisation. Furthermore, for cereal 
farmers the backlog of technology that had built up by the early 1950S 
was such that its subsequent introduction protected farm profits and at 
the same time permitted the government to reduce the real price of 
wheat. Second, major international changes in pOUltry and pig-farming 
technologies allowed a rapid growth in domestic output and a doubling 
of per capita meat consumption between 1955 and 1965. Improvements 
in breeding and feeding led to higher beef yields, which partly offset the 
limits imposed by summer droughts and the small production units of 
the North. Finally, the growing attractions of hydro-electric power, 
together with improvements in construction technologies, greatly 
Introduction 9 
increased the supply of water for Spain's irrigation needs. As a result, 
whilst labour productivity increased by about a third between 1900 and 
1950, it tripled between 1950 and 1970. Although Spanish a~culru.re 
was still poor in comparison with other western European natIons, Its 
Siesta had ended. 
Part I 
The relative backwardness of Spanish 
agriculture 
1 Spanish agriculture: the long view 
The majority of countries today still devote a significant proportion of 
their resources to feeding, clothing and housing their population. How-
ever, historically, as Eric Jones has recently reminded us, living stan-
dards have varied significantly over time and space in pre-industrial 
societies. 1 What determined these fluctuations is complicated, but two 
factors stand out: the ability of a society to produce surplus food, and 
the rate of population growth. Malthus believed that population growth 
depended on 'preceding changes in agricultural productivity which, in 
their turn, are explained as the result of extraneous factors, such as the 
fortuitous factor of technical invention and imitation'. 2 Boserup turned 
the argument on its head, suggesting that a larger popUlation would 
stimulate the search for new systems of production which would 
increase output.3 For example, it is hard to imagine the diffusion of the 
heavy plough from the tenth century without the accompanying demo-
graphic pressure to extend the area cultivated on the potentially fertile 
but heavy soils of northwest Europe. Yet population growth has clearly 
not always led to technological or organisational change. The beneficial 
effects of the diffusion of the new ploughs were largely exhausted by 
the late thirteenth century - and the continued demographic pressure 
severely depressed living standards for the bulk of Europe's inhabitants. 
likewise, in the sixteenth century, population growth failed to induce 
sufficient changes in production techniques to offset diminishing returns 
to labour, which meant that if agricultural output grew, it did not grow 
as fast as population. 
The relation between changing levels of output per hectare, and 
output per worker is shown in Figure I. I. 4 The level of output per 
1 Jones (1988). 
2 Boserup (1965, p. n). 
3 The question of whether an abundant population was the cause of improvements in 
production systems, or was the result of them, was considered by the Spanish priest, 
Generes, in 1793. See Martin Rodriguez (1984, p. 178). 
4 This section is based heavily on Timmer (1988) See also UN and FAO (1954) and 
Hayami and Ruttan (1985). 
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worker is crucial. Increased labour productivity allows economic special-
isation and a growing urban sector, whereas this cannot be assured by 
increasing yields only. Figure LI plots agricultural output and output 
per worker on a log scale, with the 45° line tracing out constant ratios 
of land per worker. If welfare improvements are considered as an 
increase in output per worker, three possibilities are shown, all of which 
involve a movement to the right (cases a, b and c). In one case (d), no 
change takes place. Finally, (e) and (t) show falling output per worker. 
Although these six examples of agricultural change are not exhaustive, 
they still cover most possibilities and provide a convenient reference for 
this book. 
In their search to simplify the agricultural transformation in Europe 
since the sixteenth or seventeenth century, historians and econOInists 
have identified a series of stages through which agriculture moved.5 
In the initial stage, not only was agricultural productivity so low that 
it often required at least two-thirds of all workers to feed a country's 
population and supply its industries with raw materials (wood, wool, 
linen, silk, etc.), but governments had frequently to intervene to 
protect the small number of urban consumers from food shortages. 
The Agricultural Revolution in Holland and England from around 
the seventeenth century showed the possibilities of increasing yields 
through better integration of livestock and arable. This book starts 
just as the transInission of these ideas gathers pace throughout 
Europe. The Second Agricultural Revolution has been dated from 
the Iniddle of the nineteenth century. It permitted the substitution of 
inputs produced traditionally on the faInily farm with those produced 
by industries (labour-saving machinery, artificial fertilisers, pesticides, 
irrigation pumps, etc.). These innovations not only raised further 
productivity growth, but also slowly released labour to other sectors of 
the economy. From the 1950S a third revolution became increasingly 
apparent - the application of laboratory science to agriculture. The 
impact of developments such as high-yield crop strains, artificial 
insemination and pest controls would in time assume revolutionary 
importance because they permitted not simply a rapid growth in 
yields but, by the 1960s, the first signs of agricultural overproduction 
in Europe. 
A major theme of this book is that Spain, and in a wider geographi-
cal context, the Mediterranean region as a whole, experienced differ-
ent problems in increasing its agricultural productivity compared with 
5 The separation of European agriculture into various stages is frequent in the literature. 
See for example, Bairoch (1989), Jones and Woolf (1969) and Thompson (1968). 
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Figure I.I Possibilities for agricultural change 
Source: Timmer (1988, p. 30 4) 
the countries of northern Europe, during both the first and second 
Agricultural Revolutions. Both the chronology and pace of agricultural 
change in Spain was different; I argue that labour productivity in 
agriculture probably fell slightly in the period 1765-1820, stagnated 
over the nineteenth century and, although it started increasing sig-
nificantly from the early twentieth century, it then suffered a major 
reversal during much of the 1930S and 1940s. The renewed growth 
from the 1950S therefore marks the true end of traditional agriculture 
in Spain. 
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Table 1.1. Changes in European population, q6o-I960 
Population (millions) Annual change (%) 
c. 1750 c. 1850 c. 1950 1760-1860 1860-1960 
North" 17.6 42·9 89·9 0.89 0·74 
Central' 44·3 73·3 126.6 0·50 0·54 
Mediterranean' 24. 2 43·0 83.6 0.58 0.67 
Total 86.1 159·2 300.1 0.61 0.64 
Spain 9·0 15.2 28.0 0·53 0.61 
"Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and Sweden. 
• France, Germany and Switzerland. 
'Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Sources: Anderson (1988, table I); Mitchell (1992, pp. 3-8). 
The Malthusian trap threatens? 
Spanish agriculture, 1765-1820 
Just as the political, economic and social problems associated with the 
crisis of the seventeenth century affected European countries very differ-
ently, so the demographic recovery of the following century would also 
turn out to be uneven in its nature. By the mid-eighteenth century it 
was well under way in most parts of Europe, and over the following two 
centuries the population increased at rates never previously recorded. 
Between 1750 and 1950 Spain's population grew at an annual cumulat-
ive rate of 0.57 per cent against 0.63 per cent for Europe as a whole. As 
is shown in Table 1.1, Europe's population grew fastest in the countries 
of the North, but even in Spain this demographic surge was historically 
unprecedented, being twice the rate that the country had experienced 
in the period 1530-1760. 6 However, at no time was Spain's agriculture 
faced by the kind of population growth that took place in England 
between 1770 and and 1869, when the population increased by three 
and a half times - an annual growth rate of 1.2 per cent - or in Ireland, 
where it reached 1.6 per cent between 1780 and 1821.7 In Spain, the 
population grew fastest over the two decades between 1910 and 1930, 
when it reached an annual growth rate of 0.8 per cent. 
The implication of this demographic explosion for European agricul-
ture during the late eighteenth century was significant because, not only 
6 Taking population in 1530 as 4.698 million and 1768 as 9.023 million, the growth is 
an annual 0.28 per cent (Nadal, 1984, cuadro 9). 
7 Wrigleyand Schofield (1989, pp. 534-5) and 6 Grada (1989, p. 13). 
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were most people born in the countryside, they would also have to be 
employed there. The Malthusian spectre of rapid population growth 
leading to falling living standards (or Ricardo's diminishing returns) 
weighed heavily in many people's minds. Yet the nineteenth century 
saw a number of western European countries experience a significant 
growth in population, rising living standards, and a decline in the rela-
tive importance of agriculture. 
One major step in avoiding the Malthusian threat is usually con-
sidered to be the Agricultural Revolution of northwest Europe.s This 
saw such innovations as the planting of forage crops in the fallow, 
especially legumes and turnips, and the introduction of convertible hus-
bandry using commercially-produced grass seeds. Both allowed a much 
greater density of livestock and its better integration with arable culti-
vation. These changes helped improve the nitrogen content of soils, pro-
ducing in turn higher cereal yields. The success was by no means limited 
to England. The diffusion of one or more of the techniques involved in 
raising the nitrogen level of soils had allowed, according to one his-
torian, wheat yields in 'Ireland, northeastern France, Holland, and 
probably western Germany and Belgium' to be similar to those achieved 
in England around 1800.9 At an assumed yield of 1.58 tons a hectare 
(22.5 bushels an acre), these northern regions enjoyed levels almost 
twice those that Spain would experience a century later. When allow-
ance for the much greater quantity of unsown fallow that was needed 
in Spain is also taken into the comparison, then northern Europe was 
producing about three times as much wheat per hectare as Spain, and 
a century earlier. IQ 
This startling contrast in yields is the single most important difference 
in traditional agriculture between Spain (or the Mediterranean in 
general) and northwest Europe. It was not caused by the ignorance of 
Spanish farmers of the new methods, but by the difficulties in intro-
ducing intensive farming rotations to a country with low rainfall and 
8 The exact timing and the impact of these new cultivation methods remain highly con-
troversial, as suggested by some of the contributors to the recent volume by Cam,?bell 
and Overton (1991). Improved yields were also perhaps caused by greater market mte-
gration in the late seventeenth century (Kaussmaul, 1990, especially ch. 5). 
9 AlIen (1988, p. 117). See also AlIen and 6 Grada (1988, pp. 93-116). . 
10 Even if 1.58 tonslhectare is considered too optimistic for northern Europe in 1800, this 
level was certainly reached a few decades later. Spanish wheat yields were 0.88 tons/ 
hectare in 1903112 and for every hectare of cereals and legumes sown, Spanish farmers 
needed 0.78 hect;res of unsown fallow (GEHR, 1991, pp. 1182-5). If fallow is taken 
as 12.5 per cent of sown area in the north, then yields are approximately three times 
greater. Yields and fallow refer to England and Wales (Holdemess, 1989, pp. 133 ~d 
138). For northern Europe, see foomote 9 above. If crop mix is considered, the situatlon 
was more favourable to Spain, as almost half the cereals grown were wheat. 
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Table I.2. Share of the workforce engaged in agriculture, 1800 to 1920/30 
I800 I850 I900/IO I92O/30 
United Kingdom 36 22 9 6 
Netherlands n.d. 44 28 22 
Gennany n.d. 55 28 23 Belgium n.d. 48 32 23 France 55 52 42 35 Italy n.d. n.d. 6I 55 Spain 6S 64 6S SI 
Sources: Grantham (I99I, table I3.I), Mitchell (I992), Perez Moreda (I985, cuadro 
2·9) and Zamagni (I987, p. 57). 
without irrigation. l1 I will explore the nature oftechnical change in dry_ 
farming later in the book. Meanwhile, the low summer rainfall implied 
that the First Agricultural Revolution would not be feasible over most 
of Spain. 12 
The achievement of obtaining higher yields in northern Europe 
cannot . by itself explain the escape from the Malthusian trap, as 
populanon growth could have led to both rising crop yields and 
diminishing returns to labour. The striking feature of English agriculture 
by 1800 in comparison with other northern European countries was that 
it combined high output per unit ofland with high labour productivity. 13 
Calculating labour productivity in agriculture for late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century economies accurately poses considerable problems 
both methodological and archival. One very rough proxy of a country'~ 
economic success is the relative importance of agriculture as a source of 
employment. This measures not just agriculture's ability to produce a 
surplus, but also the ability of the economy to channel the surplus to 
the towns. Although the classification of the labour force is not without 
its own problems in pre-industrial economies, Spain trailed behind other 
western countries in the reallocation of labour from the 1800s to 1900S 
(table 1.2). 
~e period.c. 1765 to c. 1820 was a difficult one throughout Europe, 
and It seems lIkely that in most countries, including Britian, agricultural 
11 See, for example, Garcia Sanz (I974). 
12 Intensive cultivation in Spain was possible in the comparatively small area of the North 
(see chapters 2 and 3). 
13 Amongst others, see Alien (~99~, p. 240; 1992, p. 2U), Campbell and Overton (I99I, 
p. 5), Clark (I987; I99Ia), 0 Bnen and Keyder (I978, ch. 5), and Wrigley (I987, ch. 5). 
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output was outpaced by population growth. 14 Provisioning policies and 
property rights of the anciens regimes were increasingly questioned, but 
in many countries the price of change turned out to be high, and came 
in the wake of revolution, dynastic upheavals and warfare. In Spain, 
rising population, declining real wages (as early as the 1720S in Castilla 
la Nueva), frequent complaints of 'land hunger', war and high levels 
of mortality, all suggest that agricultural output per person and living 
standards fell between 1765 and approximately 1820.15 Why was agri-
culture unable to respond more effectively to this rising demand? 
Two possibilities existed for improving domestic food supplies: either 
output per hectare had to be increased, or the area cultivated 
extended. 16 Reference to the difficulties in adopting improved farming 
techniques of northwest Europe has already been made, and if the most 
significant development in the period was the introduction of the potato, 
this was still relatively rare before 1820. Yet even at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, when conditions were perhaps at their worst, few 
contemporaries doubted the potential of Spain to feed a growing popu-
lation. The historical legacy of the 'crisis' of the seventeenth century 
was one of underpopulation, and the general belief was that sufficient 
land existed to support a greater population. With the growing poverty 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, some thinkers of the Span-
ish Enlightenment began drawing a distinction between total population 
and active population. Thus, in 1779 Ward suggested that Spain was 
overpopulated, not because of population density (still only 20 inhabi-
tants per square kilometre) but because he believed 2 or 3 million people 
lacked employment. I? Although these writers looked to industry to 
absorb labour, they also became concerned with the large quantities of 
underutilised land in agriculture itself. 
The greatest potential for increasing output in Spain therefore came 
from extending the area cultivated. As discussed in chapter 3, this often 
depended on institutions of the Ancien Regime making available more 
land for cultivation. There was a reluctance to do so, and it took the 
revolutionary wars at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
14 For Britain, see Crafts (I985, p. 40). Mokyr has recently written that 'before the mid-
I8408 at the very earliest, the living standards of the masses in western Europe were 
on average practically unaffected by the Industrial Revolution' (I99I, p. I90: emphasis 
in the original). 
15 For the problems of this period, see Nadal (I984, pp. 127-38), Perez Moreda (I980), 
Reher (I990a, p. 77), Reher and Ballesteros (I993, p. 124) and Ringrose (I983). 
16 Imports of food were minimal in this period. 
17 Martin Rodriguez (I984, esp. pp. I59, I70-3). 
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nineteenth centuries to provide the opportunities for changes in prop-
erty rights, which in turn allowed an extension to the area cultivated. 
The Malthusian trap averted, 1820-1910 
By the 1820S agricultural output in large areas of Spain, and elsewhere 
in Europe, was growing once more. IS In Spain, growth was almost con-
tinuous throughout the rest of the century, interspersed by periodic har-
vest failures, the impact of which diminished as the century progressed. 
Given that per capita output probably fell over the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the long-term changes in the nineteenth century 
seem more optimistic. But the deficiencies of the data on agricultural 
output before about 1900 imply that we have to limit our discussion to 
whether the long-term growth in agricultural output was faster, or 
slower, than population growth. No attempt can be made to identify 
short-term fluctuations. 
Given the scarcity of data, and the questionable quality of much of 
that which does exist, the performance of nineteenth-century Spanish 
agriculture is best approached by looking at the end of the century, 
and then working backwards. 19 A good point of departure is a recent 
comparative study of O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura, which allows 
a comparison between five European countries prior to the First World 
War using purchasing power parities. Their estimates suggest that male 
labour productivity in Spain was only 32 per cent of levels in the United 
Kingdom, 33 per cent of those in Germany, 37 per cent of those in 
France and 68 per cent of those in Italy.20 With respect to value added 
per hectare of agricultural land, the gap with these countries was just as 
large, and even worse in the case of Italy.21 
The evident backwardness of Spanish agriculture at the turn of the 
twentieth century has led Gabriel Tortella to suggest that output per 
capita could not have been significantly lower in the early-nineteenth 
18 For Spain see Guia mercantil de Espaiia of 1829, cited in Kondo (1990, p. 25) and Anes 
(1970b, pp. 261-2). 
19 For a discussion of the limitations of nineteenth-century sources for Spanish agricul-
ture, see Torte11a (1985, pp. 73-82), Prados de la Escosura, (1988, ch. 3), Simpson 
(1989a, pp. 355-62) and GEHR (1991, pp. 17---93). For alternative estimates, see the 
appendix to this book. 
20 O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992, table I). Final output and UK prices used. 
Their Spanish data are based on Simpson (1995a). The difference is significandy 
reduced if all workers are considered, the implication being that the contribution of 
female labour was greater in countries such as France, Germany and Italy, than in 
Spain. However, the Spanish census figures seem to seriously under-record female 
labour in agriculture. 
21 Output per hectare in Spain was 32 per cent of that in Germany, 33 per cent of that 
in Italy, 37 per cent of that in France and 54 per cent of that in the UK (O'Brien and 
Prados de la Escosura, 1992, table 4). 
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century, and therefore agricultural productivity growth over the century 
must have been small.22 To examine Tortella's hypothesis, I have calcu-
lated a food balance sheet for the period 1897-1901 when official agri-
cultural production statistics for the first time appear to be reasonably 
reliable.23 This shows consumption of roughly 2,100 calories per person! 
day, which converts to just over 2,700 calories per equivalent male unit. 
This figure cannot have been substantially lower for any significant 
length of time during the nineteenth century for three reasons. First, 
contemporary opinion at the start of our period suggests that a figure of 
roughly 2,100 calories should be seen as a minimum rather than a maxi-
mum. The Censo de Frutos of 1799 gives a per capita figure for wheat 
and rye consumption equivalent to 1,725 calories, against an intake of 
only 1,131 calories for these cereals in 1900.24 Second, the fact that most 
of the active population was employed in manual tasks implies that a 
figure of 2,100 calories would have been necessary to provide the mini-
mum energy requirements. Even at this level it seems likely that approxi-
mately 60 per cent of the active labour force would have been incapable 
of doing more than the equivalent of an average of five hours ploughing 
each day.25 Finally, harvest fluctuations from that level would easily 
depress subsistence to crisis levels, and these rarely occurred after 1820. 
By contrast, mortality was 30 per 1,000, both in the 1860s and the 
1890s, suggesting again little improvement in diets.26 
The food balance sheet, together with my new estimates for agricul-
tural output after 1900 (see below), can help to establish the 'limits to 
growth' over the nineteenth century. In total, over half of agricultural 
output (that is, total production less seed and animal feed) in 1900 was 
made up of cereals and legumes (of which three-quarters was wheat and 
rye), wine and olive oil, and this increases to 80 per cent if livestock 
products are also included (table 1.3). A further 8 per cent comprised 
'new crops', which had very little importance in 1800. Thus a good 
indication of overall change during the century can be obtained if we 
can estimate trends in output for wheat, wine, olive oil and livestock. 
In the second column of table 1.3 ('coefficients of conversion'), 
changes in the relative importance of per capita output of different farm 
products over the century have been made. For example, in the case of 
22 Torte11a (1985, p. 68). 
23 Simpson (1989a). See also the appendix at the end of this book. 
2. Ibid. (pp. 366---9). The Censo de Frutos y Manufacturas was an attempt to measure output 
in the late eighteenth century. Its reliability has been questioned by historians, especially 
Fontana (1967). 
25 See appendix, pp. 284-7. Based on Fogel (1991). 
2. Calculated from Nadal (1984, cuadro 23). For information on heights, see the 
appendix. 
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Table 1.3. An estimate of nineteenth-century output' 
1900· 
Cereals and legumes 1,068 
Wine 435 
Olive oil 270 
livestock 891 
New crops' 277 
Other crops' 367 
Total 3,308 
• Estimates are net of recycled products. 
• In millions of pesetas, I 909iI 3. 
, As note b, but using population of 1900. 
d As note b, but using population of 1800. 
Coefficient 
of conversion 
XL2 
xo.8 
xO·75 
XLI 
xo.05 
xO·5 
• Oranges, almonds, sugar beet and potatoes. 
f Mainly fruit, vegetables and industrial products. 
1800' 
1,282 
348 
203 
980 
14 
184 
3,011 
1800d 
739 
201 
117 
565 
8 
106 
1,736 
cereals and legumes, it is suggested that per capita production was 20 
per cent greater in 1800 than in 1900, whilst wine production would be 
25 per cent higher in 1900. As population rose by 74 per cent (an annual 
increase of 0·55 per cent), the implication is that total cereal and legume 
production rose by only 45 per cent and wine by 116 per cent. I now 
show how these coefficients have been obtained. 
Annual per capita consumption of cereals and legumes in 1900 was 
154 kilograms, or some 1,180 calories, of which Spain was about 93 
per cent self-sufficient.27 In addition, the potato, a crop of very little 
~mportance in 1800, provided a further 170 calories per person per day 
In 1900. As cereal imports were minimal in the early 1800s, per capita 
output of cereal and legumes at this time would have had to be 20 per 
cent greater to maintain the 1900 figure of 1,350 calories obtained from 
cereals, legumes and potatoes. Given the low total calorie intake for 
1900, and the population's high dependence on these basic foods, a 
lower figure for 1800 seems unlikely. 
Wine and olive oil appear, by contrast, to have grown faster than 
po~ulation. Garrabou and Sanz, using the Censo de Prutos as a starting 
POInt, suggest annual rates of increase of 1.3 and 1.4 per cent respect-
ively.28 This seems excessive, perhaps in pan because the Censo de Prutos 
is less reliable for these crops than for cereals. 29 Furthermore, rates of 
27 Simps?n (1989a, apendice ~). We only consider those cereal-legumes for human con-
28 sumpoon, by far the most Imponant pan of final agricultural output. 
Garrabou and Sanz (1985, p. 130). 
29 Ibid. (p. 129). 
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growth for wine have been calculated using the exceptional harvest years 
of 1887/9. If it is based on the period 189111900 instead, the increase is 
reduced to an annual 1.0 per cent.30 As a result, I suggest that per capita 
wine output was some 20 per cent and olive oil 25 per cent lower in 
1800 than in 1900, so giving annual growth rates of 0.78 and 0.84 
respectively. 
Livestock estimates present the greatest problems. The most reliable 
census figures - those of 1750, 1865, 1917 and 1929 - show stagnant 
herd sizes, implying a significant fall in per capita consumption. This 
dismal performance can be explained by two factors. In the first 
instance, there was a need for a more intensive usage of land which, 
given existing technology and per capita incomes, favoured arable rather 
than livestock husbandry. Second, the extension of arable required an 
increase in the number of work animals. Thus, although there was little 
difference in the total weight of the national herd between the census 
of 1750 and that of 1917, there were important changes in composition 
which led to an increase in work animals, and a decline in those animals 
whose primary economic purpose was the production of industrial raw 
materials (wool, hides) or food (meat and milk).31 Thus whilst the 
number of mules almost tripled between the two dates, the national 
population of sheep fell by a third, and goats by a half. Cattle, which 
were regarded as much as work animals as producers of meat and milk, 
declined by a seventh, being substituted by the more efficient mule. 
Better breeding and product specialisation could, in theory, have main-
tained or even increased the output of wool, milk and meat in the face 
of falling numbers, but there is little evidence for more than just isolated 
changes. However, to bias this argument against the hypothesis of Tort-
ella, namely little or no growth in output per person during the nine-
teenth century, I assume per capita output of livestock produce was 
similar in 1800 as I have estimated elsewhere for 1865, implying a per 
capita decline over the century of almost a third. 32 
Finally, 'new' crops, which comprise potatoes, oranges, almonds and 
sugar beet, have been taken to represent 5 per cent of output of their 
1900 figure in 1800, and 'other' crops some 50 per cent.33 
If the per capita consumption of calories seems unlikely to have grown 
significantly over the nineteenth century, the increases in annual real 
30 Garrabou and Sanz argue that production in 1891/1900 was increasingly affected by 
phylloxera (1985, p. 130). In fact, falling prices also led to a reduction in the intensity 
of cultivation. By contrast, the 1887/9 harvests were unusually large. 
31 On this point see Garrabou and Sanz (1985, p. 121). 
32 Simpson (1995a, table I). .. 
33 The composition of 'other' crops changed over the century, With chestnuts, silk, flax 
and hemp being amongst those that declined in imponance. The figure of 50 per cent 
is probably on the low side, thereby increasing slightly our estimated growth rates. 
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GDP per head identified by Carreras and Prados de la Escosura, of 1.1 
per cent and 1.0 per cent respectively between 1850 and 1913, appear 
to have done little to stimulate the demand for foods such as milk, meat 
or fruit. 34 According to the food balance sheet for 1900, the average 
annual per capita consumption of meat was just 13 kilograms, milk 24 
litres, sugar 4·6 kilograms, coffee 0.4 kilograms and cheese 0.7 kilo-
grams.35 The Spanish economy saw some significant changes during the 
nineteenth century, but dietary improvements were not one of them 
with the important exception of the elimination of major shortage~ 
associated with harvest failures. 36 
The result of these conjectures is that production in 1800 was 1,736 
million pesetas (in prices of 19091I3), implying an annual growth rate 
during the century of 0.65 per cent, against a population increase of 
0·55 per cent. This increase has assumed that there were no changes in 
relative prices. The available price information, especially for the first 
half of the nineteenth century, is highly localised and needs to be used 
with care. However, a recent estimate suggests that changes in the rela-
tive prices of agricultural produce during the nineteenth century were 
small, and should not affect the estimates of agricultural output or 
labour productivity.37 Finally, given that agriculture employed approx-
imately two-thirds of the active workforce in both 1800 and 1900, labour 
productivity in the sector was probably stagnant.38 If this was the case, 
the positive growth rates achieved in countries such as France, Britain 
or the United States suggest that the labour productivity gap between 
these other countries and Spain increased over the nineteenth century.39 
Given this rather pessimistic picture, the achievements of the sectOr 
~re worth repeating. A population, which between 1760 and 1900 
mcreased from about 9 million to 18.6 million, was successfully fed with 
only small quantities of imports. Indeed, exports of agricultural produce 
made an important and growing contribution to the country's capacity 
to import and stimulated the development of a food processing indus-
trial sector. Stagnant per capita consumption of foodstuffs need not be 
inco?sistent with wider growth of the economy if, (i), a greater pro-
portIon was commercialised and (ii), a greater value added was achieved 
by food processing industries. This appears to have taken place. Spain 
34 Calculated from Carreras (1989c, pp. 556---7) and Prados de la Escosura (1995, table 
D·5). 
35 Meat refers to lean meat (including poultry) and offal. Simpson (1989a, cuadro 5). 
36 See chapter 8. 
37 Prados de la Escosura (1988, pp. 121-3). 
38 For active population, see Perez Moreda (1985, p. 56). 
39 For Fr~ce and Great Britain, see Prados de la Escosura (1988, cuadro 3.9) and for 
the Uruted States, Weiss (1993, table 2). 
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had only 34 cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1800, three less 
than in 1600. This figure had reached 174 by 1890, and the number of 
inhabitants in these cities had grown from L17 million to 4.71 million, 
an annual growth rate of 1.56 per cent.40 Therefore the stagnant growth 
of agricultural productivity noted in Spain during the nineteenth century 
could, in theory, be perfectly compatible with modest economic devel-
opment, as productivity improvements in transport and food processing 
industries permitted a widening of the market and urban development.41 
The difficulties in estimating agricultural output in a country such as 
nineteenth-century Spain are immense, and it is worth remembering 
the fragile nature of the evidence. To highlight just one point, a recent 
reinterpretation of employment figures in the United States in the nine-
teenth century has revised considerably our knowledge of the rate of 
growth in agricultural output per worker in the United States.42 Employ-
ment data, as we shall see, are even more questionable in the case of 
Spain. Yet my claim of stagnant labour productivity during the nine-
teenth century appears compatible with what we know about the 
country's agriculture and agricultural technology. Whilst it is true that 
some farmers introduced important changes in farming practices before 
1900, as will become apparent in this book, a significant gap is apparent 
between best practice techniques and their general diffusion throughout 
the sector. 
The slow demise of traditional agriculture, 
1910-1965 
During the first thirty years of the twentieth century, a greater body of 
statistical material makes it easier to determine the general trends in 
Spanish output, and most historians have suggested that not only did 
agricultural output grow, but that land and labour productivity also 
increased significantly. The most important study is that of Grupo de 
Estudios de Historia Rural (hereafter GEHR), which gives an annual 
increase in output of 1.4 per cent between 1900 and 1931, against a 
43 Thi fi h . growth in population of 0.77 per cent. s gure owever, IS not 
without its own deficiencies. First, it refers to gross output rather than 
being net of intermediate outputs, such as seed corn or animal forage. 
40 De Vries (1984, tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.8). See chapter 8 on difficulties in using these 
figures as evidence of intersectoral transfers of labour.. . . 
41 For a discussion on the reconciliation of a slow-changing agncultural sector WIth WIder 
economic development, see Uvy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990, pp. 32-4), Prados 
de la Escosura (1989), Simpson (1989b) and Nadal and Sudria (1993, p. 204). 
42 Weiss (1993). 
43 GEHR (1983a, p. 229). 
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Table 1.4. Growth in productivity, I89I/5 to I929/33 
Labour productivity Land productivity 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1891/5 3,299" 4,033 818 109 23,934" 138 109 
1897/1901 3,308 4,392 753 100 25,898 127 100 
1909/13 3,710 4,680 793 105 26,832 138 109 
1929/33 4,741 3,827 1,239 165 28,567 166 131 
(I) Net output at 1910 prices, millions of pesetas. 
(2) Number of male agricultural workers ('ooos) in the censuses of 1887, 1900, 1910 and 
1930. 
(3) Output per male worker (pesetas). 
(4) Index of labour productivity, 1897/1901=100. 
(5) Agricultural land (thousands of hectares). 
(6) Output per hectare (pesetas). 
(7) Index of land productivity, 1897/1901=100. 
" Assumes vegetables, fruit and raw materials represented 20% of output, and the area 
7.5% of all cropped land. 
Source: See Simpson (1995a, pp. 181-6). 
Second, constant prices have been obtained by using a price index for 
the economy as a whole, rather than calculating constant prices for each 
individual product, and finally the contribution of livestock is probably 
overestimated. Elsewhere I have tried to correct these shortcomings, 
and have calculated that during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century output grew by 1.13 per cent annually, significant in itself, but 
less than the figure given by GEHR. 44 
Table 1.4, which is based on these new estimates, shows that output 
increased from 3,308 million pesetas in 1897/1901 to 4,741 million 
pesetas in 1929/33, in constant prices, an annual increase of 1.13 per 
cent. Perhaps surprisingly, the relative importance of traditional Medi-
terranean crops, cereal and legumes, vines and olives, declined only 
slowly. From 53.6 per cent of output in 189711901, they were still 
responsible for some 48.9 per cent just over thirty years later. 'Other 
crops', which include such products as potatoes, oranges and sugar beet, 
.. See Simpson (1995a). The main cause of this discrepancy is the recovery from the 
~o-called. 'Great Depression' at the end of the nineteenth century. GEHR accepted the 
mcrease m output from 1891 in official statistics as being genuine, but Simpson argues 
that they reflect a greater statistical sophistication on the part of the compilers (GEHR, 
1983a, p. 190, and 1991, pp. 44 and 59-62; Simpson, 1989a, pp. 359-61). 
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remained at roughly a fifth, whilst livestock products increased to just 
over 30 per cent.45 
To a major extent, Spanish farmers obtained greater output by increas-
ing the area sown (75.9 per cent), which not only involved bringing new 
land under the plough, but also a reduction in unsown fallow, which fell 
from 44.5 per cent of the cereal rotation in 189711901, to 41 per cent in 
1929/33. This greater intensity of cultivation was obtained, partly at least, 
through the greater use of fertilisers and better farm equipment. The 
remaining 24.1 per cent is accounted for by other factors, such as better 
farming methods, or switching to more valuable crops. 
As in most countries in this period, statistical shortcomings relating 
to the measurement of the active population make it difficult to identify 
changes in labour productivity. One problem is caused by the fact that 
each person is classified as employed in only a single economic activity, 
when a major feature of less developed economies is the low level of 
labour specialisation. A second problem is the underestimation of 
female labour in agriculture which, for example, represented only 7 per 
cent of those actively employed in the 1930 census. A final problem is 
the question of underemployment and surplus labour, as agricultural 
workers were more fully occupied in some regions or years than in 
others. Family labour tended to work more hours than wage labour. In 
theory, therefore, efficiency in agriculture should be measured by output 
per hour worked, rather than output per worker year. None of these 
measurement problems are unique to Spain, and here we shall follow 
convention by including only male workers, which have been assumed, 
for the sake of comparison, fully employed throughout the year (table 
1.4)·46 
The results shown in table 1.4 suggest that the small decline in both 
land and labour productivity between 1891/5 and 1897/1901 would be 
even larger if, as GEHR suggest, the published figures of the early 1890S 
are correct. The cause of the decline can be explained by the growing 
area of unproductive vines due to disease (phylloxera), together with a 
small fall in livestock production. Some, although not all, of this decline 
is reversed between 189711901 and 1909/13. The overall picture of the 
period 1891/5 and 1909113, therefore, is stagnation in both land and 
.5 If intermediate products are included, the distribution is: 
1897/01 traditional crops 60.7% 1929/33 55.6% 
other crops 18.8% 22.4% 
livestock 20.5% 21.9% 
Source: Simpson, (1995a, appendix IC). Rough pasture and forestry have been exclud~d. 
46 For a discussion of measuring labour productivity in European agriculture, see O'Bnen 
and Toniolo (1991, pp. 396-400). 
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labour output. Between 1909/13 and 1929/33 there is growth in both 
land and labour productivity, with the latter increasing almost twice as 
fast as the former. However, caution has to be given to interpreting the 
timing of this growth, as the 1910 census perhaps overstates the numbers 
in agriculture in contrast to the underestimation in the 1930 census.47 
Whil.e .there seems no doubt that a significant upswing in labour pro-
duCtlVlty occurred from 1909iI3, it is possible that it is exaggerated in 
table 1.4 and the movement started slightly earlier, perhaps from the 
turn of the century. 
The interwar period saw the beginning of the transformation of tra-
ditional agriculture in Spain. Greater integration of the national econ-
?my permitted farmers to purchase a growing quantity of industrial 
mputs and at the same time release labour to other sectors. According 
to ~ne recen.t study, agriculture's share of GDP (including forestry and 
fishmg) declmed from 35.0 per cent in 1909/13 to 28.6 per cent in 19291 
33. At the same time, its share of the active labour force fell from 66 per 
cent to 46 per cent. 48 Agricultural labour productivity rose more rapidly 
than it did in the economy as a whole.49 
This rapid change of traditional agriculture in Spain was halted, and 
then reversed, by the 1936-9 Civil War. If the war disrupted agricultural 
output by diverting resources away from the sector to other users and 
destroying capital equipment, the damage wrought was a good deal less 
than many countries suffered during the Second World War. However, 
more than a decade after the Civil War had finished, the Spanish econ-
omy had still not recovered its pre-war output levels, and the poor per-
formance of the agricultural sector was reflected in widespread hardship 
and the return of hunger during the 1940s. Real GDP per head, which 
reach~d a pre~Ci~1 War high i? 1929, was only surpassed in 1954. Agric-
ulture s cont.nbutlOn to ?DP m 1949151 was still 30.6 per cent, virtually 
the same as It had been ~n 1929/33, whilst the sector employed 47.6 per 
cent 0: the labour force m 1950 compared with 45.5 per cent in 1930.50 
Dunng the 1950S the Spanish economy showed a remarkable trans-
formation. It grew by an annual 3.9 per cent, and between 1961 and 
1973 GNP increased by an average annual rate of 7.5 per cent, second 
47 Simpson (199sa, pp. 18s-6). 
48 Fo~ sectoral c~ntribution to GDP, see Prados de la Escosura (199S, table C.7). For 
49 ac~ve population, sec: Nicolau (1989, p. 79)· 
This also h?ppe~ed m the cases of the United Kingdom, France, the United States 
and Austraha (Tunmer, 1988, p. 28s). 
50 For real GDP per head and sectoral contribution to GDP, see Prados de la Escosura 
(199S, tablc:s .C.7 and D.S). For active population, see Nicolau (1989, p. 79). Diets 
were also slffiilar to those at the turn of the centuty, as shown in chapter n. 
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Table 1.5. Growth in productivity, 192 9133 to 1969171 
Labour productivity Land productivity 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (S)" (6) (7) 
1929/33 4,741 3,827 1,239 
100 28,S67 166 100 
1949/S1 4,s04 4,936 912 74 
27,000· 167 101 
19S9/61 S,449 4,IIS 1,324 107 
27,32S 199 120 
1969/71 6,640 2,646 2,s09 203 
27,SoO 242 146 
(I) Net output at constant prices, millions of pesetas. 
(2) Number of male agricultural workers ('ooos) in the 1930, 19So, 1960 and 1970 
censuses. 
(3) Output per male worker (pesetas). 
(4) Index of labour productivity, 1929/33=100. 
(S) Agricultural land (thousands of hectares). 
(6) Output per hectare (pesetas). 
(7) Index of land productivity, 1929/33=100. 
"Pasture has been estimated at S.S million hectares for 19So, 1960 and 1970. 
• Estimate. 
Sources: Output: 1929/33, Simpson (199Sa); 1949/S1, 19S9/61 and 1969/71 calculated 
using growth rates from Prados de la Escosura (199S, tables A.4 and D·4); labour: Nic-
olau (1989, p. 78); agricultural land: Simpson (199Sa), AEA (1980, p. 27)· 
only to Japan amongst OECD countries. 51 The contribution of agricul-
ture to this growth was essential, providing savings, labour and basic 
foods at falling real prices to the rest of the economy. This time labour 
productivity grew roughly at the rate of the rest of the economy, with 
agriculture's contribution to GDP falling from 30.5 per cent in 1949151 
to 16.5 per cent in 1964/66, and the labour force falling from 47.6 to 
27.6 per cent. 52 The number of agricultural workers fell from 5·3 million 
in 1950 to 4.7 million by 1960. A decade later the figure had dropped 
to only 3.0 million. 
As had been the case in the interwar period, labour productivity grew 
much faster than land output, with output per hectare growing by 1.9 
per cent and output per male worker by 5·2 per cent between 1949151 
and 1969/71 (table 1.5)· 
The difference between traditional and modem agriculture is that 
crop and livestock production in the former tends to be more diversified, 
allowing farmers to achieve high levels of self-sufficiency in consump-
tion, and be independent of the market for energy (family labour and 
51 Harrison (198S, p. 144)· 
52 Prados de la Escosura (199S; table C.7); Nicolau (1989, p. 79) and AEA (ano 1980, 
pp. 16 and 606). 
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Table 1.6. The modernisation of Spanish agriculture 
Total production 
Intermediate products 
Final output 
Inputs purchased outside 
the sector" 
Gross value added 
1909/13 
146.0 
-46.0 
100.0 
n.d. 
n.d. 
1929/33 1950/4 
138.2 136·4 
-38.2 -36.4 
100.0 100.0 
n.d. 
-9·9 
n.d. 90 . 1 
1960/4 
142.6 
-42.6 
100.0 
-17.2 
82.8 
1970/4 
129.9 
-29·9 
100.0 
-29.1 
70 .9 
a In . puts purchased outSide the sector include forestry fi th 197
0
/4. or e years 1950/4, 1960/4 and 
Sources: Simpson (1995a ap endix p. 206). ' P la and IC), AEA (1975, p. 609) and OECD (1969, 
~me-~eared animals), agricultural tools and fertilisers Estimate £ 
e ear y years can be regarded as only approximate bu~ table 1 6 ~ ~r 
cates some of the changes that took lace Th hi' . . m -
products is a reflection on the P,' e gh level of mtermediate 
the supply of animal feedstuffs c~;i s ~ttempts to .be self-sufficient in 
and 1970/4 reflects the decision' to allo~=:::ec!:~ betwee~ 1960/4 
feedstuffs, together with a ra id wth . tmports 0 animal 
ery and fertilisers by fa p gro m the purchase of fuel, machin-
rmers. 
The transformation of traditional a . 1 Spain in 1965, but by this date signifi gncu ture was not complete in the labour productivity gap who h cant progress had been made. Yet lC was noted between S' d th 
western nations on the eve of th F' W pam an 0 er Indeed with e lrst orld War had not been closed 
.' respect to output per male worker the' . 
countnes was larger in 1970 than it had b .' ga!, m ~ seven (table 1.7). In the eriods een m 1930, or mdeed m 1890 
all cases, bar that of Ger:IO-3~ and 1930--70 the gap grew smaller in 
national performance of SP::Sh 1:5~~0 . In other wo~ds, the inter-
1890--1910 and 1930--50. gn ture worsened m the periods 
Output per hectare showed less severe fluctuati tha 
male worker. However in ~ns n output per 
than half of that found'l'n filv960f°thutput per hectare m Spain was still less 
e 0 e seven countrie Of d' 
resource endowments in countri . l' . s. course, ifferent 
and S . h es tmp les different farming methods Unite~a:::te~uie~t per hecta~e was respectable in comparison with th; 
cations, was l~bour ~r~::::~~po~~ce, becau~e of its welfare impli-
ten times more than their S .'han ere Amencan farmers produced parus counterparts. 
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Conclusion 
::>ne of the major characteristics of Spanish agriculture prior to the 
First World War was the growth in output. However, although suf-
ficient to feed a growing population, it was not fast enough to cause 
any significant improvements in labour productivity, diets or life 
expectancy. The causes of low labour productivity could have been 
bad farming practices, poor land endowments, climate, demand con-
straints or, as O'Brien and Keyder have noted, it may be as much a 
'reflection of lower rates of structural change and internal migration 
than inefficient farming per se,.53 I shall discuss these points later in 
the book. From about 1910 agricultural output began to grOW, with labour leav-
ing the sector in significant numbers. Unfortunately, the process of 
migration received a serious setback during the 1930S and 1940s, and 
only from the mid-1950s would it be renewed with any vigour. The 
result is that whilst labour productivity grew by 1.9 per cent between 
1909/11 and 1929/31, and 3.8 per cent between 1949/5
1 and 1959/61, the 
growth over the longer period 1909/11 and 1959/61 was a more modest 
I.I per cent.54 The interwar period therefore proved a false start to the 
ending of Spain's agricultural Siesta. 
Finally, the international comparison shown in table 1·7 indicates that 
even though Spain was a 'late-corner' compared with northern Europe, 
this provided few advantages. O'Brien and Prados de la 
Escosura have recently argued that just as European agriculture has 
shown no indication of any long-term tendency to converge towards US 
standards of labour productivity during the twentieth century, the gap 
between the Mediterranean and northwestern Europe has also 
remained. 55 The major problem facing Spanish farmers was that 
approximately 80 per cent of the land surface suffered from irregular 
rainfall, especially in the summer. As we shall see in this book, on the 
one hand there were strict limits to the possibilities of technological 
transfer from northern to southern agriculture, a restriction that had 
been present since the First Agricultural Revolution.
56 
On the other 
hand, the advances in scientific-based dry farming were only just begin-
ning to appear in the 1950s. The comparison here with northern Europe 
is not to show the failure of technological transfer, but rather the cost 
53 O'Brien and Keyder (1978, pp. 108-9). 
54 Male labour only. Calculated from Prados de la Escosura (1995, table D.4) and Nicolau 
(1989, p. 78). 
55 O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992, pp. 530 and 534)· 
56 On this point see Cipolla (1976), Galassi (1986) and Tortella (1992, pp. 63-4)· 
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Table 1.7. Spain's productivity gap with Western Europe and the United 
States, 1890-1980 
Netherlands Denmark France Germany Italy UK US 
A. Output per male worker" 
1890 43 46 53 43 84 38 30 1910 35 22 39 27 71 32 24 1930 43 24 44 38 91 39 27 1950 23 15 27 28 68 19 10 1960 21 19 30 25 68 23 10 
1970 31 21 34 26 71 27 13 1980 35 33 46 39 98 41 15 
B. Output per hectare" 
1890 30 41 45 39 40 58 166 1910 23 27 40 27 34 55 157 1930 22 23 40 28 34 61 149 1950 15 20 41 26 34 46 lIO 1960 15 23 47 28 35 57 139 1970 15 27 46 28 38 59 164 1980 13 37 55 36 46 70 184 
a Figure~ refer to Spanish productivity as a percentage of the country shown. 
Purchasmg-power parities have been used. 
Source: Calculated from O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992a, table 6). 
to the national economy of Spanish fanners not developing alternatives, 
or to the rest of the economy in not absorbing greater numbers of agri-
cultural workers earlier. 
2 Unlocking the puzzle of stagnation: 
regional variations 
Contemporaries provided a number of explanations for the poor per-
fonnance of Spanish agriculture described in chapter I, with 
unfavourable topography, poor soils, inclement climate and an 'inef-
ficient' property distribution being the most frequently cited. 1 This 
chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I examine some of 
the consequences of resource endowments. In particular, the presence 
of summer drought over much of the Peninsula meant that dry-
fanning methods were used, and livestock densities were low. In the 
second section, I look at land distribution and tenurial systems and 
identify major differences within the country. Finally, I explore what 
regional variations can tell us about the problem of backwardness. 
To do this, I have divided the country into four agricultural areas 
(see pp. xvii-xix): the North (Galicia, Asturias, Santander and the 
&ro maritime provinces of the Basque Country, Guiptizcoa and 
Vizcaya); the Mediterranean coastal areas (Catalufia minus Ueida, 
the Baleares, the Pais Valenciano and Murcia); Andalucia (the eight 
provinces), and the rest which I call the Interior. 2 It is argued that 
three factors explain the different regional perfonnances: the predomi-
nance of low value, extensive cereal and legume rotations using 
excessive quantities of labour; the relatively small areas of high value 
crops such as fruit trees, sugar beet, market gardening, which maxi-
mised land output; and, finally, the small scale of intensive dairy and 
meat production. I conclude that neither poor resource endowments, 
nor property rights, are enough by themselves to explain the slow 
prOductivity growth of the sector, but rather they were just constrain-
ing factors to more complex problems, which will become apparent 
in the book. 
1 Other popular complaints included government tariff policy, taxes, education, and an 
expensive and inadequate transport system. 
2 Regions are based on provinces, the usual unit used by government agencies. 
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How limiting were resource endowments to 
agricultural progress? 
In his widely read book, Los males de la patria (first published in 
1890), Lucas Mallada claimed that topography, climate and soils were 
especially unfavourable to Spain. Mallada classified the country into 
four areas, with 10 per cent of the surface being rock and totally 
unproductive; 35 per cent having very low productivity owing to high 
altitude, lack of water or poor soils; 45 per cent being moderately 
productive; and finally only 10 per cent that 'leads us to suppose 
that we have been born in a privileged country'.3 
Mallada's criticism has often been repeated over the past century 
as an excuse for the low productivity in Spanish agriculture. Yet a 
prosperous agriculture is the result not so much of favourable soil 
fertility or climate, but rather a function of the intensity in which 
labour, capital and technology is applied, and the nature of society's 
demands on the soil. At various periods in Spain's history, some 
areas of the country appear to have enjoyed favourable conditions for 
agriculture. Under the Romans, Spain was famous for its wheat, 
wines, and olive oil. Later, the Muslims perfected and extended the 
country's irrigation systems, and their intensive agriculture not only 
fed large urban populations but also provided the raw material for 
the important silk industry. While Andalucia and the Mediterranean 
benefited from the introduction of a wide variety of new crops, 
Spain's empty and turbulent Interior proved ideal for the merino 
sheep, and the region was for centuries one of Europe's most import-
ant suppliers of high quality wool. 
The argument that poor resource endowments alone were to blame 
for the slow growth in agricultural output does not therefore appear 
especially convincing for the period prior to 1765. Mallada's diagnosis 
of poor resource endowments, rather than reflecting a permanent 
condition of Spanish agriculture, suggests instead a slowness in 
adjusting crop mix and production techniques so as to benefit from 
the country's changing comparative advantage in international mar-
kets.4 I shall return to this point at various times during the book. 
However, the nature of Spain's topography, climate and soils clearly 
did influence the type of agricultural systems used, a subject we shall 
now consider. 
3 Mallada (r890:r969, p. 30). 
4 Indeed Mallada believed that the fanner's situation had worsened over the fifty years 
prior to his writing in r890 (ibid., p. 87). 
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Nineteenth-century travellers remarked at length on the major 
regional contrasts in Spanish agriculture caused by ~erences in 
relief, climate and soil. First and foremost was the quesnon of top-
ography, and according to one visitor, Richard Ford, who knew the 
country as well as anybody:5 
the geological construction of Spain is very peculiar, and unlike that of most other 
countries' it is almost one mountain or agglomeration of mountains, as those of 
our coun~en who are speculating in Spanish railroads are just beginnin~ to dis-
cover. The interior rises on every side from the sea, and the central portIons are 
higher than any other table-lands in Europe, ranging on an average from two. to 
three thousand feet above the level of the sea, while from this elevated plain chatns 
of mountains rise again to a still greater height. 
After Switzerland, Spain is Europe's highest country, with 18·4 per 
cent of the land mass above 1,000 metres, and only 1I.4 per cent found 
between 0 and 200 metres, the optimal height for agricultural purposes.6 
Climatically, the country divides into two broad areas, with the north 
and northwest receiving between 30 and 45 inches (760-1140 
millimetres) of rain annually and, except in the mountains, enjoying 
relatively mild temperatures. Over large areas of the rest of the country, 
rainfall is often under 20 inches (less than 500 millimetres), although 
of greater importance for agriculture is the seasonal distribution, ~th 
the summer months experiencing long droughts. Drought, combmed 
with the high temperatures, severely limits the choice of crops, and has 
made intensive cultivation impossible except where irrigation can be 
practised. Outside the North, extremes of winter temperatures are 
marked by the limits for olive cultivation, which is roughly south Of. a 
horizontal line going through Madrid, together with north-eastern Spam 
(especially the Ebro valley). Finally, except along the Mediterranean 
coast, the risk of frosts limits crop choice. 
If not the sole factor, climatic factors and especially summer droughts 
have played a major role in determining crop mix, livestock densities 
and farming systems. As table 2.1 shows, Spanish agriculture in 1910 
was very different from that of northwest Europe. First, the relative 
importance of arable was much greater in the Mediterranean countries, 
a factor which, until very recently, was reflected in the extremely low 
per capita meat consumption. Second, fruit, nuts, wine and olive oil 
were much more prominent in the Mediterranean than in the North.' 
Lastly, cereals were especially important in Spain. 
5 Ford (r846:r970, p. 17)· 
• Cabo (r986, p. 303). . ' . 
7 Spain was suffering from the heavy damage bemg wrought on Its VIneyards by the 
disease phylloxera in this period. 
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Table 2.1. Structure of output' in different European countries, c.191O 
(per cent) 
United 
France Germany Italy Spain Kingdom 
Cereals, legumes and hay 23·0 18·9 22.2 34·7 15·0 
Vegetables and raw 8.2 12.8 13·0 15·2 9·6 
materials 
Fruit, nuts, olives and 24·4 2·7 36.0 19·8 2·4 
wine 
Animal produce 44·4 65·3 28·3 30.2 71.9 Other 0.0 0·3 0.0 0.1 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 99·5 100.0 100.0 
a As a percentage of total agricultural output. 
Source: O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992a, table 3). 
~peci~lisation in cereals and legumes need not by itself imply inef-
fiCiency If the country had a comparative advantage in their production. 
However, ~i.s was not so in. Spain. Most cereals in Spain were grown 
under conditions of dry farmmg, so much so that one agronomist noted 
that if Spanish farmers had written about their own farming techniques, 
the worl~ would have used the word secano, instead of dry-farming.8 
Dry-farmmg can be defined as growing crops under semi-arid con-
ditions where moisture is deficient and which require special cultivation 
methods.9 In the case of Spain, special cultivation methods were 
required in almost all non-irrigated areas outside the North, about four-
fifths of the country's land mass. Dry-farming cereals had three main 
characteristics: the need for winter rather than spring planting; a period 
of fallow of one or two years after each crop to 'conserve' moisture; and 
the. need to carefully maintain the depth of tillage, especially in the 
spn~g, to avoid I?oi~ture loss. The unsown land provided sparse pasture 
fo~ hvestock, which m turn produced virtually the only fertiliser that the 
sod wo~ld receive. Wheat yields during the whole of the period 1765-
1965 f~ded to reach more than a ton per hectare except in years of 
exceptional harvests. If these yields were not so very different from those 
achieved by the major wheat exporting countries - the United States, 
8 Cas.c6~ (1?~1, reproduced in 1934, pp. 53-4 and cited in GEHR, 1983b). National s~nsncs diVIde production into irrigation land (regadio) and non-irrigated (secano). In 
this book, all references to secano refer to semi-arid farming techniques and therefore 
• exclude the North where sufficient rainfall made these techniques unn;cessary. 
Shaw (19II, p. 3). 
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Canada and Australia - farmers in these countries enjoyed significant 
economies of scale in production. In Spain, farmers looked for tariff 
protection and cereals were consequently relatively expensive (see chap-
ter 8). By contrast, Spain benefited from suitable climatic and soil con-
ditions for the production of wine, olive oil, fruit and nuts, allowing the 
country to compete in international markets. 
Summer droughts also resulted in poor quality animals and low live-
stock densities. The large areas of empty and initially turbulent lands 
in central Spain led to the founding of the Mesta in 1273, an institution 
which North and Thomas, among others, have identified as a major 
cause of Spanish agricultural backwardness. lo The Mesta was a trans-
humant organisation, allowing sheep to graze the winter pastures of 
Extremadura and the Sierra Morena, and the summer pastures of the 
foothills of the Cantabrian mountains and other upland areas of the 
northern Interior. ll By using two different geographical regions, separ-
ated by three or four hundred miles, relatively large numbers of sheep 
could be kept. This has led one recent study to stress the positive value 
of the institution, namely its ability to achieve efficient property rights 
for grazing. 12 The establishment of cafiadas (designated sheep walks) 
kept the animals away from crops, and special courts existed to deal with 
the problems caused by stray animals. Furthermore, and in contrast to 
what North and Thomas believe, sufficient land existed to make the 
Mesta compatible with arable farming until the late eighteenth cen-
tury.13 By then, as chapter 3 argues, under the influence of population 
growth the Mesta's usefulness began to be widely questioned, and it 
quickly lost its powers, eventually disappearing in 1836. If the role of 
the Mesta in Spanish agriculture needs to be re-examined in a much 
more favourable light, it still needs to be stressed that transhumant 
sheep farming was totally incompatible with mixed husbandry. Neither 
summer nor winter pastures were sown, leading to a physical separation 
between arable and livestock husbandry. Everywhere outside the North, 
farmers found it almost impossible to maintain high livestock densities 
for mixed farming on unirrigated soils, and this lack of grazing helps to 
explain why, by the twentieth century, mules were the principal work 
animals over much of Spain's secano (maps 3 and 4).14 As we shall see, 
10 North and Thomas (1973, pp. 4-7 and 128-30). 
11 The classic work on the Mesta is that of Julius Klein (1920). 
12 Nugent and Sanchez (1989). 
13 Conflicts also occurred in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 
14 The regional distribution of cattle was less pronounced at the start of the period. For 
the slow decline of cattle in plough teams from the seventeenth century, see Anes (1984, 
pp. 6-9), Uopis (1986, pp. 33-4), Simpson (1987, pp. 281-3), Vassberg (1984, pp. 
158-63) and Zapata (1986, p. 713). 
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only with the provision of cheap substitutes such as mineral fertilisers 
(to maintain soil fertility), the internal combustion engine (energy), and 
the technology for intensive meat production (especially poultry and 
swine, which turned consumers from occasional to frequent meat 
eaters), was Spanish agriculture gradually freed from this constraining 
factor. 
The low livestock density also had another important, although less 
obvious consequence: it contributed to the relatively high rural under-
employment. The seasonal nature of much of arable farming implied 
that idle time was common with most crops. 15 To some extent this could 
be overcome by a careful planning of the crop mix, or by short-term 
seasonal migrations to other agricultural or industrial areas. However, 
in large areas outside the North and those not favoured by irrigation, 
the tendency was for farm labourers to suffer long periods of involuntary 
idleness, with Andalucia in particular having large numbers of under em-
ployed day labourers. 
Land ownership and tenurial systems 
Contemporaries and, more recently, historians have emphasised not 
only the poverty of Spain's natural resources as a limitation to agricul-
tural progress, but also a supposed sub-optimal distribution of property. 
According to Malefakis, land ownership in Spain had two major 
characteristics: 16 
a the predominance of either very large or small holdings, with an 
absence of holdings large enough to maintain comfortably, but not 
excessively, a peasant family, and 
b a marked regional difference in the distribution of the two extremes: 
small holdings being found in the north and centre of the country, 
and large farms in the south [see map 8]. 
Malefakis defines small as below 10 hectares and large as above 100, 
a division that he admits has limitations without knowledge of land qual-
ity or cropping systems. Despite this problem, Malefakis reinforced what 
contemporaries had generally believed, that the pocket handkerchief 
plots of Galicia, the fragmented farms of Castilla-Le6n, and the under-
capitalised latifundios of large areas of Andalucia, Extremadura and La 
Mancha, all created institutional barriers to the modernisation of the 
sector. 
15 It has been suggested that output per worker in England in 1851 was 80 per cent greater 
with animal husbandry than with arable (Clark, 1991, pp. 230--1). 
16 Malefakis (1970, p. 15). 
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Table 2.2. Distribution of land by size of holding, 1930Q 
Number of holdings (%) 
% of total land area 
% of taxable income 
Size of holdings (hectares) 
<10 
99.1 
46.5 
60.2 
10-99 
0.8 
24·9 
21.5 
100+ 
0.1 
28.6 
18·3 
• The data include totals for the North that were only available in 1959. 
Source: Malefakis (1970, tables I and 2). 
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Prior to the 1936-9 Civil War, when the potential economies of scale 
for large farms were more limited, contemporaries defended the latifun-
dios on grounds of necessity given the unfavourable climatic conditions. 
However, the division of Spain into areas of high and low rainfall pro-
duces a map which does not correspond sufficiently accurately with that 
of land ownership when divided into areas of small-holdings and large 
estates. As Malefakis writes: 17 
The most exaggerated forms of minifundios are indeed found in rainy Spain, 
where agricultural conditions are relatively favorable. It is also true that the 
latifundios are located entirely within arid Spain. However the latifundio regions 
account for considerably less than half of arid Spain; in more than half, small 
holdings, not large estates have somehow managed to survive as the predomi-
nant form of property. Rainy Spain, which constitutes less than one-fifth of the 
national surface, corresponds to only the Atlantic and Pyrenean provinces of 
... 'Northern' Spain ... The Catalonian and Aragonese provinces of 'North-
ern' Spain and the whole of 'Central' Spain fall within the arid four-fifths of 
the nation. The predominance of small property in the Levante and Murcia 
may perhaps be attributed to the extensive irrigation systems that have long 
existed there. No such explanation will suffice for much of Catalonia, most of 
Aragon, and the whole of that immense region known as Old and New Castile 
which lies upon the great central plateau of Spain, the Meseta. 
The contrast between the level of aridity and size of agricultural hold-
ings illustrates the incompatibility of a simple division between these 
variables (maps 8 and 9).18 Yet this fact need not in itself condemn the 
latifundios as many farms found in regions of low rainfall were clearly 
too small by the late nineteenth century. Indeed, and as this book will 
17 Ibid. (pp. 35--6). 
18 Taking the average annual rainfall and dividing it by the annual temperature gives a 
more realistic indicator of the effects of precipitation than simply the level of rainfall, 
but it still ignores seasonal distribution and changes in variables from one year to the 
next. 
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show, the failure to consolidate holdings and increase farm size in the 
Interior was itself a major cause of the country's low productivity during 
the twentieth century. 
However, it was the latifundios in southern Spain, and especially And-
alucia, which caused the main 'agrarian problem' prior to the Civil War. 
Owners of the latifundios were often absentee, and the property leased 
in large units and on short leases, to a relatively small tenant class. Culti-
vation was then carried out by jornaleros, temporary workers, whose 
numbers tended to exceed demand except during the harvest. The tra-
ditional view of the latifundio is that, given the low yields and large areas 
of fallow found in cultivation, they were inefficient. 19 This opinion has, 
however, been challenged in recent years and it is now generally 
regarded that the owners, if not profit maximisers, at least used pro-
duction methods appropriate to an economy with large supplies of land 
and labour. Nevertheless, the social consequence of latifundios was a 
large body of impoverished landless labourers who worked the estates, 
usually on short-term temporary contracts. 20 The poverty and banditry 
in the early nineteenth century took a more political direction by the 
end of the century with the growth of rural anarchism, making the 
region one of the most unsettled in Europe. The existence oflarge agro-
towns, in contrast to a relatively empty countryside, gave the region a 
cultural identity which made emigration rare, despite the severe 
underemployment and poverty, and the political will of the pueblo was 
only broken with the events of the 1936-9 Civil War and its aftermath. 
The problem of small holdings was most acute in the North, and in 
particular in Galicia, in the extreme northwest. In Galicia it was not 
just the minute and fragmented ownership but, until the twentieth cen-
tury, also the frequent division of ownership of the dominium utile and 
directum. One example, not atypical, was a 'field' found in Mera (La 
Coruna) which measured 32 square metres and on which three people 
19 Cultivation tended to be either biennial, aiio y vez, or al tercio, which involved planting 
a cereal crop one year, and leaving the soil fallow for the following two years. In the 
immediate vicinity of towns or large farms (cortijos), a more intensive form of this trien-
nial rotation was frequent, cultivating part of the land with a fodder crop in the second 
year (barley, oats or escaiia), and part with vetches in the third. This land would receive 
a disproportionate amount of the limited manure available. 
20 The economic plight of the Andalucian day worker was often extreme. Brenan wrote 
in 1943 that 'they lived in a state of chronic hunger and the deaths from malnutrition 
... were particularly numerous' (1974, p. 120). Quevedo y Garcia Lomas noted that 
'the Andalucian day worker has the most irregular work of all Spaniards, the worst 
daily wages of all agricultural labourers in Europe, and is the worker most devoid of 
supplementary resources to his day's wage of all workers in this world .. .' (1904, p. 
55)· 
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owned indefinite property rights; one had the use of the land, another 
the chestnut tree to be found on it, and a third, received as rent six eggs 
annually, being paid alternately by the farmer who worked the land and 
by the 'owner' of the chestnut tree.21 If the Council of Castile's decision 
in 1763 effectively protected indefinitely the tenants (foristas) from evic-
tion, it was not until 1926 that they were given the legal right to purchase 
full property rights to the land.22 This was important because if the 
foristas' right to cultivate the land had been secured at a relatively early 
date, overall rents tended to be driven up by the practice of sub-leasing. 
By contrast, further east in the Basque Country, the caserias, owners of 
the dominium utile corresponding to the land, house, rights to commons, 
and sometimes even work animals, could only sell or leave their property 
on the condition that it was not divided. Farm sizes tended to be larger 
and, as rents were modest, property often remained with the tenant and 
their heirs indefinitely, and the subdivision which so plagued Galicia 
was generally absent.23 
Given sufficient rainfall and the limited area of arable, farmers in the 
North responded to growing population pressure in part by emigrating, 
and in part by changing crop rotations to maximise output per hectare. 
Although geographically suited to livestock farming, many farmers suf-
fered from a shortage of sufficient capital and from the significant dis-
economies involved in the minifundias. Therefore, although livestock 
produce accounted for about half the agricultural output, herd size in 
1865 was only 3.1 animals per owner in Galicia, and between 4 and 4·5 
animals in the rest of the North.24 
As can be seen in map 8, the Interior contained major contrasts in 
farm size. Whilst in the south and west (Centre, Extremadura and the 
province of Salamanca), large estates or latifundios existed, elsewhere 
smaller properties tended to predominate. In the area of latifundios, con-
ditions were not dissimilar to those found in Andalucia. However, in 
the area of small farms, a major feature was the large number of tenant 
farmers. Leases were often for only two or three years, with restrictions 
21 Ministerio de Agricultura, Industria, Comercio y Obras PUblicas (1904, p. 27)· 
22 However, chapter 3 will show that from the late nineteent.h century many agreements 
between the different owners of the land were reached pnvately. 
23 In 1766, the average farm in Guip6zcoa was betwee~ 3.8 and 5.5 hectares, but in Gal-
icia, usually well below 3 hectares (Femandez de Pmedo, 1974, p. 164; Saavedra a~d 
Villares, 1985, p. 454). By 1930 there was one male worker for eve'!' 2) hectares m 
Galicia, compared with 3.1 hectares in Guip6zcoa ~d 4.~ hec~res m YlZcaya. , 
24 Output refers to 1929/33 (Simpson, 1995a). Herd SIZe, Cited m Dommguez ~:u:m' 
1990, p. 191. Capital shortages were partly overcome by the use of con.tracts similar 
to those of sharecropping (la admeteria in the Basque country, la aparceria m Sa~tander, 
la comuiia in Asturias and la parceiria in Galicia), where animals were prOVided by 
middlemen, and raised by smallholders (ibid., pp. 192-3). 
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on crop mix and with tenants having no legal rights to indemnification 
for improvements.25 
A major characteristic of the Mediterranean area was also the small 
scale of much of the farming. 26 Given the favourable conditions for 
labour-intensive crops - vines, fruit trees, market gardening - a large 
amount of land was cultivated directly by the owner, with recourse to 
labour markets only at periods of peak demand. However, much land 
was also leased, either through sharecropping arrangements, or by simi-
lar contracts which protected landowners' investments in trees, irri-
gation and soil fertility.27 If the liberal land reforms of the 1830S set in 
motion a period of land concentration in the irrigated areas of Valencia 
and Murcia, this would be subsequently slowly reversed from the 1880s, 
including the major orange-growing region of Alzira.28 Larger farms 
were to be found away from the Mediterranean coast, especially where 
the major crop was cereals, and here farming conditions were similar 
to those found in the Interior. 
Regional output and productivity 
The presence of a variety of farming systems, crop mixes and climatic 
conditions produced noticeable regional differences in agricultural per-
formance. Historically, the Mediterranean has been singled out as the 
most dynamic of Spain's agricultural regions, most notably by Vilar, 
who emphasised the major contribution of Catalan agriculture to the 
industrialisation of the region during the second half of the eighteenth 
century.29 More recently, the diversification and relatively heavy capital 
investment in agriculture and related industries from the late-nineteenth 
century have been noted in Valencia.30 By contrast, institutional or cli-
matic factors are usually cited as restricting opportunities in the rest of 
the country. Table 2.3 does not necessarily refute these affirmations, as 
what is of importance for economic development is the question of value 
added in the sector, the level of exports, and forward and backward 
linkages with the rest of the economy. However, table 2.3 does suggest 
that if agriculture was more dynamic in the Mediterranean than else-
where, its influence on the national economy would be limited because 
of its relatively small size. At the beginning of the Second Republic the 
25 Robledo (1984, chapter 3) and Hennida Revillas (1988, chapter I). 
26 See especially Ruiz Torres (1985, p. 195), Perez Picazo (1991) and the contributors to 
Garrabou (1992). 
27 Calatayud (1992, pp. 236-9). 
28 Millim and Calatayud (1992) and Grupo de Historia Agraria de Murcia (1992). 
2. Vilar (1962, pp. 78). 
30 Garrabou (1985), Palafox (1985), Piqueras (1985) and Nadal (1990, pp. 296-314). 
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Mediterranean contributed little more than 20 per cent of national 
output, not so very different from regions usually considered as 'back-
ward', such as Andalucia or the North.31 Table 2.3 shows that between 
them, the Interior and Andalucia accounted for four-fifths of agricul-
turalland, but output per hectare was only one-third, and labour pro-
ductivity three-quarters that of the North and the Mediterranean in 
1929/33. We shall now proceed to consider the causes of regional differ-
ences in both land and labour output in more detail. 
Output per hectare 
If land quality was highly varied in Spain, the intensity of rotations and 
crop mix was determined essentially by the presence or not of summer 
droughts. Table 2-4 shows that final output in the Interior and Andalu-
cia was achieved mainly from cereals, legumes, olives and vines, crops 
typically found in areas of low and irregular rainfall. Any comparative 
advantage that these regions enjoyed in the production of these crops 
was not on account of yields, which were little above the national aver-
age and, in the case of cereals, required extensive rotations. 
By contrast, output per hectare was much higher in the North and 
Mediterranean, which can be explained by the more favourable con-
ditions for intensive livestock husbandry (North) and intensive crops, 
especially fruit, nuts, vegetables (Mediterranean 'other crops', in table 
2-4). Intensive livestock husbandry was difficult outside the North 
because of high pasture and fodder costs, caused by summer droughts. 
The Mediterranean benefited from irrigation which permitted specialist 
fruit farming and market gardening. These two regions, which in 19291 
33 between them had only 18 per cent of the nation's agricultural land, 
produced 55 per cent of the national output of fruit, nuts and 
vegetables.32 
A second factor was farm size, with contemporaries frequently noting 
the high output per hectare on small, family-run enterprises in contrast 
to the large estates which used wage labour. The limited area of good 
land (whether irrigated in the Mediterranean, or arable in the North), 
together with population growth, led to high rents, leaving farmers little 
alternative but to cultivate intensively their small plots. High rental obli-
31 Using political rather than agricultural regions gives us the following results. Cataluiia 
(Barcelona, Girona, Ueida and Tarragona) produced 8.7 per cent of net output, labour 
productivity was 2,439 pesetas per male worker, and output per hectare was 605 
pesetas. The Pais Valenciano (Alicante, Caste1l6n and Valencia) produced 10.9 per 
cent, labour productivity was 2,987 pesetas, and output per hectare was 905 pesetas. 
32 The Canary Islands were responsible for another 7 per cent, leaving only 38 per cent 
for the Interior and Andalucia. 
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Table 2.3. Regional output and productivity, 1929133 
% of % of Output per Output per 
agricultural national hectare male worker 
area output (pesetas) (pesetas) 
North 7·3 18·5 809 2,750 
Interior 62.6 42.1 216 2>326 
Andalucia 19·1 17·1 288 1,630 
Meditertanean 11.0 22·3 650 2,688 
Spain 100.0 100.0 321' 2>315" 
" Includes the Canary Islands. 
Source: See Simpson (1995a, Appendix 2). 
Table 2.4. Composition of regional agriculture, 1929133 (per cent) 
Vines and Other Hectares! 
Cereals olives crops Livestock male worker 
North 16.8 2.6 26·7 53·9 3·4 
Interior 41.0 13·2 23·7 22.2 10.8 
Andalucia 28·4 27·5 23·6 20·5 5·7 
Mediterranean 15·5 17·3 48·5 18·7 4.1 
Spain" 28.0 14·3 31.0 26·7 7·1 
"The Canary Islands are included in total. 
Source: Simpson (1995a, table 6). 
gations reduced farm profits, affecting investment and personal con-
sumption. However, table 2.4 suggests that intensive cultivation was 
also a means of reducing risk. The complexity of rotations in the North 
and on the irrigated lands in the Mediterranean allowed farmers to ben-
efit both from a wider variety of products, and also higher and more 
stable yields. Furthermore, in the coastal areas where external demand 
had allowed specialisation in viticulture from the seventeenth century, 
traditional technologies benefited smaller units of production, rather 
than penalised them. 
The impact of economies of scale is more difficult to assess in the 
Interior and Andalucia. In general, agricultural production in these two 
regions was much more similar than between the North and Mediter-
ranean. However, whilst Andalucia was a region of large estates, in the 
Interior small holdings were common.33 little difference in production 
33 The regions of La Mancha and Extremadura in the Interior were exceptions to this. 
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methods existed between the small and large farms, and technical 
change in dry farming made only a minimal contribution to increasing 
yields prior to the Civil War. Where technology did lead to yield 
improvements, for example with the introduction of more specialised 
breeds of cattle, phylloxera-resistant vines, or improved rice and orange 
strains, the benefits were often reaped by small farmers, but usually in 
the North and Mediterranean.34 
Labour productivity 
If the difference in labour productivity between regions was less pro-
nounced than output per hectare, then it is also much harder to explain. 
Whilst Spain's North is usually regarded as one of Europe's more 'back-
ward' regions, recent studies have suggested that the Mediterranean was 
a 'leader'.35 The results in table 2.3 need more detailed comments. 
First, the relatively high figure for the North can partly be explained 
because of the distortions caused by including only male labour, and 
assuming that the men worked the same hours as in other regions. They 
clearly did not. The North was a region where female labour played a 
major role in farming, substituting for males who had migrated in search 
of cash incomes for long periods. If we assume that the female labour 
force was equivalent to two-thirds of the male in the North, and to a 
third elsewhere, then labour productivity in the North falls to 82 per 
cent of that of the Mediterranean, 95 per cent of the Interior, but still 
a third greater than in Andalucia. However, this line of reasoning is 
dangerous, not just because of the nature of our assumptions, but 
because it fails to solve one very important problem, namely that of 
living standards. Labour productivity cannot be taken as a direct indi-
cator of per capita income because it does not include the farmer's 
operating costs, taxes, or rental obligations. However, Northern farmers 
provided most inputs themselves, they were unlikely to have paid sig-
nificantly more taxes than elsewhere, and were also increasingly becom-
ing full owners of their land.36 Perhaps even more important, farmers 
in the North appear to have benefited from both high labour pro-
ductivity in agriculture and cash incomes earned from seasonal 
34 In the North and Mediterranean, it was often the larger farmers who were responsible 
for the initial changes. See Calatayud (1986), Garrabou and Pujol (1988) and Puente 
Fernandez (1992). 
35 In particular, Garrabou (1985, p. 122). 
36 However, the small, highly divided nature of holdings, together with the region's lack 
of alternative employment opporrunities, probably pushed land prices above those else-
where. Information is not available to assess how important this was to farm 
profitability. 
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migration (not to mention emigrants' remittances). Instead of being one 
of the country's poorest regions, the North might thus appear to be one 
of the richest. Contemporary observations make this argument uncon-
vincing, so we have to look elsewhere. 
The answer to the problem would seem to lie with prices and markets. 
The North was a region of small farms and poor communications, both 
locally and with the rest of the country. If labour was integrated into 
national and international labour markets from an early date, this was 
not so with product markets. As late as the mid-1960s, farmers still 
produced a third of net output for home consumption.37 A significant 
part of output was therefore not only not marketed, but not traded at 
all, a fact which is obviously ignored in the official statistics, where a 
market price is given to all production whether sold or not. Low levels of 
market integration for agricultural produce severely restricted economic 
growth, as surplus agricultural production could not easily be converted 
into an easy form of stored wealth.38 Market-orientated livestock pro-
duction might have overcome this limitation, and was also compatible 
with the region's natural endowments, but the small scale of most farms 
made the risks of specialisation considerable, and most farmers had 
neither the necessary finance nor access to capital markets. 
The difficulties in selling farm produce in the North can be illustrated 
by farmers' diets in GuipUzcoa at the end of the nineteenth century. 
This consisted of chestnuts, beans, a type of cake made from maize 
called talua and, in particular, milk from their cows. Meat was very rare. 
Only if the farm was near a town might some milk be sold, but hardly 
any butter was produced, and the little that was, was consumed once 
more by the farmer. 39 This was the province which in 1909/13 had by 
far the highest labour productivity in Spain, and had some 45 per cent 
of its active labour force employed in the sector. 
Just as it would be wrong to forget that in some areas of the North 
efficient markets for agricultural commodities were operating by the 
1936-9 Civil War, so it would be equally wrong to assume that all far-
mers in the Mediterranean were totally market orientated. However, a 
major difference between the two regions was that of opportunities: in 
the coastal Mediterranean a rapidly growing urban population and 
dynamic external markets encouraged high labour and capital inputs to 
37 If recycled items are included, farm consumption was a fifth. Only approximately two-
fifths of total output was sold to non-farm consumers (INE, 1964 [cited in Leal et al., 
1975, p. 100]). 
38 Mokyr (1985) makes this point for Ireland as one explanation of how a comparatively 
well-fed population could suffer a loss of a million people in the Gteat Famine of 
1845-50. 
39 Direcci6n General de Agricultura, Industria y Comercio, Madrid, 1892, I, p. 448. 
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Table 2.5. Agriculture and urbanisation in Spain, I887 and I930a 
Male employment in % of population living 
agriculture, % of total in towns of 10,000+ 
1887 1930 1887 1930 
North 770 8 48.6 10·3 2I.1 
Interior 76.2 53.2 16.6 29·3 
Andalucia 70.1 58.8 41.5 52·9 
Mediterranean 62.8 38.8 42.5 54.0 
Spain 72.3 49·7 26.0 38·3 
a The Canary Islands are not included. 
Sources: 1887 and 1930 Population Censuses; Luna (1988, cuadro I). 
produce specialised agricultural products, whilst in the North there was, 
a 'Boserupian concentration on basic food crops in response to localized 
population pressures,.40 The relatively small share of national output 
which I have estimated for the Mediterranean in 1929/33 hides the fact 
that a much higher share enter commercial circuits, leading to a signifi-
cantly greater value in transport and food processing industries.41 It was 
also the region which competed most in international markets with such 
products as spirits (aguardiente), almonds, citrus fruit, onions, raisins, 
rice, new potatoes, silk and wine. 
The Mediterranean was not just integrated into commodity markets, 
but also into national labour markets. By 1930 some 54 per cent of 
the region's population lived in urban centres with more than 10,000 
inhabitants, and agriculture employed less than 40 per cent of the active 
labour force. Labour was highly mobile, with the industrial centres of 
Valencia and especially Barcelona being the main foci of attraction. 
Therefore, despite some of the country's highest rural wages, the region 
was the one where the agricultural sector was least important (Table 
2·5)· 
In the case of Andalucia, low labour output can be explained by a 
combination of three factors: low output per hectare, low land to labour 
ratios and the lack of mechanisation. Large units of production coupled 
with low crop yields need not have led to low labour productivity if they 
40 The quote is from Grantham (1989, p. 50), who makes a similar distinction for northern 
France to explain regional differences in agricultural income per hectare. 
41 Nadal (1990, pp. 296--314), Martinez Carrion (1989, pp. 619-49), Palafox (1985, pp. 
319-43), Perez Picazo (1990, pp. 315-41) and Simpson (1992a, pp. 131-7). 
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had been associated with mechanisation (see chapter 7). However, as 
table 2-4 shows, the amount of land per male worker in Andalucia was 
only 39 per cent more than in the Mediterranean, even though these 
figures include uncultivated land found within the rotation. In total con-
trast to the North, and especially Galicia, it would seem that whereas 
farmers in Andalucia were integrated into commodity markets at a 
relatively early date, this was not the case with labour.42 Despite low 
wages and a short working year, the region was the only one which saw 
a growth in the number of farm workers during the first third of the 
twentieth century. If few would doubt the profitability of large farms in 
southern Spain during this period, the slowness of mechanisation and 
of labour to leave the land had important implications for the overall 
efficiency of the economy. Despite the high level of urbanisation, 52 .9 
per cent compared with a national figure of 38.3 per cent in 1930 , out-
side the provincial capitals there was virtually no industry other than 
food processing and, as shops relied upon poor agricultural workers' 
spending capabilities, their numbers and contents were limited.43 Fur-
thermore, the intersectoriallinkages in olive oil production, the region's 
most important product, were limited. 
The final region, the Interior, contained three-fifths of the nation's 
agricultural land and two-fifths of farm workers on the eve of the Civil 
War. Output per hectare was two-thirds of the national average and 
labour productivity similar to the national average. Although the Interior 
encompasses a region with great contrasts, an underlying characteristic 
was the specialisation in low yield, cereal and legume rotations. In 19291 
33 some 41 per cent of output was from cereal and legumes, with only 
22 per cent of output derived from livestock products, and 24 per cent 
from fruit, vegetables and industrial products, products which had con-
tributed to the high output per hectare in the North and Mediterranean 
respectively. It was the specialisation on extensive cereals, together ~th 
extensive viticulture in La Mancha and ranching in Extremadura, which 
limited labour productivity because, although each worker enjoyed three 
times more land than those in the North (two-and-a-half times more 
than those in the Mediterranean and twice as much as in Andalucia), 
yields were significantly below those of the first two regions. Despite 
42 For commodity markets, see Bemal (1988) and Herr (1989). 
43 Brenan describing in 1943 towns such as Osuna (population 16,000), Moron .(19,000) 
and Carmona (22,000) in the province of Sevilla, noted 'the first impressi~~ IS one. of 
decay and stagnation. A few wretched shops selling only the bare necessIties. of lit:e: 
one or two petty industries - soap making, weaving of esparto mats, pottenes, 011-
distilleries that between them employ some couple of hundred men .. .' (1960, p. 118). 
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Figure 2.1 Regional changes in agrarian productivity 1909/13 to 1929/ 
33 (in semi-log scale, constant pesetas 1909/13) 
Source: Simpson (1995a, pp. 206-7 and 212-3). 
losing some 17 per cent of its labour force between 1900 and 1930, this 
would not be enough to close the gap with either the North or the 
Mediterranean. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the importance of natural endowments in 
determining crop choice. Crop mix, together with the distribution of 
property has a significant influence on the level of output per hectare 
and labour productivity. Figure 2.1 shows graphically the changes in 
land and labour output in the four regions between 1909113 and 19291 
33. This period, as noted in chapter I, was when labour productivity 
for the first time increased significantly after 1765. At one extreme was 
the Interior, which saw an important growth in labour productivity, but 
scarcely any change in output per hectare. As we shall see, this occurred 
on account of a declining workforce, stagnant yields, mechanisation and 
an extension in the area cultivated Ca mixture of possibilities 'a' and 'b' 
in figure 1.1). Andalucia saw a mucl1 smaller growth in labour pro-
ductivity, but output per hectare increased by slightly more. These two 
regions, which between them accounted for 60 per cent of output and 
covered 80 per cent of the agricultural land in 1929/33, were essentially 
regions of secano. By contrast, both the North and the Mediterranean 
combined larger increases in land output and labour productivity 
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(possibility 'c' in figure 1.1). These were regions of small farms and 
intensively cultivated crops. 
Important as natural endowments and property distribution were, it 
would be wrong to conclude that they were the only cause of low pro-
ductivity in Spanish agriculture. They were not, and parts III and IV 
will examine in detail the ways in which farmers might have overcome 
the barriers imposed by these factors, and why they failed. to do s.o. 
First however we must examine how agriculture was able to mcrease ItS outp~t to feed'the nation's growing population from the mid-eighteenth 
century to the late nineteeth century. 
Part II 
Traditional technologies and market 
opportunities, 1765-1880 
59 
3 Agricultural growth and stagnant technology 
. . . Spanish agriculture is still the agriculture of the fifteenth century: 
an agriculture which plants one year and leaves fallow the next because 
of the lack of mineral fertilisers; of litanies sung because of the lack of 
irrigation; of pack animals because of the lack of local roads; an agricul-
ture of scratch ploughs, of illiterate labourers, of money at 12 per cent, 
of the iniquitous sales tax (the consumos), of miserable harvests of five 
or six grains for each one sown, of the hungry farmer . . . a slave to a 
mortgage and his patron (cacique). (Costa, 19IIe, p. 122) 
Prior to the 1880s, agricultural imports were negligible except in years 
of major harvest failures. Even at the turn of the twentieth century, 
when imports were temporarily much more important, Spain was still 
94 per cent self-sufficient in wheat, 87 per cent in maize and 100 per 
cent in potatoes, wine and olive oil. 1 Consequently, the population 
increase of some 10 million between I7I2/17 and 1900 was fed essen-
tially on domestically produced food. In this chapter and the next, I 
examine how traditional agriculture was able to increase output with 
few changes in land and labour productivity. 
In the first part of this chapter I argue that cereal production was 
increased by extending the area cultivated, rather than improving yields. 
In the long term this was only possible because of a combination of 
institutional reforms and the presence of large areas of under-utilised 
land. As figure I. I showed, if technology remains unchanged, labour 
productivity could only remain constant if the land to labour ratio and 
land quality did not deteriorate. Chapter 4 argues that the tendency 
towards diminishing returns in the second half of the nineteenth century 
was offset, at least partly, by two processes: improved market integration 
which allowed for greater specialisation, and favourable trends in com-
modity prices, which helped to compensate the negative impact of stag-
nant or even falling physical yields. By the late nineteenth century this 
model of growth would be threatened by both technical limitations to 
1 Except for potatoes (1902), these figures refer to 189711902 (Simpson, 1989a, p. 382). 
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extending the area cultivated, and falling international cereal prices. The 
problem would be resolved through domestic price increases (tariffs on 
imports and a depreciating peseta), and the use of artificial fertilisers to 
maintain soil fertility (see chapters 5 and 10). 
The second part shows how traditional technologies were also ideally 
suited for farmers to meet increasing demand for the country's leading 
export commodity prior to the First World War, namely wine. Large 
areas of suitable land and surplus labour were brought into use to take 
advantage of upturns in demand, and poor product quality was unim-
portant given the widespread use of blending. Once again, in the 
absence of labour-saving technologies, the tendency towards dimin-
ishing returns to labour were offset by improving commodity prices and 
the greater employment opportunities in viticulture compared with 
cereals for family labour. However, like cereals, but for differing reasons, 
this favourable situation would be threatened at the end of the nine-
teenth century. 
In the final part of the chapter, I look at the region of Galicia in the 
North. Here the area of arable could not easily be extended to 
accommodate the increase in population, but climatic and soil con-
ditions permitted the introduction of new crops (maize and potatoes) 
into traditional subsistence rotations. A major restriction to increased 
output was property rights, which were not clearly defined for much of 
the period. Although it had been determined as long ago as 1763 that 
most farmers could not be evicted from the land they worked, it was 
not until 1926 that they had the legal right to become full owners. 
Finally, the small scale of most farms and the difficulties in marketing 
produce, led to incomes remaining extremely low. 
Cereal production under conditions of elastic supplies 
of labour and land 
The two factors which determined the size of the agricultural labour 
force in nineteenth-century Spain were the rate of population growth 
and the fact that agriculture was a residual employer, implying that the 
amount of labour in the sector was determined not so much by its own 
labour requirements, but rather by the demand for work in other sectors 
of the economy, or the possibilities and attractions of emigration. From 
the limited information that exists, it would seem that the active popu-
lation in agriculture grew at the same pace as total population during 
the nineteenth century (chapter I). As most cereals were for domestic 
consumption, and Spain's crop mix changed little during the century, 
it can therefore be argued that labour supply for cereal producers grew 
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roughly in line with demand. As a result, the incentive to introduce 
labour-saving technologies would be strictly limited, with farmers 
continuing to use almost exclusively scratch ploughs rather than mould-
boards, together with labour-intensive harvesting and threshing technol-
ogies until the turn of the twentieth century (see chapter 7)· 
The question of land supply, however, was more complicated. One 
of the major concerns of seventeenth-century writers such as Caxa de 
Leruela, Martinez de Mata and Moncada, was the question of Spain:s, 
and especially Castilla's, underpopulation. From a population denSity 
of 15 persons per square kilometre in 1712/17 (about a third of that of 
France), Spain still had only twenty-four persons per square kilometre 
in 1833.2 Travellers wrote at length on the absence of habitation in many 
areas of Spain and the large quantities of uncultivated land which might 
be made good by the plough. Thus in Andalucia in the early I830s, the 
'depopulated wastes' were 'of vast extent', and in Extremadura the land 
was 'abandoned to sheep-walks, or left as uninhabited wastes overgrown 
with cistus; yet the finest wheat might be raised here in inexhaustible 
quantities'.3 Even in Valencia, one of the most densely pop~ated 
regions of the country, significant areas of uncultivated land remamed, 
especially away from the coastal region.4 , 
In Spa~lU~~.~Q~UJl~_tb.et~i~k,~Mftlth.\1~LW,!~~' 
arurthe low population density implied that.,~J~~:~t.e~.,~!e.~!~~~~.~~?~. ~~?l:!::J~i~9!i~~~~~~~~;~;;';'~~~~::;Eb;?~;r~;~; >, /' ':, 
~a~:::~~~~i~~~~:!~~~~i ~r~!o:~~:~:~~~~:~!~:J:;=S '. 
ments, and the legal access they had to the uncultivated land. In general, 
Boserup's observations about demographic pressure and land use 
appear appropriate for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Spain: rather 
than simply incre.~~.!!!&.~.~~&Ylti.~~.g~El~!iml.,gtQ.wtlll(!4to a 
moremteoslve-use of the soil, Wlth arable farming gaining at the expense 
ofpastoral;'aiid-rotanons' shorte~g. In this res.~~~t~ncrucial to th~ far-
mer's ability to increase production would be changestop~perty nghts. 
-.- If Spain at the end of the eighteenth century had extensive areas of 
uncultivated land, various institutions, which had often existed for 
centuries, severely restricted access to most farmers. Despite regional 
2 The population in I7I2/17 is here taken as 7.5 million (Perez Moreda, 1984, cuadro 
I), and the area of Spain as 504,678 km2. 
3 Ford (1966, I, p. 226, and 2, p. 771). . 
4 Cavanilles (1795-7, especially I, pp. 66 and 78). For a general VIew, see Caballero 
(1864, p. 2). 
5 Schumpeter (1954, p. 252). The North, as shown by the case of Galicia below, differed 
from the rest of Spain. 
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differences in property ownership and tenurial systems, a number of 
generalisations can be made. First, less than half the nation's land in 
the eighteenth century could be sold if the owner desired, because much 
of it belonged to the church, municipalities, or was held by the nobility 
in entail. Second, legal ownership was often divided between those who 
had indefinite rights to receive a 'rent' from the land, and those who 
had the right to cultivate the soil (dominium directum and dominium utile). 
Third, large areas of lands were communal to all villagers, either perma-
nently (commons, usually pasture or woodland), or temporarily (e.g. 
grazing rights for the village flocks on the stubble of all lands). Fourth, 
seigneurial jurisdiction and rights still remained important in some 
regions. Finally, a number of institutions held important privileges, most 
notably the church with respect to tithes, and the Mesta in pasturing 
rights.6 
&e.s.tricte.d,a~S~"~~j~.fur.mJ!cE .. ()K.!1!:~J?()p.ulati?~ !m.Eliesl tha.!}t 
would be the mstltutlOnS, essentially the nobility, church and mynici-
palities?\vhlCh would 'determmeffie, flexibility of agnCUIiU;e-rt~~~b;~rb 
p0l'ul.~tion growth. The"ttaditional" welfaremecnarusr;tI}at"he!ped 
offset diminishing returns to labour as population grew was the supply 
of uncultivated municipal land. In theory, however, national law stated 
that prior permission from the Crown was necessary for the ploughing 
up of pasture. This was because the Mesta, the transhumant sheep 
owners' organisation, enjoyed the privilege given by the Crown to pas-
ture on all land which was traditionally unsown, in exchange for taxes.7 
Both enclosing property and changing pasture to cultivation were thus 
illegal. Disputes between arable and sheep farming were not new in 
Spain, but the generally favourable market conditions for both wool and 
grain in the second half of the eighteenth century made them assume 
much greater significance. Whilst the numbers of transhumant sheep 
more than doubled between 1708 and 1780, the cost of pasture 
increased by only a third, significantly less than either the price of wool 
or wheat. According to one historian, 'it would be difficult to find in 
the Mesta's history such a long period of prosperity'. 8 During the Penin-
6 The ~est short survey of institutional rights and privileges is Garcia Sanz (1985a). For 
Castilla, see Vassberg (1984). 
7 Sanchez Salazar (1988, p. 24). The Decreto of 1748 re-emphasised the prohibition 
against ploughing up dehesas and common pasture, and ordered the rerum to pasture 
of all land that had been converted to crops during the previous twenty years (ibid., 
P·5)· 
8 Uopis (1982, p. 12). The tasa maxima of 1731 fixed the cost of pasture at six reales de 
vellon per anima1 in Extremadura, and five reales in Castilla la Nueva and Andalucia 
but table 3.1 ~uggest~ that in reality they tended to rise. The derecho de posesion gav~ 
flock owners mdefinite use of pasture, unless the landlord wished to use it himself 
grazing at least a similar number of animals (Garcia Sanz, 1978, pp. 287-8). ' 
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Table 3.1. Eighteenth-century pasture and commodity price indices 
Pasture costs Commodity prices Total 
Summer 'fine' wool Wheat 
number of 
Winter sheep· 
(A) (A) (A) (B) (millions) 
1709/176 100 100 100 100 
2.1 
1741/70' 109 110 131 130 3·4 
1771/83 135 135 186 158 5.
0 
(A) Guadalupe monastery. 
(B) Fabrica de la Iglesia de ViIIacastin (Segovia). 
a Sheep numbers refer to transhumant flocks. The figures refer to the years 1708, 1746 
and 1765, and 1780, respectively. 
6 Comprises data for the periods 1709/10 and 1714/17. 
'Comprises data for the periods 1740150 and 1765/7. 
Sources: Uopis (1982, Appendix 1.2, 1.5 and 1.6); for sheep numbers, Garcia Sanz 
(1985b, p. 24)· 
sular War, however, many of the larger flocks were devastated, and after 
a brief Indian summer in the early nineteenth century, wool production 
declined and the Mesta became a less attractive source of revenue for 
the Crown. Its ab~~~~1~ .. g1q.!lQl.m~rl~. t4~ .. ~E~~.,()f_transhumant 
sheep farn11hg;::"l[@uremov,edJhe.J!rlyil~ges thl!:0!..ast,htelpeft.~~~ the 
system profitable, and it allowed landlords and farmers to switch from 
pastUre to arable if they so desired. As a result of the Mesta's abolition, 
the number of transhumant sheep requiring winter pastures fell from 
4.5 million in 1796 to 1.9 million in 18~51Jm..dJ:b~_rumYm!iQg QfEx~.!!l­
adura would grow faster than the national average in the 150 years prior 
«nIle-Civil War. . .,' 
"'pespite the power of the Mesta, farmers resorted to various methods 
to extend the area sown in the eighteenth century. f~t, the Crown on 
-occasion' granted permission to municipa.liti<:s~o~I£J;l# up some. of 
m~irpastures for grain.1) Second, although national law might restrict 
the ploughing of traditionally unsown land, each locality was governed 
by its own rules which, on occasions, contradicted those of the state, 
• Between 1700 and 1800 there were 959 petitions by municipalities (more, if individual 
ones are included), of which 579 were granted, 353 remained pending and 27 were 
refused. Andalucia accounted for 25 per cent of all petitions, Extremadura 21 per cent, 
Casti11a la Nueva 31 per cent and Casti11a la Vieja and Le6n 19 per cent. The rest of 
the country accounted for only 4 per cent (Sanchez Salazar, 1988, p. 66). The number 
of petitions tended to be greatest in those areas where the Mesta had most interest in 
maintaining pasture rightS, and consequendy was less tolerant of illegal cultivation. 
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and permitted controlled cultivation of communal lands. lO Finally, the 
authorities often turned a blind eye to the illegal ploughing up of pas-
tures, especially if the local notables did not have grazing interests, or 
were themselves involved in the encroachment. Indeed, government 
attempted to solve the problem of rising land values, rents and com-
modity prices in the eighteenth century by achieving a more equitable 
use of the municipal land already under cultivation, and reducing the 
power of larger farmers over the distribution of rented municipal lands 
(propios).l1 By contrast, the Real Decreto of 1793, applicable only in 
Extremadura, attempted for the first time to increase cereal output by 
allowing farmers to plough up their own pasture lands, and represented 
an important defeat for the Mesta. 12 
This extension. of cul~yation was ofteR1~JlIporQPy, betft eeGQ\lSe...9f 
the desire of the municipaiitiesnottoI;;~ . legal conn.:9!'QU:be.J.an9",J\nd 
because land quality would Ii~t·~'~~p?rt"·c()nilii.§~§~s~!pg. In many 
areas, some form of bush-fallow (rozas) was practised, with the under-
growth being cleared by burning and a cereal crop sown for a year or 
two, before being abandoned again for as many years as was necessary 
to allow the land to recover its fertility. Caxa de Leruela noted in 1631 
that this form of cultivation had two major advantages: it required less 
work than normal short-fallow cultivation, and the ashes acted, in the 
absence of manure, as a fertiliser. 13 Therefore, Iow levels of population 
density using bush-fallow were not incompatible with relatively high 
labour productivity, when measured by hourly labour requirements to 
obtain a fixed unit of output. The importance of shifting cultivation 
compared with short-fallow rotations at the start of our period is difficult 
to quantify, although it seems to have been practised to a greater or 
lesser extent in most regions. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the success of these legal and 
illegal mechanisms to absorb population growth appears to have been 
stretched to the limit. Whereas in Extremadura and Andalucia 'land hun-
ger' appeared aD'ainstabaci,:.:..v,. .. di" 'd·;·;r;· .. ····-··-rc·-·-·-:·:~-·~· 
.... • .... ,,:Q .. ~ ••• -... • .!"Eo~.~:W:t ... fL.Y.!l.~.!.~w,UyJLtu,m, ow popwatlon 
density and restricted access to land, elsewhere diminishing returns to 
labour were apparent. For example, in Arag6n, large areas of land had 
been given over to the plough during the century so leading to a reduction 
10 Sanchez Salazar (1988, p. 46). For a description of local organisation and the 'web of 
use-rights' in one village in Castilla, see Behar (1991, part 4). 
11 Government legislation occurred in 1738, 1766, 1768 and 1770 (Sanchez Salazar, 1988, 
pp. 42. and 144-53). See also Uopis (1983, pp. 140-1). 
12 Sanchez Salazar (1988, p. 154). 
13 Caxa de Leruela,. (1975, p. 79), Boserup (1965, pp. 2.4 and 33) and Herr (1989, p. 375). 
Herr notes that, ID the mid-eighteenth century, yields using this fonn of cultivation in 
Bafios (province ofJaen) were 'higher than any other land in the town'. 
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in the area of pasture and the capacity of the region to support livestock, 
resulting in less manure, declining yields and food shortages. 14 In Castilla, 
a similar situation existed, and Larruga wrote of Pal en cia at the end of the 
eighteenth century 'that they sow all the land most years without resting 
them and even so, the production jLllQt.l!!1.ffident-to...oompensate.lhe 
~. -~~ .... ,-.""",.- .. ,.,,," ... ~. , 15 
tenant for his efforts aiter satisfying the heavy burdt:l) of the J:'ent . 
.... WliIIe··the government between 1765 and 1796 had struggled to find 
a way of encouraging farmers to produce more food, from 1796 its over-
riding priority would be to obtain sufficient money to pursue the War 
and maintain the monarchy.16 There followed between 1798 and 1808 
the first sale of church properties, which netted some 1,653 million reales 
for the Treasury and accounted for approximately one-sixth of the 
church's wealth.17 However, the brea~g .. of ne\\, land bt!f~re ... ~89~ ... \Vas 
of minor importance comPared . with the 'avalanche'. following the 
mvasion of the French army, with farmers failing 'to respect sheep walks 
"{canadCss) , foot paths, or even private property'. IS. Bankruptcy led 
ii~~rous municipalities to sell properties, while elsewhere the landless 
occupied land illegally, part of a wider movement of civil disobedience, 
which also included the non-payment of tithes and seigneurial rightS. 19 
The magnitude o~.~S.~~_,j;!l!l!1gt,!!! .. m ..pmn~nYQvvn«:r.sl1Jp. cannot be 
quanfinea,o'utwhereas by the late 1780s Spain had difficulties feeding 
apoptilation of 10.4 million; by theel!rly r8.208 the country had enough 
whe'a:f to export' small quantities, .. even t:l:lQughi.~.~J)<?P\llaJi,Q.ll .. had 
.... _.c. ... ' 20 
increased bY.U,S.Jle.Lcep.UQcII.,7millioll. " 
-The 'Liberal' land reforms of the nineteenth century were wide reach-
ing, and included the disbanding of the Mesta (1836), the abolition of 
entail of estates of the nobility (1836-41), the ending of the tithe (1841), 
and the sale of approximately 10 million hectares of church and munici-
pal land, or 20 per cent of the national area between 1836 and 1900.21 
14 Asso (1798, pp. 176-9), cited in Sanchez Salazar (1988, pp. 192.-3). See also Per~z 
Sarri6n (1989). High cereal prices between about 1780 and 1817 were to be found ID 
most parts of Europe, and they explain in good part the general pessimism of econom-
ists such as Malthus and Ricardo. 
15 Larruga (1794, Tomo XXXII), p. 2.35, cited in Yun Casalilla (1987, p. 614). 
16 Herr (1989, p. 98). 
17 Ibid. (pp. 12.2. and 133). 
18 Uopis (1983, pp. 143-4). Sheep walks were regarded as communal property. 
19 Fontana (1985, p. 2.2.4), Garcia Sanz (1985a, pp. 2.4-7), Torre (1990) and Sanchez 
Salazar (1990). Because the tithe was usually 10 per cent of total cereal output, its 
non-payment implied an increase in net income to the farmer of considerably more. 
20 Population census figures of 1787 and 182.1 (Perez Moreda, 1985, p. 2.6). 
21 Sim6n Segura (1973, p. 2.82.). Garcia Sanz estimates 2.5 per cent if sales outside the 
period chosen by Sim6n Segura are included (1985a, p. 30), and Herr (1989, p. 718) 
estimates about 30 per cent, 'measured by the value of its annual product at time of 
sale'. 
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With one or two notable exceptions, these reforms were successful in 
establishing private ownership with full legal property rights over the 
land, and limited most owners' interests to either direct cultivation or 
rent.22 Although much has been written on the mechanism of land sales, 
the economic consequences of disentailment have received virtually no 
attention. Two general observations, however, have been noted. First, 
the sale of large quantities of land took place against a background of 
(;,,~ rents and land prices; and second, that farming techni.s~es and 
~9!INra.1 l'rodl!s:tiyj.ty" would change little, if at "liiI"These JX;ints 
would appear to be related: "'-=" .'- .'" .... '.. . 
H:~~~~~ ,()~s~rv~~.,~!l"'.tj,"eriods.oi,maiQr.le~~lation p~~~ 
s~~~~<.Itllmely me Tate elghteenth century, 1836-7 (Mendizabal's sale of 
church lands) and 1855 (Madoz's sale of municipal lands) coincided 
with high wheat prices.23 Likewise the limited information on rents, the 
two series from Andalucia and Ciudad Rodrigo (Salamanca), both indi-
cate that rents had recovered their 1774-90 levels by the mid-nineteenth 
century. In Andalucia between 1850 and 1866, rents increased to 'giddy' 
new highs on account of demographic pressure, together with other fac-
tors such as the re-establishment of commercial contacts with Latin 
America.24 It was similar in Ciudad Rodrigo where, having fallen to 83 
per cent of their 1774 level in 1824, rents proceeded to increase to 91 
per cent in 1840 and 194 per cent by the 1870s.25 Therefore, the sale of 
large tracts of land in the nineteenth century occurred when rents and 
wheat prices (see chapter 4) were rising strongly, after the post-Napo-
leonic War depression. 
It is normally supposed that the sal~. 9Lth~ ,C;QlJ!:(~hJ~!!~Y.eJinle 
~ossibility ofiI!c;r~g,sing agriculiUiill output as most of it was already in 
production.26 lk. contrast, ,$he sale,. of municipal land pe~~~~~" an, 
22 Two major exceptions were Galicia, where the owners of the dominium utile often 
remained distinct from those of the dominium directum, and the rabassa morta sharecrop-
ping contracts in Catalufta, which led to major problems for the regional government 
(Generalitat) during the 1931-6 Second Republic. Both are discussed below. 
23 'Historical writing has explained the Spanish legislation of 1836 and 1855 as the product 
of the current political situation, which on both occasions temporarily put the Progresi-
sta party, committed to desamortizacion, into power. It is hard to escape the conclusion, 
however, that the international grain market was partly responsible for the attractiveness 
of these laws at these dates. In the United States the distribution of public lands and 
in Spain the legislation creating them and putting them up for auction were both 
responding to developments affecting all the Western world.' (Herr, 1989, pp. 736-7). 
24 Bernal (1978, pp. 128-30). 
25 Robledo (1984, cuadro 24). 
2. Rueda (1986, p. 151). A distinction must be made between these lands, and the sale 
of property held in entail by charitable institutions and other religious endowments 
between 1798 and 1808. Of these, Bruna wrote in 1784: 'There is nothing more 
common in Andalucia than unti1led scrubby lands and unkept vineyards of abandoned 
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extension of the area £llltiv2teci. leading to a decline in pastures and 
llvestock"an£"in' ~~~; areas, a fall in yields. As Sanchez-Albomoz has 
noted:27 
Cerea! 'p"!"()gYCtlQP mcreased notably, but through an exte~sio~ of the ,area sown 
and not thanks to an increase in yields. Lands of diminishing producnon poten-
nilt"were brought into cultivation without recourse to more advanced technol-
ogy. The employment of more labour in these activities produced an increase 
in the size of the rural population. Land or labour productivity fell, making 
once more the living standards of the average Spaniard more precarious and 
consequently more vulnerable to natural calamities. 
From the 1870S, some of the major wheat provinces of the Interior 
began to note both a limit to the area of cultivation and perhaps falling 
yields.28 It seems highly likely, although difficult to show, that a combi-
nation of growing farm debt caused by heavy land purchases, encour-
aged by rising cereal prices, was the cause. Much of the new land put 
into permanent cultivation in the 1860s and 1870S had in fact been culti-
vated occasionally in earlier times, or had been wooded common land. 
Eager to recover their initial capital investments, farmers cut down large 
areas of forest and shortened rotations. Given the traditional technol-
ogies for ma~taining, soil jextility and t):lfin~rease in cereal prices until 
!:ei:!i~;8:1!l.~ft~~~g~~~:h~~~~~:: i~~~~o~:li~:·~;r:;~~ 
temporarl1y released marginal land from the plough. The relief was 
shortlived as a combination of tariff protection and chemical fertilisers 
permitted about another million hectares of wheat to be sown between 
1899/1901 and 1930/5 (chapter 5)· 
On a more positive n.Qt~~improved transportation and market inte-
grati~n'allowed for'li"more" rational distribution of crops an~t"~. *gJ:'ee 
of produ,ci" specia"lisanon'( see chapter 4)." ItJ~ !)l,S9, PQs'sl~I~!4at with the 
ch'anges inproJ>ert:y rights, farmers cultivated their lands with greater 
care. However: utiheaosence of sufficient supplies of manure (livestock 
numbers were actually declining) or the planting of clover or vetches 
(difficult under conditions of dry farming), the only protection against 
soil exhaustion was fallow. This meant leaving the land uncultivated 
capellanias. When one sees a field in this condition in the countryside, one naturally 
remarks that it must belong to a capellania' (cited in Herr, 1989, p. 91). 
27 Sanchez Albornoz (1977, p. 43)· . , 
28 Nineteenth-century information on crop yields is virtually non-existent. Although It IS 
true that isolated figures exist for crops in different townships, this information is of 
very limited value. What is required are farm-ba~ed series with informa~~n on l~ngth 
of rotations and changes in factor inputs and pnces. See however, Gunerrez Bnngas 
(1993, pp. 505-38). 
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once every other year O'n the better secano soils, and up to twenty years 
O'n the PO'O'rer O'nes. 
Spanish farmers O'f course acted not so differently from those in 
cO'untries such as the United States, where yields in the 1920S were little 
abO've thO'se of the early nineteenth century, although in this case the 
PO'tentialland supply was significantly greater than Spain's.29 In periO'ds 
O'f histO'ry when international freight rates were high, and internal trans-
PO'rtation difficult, this was a perfectly ratiO'nal response. HO'wever, by 
the end O'f the nineteenth century neither of these two factors were valid 
any longer, and traditional agricultural practices CO'uld only continue 
with the help of artificially high prices O'btained by tariffs and a depreci-
ating peseta. 
Viticulture and traditional agriculture 
If contemporaries believed that Spain suffered from unfavourable 
resource endO'wments fO'r cereal farming, they thO'ught otherwise in the 
case of vines. Cyrus Redding, in his majO'r boO'k O'n wines published in 
the middle O'f the nineteenth century, nO'ted that: 
southward of France geographically, Spain should from its happier climate as 
a wine-growing country, precede it in the excellence of its vines, ... if France 
comes before Spain in its wines, it is because science has led the way to excel-
lence there, and enabled the French to obtain, by delicacy of management, by 
art and by labour, that which nature had well-nigh accorded to Spain without 
such appliances. 3o 
Certainly mO'st wine prO'ductiO'n in Spain was primitive, but the 
CO'untry's cO'mparative advantage lay nO't so much in quality, as quantity. 
Large areas O'f the CO'untry were suitable for vines - land which had 
only a marginal use fO'r other forms O'f agriculture. According to' Le RO'y 
Ladurie, the 'classic reSPO'nse of Mediterranean agriculture to' a rise in 
populatiO'n' was to' 'plant trees O'r vines O'n old O'r new ass arts, thereby 
increasing the returns frO'm agriculture by mO're intensive forms of land 
utilization'.31 Vines in Spain were rarely irrigated and summer drought 
meant that intercropping was generally impossible except with im-
mature plants. If viticulture required greater quantities O'f labO'ur than 
cereals, seasO'nal demand was less pronounced, which made the crop, 
as Le Roy Ladurie noted, PO'Pular with smallholders. An indicator of 
~:.greater O'utput per hectare is shown in table 3.2, whe~~-~es pro-
duced 119 percent m~re.i?~!<~!!~~tatethah wh~~t.!E~~~~rl(}~~.·.~,~.9ir 
29 Grigg (1992, p. 40). One area where the United States did differ from Spain was in 
the considerable rise in labour productivity during the nineteenth century. 
30 Redding, quoted in Read (1975, p. 36). 
31 Le Roy Ladurie (1976, pp. 56--7). 
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Table 3.2. Area and value of output of different crops, 18971I901 
Gross outputlhectare sown Area sown 
(pesetas) (' ooos hectares) 
Wheat 134" 3,733 
Barley 107" 1,376 
Maize 295 465 
All cereals (ex. rice) 120" 6,781 
Vines 293 1,429 
Olives 186 1,197 
Oranges· 1,214 42 
Almonds· 610 41 
Potatoes· 819 243 
Sugar beet· 1,095 21 
Rice 1,882 34 
" Figures for wheat and barley have been divided by twO to take into account one 
year's fallow. 
• Oranges, almonds, potatoes and sugar beet are for 1902. 
Source: Simpson (1995a, Appendix la and Ib). 
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1901. This figure should be taken as a minimum, as in numerO'us prO'v-
mees wine O'utput was IO'wer O'n accO'unt O'f disease (phyllO'xera), and 
IO'W cO'mmO'dity prices reduced labour inputs from what they had been 
a decade O'r sO' earlier. 
The amO'unt O'f labO'ur required in traditiO'nal viticulture to' clear and 
prepare the land befO're planting depended nO't O'nly O'n the nature O'f 
the terrain, but alsO' the price O'f wine. By the late nineteenth century, 
market cO'nditiO'ns increasingly played an impO'rtant rO'le in determining 
labO'ur inputs, as the prO'vincial agrO'nO'mist nO'ted in Valencia.32 
In prosperous years, such as occurred. in. the five .years ·from 1880' to' 1885, the 
cultivatien ef the vine advanced in intensity frem year to' year, the plantatiens 
being made with great careanerdeep~ploughifigs, me'ruggmg ef spacieus heles 
for the sheets, and abundant manuring. Teday (1889), circumstances have 
unfertunately changed fer agriculture generally, and these cares and pleughings, 
while still taking place with seme regularity, are net able to' reach such a degree 
ef perfectien en acceunt ef lack ef reseurces. 
Annual cultivatiO'n was alsO' labO'ur intensive with hand tO'O'ls, rather 
than plO'ughs, being used almO'st everywhere except in La Mancha in 
the mid-nineteenth century.33 A cO'mbinatiO'n O'f irregular spacing, 
difficult terrain, and fragmented small-hO'ldings hindered the use O'f 
32 Direcci6n General de Agriculrura, Industria y Comercio, 1891a, p. xv. 
33 Hidalgo Tablada (1870, p. 272). 
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animals in other areas. Pruning and harvesting were naturally both 
labour intensive. With respect to wine making, the soft skin of the 
grape made the extraction of the must a relatively simple task, being 
done by treading the grapes in 'almost all provinces'.34 The containers 
used for fermenting the wine reflected closely local resources, but 
wood was rarely used. Finally, wines were frequently strengthened by 
the addition of alcohol, both to reduce the fiscal impact of domestic 
sales taxes and transport costs (see chapter 4) and to extend the 
product's life. It also served to disguise the poor conditions under 
which it had been made.35 
The heavy labour requirements both in the initial planting of vines, 
and in their subsequent exploitation, encouraged small units of pro-
duction, using family labour. In Cataluiia, landowners had responded 
to the growth in demand for spirits and wine in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries by the use of sharecropping arrangements - la 
rabassa morta - which had originally given peasants almost unlimited 
use of the land, thereby offsetting both the high cost of land clearing 
and the particularly labour-intensive nature of local wine production. 
Although changes took place in the nature of the rabassa morta during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it would remain a long-term 
sharecropping contract.36 As contemporaries noted, the advantage of 
these contracts was that vines were cultivated on lands where they other-
wise would not have been if wage labour had been used.37 Outside 
Cataluiia, sharecropping also appears to have been fairly common in 
viticulture in Zaragoza, Huesca and Navarra.38 Nearly everywhere, how-
ever, vines were worked by landowners or sharecroppers. Land was 
rarely leased because of the greater labour requirements in contrast to 
cereals, and because tenants would have had little interest in conserving 
the capital value of the vineyard.39 It would be the response of these 
smallholders, using periods of underemployment to extend the area, 
34 Elias de Molins (1904, p. 102). The use of mechanical crushers before the turn of the 
twentieth century was rare; two major sources, the ExposiciOn Vinicola Nacional (1878-
9) and Ministerio de Fomento (1886) barely mentioned them. Their appearance can be 
linked to the decline in wine prices and the increase in wages during the early twentieth 
century. 
35 For example, almost all wine produced in Ciudad Real was strengthened, whether for 
local consumption or for export (Ministerio de Fomento, 1886, p. 81). 
36 See especially Giralt i Raventos (1965), Balcells (1980), Colome i Ferrer (1990). 
37 EPAPM (1904, no. 414, p. 711). 
38 See Espejo (1900, pp. 196, 216 and 223); Laguna (1903, p. 108). In particular, there 
seems to have been a correlation between falling wine prices and the growing use of 
sharecropping contracts in viticulrure; see Espejo (1900 p. 196) for Zaragoza, and Simp-
son (1985b, pp. 180-1) and Zapata (1986, p. 283) for sherry in the 1880s. 
3. For a theoretical approach to the question of sharecropping, monitoring costs and 
moral hazard, see Galassi's work on Tuscany, especially that of 1992. 
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which accounted for the significant growth in output and commercial-
isation of wine from the 1870S (see chapter 4)· For example, in Zara-
goza, landless labourers planted vines on scrub land (monte) and the 
high prices provided the income to allow them to acquire small plots of 
irrigated land in the valley. It would not last long, as falling wine prices 
from the late 1880s were met by either reducing variable inputs (labour) 
to a minimum (ploughing but not hoeing, pruning and harvesting), or 
by abandoning cultivation completely and using the land for pasture.40 
However, in general, supply had a tendency to be 'irreversible', as far-
mers were reluctant to uproot plants to reduce output in periods of low 
prices.41 
Given the large areas in Spain suitable for viticulture, the labour-
intensive nature of production, and the difficulties in transportation, it 
is hardly surprising that the very great majority of wines were of poor 
quality, and that most villages kept them for their own consumption, 
with the small quantities exported being produced near the coast. As 
Ford had noted in the 1840s:42 
Local is everything, the Spaniard takes the goods that the gods provide him, 
just as they come to hand; he drinks the wine that grows in the nearest vine-
yards, and if there are none, he regales himself with water from the least distant 
spring. 
With the development of rail communication, wines could be 
transported greater distances. fl2w.ever, th.e.great wine .. 'boom' of the 
1870S and 1880s saw few~Iianges in production techniques. Where 
possible, farmers extended the area of vines on previously worthless 
scrub, or at the expense of marginal cereals, such as noted above in 
the case of Zaragoza. When this was not possible, farmers worked 
the soil to take maximum advantage of the limited quantity of moist-
ure. Product adulteration was also another method to raise short-term 
output. 
In conclusion, growing commercial opportunities allowed. traditional 
viJtcU:l~t~.J~r:}'~~~exteiiOiil(:.!!ir'~:§liiY~§:fi~~~_~!€~.· 
~~L£h!B&'~§,~~These methods were sufficient given the high com-
modity prices until the late 1880s, and the lack of product differentiation 
within both domestic and French demand for wine. With time, disease 
(phylloxera, which by 1909 had already destroyed over a million 
40 Rivera y Casanova (1897, pp. 93-4)· 
41 This makes estimating changes in wine productivity very difficult. Apart from the prob-
lems in determining changes in product quality over time, output was essentially a 
function of the age of the plant, climate variations and labour inputs. As the latter 
responded to short-term changes in product prices, they hide longer term changes. 
42 Ford (1970, p. 159). 
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hectares of Spain's vines), low wine prices and rising wage costs, led 
to a complete reorganisation of production, as will be discussed in 
chapter 9.43 
New crops and delayed institutional change: 
the case of Galicia 
The~,~JCP~~.~_~£c;_.gfJJAli.~1l;l? together with other areas in .the Nonh, was 
cffiferent from that of the rest"ottne' cotirifty foi'iWo·'r~asoiis.·t:'irst;-tlie 
possibilities of extending the area cultivated were much 'lessilian~eIs~ 
wnereanCl' second~' dimate ana soils permitted the introduction of new 
CI2l?~~~!!!L~I?:Ei~e~~ifi~'ation-ofro'ta:rlon"Slrn'esJ56rr~~to-l!~~ss:-­
ut'e, DespIte these diIi€!tences-, techiiology"again' went unchanged and if 
the growth in labour inputs increased production, it was at the expense 
of a decline in output per unit of labour.44 In this section I consider in 
detail the changes in Galicia, before extending the general conclusions 
to other areas of the Nonh. 
By the eighteenth century, perhaps 80 or 90 per cent of the cultivated 
area in Galicia was held under an emphyteusis contract, the foro, which 
gave the dominium utile to the peasantry, and left the dominium directum 
in the hands of others, especially the church. 45 As the 1763 Real Provision 
failed to establish whether the owners of the dominio directum had the 
right to evict their tenants, this effectively gave the tenants indefinite use 
of the land. Given the limited area of arable land available, the pressures 
of a growing population led from an early date to the shortening of 
rotations, with maize being introduced by the end of the seventeenth 
century. Output was also increased by greater use being made of scrub 
land, both as a source for organic fertilisers, and for slash-and-burn 
cultivation. 46 .Dm:iJ;l&..m~J~eriod covered by this book, the major inno-
vati~n w.\!s..Jhe .• p.Qt.ato. ".w",-_ ••• '. " • -,~..,,- •• ~ 
r The-potato wasvUtul(l!lyignored by farmers untilt1J.e late eighteenth 
cell~' an4 .. ~~~!L !J?e],U!s ..• qiffu.~!.<J,nju. ,,~pa,!n~>-as in~tlier~uropean 
countries, w~g.S~!9s~ As potatoes in Spain produced the equivalent 
of 6·48 million calories for each hectare sown (some 3.75 million more 
43 Phylloxera first appeared in Spain in the early 1870s, but made little headway before 
the late 1880s. See especially Camero i Arbat (1980, chapter 3). 
44 For comments on agricultural technology in Galicia at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, see Dopico (1983) and Barreiro Gil (1983). 
45 Saavedra and Villares (1985, p. 467). 
46 For example, in. eighteenth-~entury Galicia, slash and bum cultivation provided up to 
50 p~r cent ofwmter cereals m. some villages, as well as providing fertilisers and pasture 
for livestock (Saavedra and Villares, 1985, p. 455; Garcia Fernandez, 1975, pp. 128-
30 ). 
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than could be achieved with wheat cultivation), the reluctance of far-
mers to grow the plant is often regarded as a missed opportunity to 
improve diets.47 In the words of one European historian:48 
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the conservatism and suspicion of the peas-
ants, and the injuries that they inflicted upon themselves by their obduracy and 
ignorance, than their long resistance to planting and eating potatoes. 
_"A."!!YJnb~J: oU~ns can explain this resistance, namely the crop's 
novelty, }!l~~i1;l!~9JlaLieSwc.tiDiis:.'aiid.leCliiilCJil::lii~J~wincluding the 
need to change existing crop rotations, the adaptation of seeds to local 
conditions, and problems of storage. Only the first of these can perhaps 
be associated with peasants' 'conservatism'. Just as Blum noted for cen-
tral and eastern Europe, the acceptance of the potato by Spanish farmers 
was usually associated with hunger, which 'swept away the peasants' 
scorn for the vegetable'. 49 In Galicia the area sown was extended after 
the famine of 1768-9,50 but it would be the food shortages which 
accompanied the French invasion and Peninsular War that popularised 
its use.51 
The question of seed selection appears crucial in some areas to the 
speed of diffusion. In neighbouring Asturias, the introduction of the 
potato within the main rotations (tetTazgo) failed, because the initially 
good yields quickly declined, and the potatoes acquired a bad taste. 
This problem was not present on the upper lands, and it was here that 
the crop was mainly cultivated. In the 1850S - a period of bad cereal 
harvests - it was discovered that potato seed from the uplands gave good 
results on the tetTazgo, and it was reintroduced. However seed problems 
continued until the end of the century.52 
47 Based on a net potato yield of 9.26 tons (Ministerio de Agriculrura, Industria, Comercio 
y Obras Publicas, 1902), with seed requirements estimated at 2 per cent, and 700 
calories producd per kilogram. By contrast, the net wheat yield was 0.67 tons for 1897/ 
1901 (Sotilla, 1911), with seed corn estimated at 16 per cent of harvest, the flour coef-
ficient 0.75 per cent, and 3,420 calories produced per kilogram of flour. For each hec-
tare of sown wheat some I. 73 million calories were available. Doyle in 1784 suggested 
that the potato supported more than four times as many people as wheat, without the 
risks associated with wheat such as inclement weather or locusts (cited in Meijide 
Pardo, 1984, p. 12). 
48 Blum (1978, p. 272). 
49 Ibid. (p. 273). 
50 Lucas Labrada (1971, p. 27). 
51 Meijide Pardo (1984, pp. 16-17). The same was true elsewhere in the North. For the 
Basque Country, Bilbao and Fernandez de Pinedo (1984, p. 166) suggest that contact 
with potato-eating French troops encouraged the plant'S use amongst the local 
population. 
52 Gonzalez Uana, (1889, cited in Garcia Fernandez, 1988, pp. 112-18). As the potato 
was finally introduced successfully on the terrazgo during a period of famine, it is not 
clear to what extent the delay had been caused by difficulties associated with the seed, 
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_~~l'u!ation~c:.~ .. ~_~~.~~.ia from 1-3 to 1.8 million be~ee!!..rn~.~d 
1860, and there is a ~ignificant correlationbe~een zones 9<~e~!~st 
demographic growth and those wher~ the. potato first appeared and 
• ~chi~ved.,its.greatest intensity.53,The lack of commercialisadon""of the' 
potato can be explained by its low calorific content to weight ratio. Its 
price was rarely quoted with other agricultural products during the first 
half of the century. Indirectly however, the potato allowed peasant far-
mers to sell other products which they had previously devoted to their 
subsistence, especially cereals. As a result Galicia, which in the late 
eighteenth century had imported cereals, was exporting them by the 
1820S despite a larger population. 54 
The final question was that of property rights. Being a new crop, the 
potato was exempt from tithe payments and the ecclesiastical authorities 
complained that farmers dedicated substantial resources to it for this 
reason alone. However, by the nineteenth century the effective oppo-
sition of the church appears to have been limited. By contrast, the foro 
contracts did not pose a restriction, so that the potato (like maize in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) was regarded as being compatible 
with the existing institutions. 
In contrast to other areas of Spain, the nature of land ownership in 
Galicia implied that nineteenth-century changes in property rights 
released relatively little land for cultivation. Furthermore, the sale of 
ecclesiastical lands failed to join the dominium utile and directum in the 
hands of one owner but rather consisted of the 'transfer of rentiers rights 
and not of land'.55 _9}ven the)imits ofp;targinal J~ru.lj~Lthe mid-
ni!,l<?!eenth cenw,ry, ~creased output was achieved by changes in' crop 
m!!" J:l11.Q._rotl!tions,~andnot through ixnp!"()y~(Lpt,gpert.in~. The 
region therefore differed from the rest of Spain. 
Yet property rights are generally considered as having restricted 
growth, and from the 1840S there was increasing criticism of the foro 
contracts. In particular, the foro was seen as both causing the further 
subdivision of property (and consequently making it extremely difficult 
to consolidate holdings at a later date) as well as leaving farms without 
and to what extent other factors, such as consumer preference for other products, 
delayed its diffusion. For Galicia, see Rodriguez Galdo and Dopico (1981, p. 61). 
53 Rodriguez Galdo and Dopico (1981, p. 38). 
54 Junta de Comercio, La Corona in 1833, cited in ibid. (p. 58). 
55 Villares (1982, p. 145). The State failed to sell virtually any municipal land as in Galicia 
it was the villagers and not the municipality who owned the property (ibid., pp. 157-
8). More recently, Quintana Garrido (1990, pp. 148-51) has suggested that Villares 
perhaps underestimated some of the changes in property rights in nineteenth-century 
Galicia. 
Agricultural growth and stagnant technology 77 
working capital. 56 Therefore, although the foro institution proved flexible 
enough to allow both the introduction of new crops and the shortening 
of rotations, it failed, or indeed perpetuated, the subsistence nature of 
Galician agriculture. It was also a major factor in leaving the region with 
a staggering 15 million holdings in 1959.57 
Attempts to reform the tenure system met with opposition from ren-
tiers, many of whom were urban dwellers and had bought their 'prop-
erty' during the sale of ecclesiastical lands. The lawyer Unares Rivas 
argued in the 1860s that alternative investments to the foro, such as 
commerce, would have led to quick ruin given the rentiers' lack of 
experience and difficulty of obtaining it in Galicia, 'where we do not 
breathe the same air as in modem towns'.58 As a result, the 1873 legis-
lation, which ended the institution, lasted less than six months. 
However, the growing integration of the Galician economy within the 
national and international would signal the institution's slow demise. 
From the eighteenth century in Galicia, it was common for household 
economies to receive an important cash contribution from migrant wor-
kers, with as many as 90,000 workers (equivalent to 38 per cent of the 
active population) making an annual exodus each spring.59 From the 
1830S and 1840s, emigration to South America became increasingly 
-common.;"Iri pafr1Jecause of the decline in local rural industries' and the 
inabilitY to increaseagricultura1 output more quickly without dimin-
"isliliig'returIls, but also because of the introduction of cheaper and 
"quicker ~te~atiOnirtra:rls.poitaiio:Q.. Between 1860 and 1900 net emi-
gration from Galicia was equivalent to 20 per cent of the region's total 
population in 1860, less than half the number in Ireland (46 per cent), 
but considerably more than the Italian figure (12 per cent).60 As with 
the earlier migrations, a major part of this emigration was male and 
temporary, with the emigrant attempting to obtain a source of outside 
56 Recent research has suggested that between 1750 and 1880 the importance of the foral 
rentals was in fact declining (although more than compensated by the peasants' growing 
obligations to the State), and property had become no m.ore fr~gmented ov~r. the 
period. The redemption of the foros from the 1890S further mtensdied the subdiVlson 
(Villares, 1982). . . 
57 Of these, 23.3 million were of less than half a hectare, and only 0.1 million had more 
than 10 hectares (Garcia-Badell, 1960, cited in Malefakis, 1970, p. 18). 
58 Cited in Villares (1982, p. 278). 
59 The main destinations were the cereal harvests of the two Castillas, Andalucia and 
Portugal (Laborde, cited in Dominguez Martin, 1992, p. 155)· This was not so d~erent 
from Ireland in the early nineteenth century, where 'like the potato and cotta~e mdus-
try, it [seasonal migration] accommodated population pressure on the land' (0 Grada, 
1989, p. 15)· 
60 Carmona Badia (1990, esp. pp. 32-4)' Nationally the figure was considerably less, as 
discussed in chapter 10. 
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capital that would protect and strengthen his hold on his small farm. 61 
In common with other regions of Europe with abundant pastures and 
sitUated at a distance from urban markets, the North speclaIrseam. live-
st()~~,p,~4Y-<::!ioq.As early as 1802it WliS r!Qt~ii:tPAt th~:si!~::9l:i~~!s 
"proVided an important cash income for farmers (see chapter 8) .. l"rom 
the i860L. th .. ~X~2!! .. 2.~j~.!?' .. ~~Pl?!y,~!!~~~!,:~.~ ..~,,~~~:~.p .. ,.~~~.,~l~ .with 
die numbet.of anunals . sold. each year .. r.eachU:lga~J'I.""4Q..a.29.0 lri. the 
~~~~s before declining. inUte 1~9os. However, this decline ;~~"more 
than compensated for by the growth of sales within Spain, with the 
numbers despatched by rail increasing from an annual average of 90,000 
head in 1907/10 to about 200,000 in 1926/30.62 By the Second Republic, 
the equivalent of about one-fifth of Galicia's cattle was moved out of 
the region annually. 
Armed with growing sums of cash from livestock sales and emigrants' 
remittances, the peasants from the 1890S started buying out their land-
lords. Peasant organisation, rent strikes and occasional violence also 
took place, so that the Real-Decreta of 1926 permitting the redemption 
of the forDs by the farmer merely signalled the State's recognition of 
what had already become a reality in the Galician countryside. However, 
despite these changes, the region remained extremely poor. In 1910, 
when some 78 per cent of the active male labour force was employed 
in agriculture, it was noted:63 
Scarcity of manual labour, the employment of heavy primitive agricultural 
implements, and the absence of scientific methods account for the poor returns 
for the hard labour of the industrious peasants, who work from dawn to night 
to scratch a bare living from the soil. 
Women and little children appear to perfonn nearly the whole of the hard 
labour of ploughing and harvesting, and only in the neighbourhood of the towns 
are good results obtained from market gardening, which is the favourite occu-
pation of the scanty male population. 
Despite a diversified diet, the region's farmers suffered from a short-
age of good land, minifundios, working capital and, as noted in the pre-
vious chapter, weak market integration. 
Conclusion 
lJ;Ubi~,-~bAP.!~_r it has been argued that an extension of the area cultivated 
was sufficient'"tOTeedmeextra~To'niHion-inhabitants-tnat-were'aaded 
tothe'cowltty's popu.latiou'o~er theelgnteenth arid ~eteenth centur-
61 Villares (1982, p. 400). 
62 Ibid. (p. 377). 
63 British Parliamentary Papers, 1910, no. 4625, pp. 7-8. 
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ies. In the same way, the growth of the country's agricultural exports 
would be successfully achieved by increasing the use of factor inputs 
rather than technical change.64_1Jle .. k~y',~0 unlocking the potential of 
these lands was institutional reform which allowed farmersaccess to .the 
land !.1!~til!i~:~~IIj:~rii~~~~c,~i~~!£~"C?!fu~4·piie~~:~~~~~OniY· in. ,the 
N~E!hL wh~r:e ... theJlr:e~2f .P9t~D!i~lJ~P"Q,§Wteg. t9 .... b9 .... §p.ort, fa,ll()~ 
rotationll.apd j11l:ensiveJ:tJ1PY-I!} .. cJ;:QPping was severely limited,L,did 
~atf~~iill~~,l'lac.e~to,.in~re.as.e,S;J:9P,.y~.e14S;6'5' However; 'aselsewh'e~e,'1he 
·-'mtr(!du<;J;lQ1LQfJaQ.Ot,JI:-:saviIlg te,chnologies was of little importance, and 
-ilie--tendency for unit hibo~~outPu.t 'io·fal1co~ldoD.Iy be offset' by 
increases in commodity prices. I shall consider this process in the follow-
ing chapter. 
Where abundant, under-utilised resources existed, as in Spain, it was 
unnatural to expect farmers to be interested in raising labour or land 
productivity by introducing new production techniques. Therefore, for 
farmers and rentiers alike, the most profitable agricultural investments 
would remain the extension in size of their land holdings. 
64 One exception was sherry, discussed in the following chapter. 
65 Increased crop yields were also attempted in the few areas of irrigation (see chapter 6). 
4 Agricultural specialisation and the growth 
of markets 
In the mid-eighteenth century, the low purchasing power of much of 
the population placed it at risk from harvest failure. A slow and costly 
transport system, inefficient transmission of market-place information, 
and government interference with the market mechanism all implied 
that short-term local shortages were difficult to overcome and that local 
prices of basic foodstuffs might double or more in a short space of time. 
To protect themselves from adverse price movements, farmers dedi-
cated a significant part of their resources to growing basic food crops, 
regardless of the suitability of their land for such production. By con-
trast, the more integrated markets to be found by the end of the nine-
teenth century not only permitted farmers greater security of supplies, 
but also allowed them the possibility of specialising in those crops most 
suited to local climatic and soil conditions, especially those that factor 
and product prices showed were most profitable. 
In the first section I argue that Spain's transport system improved 
significantly over the century prior to the railways although, in compari-
son with France, the country was to continue to suffer severely from 
an inadequate road network and an almost total lack of inland water 
communications. Greater market integration, however, was not just a 
question of public works; it also implied a complete overhaul of the 
Ancien Regime's concept of the market. In particular, official policy 
changed from one of trying to protect the consumer by fixing maximum 
prices to one of letting them be determined by the market, with recourse 
to external supplies in years of significant harvest failures. 
Improvements in transport technologies, the decline in freight rates, 
and the liberalisation of market operations had two important conse-
quences. For wheat consumers the greater stability in supplies, rather 
than a fall in commodity prices, became the major feature. By contrast, 
for producers, cheaper freight allowed them to raise prices and extend 
the area cultivated on marginal lands. The supposedly 'irrational' 
ploughing up of 'marginal' lands was the farmers' response to a strong 
80 
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upward movement in farm prices. Only in the 1880s and 1890s, when 
falling international prices threatened to make domestic cereals 
unprofitable on the marginal soils, would the process be temporarily 
halted. Thereafter, as chapter 10 will show, the price of wheat, and 
through it the area cultivated, was determined by government tariffs and 
price policies. 
Finally, I examine the impact of changes in international demand for 
wine on domestic production. In each of three different examples - Cat-
aluiia (wine spirits in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), 
Jerez de la Frontera (sherry in the mid-nineteenth century) and bulk 
table wines (1870s-1890s) - producers were quick to spot commercial 
opportunities to extend the area cultivated to meet the growth in 
demand. The chapter's conclusion is that the cause of agriculture's low 
~llCJivity~ was~'.oot::-:-ilia·Cpr:oaucetrnileij'i:o 'respond. to cormnercial 
opportunities. By the late nineteenth century, both 'national and inter-
ilatloIt;i-~rkets were having a major impact on farming decisions in 
most corners of the country. Rather, low productivity was caused by': 
the traditional farming systems that prevailed due to the extensive areas 
or uij.aerCiilliilll~:r·~~F1';;:;;,;:"artl1e"sta:ri of the diod Ccha tt!r 3) 
,__ ;~.*"".......;~.". .... ~ .. "",.'t'<~')<>"""""-f..:~2."",,, .. ~.:. ~ p 
~d the rel~Ir.~~,~E,gg!Y~.QLb,30'~.§,tJ~!2~'!:, (chapter 7)· 
Physical and institutional restrictions to trade 
The me-rail trapsport ~lem_in._.sPJ!iA\yas costly and inefficient. 1 In 
.e.a~~~,\Va~ S~~~~~.~l.problems comm~~t~:!xl0'~t-i>n!-in~U:s~al_Euro- / 
p.:an .~.oun~es,n~:rI!elr,t1i~drel~tiveIfli!Wi:§~pital requirement~ ?fr~ad l 
bUiIamg OWIng to the defiCIenCIes of the natIonal exchequer, low popu~ I l~tioD.Jfe!iS.j!.i_~S (aE:,.<!Jh.~er~£.9.rerelativelY high. p ..er caPita. costs of p. Ublic_) 
works pr~~~~']"",.i!~g.,J;h!!,.,l}jgh cost of aninlal energy (mules, oxen). 
'l'1lese-were compounded by two features peculiar to Spain: its virtual 
lack of navigable rivers and canals (much the cheapest method of tra-
dition~ transport in pre-industrial economies), and the decision to 
locate its capital some 350 kilometres (220 miles) from the nearest major 
port, Valencia.2 As witltother European countries, attempts to over-
come these restri.~zi:s~rclateafrom ¥iemid-eighteenth c:t:nt!l,ry. 
In the mid-ei.s!ite~_~~ century, Spain had le~~n 10.QoQ...kilometrfti 
(6,000 miles) o,~~~~.~roa:<tssw~,~,L!:.!?~,,~h,~eled traffic, making 
1 See especially Ringrose (1970) and G6mez Mendoza (1982). 
2 Only the lower reaches of the Guadalquivir and Ebro rivers were navigable, but many 
others provided physical obstacles which required bridging, and at times they were 
prone to severe flooding. 
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Table 4.1. Length of paved roads and rail-
ways, 175(}-1908 (km) 
Roads Railways 
1749 0 0 
1779 400 0 
1800 2,000 0 
1834 4,000 0 
1855 10,323 440 
1868 19,815 5,269 
1884 23,368 8,165 
1890 28,621 9,083 
1908 41,466 II,362 
Sources: Roads (1747-1868): Madrazo (1984, 
pp. 163-79), Frax Rosales and Matilla Quiza (1988, 
p. 209); railways: Cordero y Menendez (1978, Apend-
ice II-2, pp. 324-5). 
gllnsPQrtslow:,jo:e~,m,;t~~As,i~e. 3 Following the French example, 
the Spanish government started a road building programme in 1749 
which served first and foremost in centralising the communication needs 
of the state, linking the capital by paved roads to six of the country's 
portS.4 It took 85 years to finish these six roads, but then, in the space 
of 30 years, the construction of paved roads in Spain almost quadrupled 
to nearly 20,000 kilometres (12,500 miles) by 1868 (table 4.1). Thus in 
the century prior to the railways, Spain's transport system changed from 
being based essentially on pack animals (usually mules) to one using 
carts. 5 Yet in spite of these improvements, France, a country of similar 
size, enjoyed a road network eight times larger than Spain's, together 
with over 11,000 kilometres (7,000 miles) of navigable water by the mid-
nineteenth century.6 
3 In Spain, as elsewhere, the condition of roads depended not only on their construction, 
but also on the amount of traffic that they were required to carry. This led to the best 
roads being found in the sparsely populated regions of La Mancha, and the worst roads 
in the most commercially active region of the country, Cataluiia (Fontana, 1975, pp. 
29-30). 
4 In 1700 Spain's road network was decentralised, with no single point of the country 
serving as a central hub of communications; but, by 1800, Madrid had firmly estab-
lished itself as the centre, with three-quarters of the 2,000 kilometres of paved roads 
built by this later date corresponding to these six arteries. 
5 Fontana (1986 p. 86). Improved organisation of transport services (relay teams) and 
carriages (stagecoaches) also helped reduce the journey-time for passengers. For 
example, the journey from Iron to Cadiz via Madrid, which had taken 24 days in 1776, 
took only seven days in 1850 (Madrazo, 1984, p. 548). 
6 G6mez Mendoza (1982 p. 24). 
Agricultural specialisation and market growth 
Table 4.2. Estimated costs of commercial trans-
port/ 1872 and 1912 
1872 1912 
Rail 
cost 0.02 0.02 
charge 0.09 0.07 
Coastal shipping 0.04 0.04 
Canals 0.14 n.d. 
Roads 0.82 0.88 
• Prices in pesetas per ton-kilometre. 
b The cost price of railways is that estimated by the None 
and MZA to transfer products (coal) for their own use 
(Tarifa de servicio). 
Source: G6mez Mendoza (1982, tables 3.2 and 3.3, and pp. 
77-8). 
Although greater investment in road improvements increased the 
efficiency of Spain's transport services in the century prior to the rail-
ways, the impact on transport costs would be limited. In the pre-railway 
age, draught animals were the main source of energy in transportation, 
and for professional carters between a third and a half of total costs was 
absorbed by animal feed. 7 Therefore carting costs depended consider-
ably on agriculture's ability not just to improve livestock breeds, but 
also to provide a cheap source of animal feed, neither of which were 
achieved until well after the advent of both the railways and the internal 
combustion engine. 
It has been calculated that by 1878 the railways, which effectively 
replaced an animal-based energy source with a mineral-based one, 
saved the equivalent of 0.5 million mules and oxen, and about 1.12 
million hectares of barley to feed them",.~ AtWrigley has noted, ,rail 
_~an.~!?2!l.E~~ub:~-Pe.rmitt~9 .• .!h~,.~<?",~m.~.~~ _ C?r ,far, heavier!?ads, 
. ana: at a slgruficantly greater .speed, but also had the capacl~ to 
-rncreii~_9J!mJ!L'Y.i!h<?_~t ~1.ly q~mands on. ~e dome~tic. ~cu.It~ar 
system.9 Unit transport costs fell, permIttmg a Wldenmg of the 
market, growth in urbanisation, and an increase in agric:J,l~nrral 
---... .---""~""",~.,.;. .,. '" . ~ 
7 Refers to 1878 and is based on two mules led by one man (53 per cent), one cart pulled 
by two mules (50 per cent), and one cart pulled by two oxen (38 per cent) (calculated 
from ibid. (cuadro 3.5 and 3.6». 
8 Ibid. (p. 97). The model used assumes that all goods that were transported by rail were 
moved by the next most efficient system of transport. 
9 Wrigley (1988, pp. 27-30). 
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specialisation.lO The greater efficiency of railways is highlighted in 
-tabie"4:·i,--b~t'1he lack of competition to them in much of Spain 
prior to the internal combustion engine implied that complaints by 
farmers on the tariffs that they charged was especially bitter. In May 
1880, for example, Costa noted that it was cheaper for wheat to be 
brought from California to Barcelona or Bilbao, than it was from 
Palencia or Arevalo, two major centres of production in the Interior, 
to Barcelona. 11 Although Spain's domestic rail tariffs would fall, the 
above situation appears not to have changed significantly on the eve 
of the First World War.12 From the time of the Great War, however, 
the question of transport costs for cereal producers was only part of 
the much wider question of government intervention in domestic 
markets, as will be shown in chapter 10. 
~sical relief~ transport technology, and levels of investm~nt in infra-
sttUctuie-·~;e;~·--'·n~t·"tj}~~:().i1li:'i:~~aoiiS~,.oo:,ilie, ~aei.eiQmP~the 
'n-anonaf'market'iil th.e pre-:-indlJl!Ui~ c;t',a. There was, .~,!:i t~.!(a 
conflict of interest between the farmer, .. andoonsumer, and it was the 
goyelJ)lll~l}l~hi£h determined the legal framework iii-WhlctCthe-tti1es--
of supply and demand would operate. In addition, government bodies 
at both national and local levels often intervened to tax agricultural com-
modities to raise revenue. It was natural, therefore, that both producer 
and consumer should look to the government for protection in times of 
difficulties, and the government in turn should be concerned about the 
impact on an important source of its revenue by exogenous changes in 
the market. It is also not surprising that almost all agrarian reformers of 
the period should have characterised government intervention in the 
market as either insufficient to protect farmers or as harmful to trade. 
Here I describe the gradual freeing of the internal market for cereals 
from trade restrictions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
leaving to part 4 their reappearance in the twentieth century. 
Until the sixteenth century, the limited size of most inland cities in 
Spain meant that their grain demands seldom exceeded the supply from 
their hinterland - the rural areas where the city had special rights and 
10 The rate of rail construction in Spain was slow in comparison with other countries, 
with only 440 kilometres completed in 1855, compared with 1,207 kilometres in Italy, 
5,037 in France and 11,744 in the United Kingdom (Mitchell, 1992 pp. 655-6). 
11 Costa (19I1a, p. 124). Complaints of high rail tariffs at this time were by no means 
limited to Spain; for France, see Moulin (1991, p. 91). 
12 Camara de Industria de Madrid, 1912, p. 40. Tariffs for wheat and flour fell from 0.094 
pesetas/ton/kilometre in 1878 to 0.064 pesetas in 1905 according to Gomez Mendoza, 
cited in Garrabou and Sanz (1985, p. 52). See also GOmez Mendoza (1989, pp. 47-
51). 
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privileges to the agricultural surplus. 13 Everywhere cities tried to control 
supply and demand by reducing to a minimum the possibilities of specu-
lative profit. Three legal instruments were used. First, the use of the 
tasa, or maximum price at which wheat could be sold. 14 Second, an 
attempt was made to control grain merchants by eliminating the pos-
sibility of short-term speculation by forbidding the purchase of grain for 
storage and later resale. Prices could be raised between the point of 
production and consumption by a margin only sufficient to cover trans-
port costs. There was no room, therefore, for the grain merchant who 
might buy when prices were low, and sell when high. By contrast, direct 
contact between the small farmer and domestic consumer in the official 
markets was encouraged. 
Finally, these legal controls of the market were supplemented by 
public granaries, the pOsitos. These were originally designed to form a 
buffer stock, buying and storing grain at times of surplus, selling at times 
of scarcity, in an attempt to influence price, a situation not dissimilar to 
a central bank today trying to 'defend' a national currency.15 The major 
difficulty facing the posito was that of balancing its books. Without 
knowing the full size of the harvest, the town had to buy sufficiently to 
restock or replace old grain. Freed from its public duty, the posito might 
have made large profits, but its social duty to stabilise the market often 
implied large losses which had to be borne, in one form or another, by 
the municipality.16 
By the 1750s, the disadvantage of a system which relied upon munici-
pal or, in the case of Madrid, national finances, to be used to balance 
supply with demand, was becoming all too apparentY A renewed 
growth in population and a run of poor harvests encouraged new 
13 As Madrid's population grew from approximately 109,000 in 1700 to 190,000 in 1800, 
and reached 246,000 by 1850, its food demands naturally increased at roughly the same 
rate. Coastal cities were less at risk because of the greater possibility of obtaining 
imports in years of shortage. 
14 The first general tasa was introduced in the Crown of Castilla in 1502. When the under-
lying price level was depressed, the tasa was rarely used, but when grain prices started 
moving upwards, such as between 1740 and 1760, it became a controversial policy 
instrument. When it was operative, holders of stocks were forced to sell at the fixed 
price. 
15 The comparison is not exact. An important difference was that the market policy of 
the pbsito was often determined by the municipal officers, often themselves important 
producers, leading to a conflict of interests. I owe this point to Entique Uopis. See 
also Caballero (1864, pp. 132-3) and Reher (1990a, p. 158). 
16 Castro (1987, pp. 106-7). 
17 For example, the imports from Naples and Sicily to supply the Madrid posito in 1753 
and 1754 cost the national exchequer 6 million reales, and the pbsito had debts outstand-
ing of 4.4 million reales owed to the Cinco Gremios Mayores (ibid., p. 118). 
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thoughts concerning the role of the market. Two ideas in particular were 
borrowed from those developed by the physiocrats and others in France. 
First, the need to encourage farmers to increase production began to be 
seen as the best way of securing adequate food supplies, rather than 
trying to shelter the urban consumer from the consequences of harvest 
failure. Farmers, it was argued, would respond to higher prices by pro-
ducing more. IS Second, there was the need to free the market from 
all legal restrictions. Campomanes, a leading member of the Spanish 
Enlightenment and a politician, argued that artificially low prices restric-
ted production, and the strong fluctuations in grain prices dislocated the 
national economy. Grain merchants would, he argued, match supply 
with demand, and food would circulate freely, costing the state 
nothing. 19 
In 1765, the tasa was officially abolished, although it would take at 
least half a century for a free grain trade to be fully accepted and operat-
ive in the whole country.20 The reasons are various. First, it took time 
for a sufficient number of grain merchants with established granaries to 
appear, which would enable the quick and effective movement of sup-
plies to alleviate local shortages. Without enough merchants, the 
government rightly feared that supplies would simply be held in the 
hands of a few, who would effectively enjoy an oligopolist position.21 
Second, for a market system to work efficiently, sufficient information 
on prices and stocks would be required for consumers to act rationally. 
As is well documented in many European countries, this information 
was usually unavailable, and rumour and 'fear' acted instead. Finally, 
falling transportation costs would be needed to extend the market for 
grain producers, and reduce the impact of local harvest failures. 
It is probably only in the decade following the Peninsular War that 
conditions permitted a relatively free movement of cereals within the 
country. The advantages for farmers would be significant, as one 
example will show. LOpez y Peiialver noted that in Palencia after the 
1806 harvest, wheat was so plentiful that it could only be fed to the pigs. 
He argued that a succession of good harvests were accompanied not just 
by low prices, but also by high labour costs. This in turn encouraged a 
18 The Real Provisi6n of 1735 had anticipated this change by giving the pasito the responsi-
bility of guaranteeing farmers loans of seed corn until the following harvest. Adminis-
trative restructuring in 1751 strengthened further this emphasis on production rather 
than just consumption, and the number of positos run by municipalities (but centrally 
controlled) reached 5,225 in 1773. See Anes (1969, pp. 73-94). 
19 Campomanes (1764, cited in Castro, 1987, pp. 126-7). 
20 Larraz (1935, p. 19) suggests that only after 1834 was unrestricted internal trade finally 
achieved. 
21 See especially Anes (1970a), Yun Casalilla (1989 and 1990) and Uopis (1989). 
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reduction in the area sown, thereby worsening the situation when the 
inevitable poor harvest came.22 The example of Palencia is important, 
because it was to be one of the leading provinces in the growth of 
internal and colonial trade in wheat from the 1820S.23 
Restrictions to trade were further improved with the abolition of 
internal tolls (pontazgos and portazgos) and of the last internal customs 
barrier with the Basque Country in 1841. However the consumo, a sales 
tax levied on the entry of goods into cities and municipalities (which 
raised prices thereby affecting consumer demand), remained operational 
in one form or another throughout much of the period. Rates varied 
according to product, place and period, but the produce worst affected 
was wine. Again one example will suffice. In the early 1920S the major 
cities (for example, Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia) taxed wine by at 
least 10 pesetas a hectolitre which, when added to the depressed price 
of that period of 15 to 18 pesetas, implied a tax rate of between 36 and 
40 per cent. To reduce the effective rate of taxation to a minimum, 
producers strengthened wines with alcohol to the maximum permitted, 
and then watered it down once duty had been paid. 24 
Nineteenth-century market integration: 
the case of wheat 
If in the 1770S Adam Smith could write that 'the prices of bread and 
-butchers' meat are generally the same, or very roughly the same 
throughout the greater part of the United Kingdom,/5 this was not the 
case in Spain, nor in much of continental Europe. In the pre-railway 
er~,1?Jj<?~~yvere lower in Spain's Olain ,wheatgro~g"~r~~!'~~.~~r:ior, 
-~~~$_S9.~,§1~L£m~,9S_~~~lthough the latter's ability to import in 
,'. years of harvest failure resulted in greater price stability.26 To take an 
extreme example, the May price for wheat in Medina de Rioseco 
(Valladolid) in 1804 was some 348 per cent higher than it had been 
22 L6pez y Peiialver (1812, pp. 3 and 8). 
23 Sanz and Garrabou (1985, pp. 15---67), Yun Casalilla (1991, pp. 47-76), Hoyo Aparicio 
(1991, ch. 3) and Kondo (1990, pp. 83---6 and 130---43). 
24 Confederaci6n Nacional de Viticultores (1925, pp. 11-19). 
25 Smith ([1776], 1970, p. 177). Schofield has noted for England that the 'demographic 
record ... points to an increasing integration of market networks over the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century' and 'in the case of wheat, regional prices were moving 
in a way that suggests the emergence of a national market by the 1690s' (Schofield, 
1983, p. 91). In France, it has been suggested that a single market was achieved only 
in 1863, with the extension of the railways (Renouard, 1960, pp. 42-4, cited in Price, 
1983, pp. 309-10). For wheat prices in the Spanish Interior in the eighteenth century, 
see Escriva and Uopis (1987). 
26 Anes (1969, pp. 45-70). 
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Table 4.3. Fluctuations in wheat prices during the nineteenth century (per 
cent) 
Centres of production 
Valladolid 
100 
207 
Zaragoza 
100 
137 
Centres of consumption 
Barcelona 
100 
106 
Valencia 
100 
88 
Source: Calculated from Garrabou and Sanz (1985, Apendice I). 
during the previous eleven years, and some 264 per cent higher than it 
was in Barcelona in the same year.27 The increase in domestic pro-
~acgc~~~~~'l~~!;:![~~:!~:[it~;~~~~!~~;~~~~~:!-
<.!~ffi.c::,!_~!L~ay:a,ge, as illustrated by the harvest shortage of 1867-8, 
when in June 1S"68,'wheat prices were lower in Barcelona, a centre of 
consUlllPtion. than the.y~.w= ID :v alladolid;~ .ce.uYi:§!:p:@:duc'tion.28 
'The cOIlv(!.r.~~nce of wheat prices during the nin~t~~n~_c~nt~ was 
accomparued by tItree reJatedchanges:... an upward trend in producer 
prices, a decline in the i,m.g.Q.n1Wce of local supply-and-demand curves 
in detenilliiiiigtarm:g;; pri~es~';~d' di~:t;:ges-intlienature'oftlie sub-
sistence crisis.··-""·-·"-·~· 
. Despite occasional significant local fluctuations, the price differences 
between areas of production and areas of consumption declined as the 
century progressed. Yet, as can be seen in table 4.3, while prices in 
Barcelona and Valencia (centres of consumption) changed little between 
1820 and 1880, those in Valladolid and Zaragoza (centres of production) 
increased by 107 and 37 per cent respectively. !!.would:uw.~~r that fall-
ing transp~I! and. transaction costs did not lead to cheaper wheat for 
consumers, but·rathei·anowea·a~arer·tevel of product specialisation 
fOI~x§~i!ia'a~stea;ry-exteIiSiofi'ofthe'areacUltivate(roiriiicreasmgry. 
marginal soils, as noted in chapter 3.29 Higher product prices helped 
offset the negative impact of diminishing returns to labour. 
With a greater integration of national markets, prices were no longer 
determined by movements in the local supply-and-demand curves. Tra-
27 Fontana, (1975, pp. 25-7). 
2. Sanchez Albomoz (1977, ch. 3). For regional wheat prices in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, see GEHR (1980). 
29 Events in Spain were therefore similar to what happened intemationally. As Harley has 
written, 'although the price of wheat has fallen during the period of frontier (1850-
1913), the movement of the frontier occurred as the local price rose' (Hariey, 1980, p. 
232). 
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ditionally, a poor harvest was compensated in part by a sharp rise in 
prices, whereas a good harvest led to a fall. 30 Although this did not 
imply complete stability in farmers' incomes, it caused a different set of 
problems to those of a fully integrated market, where the shortages 
caused by a poor harvest could be alleviated by supplies coming from 
outside. This situation was further complicated by the growing inte-
gration of international markets, especially because from the early 1880s 
world prices were below those in Spain. From this period the determin-
ing factors in Spain's internal wheat prices were import tariffs and the 
value of the peseta, and then, from the First World War, increasingly 
government-fixed prices. With this last measure, policy had effectively 
returned to that of the Ancien Regime (chapter 10). 
Consumers benefited from the greater integration of the market, not 
so much through lower prices, but rather by a greater stability in sup-
plies, leading to a decline in the intensity and frequency of 'subsistence 
crisis' . At the end of the eighteenth century Spain had seemed incapable 
of feeding its population, yet appears to have had little difficulty in feed-
ing a much larger one from the 1820S. Indeed, imports of wheat were 
only permitted after years of harvest failure, in 1825, 1835, 1847, 1856 
and 1867.31 It was not to last, and in the words of one prominent 
historian: 
The second half of the nineteenth century suffered once again from the old 
imbalance between men and resources. The recurrence of food crises - in 1857, 
1868, 1879, 1887 and 1898 - supplies, in my opinion, the clearest proof of the 
nation's incapacity to provide even for its most pressing needs.32 
However, as I have argued elsewhere, food crises need imply neither 
ineffiCienCi~s in agriculture nor in transportation, but rather in govern-
menrptHtdes.33 Unless Spain had a comparative advantage in producing 
-wfieai:~-;;md could export competitively on world markets, it would be 
rational to expect some of its domestic requirements to be produced 
outside the country, especially in years of poor harvests. Thus the fact 
that Spain imported increasing amounts of wheat from the 1880s, which 
by 1900/9 was equivalent to the output from 318,000 hectares, should 
not be seen as a failure so much as the consequence of domestic 
resources being switched into the production of more valuable export 
crops, especially wine and olive oil. 
30 See Wrigley (1987, esp. pp. 102-8). 
31 Sanchez Albomoz (1963). Not only was Spain self-sufficent in wheat, but there was a 
small surplus until the 1880s to export to the country's remaining colonies. 
32 Nadal (1973, p. 537). 
33 Simpson (1989a, pp. 370-2). 
90 Traditional technologies and market opportunities 
If markets became increasingly efficient during the nineteenth cen-
tury, especially after the creation of the basic rail infrastructure, the 
renewal of subsistence crises from the middle of the century can be seen 
in part as the result of government trade policy in delaying vital 
impOrtS.34 In Andalucia, where hunger would continue the longest, the 
lack of 'entitlement rights' to food after the sale of commOn lands would 
seem to be a further contributing factor, especially for the landless.35 
Nineteenth-century wine exports 
By 1880/4, the vine accounted for 45 per cent of all Spanish exports, 
before it started a long decline.36 Low entry costs and extensive areas 
of suitable land for its cultivation were offset by its perishability (most 
Spanish wines in their natural state frequently became undrinkable 
within a few months of production) and by the bulky nature of the 
product. These problems were overcome by the simple expedient of 
adding more alcohol to the wine, or distilling it into spirits. With respect 
to the fruit, conservation was achieved by drying the grapes (producing 
raisins), although refrigeration at the end of the nineteenth century 
would allow the export of fresh fruit. For the export market in the pre-
railway era, transport costs for wine were kept to a minimum by locating 
production centres close to the coast. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the intensive nature of viticulture made it well suited to the small family 
farms of the Mediterranean area, and the lack of capital often associated 
with peasant farming was alleviated in the pre-phylloxera period by the 
fact that factor inputs tended to be almost entirely labour. The advent 
OCth~,!~,iJ~~Y.!.J.iftt!~ .. ~~".g~~~~£~~c ... ~~~~c.~i.oll.s_ .. £.~ producti~n and 
resulted in a rapid expansion of cultivation ill celltr.~l.~pain. _. 
.. ' Wine exports can be diVided into two broad types: 'luxury', and 'bulk' 
or 'table' wines. 37 ~uxury wines differed in a number of important ways. 
First, considerably gi-eater"carewas taken at all stages of production, 
and higher capital outlays were required to mature the wine. The result 
was that quality wines might be sold at prices up to ten times higher <>_ .... ,"'..,,-..._-
34 Sanchez Albornoz (1977) has noted how political errors delayed imports and exasper-
ated the difficulties of the 1857 and 1868 shortages (pp. 30-2, 46-52 and 85). It is of 
interest that the 'crisis' in 1898 took place when a tariff of 3.9 pesetaslhectolitre, equival-
ent to 16 per cent of the national wheat price, was in force (calculated from GEHR, 
1980, cuadro 14). 
35 For the 'entitlement' theory, see Sen (1982, esp. pp. 1-8). 
36 Prados de la Escosura (1982, p. 41). See table 9.1 for the contribution of the vine to 
Spanish exports over the period. 
37 Most national trade statistics do not attempt to differentiate between the two, although 
sometimes they distinguish between alcohol content, a factor which may, or may not, 
be relevant in determining quality. 
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than normal ones.38 Second, for the consumer, Spanish luxury wines 
were rarely drunk with meals, and therefore tended to compete not with 
table wines but rather with other aperitifs and with whisky, brandy or, 
later, champagne. Finally, production,w,:~§ .. attict1yJilnited to a fe~ small 
areas on account of soilqualttYaild climate. Therefore, for the very 
great maJontY of Wine producers, the luxury wine market was not an 
option. In terms of value, however, the export of Spanish luxury wines 
was at least as important as that of bulk wines during the first half of 
the nineteenth century (see table 9.1 below). Given its predominance 
among luxury wines, my comments will be limited to sherry.39 
Sherry was produced in Jerez de la Frontera (Oidiz) for the export 
market, with the bulk of it going to the United Kingdom.40 In the first 
half of the nineteenth century, the British market had shown a strong 
preference for wines which were heavy and strong, with port, madeira, 
malaga and sherry being especially popular. Around the middle of the 
century, however, there was a drift away from these towards lighter, 
drier wines, often consumed as an aperitif or with meals.41 This change 
in fashion is impossible to quantify, but it did not go unnoticed by con-
temporaries. Denman, writing in 1876, noted that the:42 
general public taste has so manifestly altered that the wine trade is being revol-
utionised. The strong old Sherries and Ports of the past are gradually being 
supplemented by lighter qualities, which our fathers would scarcely have recog-
nised as wines. Instead of strong draughts derived from added alcohol, and 
cloying sweetness from added saccharum, persons are looking for wine flavour, 
bouquet and cleanness upon the palate. 
In Jerez, the change in fashion brought with it a response through 
changes in the manufacturing process and nature of the end product . 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the principal method of 
38 Price differences are based on sherry (British Parliamentary Papers, Cadiz, 1865, liii, 
p. 657)· 
39 Others included Malmsey produced in the Canary Islands and Sitges (Barcelona), and 
Malaga or 'Mountain'. 
40 It was noted in 1846 that 'The people at large in Spain are scarcely acquainted with 
the taste of Sherry wine, beyond the immediate vicinity in which it is made; and more 
of it is swallowed at Gibraltar at the messes, than either in Madrid, Toledo or Salam-
anca. Sherry is a foreign wine, and made and drunk by foreigners; nor do the generality 
of Spaniards like its strong flavour, and still less its high price, although some now 
affect its use because, from its great vogue in England, it argues civilisation to adopt 
it', Ford (1970, p. 177). 
41 Drummond and Wilbraham (1958, p. 337) suggest that the custom of taking an aperitif 
before dinner appears to have been introduced in England in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, although they do not specifically mention sherry. 
42 Denman (1876, p. 3). 
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making sherry was by the anada system. This involved the laying down 
of wine year by year, sometimes vineyard by vineyard, and its sale 
according to its year of production. Before despatch, or sometimes 
during the making, a certain amount of wine spirit was added. An 
alternative method, the solera system, became more important after the 
Napoleonic Wars. By the middle of the century it had become the pre-
dominant form of sherry making,43 and can be directly linked to the 
growth in fino exports to the United Kingdom. The fino was a com-
pletely different sherry, and catered for the change in tastes in the British 
market noted above. Wines were initially stored by the year, as in the 
anada system but, after a number of years, they entered the solera which 
most suited their characteristics.44 The solera consisted of casks of simi-
lar wines, each at a different stage of development. The length of the 
solera, together with the number of casks at each stage, varied according 
to the scale of production and quality of wine required. When a quantity 
of wine was drawn from the end cask with the most mature wine, it 
would be replaced in equal quantity by a slightly younger one, in the 
next cask. The process would then be repeated all along the solera, so 
that as mature sherry was removed from one end, new wine would be 
entering from the other. Surprisingly, this does not reduce the quality 
of the wine, because if it is not done in excessive quantities, the younger 
wine will, within a few months, take on the characteristics of the original 
wine.45 
The development of the solera system was important for two reasons. 
First, a homogenous product could be constantly marketed, facilitating 
the selling of wine by brand names.46 Two butts of wine produced by 
the anada system in Jerez could differ significantly despite having come 
from the same vineyard, having been pressed together, and subsequently 
stored side by side.47 The second reason for the development of the 
solera was the increased demand for finos, as already mentioned. 
Although excellent finos could be produced by storing wine, say for ten 
years, this involved a considerable outlay of capital. The solera system 
produced an equally acceptable drink after only a few years, cutting 
43 Parada y Barreto (1868, p. 129). Vizetelly found some sherry still being made by the 
anada system, although it had largely been succeeded by the solera (Vizetelly 1876, p. 
33)· 
:: Parada y Barreto (1868, p. 129) and Vizetelly (1876, p. 105) both give four years. 
Jeffs (1970, p. 193). 
46 The legislation in Britain in 1861 was especially important as this allowed the sale of 
wines by people other than publicans, hoteliers or wine merchants and the British 
public began to buy sherry under recognised labels (e.g. 'Tio Pepe'), rather than on 
the advice of their wine merchants. 
47 Jeffs (1970, p. 191). 
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costs, and increasing the commercial power of the shippers at the 
expense of the wine maturers. 
Demand for Spanish sherry grew rapidly in the middle of the century, 
with total exports increasing from 125,000 hectolitres in 1855/9 to 
282,000 in 1870/4.48 Of greater significance to producers, prices rose 
from 40 pesetas a hectolitre in 1851/4 to 132 in 1862/4.
49 Given the time 
it took to bring plants into production, and the time required to mature 
the wine, supply from Jerez in the short term was relatively inelastic. As 
a result, increasing demand for sherry was met by adulteration, using 
wines from neighbouring Montilla (Cordoba), Moguer, ManzaniIla, 
Niebla, and Bollulos del Condado (Huelva) and Aljarafe (Sevilla).50 
Adulteration was not a monopoly of the Jerez's sherry shippers, how-
ever. Because of the lack of product definition, 'sherry' started to be 
imported into the United Kingdom from countries such as South Africa 
and Australia. However, the product which did most harm came from 
Hamburg, which was based on poor wines with potato spirits and sac-
charine added.51 
Product adulteration, health concerns with respect to both the 
genuine product and its imitations, and excessive prices for unadulter-
ated wine severely damaged the sherry trade. 52 The increased customs 
duty in 1866, allegedly designed to protect the British consumer from 
fortified wines, reduced demand further. 53 Although exports did not 
fall off until 1874, and production reached its maximum in the 1880s, 
this was of no consolation to those producers who aimed at a quality 
product, as prices peaked in 1863 and then fell significantly (table 
4·4).54 
Given the relatively small area of sherry production in Jerez (around 
8,000 hectares in the late nineteenth century), the contribution of 
48 Gonzalez Gordon (1972, pp. 203-8). 
49 Gonzalez Gordon (cited in Zapata, 1986, p. 1208). Wine prices refer to must produced 
on the region's best soil (albariza). 
50 Simpson (198Sa, p. 309) and LOpez Estudillo (1992, pp. 60--2). 
51 Medical Times and Gazette, cited in Tovey (1880). 
52 In 1873, The Times carried a letter from a Dr Thudichum which drew ~ttention to ~e 
supposed health hazards of the drink on account of the use of gypsum ID ~e c~shIDg 
of grapes, and sulphur in the fumigation of casks. It started a debate :which did not 
end until a detailed report appeared twenty years later in The Lancet which cleared the 
drink (Jeffs, 1970, pp. 95-8). One wine specialist wrote in the 1860s that 'sherry has 
long been a favourite wine, but the quantity of bad quality now shipped and sold under 
its name has already injured its reputation, while high prices of any that is good or old 
offers an opportunity of another kind' (Shaw, 1863, pp. 142-3)· . 
53 Although alcohol content in sherry was high, in general it was an unfo.rtifi~d w~e. 
54 For producers' responses in the face of falling prices, and the lack of dlverslficaoon of 
the local economy of Jerez de la Frontera, see Simpson (198Sb, pp. 183-4 and 188---9). 
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Table 4·4. Changes in prosperity for sherry producers, 1860-89 
Annual 
production Price of must" Output ('000 (pesetas per (millions Value of output hectolitres) hectolitre) pesetas) index 
1860/4 136' 108.0 14·72 100 1865/9 13T 68·3 9·34 63 1870/4 n.d. 57·5 n.d. n.d. 1875/9 180d 41.4 7.46 51 1880/4 171 n.d. n.d. n.d. 18899 215 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
• Prices refer to must produced on albarizas soils (i.e. high quality sherries). 
• Excludes 1861. 
, Only years 1865--'7. 
d Only years 1876 and 1879. 
It has been assumed that the proportion of 'quality' wine to 'normal' remained constant 
~ver the period; if the proportion of 'normal' wine increased (as seems likely), the decline 
m output value would be even greater. If prices are used only for those years when figures 
for ~roduction are aVailable, then the 'value of output index' falls from 100 in 1860/4, to 
63 m .1865/9, and to 48 in 18799. Production in 1870/4 was probably about 170,000 
hectohtres, and the price of must in 1880/9 roughly similar to 1875/9. 
Sources: Simpson (1985b, Apendice A) and Gonz:ilez Gordon cited in Zapata (1986, 
p. 1208). 
exports to national production would inevitably remain limited. 55 How-
ever, the experience of the 'sherry' boom of the 1860s highlights a more 
general characteristic of the nation's agriculture, namely the difficulties 
in introducing quality controls on producers to maintain consumer con-
fidence. The denominaciOn de origen was only established in 1933, but 
even then major difficulties remained in enforcing it. 56 
. If sherry was the best known of Spain's wines, its relative importance 
m terms of volume was insignificant as Spain produced overwhelmingly 
cheap, bulk wines. The success of foreign trade in stimulating output of 
bulk wines would depend on the response to the market of numerous 
small producers, as noted in the previous chapter. 57 That this Occurred 
can be seen in two major wine 'booms'. 
55 For area of vines in the nineteenth century, see especially LOpez Estudillo (1992, pp. 
50-2). By 1932-4 the whole province of Cltdiz produced less than 2 per cent of Spain's 
must (by value). 
56 A second question was the protection of the name 'sherry' itself in international markets 
from other us~. Legal action was started in the 1920S, and has only been recendy 
resolved (Gonzalez Gordon, 1972, pp. 41-52). 
57 The Confe~r~ Nacion.al de Viticultores suggested, no doubt with exaggeration, that 
almost 4 milhon people hved from the vine (1925, p. 7). 
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The first example is the expansion of production and specialisation in 
Catalan agriculture in the eighteenth century, which helped provide a 
strong domestic market for the incipient cotton industry. Central to this 
growth was a viticulture based on small producers and involving the 
export of spirits rather than wine to South America and Europe. Sp~t 
production was dispersed amongst the vineya.rds as the ~e of s~tl~s 
used olles and fassines, were cheap in construction and requIred a mtru-, . 
mum of skill to operate. 58 The frequently poor quality of the wme was 
therefore not a problem. The decline in prosperity of spirit production 
can be dated to the interruption of commerce during the Napoleonic 
Wars and as a result of the independence of Latin America, with both 
spirit and wine prices falling faster after 1817 than those for wheat or 
olive oil. 59 The second 'golden age' was national in scope, and occurred 
with the rapid increase in wine exports from the early 1870S to France 
where phylloxera had severely diminished harvests (see table 4.5). Phyl-
loxera had been first noted in Europe in 1863, and although the disease 
spread relatively slowly, virtually all vines in time suffered to some 
extent.60 The only effective cure was the replanting of vineyards with 
American disease-resistant root stock, which would then be grafted onto 
European stock. The impact of the disease in France can be measured 
by wine production in the period 1876/90 being only 61 per cent of what 
it had been in 1861/75. Replanting allowed it to recover to 97 per cent 
by 1901110.61 The increased demand for wine from France brought a 
rapid response from Spanish producers and, as the expansion of viticul-
ture was mainly on land previously devoted to either rough pasture or 
h . d 62 low yield cereals, output per ectare mcrease . 
If vine growers responded to rising prices in the 1870S and most of 
the 1880s by increasing output, so too did wine merchants. The French 
market required a wine with an alcoholic strength of up to 15° for mixing 
with their own domestic production.63 Although Spanish wines were 
naturally stronger than French on account of the climate, most were 
strengthened with spirits before being exported. This suited wine pro-
ducers because in the absence of strengthening, most wines would have 
become undrinkable within a short period of time and could not have 
58 Vilar (1978, p. 278) and Martinez Shaw (1985, p. 75). 
59 Torras Elias (1976) and Fontana (1978, p. 185). . . 
60 The use of sulfocarbonates and flooding were expenSive, and only temporanly halted 
the disease. The timing of phylloxera's outbreak can be linked to the shortening in 
travel time between Europe and America, allowing the louse to survive the journey 
(Ordish, 1972, pp. 5 and 19-23). 
6' Calculated from Mitchell (1992, pp. 313-4). 
62 Assuming a wine yield of 16 hectolitreslhectare, in the period 1.886-90, France was 
taking production equivalent to some 436,250 hectares from Spam. 
63 French import duties during the 1880s were 2 francs on all wines up to 15°, and there-
fore there was a financial incentive to strengthen it to that level. 
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been transported. Given the high domestic prices, wine merchants 
started importing foreign spirits to strengthen Spanish wines, leading to 
the closing of most domestic distilleries.64 The result was widespread 
abuse of 'wines'. To cite just one report from the Consejo Provincial de 
Agricultura, Industria y Comercio in the important wine producing prov-
ince of Tarragona:65 
The commerce of true wines has greatly diminished for some time in this area. 
Since a considerable quantity of those exported only have a small base of wine, 
the rest is composed of water, foreign alcohol, colouring materials and tartic, 
citric and sulphuric acid, the last being harmful to the health. 
Wines for domestic consumption were not exempt from this, and per-
haps viniculture should be regarded as an integral part of the nation's 
early chemical industry! According to one source, about a quarter of 
wines consumed in Spain had been 'manufactured' using foreign 
alcoho1.66 Not surprisingly, given the nature of some of the products 
used, 'wine' was considered by many as a health hazard.
67 
In conclusion, there. were few changes in wine presses. or storing 
metlioosoef'6i"C! tl'fe''ertd'Ofthe century. Acertam' prodli~t speciaiisation 
diaOcCur:t:KegrmvtlrJrrfini:isherries, the commercial. production of 
~lia.!!!p~ii1e?,",or~~a~a];y Codomiu from 1872 , and the founding of some 
'ofRioja's major bodegas from the 1860s. However, these weJ;"e exceptions 
'ilnd"'represented a minute part of Spain's total wine productiol!. ay the 13!~.!!i!tC;:Jeemlf:CeiifiiIY·'ihe""vasi·amount of Spanish WUie sold in both 
dO~,J;.and export markets was traditionally-produced bulk wine . 
. --- . 
Conclusion 
The removal of legal impediments to trade and the improvement of the 
transport system allowed greater market integration and a fall in freight 
costs. More efficient markets in turn allowed farmers to specialise in 
those crops that were most profitable and suited to local resource 
endowments. A relatively low elasticity of demand implied that the pro-
ductivity gains in transport allowed farmers to extend the area cultivated 
for cereals, helping to offset the diminishing returns to labour in these 
crops given the generally inappropriate conditions for their cultivation 
64 In Alicante, for example, despite a 20 per cent increase in vines during a decade, 40 
of the province's 50 stills were out of action, with the remainder hardly working in 
1886 (Crisis agricola y pecuaria, no. 307, p. 289; see also vo!. 2, p. 335 (Ueida), vo!. 3, 
p. 201 (palencia) and vo!. 3, p. 547 (Rioja)). 
65 Ibid., (vo!. 3, no. 132, p. 26). 
66 Anrunez (1887, p. 16). 
67 Simpson (1985a, pp. 112-15)· 
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nationally. In conclusion, it was the development of the market and the 
farmers' access to land, rather than changes in agricultural technology, 
which allowed the country to escape the Malthusian consequences of 
its population doubling between the early seventeenth century and the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
If Spanish wheat farmers were generally willing to extend the area 
cultivated in the face of rising prices, this also appears true of wine 
producers. The example of wine spirits from Barcelona, sherry from 
Jerez, and table wines almost everywhere from the 1870s, shows that 
growth in demand was met by a wave of new plantings, together with 
product adulteration. Peasant farming was clearly market orientated in 
large areas of the country by the late nineteenth century. 
Part III 
The limits to technical change, 1880-1936 
5 Soil fertility and the chemical revolution 
In Part 11 we saw that Spanish farmers had tended to increase their 
output during the nineteenth century by shifting the frontier of culti-
vation. If improvements in welfare required higher labour productivity, 
there were strict limits to how far this could be achieved using traditional 
production systems, especially in a period of relatively fast population 
growth. Furthermore, by the late nim~~~.enthcentur¥"thethreat of cheap 
foreign cereals in domestic-mark;~. the,presence of new vegetable oil~' 
~_~ .. " ___ ,,_,,,,_ ''''~'~'',~'l~ ... " .• ",,';;'.~' ... -,."~-'" '.. , -
in export markets, and the widespr~addestruction of vineyards through 
diSease tPIiY1!Oxera}'reqtirreClnew ideas and farming practices if farmers 
-""_..;v<-=...,....-<"".'.-"'-.....'_"'~~.' "" '~,. . 
were ~.£._~JE.!i!!s9I:Jlpetitive. 
~~eo~~~~_~~~~.~? ways in which labour. productivity might 
hav:..~l!!1P..tQYe4~.byj,o,creasmg the .area cultivated per worker, or by 
m~~!~jt9,\l.tpyt,P.~ 4ectare .. either through. increased crop yields,_ or 
by changing. the._.<;:rQILm~ .. t.() ~igher value products .. These two 
approacfies~a-;e~often illustrated by the historical experience of Japan 
and the United States between 1880 and 1930. Although both countries 
enjoyed significant growth rates in output per worker (1.85 and 1.02 per 
cent a year respectively), the methods of obtaining the increase were 
very different. In the United States output per hectare grew relatively 
slowly, but the area of arable per male worker increased from 12 to 21 
hectares between 1880 and 1930, an achievement made possible by the 
introduction of mechanical technology which reduced labour inputs, 
especially in cereal cultivation.! By contrast, in Japan the area of arable 
per male worker increased from only 0.66 hectares in 1880 to 0.78 hec-
tares in 1930. After unsuccessful attempts at using American farm tech-
nology at the end of the nineteenth century, Japanese farmers switched 
to 'biological yield-raising technology, much of it supported by heavy 
irrigation investments,.2 In this and the following chapter I consider the 
1 Hayami and Ruttan (1985, appendix tables B-1 and B-2). See also the comments of 
Olmstead and Rhode (1993). 
2 Binswanger (1984, p. 7). 
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possibilities in Spain of raising output per hectare, leaving to chapter 7 
the potential for reducing labour inputs. 
The close relationship between high animal densities and high crop 
yields, which was well established in some agricultural regions in the 
Low Countries and in England by the seventeenth century, was 
regarded by many Spanish writers as being crucial to the long-term 
development of the country's agriculture.3 However, demographic 
growth, together with the sale of large areas of municipal lands that had 
previously been kept for pasturing the village herd, encouraged farmers 
to extend the area of cereal cultivation (especially wheat) rather than 
attempt to maintain livestock densities and increase fertiliser inputs. As 
I argued in part 11, it was the existence of large areas of underused land 
and the rising cereal prices which permitted farmers to ignore, at least 
temporarily, the need to maintain soil fertility. When cereal prices stag-
nated in the late nineteenth century, it was the low livestock densities 
which were often regarded as the prime causes of poor crop yields and 
agricultural backwardness. 4 
)}) ~~ chemical"~~~~!~~.9n .QLtb~~eS.<:l.Il,.(th~1.t()f the nineteenth century 1 I1.tgrida:""KliJiiay.sj:~.!L.alt~~.!I~in the form of'artiftciif1eniIisef'S;"io 
overcome the limitations of poor resource endowments for intensive 
livestock farming in Spain. Yet farmers' response to this opportunity 
was slow. Animal manure and other organic material still accounted for 
four-fifths of all fertilisers in terms of mineral content in 1911, and as 
much as two-thirds as late as 1933.5 Although chemical fertilisers were 
replacing imported guano in the paddy fields and orange groves of 
Valencia as early as the 1880s, most arable land in Spain rarely benefited 
from their use. I argue that the small usage of chemical fertilisers in 
much of dry-farming agriculture can be attributed to both the relatively 
small quantities required before the marginal physical product was 
reached, and the high costs associated with employing fertilisers. The 
real potential of chemical fertilisers was in intensive agriculture, which 
in Spain usually implied a demand for other complementary inputs such 
as irrigation and new crops. 
3 See for example Jovellanos (1986, p. 185). 
4 Costa argued that it was the ' ... ill-fated divorce between arable and livestock which 
had been the principal cause that has brought about the crisis in national output', 
(Costa, 1911c, p. 267). Likewise Rodriganez noted that 'perhaps the principal cause of 
?ur backwardness is the abnormal relationship between livestock and arable, which 
unpoverishes the nation's agriculture' (Rodriganez, 1977, p. 281). 
5 In 1911.' 79 per cent and, in 1933, 67 per cent. The 1919 government survey suggests 
that anunal manure accounted for approximately 94 per cent of organic manure in use 
(Gallego, 19~6, p. 197 and cuadro 5). For further comments on this survey, see below. 
However, Gngg (1992, p. 41) has noted that 'until the 1930S farmyard manure provided 
most of the plant nutrients added to the soil in Western Europe'. 
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The limitations of organic fertilisers 
In traditional agriculture, farmers maintained soil fertility by moderating 
thefrequenq7"orculttvatlon'ancf'by 'usmg"organic'reftUi§"ei'§'; "sudr'as 
ammal IiiiiiiUie;rugfitsOir'orcompostma(rt'fro;;'~"~'~g~t~bi~' material. 
The use of fallow also limited weed growth and the spread of disease, 
although its effectiveness could be increased by frequent weeding and 
destroying by hand either the insects themselves, or the diseased plant.6 
In the Low Countries, northern France, and probably parts of England, 
the experience of the Middle Ages was that cereal yields incre~~~.<;i.~(.i 
fell._.~t1!.!!t~~.gr~~_~~9J!!1l.jP,.,'popul~:~iI§DaQQQi:pro<iuctivity 
mov~<i. j~Lth~ ,9PP9.,!i.i!~,.dir.esnQIl.7 .Th~.,rs;h!~p_.lY:i!!!.>}?~~-R,t;g,lwp 
with ~!!~.du~n o!.r:.~ h~~~~<kYtecluliQ~!!~.'~H,c.h.a~.m~_,P,t~~g, 
OD~~W9l!~ .. c.~9-p!i.1Urnlps, a greater concentratIOn of hvestock, and 
a better integration of livestock an.~LJ!!~£!~,." (mixed husbandry). 
Improved yields were achieved through a more efficient tillage, a greater 
application of fertilisers, and by increases in the soil's nitrogen content. 
Dry farming conditions in Spain made impossible a similar scenario 
to that of the Agricultural Revolution in northern Europe. For one 
thing, soils could not be worked as intensely because summer drought 
and low rainfall meant that they could only be cropped about once every 
two or three years. As late as 1960, fallow still occupied about 40 per 
cent of rotations.s Second, fodder crops require ample supplies of 
summer rainfall, which favours northern climates where 25 to 35 per 
cent of rainfall occurs in the summer, but such a requirement makes 
fodder crops all but impossible outside irrigated areas in much of the 
Mediterranean.9 Artificial grasses such as clover and lucerne (alfalfa) 
present similar difficulties. As a result, northern European livestock 
densities based on traditional grazing methods (as opposed to being 
stall-fed) were impossible. Howl:!yer, in Spaith.not only were livestock 
g.~~~~~~~'rY .... w,~y,probabl¥..£eJL~J~fi~.~~ly ~urin~ much of tli~ J)~~()~' 
j~.9S?~~9j~cl)al'.~e,~,..L .. Eurthermore, outSide the small number of areas 
of intensive cultivation, the limited quantities of organic fertilisers avail-
able were frequently wasted by the farmers. 
The government fertiliser survey of 1919 suggests a close correlation 
between the use of organic fertilisers and regional livestock densities in 
6 Boserup (1981, pp. 23-4). 
7 See especially Campbell (1991, pp. 144-82) on which this paragraph is based. 
8 AEA (ana 1980, p. 27). The figure would be higher if only cereals and legumes are 
included. 
9 Summer rainfall figures refer to regions bordering the North Sea. See Galassi (1986, 
pp. 93-4)· 
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1917.10 However, as the 1919 survey includes virtually no organic ferti-
lisers for the provinces of La Coruiia, Logrofio, Lugo, Orense, San-
tander, Tarragona and Valencia, I have estimated the potential supply of 
animal manure, by calculating a figure based on the animal popu-
lations.ll In table 5.1, an index of the supply of manure has been 
obtained by estimating the total live weight of animal stock, and the 
potential demand by the area cultivated with cereals and legumes. Only 
cereals and legumes have been considered for two reasons. First, these 
crops, together with the vine and olive, accounted for over 90 per cent 
of the sown area during this period, but the quantities of manure used 
with olives and vines was small. 12 Second, although animal manure was 
used with fruit trees, sugar beet and other industrial crops, the area was 
relatively small, and by the 1920S chemical fertilisers were often more 
important (see below). 
Table 5.1 suggests that the animal live weight per hectare (my proxy 
for manure supplies) fell from 228 kilograms per hectare in 1865 to 137 
in 1886/91, rising again to 170 in 1917122 and 199 in 1930/5. Even if the 
1891 census (the weakest of the three) is ignored, the trend is of a 
decline in the long-term supply of organic manure as the area of arable 
increases, indicating that contemporaries were correct in their com-
ments concerning the shortage of organic fertilisers in agriculture. 13 
Only in the North would a system of mixed husbandry appear truly 
operative. Furthermore, not only was the supply of manure small, it was 
seldom used to its full potential. To maximise output, animals had to 
be well fed and kept inside, their bedding changed frequently and the 
manure kept properly to reduce weight loss and leaching of its mineral 
content during the rains. One agronomist suggested that the manure 
per animal obtained and used on the experimental farm in Palencia in 
1915 was 90 per cent greater than that used by many local farmers, 
because of their poor collection and storage methods. 14 
10 Government estimates for livestock (live weight) in 1917 (Ministerio de Fomento, 1920) 
and manure used in 1919 (ibid., 1921) show: 
Share of nation's livestock (%) Animal manure used (%) 
North 27 25 
Mediterranean 9 13 
Interior 47 50 
Andalucia 17 12 
Spain 100 100 
11 The inclusion of more realistic figures for these provinces would considerably increase 
the advantage enjoyed by the North. 
12 Furthermore, the almost total absence of the vine and olive in the North implies that 
their inclusion would widen even further the difference between this region and the 
other three. 
13 For a discussion of the 1891 livestock census, see Simpson (1995a, pp. 182-3). 
14 Casc6n (1934, pp. 325--6). The remarks are likely to have been valid for all dry-farming 
areas of the country. Animals were frequently kept outside, thus reducing the need for 
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Table 5.1. An estimate of the supply of animal manure in cereal 
cultivation 
A. Area: cereal/legume rotations (thousands of hectares) 
1860 1886/90 1922 1930/5 
North 795 650 810 657 
Mediterranean 1,189 1,241 1,304 1,299 
Interior 8,737 9,591 10,573 11,291 
Andalucia 2,509 2,867 2,674 2,753 
Spain 13,230 14,349 15,361 16,000 
B. Live weight of animals (thousands of tons) 
1865 1891 1917 1933 
North 712 519 701 908 
Mediterranean 245 172 245 293 
Interior 1,590 1,018 1,225 1,479 
Andalucia 469 258 446 502 
Spain 3,016 1,967 2,617 3,182 
C. Potential supply of animal manure per hectare (total live weight"/area cultivated in 
kilograms) 
1865 1886/91 1917122 1930/5 
North 896 798 865 1,403 
Mediterranean 206 139 188 226 
Interior 182 106 116 131 
Andalucia 187 87 167 182 
Spain 228 137 170 199 
D. Wheat yields and potential supply of manure, 190 9/22 
Manure index, 1917122 Soil fertility index' 
North 508 213 
Mediterranean III 113 
Interior 68 87 
Andalucia 98 127 
Spain 100 100 
105 
a Live weight coefficients: horses and mules 0.326 tons, donkeys 0.172 tons, cattle 
0.371 tons, sheep 0.03 tons, goats 0.034 tons and pigs 0.077 ton~ .. 
b Wheat yields for 1909/13 (excluding irrigated land) have been diVided by the fre-
quency of cultivation of all crops in the cereal and legume rotations in 1922 (calculated 
from GEHR, 1991 and 1983b, pp. 308- 18). 
Sources: Area, 1860: DirecciOn General de Contribuciones, 1879 (area cultivated using coef-
ficients of 1886/90); 1890, 1922 and 1930-5: GEHR (1983b, pp. 285-325). Live weight 
coefficients, Flores de Lemus (cited in GEHR, 1978, p. 150), and national census 
figures. 
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Table 5.1 also provides a rough proxy for soil fertility, and indirectly 
an estimate of the success or failure of farmers to improve soils. This 
has been calculated by using wheat yields on non-irrigated land for 
190 91I3 and dividing them by the ratio of sown land to total lands 
within the rotation, to account for differences in the intensity of 
cultivation. 15 To establish more clearly the limitations of traditional 
fertilisers in raising crop yields, we need to examine each of the four 
regions. 
North 
In terms of the potential supply and demand, table 5.1 shows that the 
Nort1;)...receivedabout four or five tim~s more animal manure per hectare 
of cultivat~d landthal)"ib~.·r~~t);n!!~~'OlIDtry~ Furth~~ore, the"small-
scale and labour-intensive nature of farmmgriithe North, together with 
the close integration of arable and pastoral activities, resulted in a higher 
use of animal manure, which is reflected in the index of soil fertility 
(twice that of the national average).16 
Yet the intense cultivation of generally poor soils in the region implies 
that the supply of manure was not enough, and the vegetation from the 
large areas of uncultivated hillsides played a significant role in main-
taining soil fertility by providing bedding for animals and compost. 17 
Both the extension of cultivation and the greater intensity of rotations 
during the nineteenth century resulted in these resources being utilised 
more efficiently, with the growth of private usage instead of commu-
nal. 18 However, although traditional fertilisers produced high yields in 
the North, such intensive farming based on family labour could only be 
achieved if farms were small, which in turn implied that the surplus over 
consumption available for sale was inevitably also small. Furthermore, 
by the late nineteenth century the supply of organic fertilisers was 
manure collection and distribution (assuming that it fell on cultivated land), but reduc-
ing the total weight as straw would be absent. 
15 Thus, annual cultivation is divided by I, bi-annual by 2, etc. Wheat was important 
everywhere, unlike barley, oats, maize or artifical grasses, which varied considerably 
according to local conditions. 
16 The collection of manure was not a time-bound operation and could be carried out 
when the opportunity cost of the farmer's labour was small. Consequently, the small 
family farms of the North were inclined to maximise the use of the potential supply of 
manure, as their employment decisions would be regarded as fixed overhead capital 
cost rather than as a variable cost, unlike the latifundios in the South, which relied on 
wage labour, 
17 In the humid areas of the Basque Country, lime was also used in some areas from the 
late seventeenth century to treat the heavy acidic soils (Fernandez Pinedo, 1974, pp. 
216-19). 
18 For Galicia, see Quintana Garrido (1990, p. 153), 
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becoming increasingly scarce in some areas, implying a significant 
increase in the time spent in collection. 19 
Interior 
The high ~ostof feed and poor cereal yiel4s'}~n,.th~~:ynjrogll-~~d soils in 
tIie-dry"Iii.i:eriorfed'to'~~chl'ovVer animal densities than in the North. 
PopUIiittoifgrowUfiiia-'tismg Wheat pricesttom me"se'condhiilfof the 
elghteenmcenturY"snmulated'gram "productionai'me" expense' of pas-
iiiies~~a'process' further encoUraged by instiiuiioti:arrelorms' which 
r;~-ove"d legal protection of lands which had traditionally been reserved 
for animals. 20 As the area under cereals grew, liv.~stock, d~t\li\iti~sJell, 
from 182 kilogfii;;s of live animal weight per hectare in 1865, to only 
il6 in 1917122, just 68 per cent of the national average.21 
The failure of the Interior to adapt to population pressure by increasing 
yields, and thus achieving falling unit costs, is often considered a major 
characteristic of the nation's agriculture at the turn of the century. The 
small farms of the Interior appear to have attempted to maximise pro-
duction at periods oflow prices, in direct contrast to the large producers in 
Andalucia (see below). Finally, low summer rainfall considerably reduced 
natural vegetation which might have been transformed into compost as in 
the North. It also implied meagre diets for the livestock, reducing in turn 
the quantity of manure produced. In conclusion. the introduction of 
chemical fertili,~ers inJ:beJw.entietli'~c.eiitury presented,at least in theory, a 
vv:ay:-oTIi£~mi.~"consequences o(<ii.J;ninishing re~rn.s. 
Mediterranean 
The dry cereal lands of the Mediterranean showed characteristics simi-
lar to the Interior, namely low livestock densities, small holdings, miser-
able wheat yields and poor utilisation of manure.22 l:low.ever, the com-
parative agY!J,pJ~ge .ofthis.,region, wasjn thep~<i\!~tio,J1. of wine, olive 
·o~Ll!.ri([~arQj;),tl:~eli"QDm~,~~~qil.nP' and a whole variety of crops on the' 
small, but heavily settled irrigated areas. WE,~re.as olives and vines 
required little in th_e.way"QL(ew,li!lers" irrigation implied intensive culti-
.--""""-"-",~",---",-,,,~",~., , , 
19 Carmona Badia (1990, p. 40) argues that shortage of fertilisers was a limiting factor 
in Galicia. 
20 Invasions of common lands, the abolition of the Mesta (1836) and the disentailment 
of common lands from 1855 affected the size of local flocks and herds, (see chapter 3, 
pp, 64-7)· 
21 This was the cereal heartland of Spain, with over two-thirds of the nation's non-
irrigated wheat lands in 1905/9 (table 5.5), 
22 For poor utilisation of manure, see Ministerio de Fomento, (1921, Barcelona: p. 361, 
Tarragona: p. 372, Ueida: p, 380, Girona: p. 394, and Baleares: p. 424). 
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vation and the consumption of large quantities. The limitations on local 
agnculture of an ineIastic supply of organic materials can be seen in 
some of the more densely populated areas of Mediterranean coast as 
early as the eighteenth century. For example, in Burriana (CasteIl6n), 
Cavanilles writes: 
the multitude of irrigated plots (huertas), and the fact that Burriana has no waste 
land at all except the sea shore, has caused a shortage of manure which is 
required for the land and to obtain it, they (i.e. the farmers) turn to disastrous 
methods. One is the excessive frequency by which livestock are allowed to graze 
where they like, irrespective of the clearly stated fines; another is the robbing of 
soil from irrigation channels, diminishing thereby the thickness of the banks to 
the point that they do not have the strength to contain the water, leading to the 
loss of the major part and prejudicing those of Nules; finally another is to make 
holes in the roads to carry the soil to their fields!3 
A later writer of the same province noted how children's education 
was much shorter in areas of irrigation because of the high opportunity 
cost of their labour in collecting organic fertilisers. 24 The high cost of 
manure resulted in the Levante coast being one of the first areas in 
Europe to introduce guano in 1844.25 ~_E.!!.~ ofgy.~.Jh~..Q.9_th 
increased the supply off~~j!~~JPst~g:Qced 13bQl,p::,",<!~m~ permit-
ting a major mcreasem the area of rice on land previously considered 
marginal because of lack of manure.26 
Andalucia 
In Andalucia not only was the animal density low, but the utilisation of 
manure was further reduc~d by thr~e factors: first, tbeexlsletice-of.. 
23 Cavanilles (1795-7, I, p. 107). 
24 'In towns where irrigation predominates, the labourers' children from six years old are 
already being used to collect rubbish for fertilisers. In areas of secano, they do not 
usually work until they are twelve.' (Junta de Agricultura de la Provincia de Casrellim, 
AMA legajo 123, cited in Garrabou, 1985, p. 194.) This was also the situation in Murcia 
during the early part of the twentieth century (Ministerio de Fomento, 1921, p. 453). 
See also Caballero (1864, p. 59). 
25 Polo de Bemabe wrote in 1846 that: 'This task (of collecting fertilisers) increases each 
day because of the growth in cultivation in many villages and, happily, when the need 
for more fertilisers was thought to have been almost impossible to find, the import of 
guano into the country has overcome the greatest and most urgent of agriculture's 
needs; it has led to the enrichment of the inhabitants of some areas, and improved the 
lot of almost all their farmers', cited in Giralt i Raventos, (1978, p. 76). Apart from 
the important role in introducing guano into Spain, Polo de Bemabe also introduced 
the mandarin, leading Giralt to refer to him as a 'gentleman farmer' (ibid., p. 76). 
Imports of guano into the Levante had reached 20,849 tons by 1862/5 (Porqueras 
Gimenez, cited in Garrabou, 1985, p. 45). See also Mateu Tortosa (1993). 
2. See chapter 6. Polo in 1844 estimated guano as being a third of the price of 'abonos 
comunes', although transport from the port increased its final price to farmers (Giralt 
i Raventos, 1978, p. 75). 
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ranching, which implied a separatio!lbetweenlivesrockdand.arable,and 
the consequent loss of animarmanure to the latter/7 second, the much 
larger farms were worked mainly by seasonal labour, and it seems likely 
that farmers viewed the marginal cost of collecting and spreading the 
manure as being greater than the marginal revenue obtained from the 
larger harvests;28 and finally, significant distances were to be found 
between towns and the outlying fields. 29 However, unlike the Interior, 
the predominance of large farms implied that in periods of low cereal 
prices, farmers were more likely to reduce the intensity of cultivation as 
the marginal cost of labour rose, thus reducing the risks of soil exhaus-
tion. S~~~~th~r~(Qr~~!ll"~ia!l!:~.~~<>~~.,~~!=~~,~~,~~:~!,t~~~tio~: 
Chemical fertilisers - a slow revolution30 
The useoLchemicalfettilis~x.:sj!l.~pain8J:e\V r!lPi~bl, increasing from 
about 50,000 tons in the early 1890S to 1.3 million tons by the early 
1930S.31 Yet as table 5.2 suggests, use of all three major elements 
(nitrogen, phosphate and potash) remained low by European standards, 
with only a quarter of the phosphates and nitrogen being applied to the 
soil compared with what was believed to have been required, and less 
than a tenth of the potassium required. 
However, there were marked differences in the use of chemical 
fertilisers on the eve of the Civil War (table 5.3). In the North, where 
the supply of organic fertilisers had been appreciably greater than in 
the other regions, chemical fertiliser consumption was concentrated 
in the Basque Country and Santander, with the amounts used in 
Galicia being minimal (maps 10-12). The Interior was the region 
where most chemical fertilisers. were used, accounting for 666,000 
rons,··o"'r "half theIlati~~;l-;~~~~;;ptio"[l. Yet given this region's greater 
area of cultivation, the figures are equivalent to only 63 kilograms of 
phosphates, 14 kilograms of nitrogen and 2 kilograms of potassium 
per hectare sown. These figures are not dissimilar to the third region, 
Andalucia, with again much larger quantities of phosphates being 
applied to the soil than nitrogen or potassium. Finally, consumption 
27 Ministerio de Fomento (1921, Cadiz: p. 524). 
28 In Sevilla it was suggested that manure was not used because of the availabilty of chemi-
cal fertilisers, especially superphosphates. Fertilisers were used here primarily to save 
labour (ibid., p. 520). 
29 In general, most manure would be concentrated on irrigated land and the relatively 
small areas of intensive cultivation around towns and farmhouses (e.g. ibid., Jaen: p. 
474, Malaga: p. 485, Cordoba: p. 537)· 
30 Chemical fertilisers are taken to include all non-organic fertilisers, including mineral 
fertilisers. 
31 Gallego (1986, pp. 218-19). 
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Table 5.3. Consumption of chemical fertilisers in Spain, 1930a 
I. Consumption in 1930 (thousands of tons) 
Phosphates Nitrogen 
North 51 3 
Interior 534 119 
Andalucia 176 28 
Mediterranean 211 154 
Spain 972 303 
2. Consumption in 1930 (% of total) 
Phosphates Nitrogen 
North 5·2 1.0 
Interior 54·9 39.1 
Andalucia 18.1 9·2 
Mediterranean 21.7 50·7 
3. Consumption in 1930 (kg per hectare sown)' 
Phosphates Nitrogen 
North 49 3 
Interior 63 14 
Andalucia 53 8 
Mediterranean 90 66 
Spain 65 22 
a The Canary Islands have been excluded. 
• Includes all land except natural pasture and unsown fallow. 
Source: AEPA (1930, pp. 290-1 and 302-3)' 
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in the Mediterranean accounted for 387,000 tons or 30 per cent of 
the total, equivalent to 90 kilograms of phosphates per hectare sown, 
60 kilograms of nitrogen and 9 kilograms of potassium, appreciably 
more than that of the other regions. As shown in maps loa-c, the 
provinces of Valencia and Barcelona consumed considerably more 
than elsewhere.32 
Although. the develepment QLc4~roi~f1,1 f~r.tm~~.~,r~,~,~£$:q .. ro$..J!HPl?'!~ 
price of plant nutrients for their successful use farmers hJid tpl~ -..~,.,,~, _, _ ,_ w~,""", V'I> .~, __ .,",~"";''''''-'L-''Ii,,"'i'''''''''''''''\·' __ '~. __ '; ",,,,-.,,,,, •• , •• ";, , .. ~",., ""', ~.',-. '-.,' .r".-. ".' ., • 
about . ilie"·'"pot.enQ.~J .... .9f .. JjUI~tcm,L~~D,qfli£tyI~_~ ,..IU:Q9:!!~~l_ ,in 
retU!2E-!2:~5!ir .specific.so.il .. C,!:lQ,rugQ!!§J.~~~(LYJlP.eti.es. and crop .Illix . 
In a country where 48 per cent of the inhabitaIJ,t!l, w~e,.il1ite.tau:._on 
.".~ ...... ~",".-.".-"""<'"-'"'''~,~,~,..''-.' ",'". ,''< ... ,~"" • • 
32 Highest consumption, however, was in the Canary Islands, with 170 kilograms of phos-
phates, 300 of nitrogen and 120 of potassium . 
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the.,"~.Y~.~Q,cm~.FjmmW:Ql'w.,~W.ftF1~pr~88wwould.",U1ex;\~J?Jx~~.~~ slow. 33 
···'11ie first serious attempts to introduce chemical fertilisers iir'5'fJain 
appear to have been made in the 1880s in the Mediterranean, especially 
around Valencia, with the replacing of guano in the paddy fields and 
orange groves.34 Chemical fertilisers offered two major advantages com-
pared with org~~~.~,g!l~iL·~~i~~~ .. a 'hlgh' ~~.~~~C~~Il:te,~i:t'<?~iVefgnt 
faffo~"'anatlleycould be adapted to the soil and to the plants' individual 
requiiemeIlts.Ji;;;ever,'r!<£farmers in Valencia in the 1880s initially 
f6'Giia"aifncufnes in achieving a correct balance of fertilisers, with the 
result that yields remained stagnant or even fell in some areas.35 
Likewise, orange growers also had problems in using the new chemical 
fertilisers, although once the initial difficulties had been overcome, they 
contributed significantly to the rapid growth in the area of the crop.36 
The obtaining of scientific information and its diffusion was the result 
of both publicly funded experimental stations and private chemical ferti-
liser interests. In the case of rice, significant research was carried out by 
the Estaciim Arrocera de Sueca founded in the 1880s. Elsewhere in Spain, 
the highly esteemed experimental and teaching farm in Zaragoza at the 
end of the nineteenth century investigated the role of chemical fertilisers 
on irrigated soils, especially for the growing of sugar beet and red 
clover.37 In Granada, Martin Rodriguez notes the rapid growth of sugar 
beet from the late 1880s, and the inelastic supply of manure made it 
necessary to use chemical fertilisers, which the 'farmers did not know 
33 NWiez (1992, p. 94). 
3' Imports of guano to the Levante fell from an average of 17,000 tons to a tenth of that 
figure between 1893/9 and 19061I3; total imports of all fertilisers doubled between the 
two dates (Garrabou, 1985, p. 46). By the 1880s, rice was a firmly established crop, 
but oranges were only just beginning to be of commercial importance. 
35 Crisis AITocera (1887, p. 73). One author believed that the exclusive use of guano led 
eventually to a lack of potash in the soil and falling yields. However, as a producer of 
chemical fertilisers himself, perhaps this author had reasons to exaggerate the decline 
in yields. (Utor, no date, but between 1873 and 1887). In the years immediately preced-
ing the First World War, it was believed that the secret to high yields lay in the use of 
sulfato amonico, but when prices increased, its partial substitution with superphos-
phates led to 'equally or greater' harvests (Ministerio de Fomento 1921, pp. 430-1). A 
later writer, however, would doubt the need to use potash as a fertiliser in rice culti-
vation, given the type of soils in Valencia (Font de Mora, 1939, p. 124). 
3. For the early difficulties in using chemical fertilisers in Valencia, see Arevalo y Baca 
(1886, pp. 5-{), quoted in Calatayud, 1989a, p. 73). 
37 The Granja-Instituto was founded by the royal decree of 14 May 1881, and its first 
experimental work dates from 1885 and 1886 (Granja-Instituto de Zaragoza, 1906, pp. 
xxi). The first two directors, Otero and Rodriguez Ayuso published widely the results 
of the Granja in Spain. By 1900 there were other Granja-Instituto's in operation in 
Barcelona, La Corufta, Jerez and Valencia, and Estaciones de Viticultura y Enologia in 
Ciudad Real, Haro, Palencia and Toro, together with the Estaci6n Agronomica delInsti-
tuto Agricola de Alfonso XII in Madrid. 
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how to use'. ~.~ As a result, local sugar factories set up a 'parallel business' 
of producing and marketing fertilisers, using as a base the remains of 
sugar beet.39 In all these cases, chemical fertilise.~.~.fJ:~. ~s<:ompaqic;g b~ 
the use of irrigation and high yieTd:crops wruch, in the case of Granada 
ancrZaragoia;-were~new·t(r·ilie··region;t:u'lt'was ···n;t"·~tiTi9~5';~n 
jos~Casc6n was given the task'of est~bii~hing an experimental farm in 
Palencia, that the question of chemical fertilisers and dry farming was 
given any serious consideration by the authorities. 
Research into chemical fertilisers and their use was also carried out 
by private initiative. Martin Rodriguez's work on sugar beet in Granada 
shows clearly the role of highly capitalised food processing industries in 
the provision of technical instruction (and materials) on such matters as 
fertilisers and seeds, to insure an adequate supply of raw materials of a 
predetermined quality for the new factories. In 1903, the Sindicato de 
potasa de Strassjurt became operational in Madrid, and six years later 
claimed to have given free fertilisers and technical advice to more than 
2,000 farmers for testing throughout the country, and distributed over 
400,000 copies of its pamphiets.40 Finally, though the list could be con-
siderably extended, Luis Utor, producer of chemical fertilisers and an 
industrial engineer, wrote one of the first books on the advantages of 
chemical fertilisers for Spanish farmers. 41 
The uneven regional consumption of chemical fertilisers noted in 
table 5·3 and maps lo--I2 is in part the result of differences in the inter-
action between manufacturers, distributors, agricultural research 
centres and farmers. Yet table 5.4 suggests that a major factor determin-
ing chemical fertiliser usage was also the distribution and concentration 
of different crops within the country. 'Intensive' crops covered 13 per 
cent of the nation's sown area and consumed 34 per cent of phosphates, 
57 per cent of nitrogen and 76 per cent of potassium. The Mediterran-
ean, with 18 per cent of the nation's cultivated area, had 77 per cent of 
the country's market gardening and fruit trees .. :IhC!refore ... althoughfar-
II?--2_I}~~~s! s,1:lffi~~ent technical knowledge and supplies of suitably 
priced fertilisers, the incentive to use them appears to have t)eerigreatest 
in areas of intensive cultivation. 
38 Martin Rodriguez (1982 p. 209). 
39 LOpez-Rubio appears to have been one of the first, and in 1892/3 profits from his ferti-
liser business were higher than those from sugar beet production. Competition soon 
grew, until the firm Carrillo y Compailia in 1900 obtained control of the local market 
(Martin Rodriguez, 1982, p. 209). These fertilisers were based on residues from the 
sugar mills and artifical fertilisers. 
40 EPAPM 7/1/1909. 
41 Utor (no date, but cited in Crisis Arrocera, 1887, p. 118). 
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Table 5-4. Use of chemical fertilisers by crop type, I933 (kg per hectare)a,b 
Phosphates Nitrogen Potassium 
Cereals and legumes 60 16 I 
Intensive crops' 170 121 26 
Vines and olives 18 8 
Artificial pasture 88 5 0 
a The Canary Islands have been excluded. 
b The Ministry's estimate of fertiliser consumption for each crop must be considered as 
only very approximate. 
, Includes root and industrial crops, market gardening and fruit trees. 
Sources: Calculated from Ministerio de Agricultura (1934, pp. 176-7) and AEPA (1933, 
pp. 346-7)· 
To test the hypothesis that an important element of demand was the 
presence of intensive crops, a regression has been carried out using the 
relative value of intensive crop production in each province as the 
dependant variable and the relative value of fertiliser used as the inde-
pendent variable, for the year 1932. All provinces of 'dry' Spain have 
been included, but not those of the North or Canary Islands, given their 
much higher supplies of organic fertilisers. The results give a significant 
correlation coefficient of 0.85, with an R2 of 0.72. These results tend to 
confirm the statement that fertilisers were used mainly with intensive 
crop cultivation. The delay in the use of chemical fertilisers on the dry 
cereal land, in contrast to those irrigated in the Interior, was noted by 
contemporaries.42 
Yet if most government and private resources were devoted to irri-
gated crops, artificial fertilisers were also initially considered as the solu-
tion to the low yields of the secano. In particular, phosphates were seen 
as a remedy to the soil exhaustion experienced in various parts of Cas-
tilla la Vieja and Aragon.43 The relatively low usage of chemical ferti-
lisers in comparison with northern Europe (table 5.2) and Spain's low 
cereal yields are often considered as evidence of technological failure. 
To explain why farmers in Spain's secano did not use more chemical 
fertilisers, we need to consider the potential for technical change in its 
wider aspects. 
In the first instance, although comments on the potential benefits of 
fertilisers abound in the Spanish farming press, prior to the First World 
42 For example, Ilern writing in EPAPM, 1909, no. 647, p. 606. 
43 Rodriguez Ayuso (1897, reprinted in Granja-Instituto de Zaragoza, 1906, p. 439). See 
also Lapazaran (1918, cited in Pinilla Navarro, 1990, p. 277 for Aragon). 
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War most refer to experiments that had taken place in northern Europe, 
especially France, and under conditions very different to those found in 
Spain's secano.44 One notable exception was that produced under dry-
farming conditions of the Granja-Experimental in Palencia in 1910, 
where it was claimed that an extra 255 pesetas per hectare invested in 
fertilisers and their complements produced a return of 1.7 tons more 
wheat, or 422 pesetas, in comparison to the return on local fanns using 
traditional methods.45 However, conditions on the experimental fann 
appear to have been exceptional, and as late as 1976/80 average wheat 
yields in this province for secano were still only 1.65 tons, or two-thirds 
of that reportedly achieved on the experimental fann some sixty years 
earlier. A second factor was enforcement of product quality control, 
because the opportunity for fraud was especially great with mixed ferti-
lisers. The government decree of 1900 had allowed, on the initiative of 
the consumers, the right to test the content of fertilisers in the ten exist-
ing official laboratories. The 1919 report, however, indicates that this 
had had only a limited affect, and new legislation in the same year 
strengthened controls, allowing the initiative to check fertilisers to be 
extended to official bodies.46 Only with time did fanners acquire the 
technical infonnation required for successful use of chemical fertilisers, 
so that demand was sufficient to allow specialised manufacturers to be 
able to establish reputable brand names. 
A third factor was that of price. Whereas in the major cities of Madrid 
or &~i~a"sUpeil)"hosphates'\ve~e under 220 pesetas per ton in 1921, 
in the important wheat producing provinces ofValladolid the price was 
252 pesetas, in Zaragoza 283 pesetas, and in Albacete 328 pesetas.47 
Furthennore, most of the demand from cereal fanning was found in the 
Interior, but production of superphosphates took place on the Mediter-
ranean coast.48 However, over time, changes in the relative price offerti-
lisers undoubtedly encouraged their greater use. Figure 5.1 shows that, 
with the exception of the First World War, use of superphosphates 
became increasingly more profitable in wheat production. The growing 
.. See, for example, Uorente (1899). 
45 Fertilisers and complementaries relate to soil fertility, and include both organic and 
inorganic fertilisers and their distribution, the use of seed drills and differences in land 
preparation. As some 300 kilograms of superphosphates and 100 kilograms each of 
nitrogen and potash were used, these soils must have been more receptive to artificial 
fertilisers than most. The land also benefited from heavy manuring. The experimental 
farm also enjoyed greater economies in the harvesting and threshing of the harvest, but 
these have been excluded from the calculation (Cascon, 1934, pp. 456-7). 
46 Real Decreto 1919, article 11. By this date, official government laboratories were in oper-
ation in 55 towns (article 25). The level of fraud appears greatest in those provinces 
outside the main centres of consumption. 
47 Anuario Estadistico de Espaila (1921-2, 7, p. 195). 
48 Nadal (1985, p. 100). 
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Figure 5.1 Superphosphate price relative to wheat price, 1901-34 
(three-year averages used; 190012 = 100) 
Sources: EPAPM (1928, pp. 254 and 328); Paris Eguilaz (1943, pp. 35 
and 63). 
numbers of cooperatives (which obtained fertilisers more cheaply 
because of bulk purchases, provided the technical expertise to check the 
quality, and gave instructions to fanners on their use) and the favourable 
price movements both help to explain the increasing use of superphos-
phates on Spain's secano. 
What figure 5.1 does not show, of course, is whether fanners should 
have increased their fertiliser usage even more. To answer this question, 
we need to know what the limited quantities of chemical fertilisers used 
actually achieved. Greater use in cereal fanning might produce three 
possible results. First, rotations and the area cultivated could remain 
constant but yields increase; second, whilst the area cultivated and yields 
remain constant, the frequency of sowing (intensity of the rotation) 
increased; and finally, average yields and frequency of sowing might 
remain constant, but artificial fertilisers might allow an increasing quan-
tity of previously marginal land to be brought under the plough. 
Figure 5.2 shows that wheat yields in Spain during the first thirty 
years of the twentieth century grew by less than 10 per cent, averaging 
0.85 tons on dry land, and 1.75 on irrigated land, with a national average 
120 
ft 
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Figure 5.2 Wheat yields, 1890-1933 (five-year averages used) 
Source: AEPA (various years) 
on all of 0.90.49 Total production nevertheless increased by a hefty 1.06 
million tons, or 33 per cent between 1900/4 and 1931/4, making Spain 
Europe's fourth largest wheat producer. 50 The figure also suggests, how-
ever, that important yield increases occurred at the end of the nineteenth 
century, and this has led a number of authors to see th~, .. PS!i"'5>.9.JJJ~ ..... 
1.936 _~ a successful period of growth, with both total production and . 
average farm yields increasing. 51 However, whereas total production cer-
tainly increased, and cereal, farmers did change prOductiOn methods 6y 
slowlymttoQucmg15<Sn'l cnemi'cal fertilisers and new machill~:It:iinQt 
!!s clear that wheat yields "'enjoyed a major increase in the~period. In' 
the first place,· contemporanes themselves remained sceptical about the 
accuracy of the early estimates of wheat production. 52 Second, even if 
cereal yields did grow during the period 1886/90 and 1898iI902, it is 
possible that this was simply a recovery to levels that had been 
reached during an earlier period.53 Finally, in the unlikely event that 
the yield increase between 1886/90 and 1898iI902 is not simply a 
statistical illusion, the increase could not have been caused by chemical 
'9 Dry-fanning accounted for almost 90 per cent of total wheat production. 
50 After France, Italy and Germany (Malenbaum, 1953, pp. 238-9). 
51 See especially GEHR (1983b, pp. 304-6). 
52 For the 1890s, see Arrazola (1896), Sanz (1981) and Simpson (1989a). 
53 The 1886/90 yields were poor because, 'in most provinces, drought and other unfavour-
able weather, and even plant diseases, have not been favourable to production' 
(Direcci6n General de Agricultura, 1891a, 3, p. 594). The yield for 1886/90 of 0.8 tons, 
however, may be excessive, as in the absence of an area sown, I have used the average 
for 1891/5. 
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fertilisers, as only 143,000 tons were available to all Spanish farmers 
by the later period. 54 To avoid these problems of interpretation, this 
study of the wheat farmers' response to the opportunities presented by 
chemical fertilisers will be limited to the periods 1905/9 and 
1930/4.55 
Most of the increase in non-irrigated wheat production during the 
first thirty years of the twentieth century was achieved through 
extending the area sown, the rest being achieved through improved 
yields on land already under cultivation. Table 5.5, however, 
suggests that there were very strong regional contrasts. In the North, 
a region which accounted for less than 3 per cent of all output, the 
area sown fell and yields increased, and in the Mediterranean, with 
between 6 and 7 per cent of output, most of the growth in output 
was also achieved through better yields. It was in the two major 
regions of production, Andalucia (about 18 per cent of total) and the 
Interior (60 per cent), where the contrasts are most apparent. In 
Andalucia, non-irrigated wheat production grew by some 19 per cent, 
but the area fell marginally. By contrast, the Interior's wheat produc-
tion grew by 44 per cent, and the area sown by 37 per cent. In 
Andalucia the use of chemical fertilisers (and, their complements, 
especially better ploughs), appears to have led to better yields, 
whereas in the Interior they tended to be used to extend the area 
cultivated. 56 
If yield improvements were not the prime cause of the increased 
output of wheat, it is possible that the greater use of chemical fertilisers 
was instrumental in the reduction of fallow used in cereal and legume 
cultivation. The measurement of uncultivated land within the rotation 
poses significant problems for historians. However, with the exception 
of Andalucia, it would appear from table 5.5 that there was very little 
shortening of the period under fallow. Dry-farming in the Interior and 
the Mediterranean remained essentially biennual. In the case of Andalu-
cia, the estimates of GEHR suggest that the area sown within the 
rotation grew from 52 per cent in 1903/12 to over 60 per cent of the land 
by 1930/5, a figure greatly at odds with critics of the region's agricultural 
5. Gallego (1986, p. 218). 
55 Dry-farming wheat yields averaged 0.83 tons in the five-year period 1900/04, and 0.82, 
0.82, 0.86, 0.85, 0.87 and 0.90 in the following six periods. This study therefore com-
pares the lowest (0.82 in 190519) with the highest (0.90 in 1930/4). 
56 Within these regions there were naturally contrasts. In both eastern and western Andal-
ucia the area sown remained constant, but whereas in the east yields actually fell by 
17 per cent, in the west they rose by 61 per cent. This might either be due to a rearrange-
ment of crops, with the strong growth of the olive in the east taking place on previously 
fertile wheat lands, or due to statistical inaccuracies for the period 190519. 
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Table 5.6. Wheat production in selected countries, 19091I3 and 192519 
Area sown (ha) 
Yields (tons per 
hectare) 
Spain 
Four exporters" 
Three European 
countries· 
100 
100 
100 
II2 
140 
90 
0·92 
0·95 
1.34 
" Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States. 
• France, Gertnany and Italy. 
Sources: IIA International Yearbooks (1924-5 and 1933-4)· 
1.47 
Exports (+) and 
imports (-) as % 
of national output 
-3·4 
+29·5 
n.d. 
-3.1 
+43·9 
practices in this period. 57 Although it is clear that rotations did shorten 
in some areas of Andalucia, especially in the rich lands of the Campifta 
during the 1920S, very large tracts of land were sown little more than 
once every three years. 58 
Instead, Spanish farmers used the growing quantity of chemical ferti-
lisers on the secano to increase cereal output through an extension of 
the area sown. Therefore. the traditional ~gricu.Jturalll\lPplY response of _~~tendinB th;-ara£iiiti.'iillii.J~;··.~an __ ~.£!~a.s~g .. i.t.~.inif;~~i!Y~ 
remained valid in much of Spain not just until the late nineteenth cen-
tury, but until the 1960s (table 11.4). In this respect Spain was not 
alone. The use of new seed and fertiliser technologies to increase the 
area cultivated, rather than improve yields, can be shown comparing 
the experience in Spain with four wheat exporting nations (Argentina, 
Australia, Canada and the United States) with three of Europe's largest 
producers (France, Germany and Italy) between 1909!I3 and 1925129 
(table 5.6). 
The experience of Spanish wheat farmers followed that of the 
exporting countries, with stagnant yields but increases in the area sown, 
albeit on a significantly more moderate scale. By contrast, Europe's 
three largest producers reduced the area cultivated by 10 per cent, 
57 In Seviila, the area sown given by GEHR reached 69 per cent in 1930/5, a figure which 
not even the most optimistic supporters of its agriculture would have accepted in the 
debate on the land refortn during the Second Republic. In contrast, Pascual Carrion 
suggested that over 60,000 hectares were still devoted to shifting cultivation, more than 
100,000 hectares to al tercio, and some 233,740 hecrares to dehesas in this province in 
this period (Carrion, 1975, p. 339)· 
58 For the Campifta in the 1920S, see Sumpsi (1978). 
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allowing yields to grow by a similar amount, leaving them some 60 per 
cent higher than Spain's in 1925129.59 
I do not possess sufficiently detailed sources to measure the degree to 
which cereal farmers were rational in their response to the potential of 
artificial fertilisers. However, in the couple of decades following the 
1936-9 Civil War, two factors became apparent. First, perhaps a sixth 
of the nation's wheat lands were totally dependent on artificial fertilisers 
for cultivation by 1936, implying that in their absence - this land would 
return to rough pasture (see table 1I.4 below). This growth in the area 
of cultivated land helped to improve the land to labour ratios, especially 
in the Interior, which in turn encouraged mechanisation (chapter 7). 
Second, although consumption per hectare of artificial fertilisers was 
small, especially in comparison with northern Europe, so too was the 
marginal physical product of fertilisers in Spain's secano. According to 
government figures in table 5.2, Spain used only 20 per cent of the 
phosphates, and 28 per cent of the nitrogen required to be technically 
efficient. However, a later study of a region in the Interior (the north 
Meseta) shows that yields were responsive only to a maximum input of 
30 kilogramslhectare of nitrogen and phosphates each, suggesting that 
inputs of phosphates perhaps were not especially low, and nitrogen 
usage was only about half the technical ideal by the 1930s.60 Even if the 
example of the north Meseta cannot be extended to the rest of the 
country, there can be no doubt that given Spain's climatic conditions 
and its traditional seed varieties, there was no real possibility of greatly 
increasing wheat yields using dry-farming techniques. If market prices 
suggest that more resources should have been used for wheat farming, 
Spanish wheat farmers appear to have been perfectly rational in 
extending the area cultivated, just as their contemporaries were doing 
in the Americas. Whether it was correct for the government to stimulate 
the input of more resources into wheat through its manipulation of the 
price mechanism is another question, and one to which we shall return 
in chapter 10. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, I!Jthqllgh there, W~l:e !)ignifi.canu:egion~l 
y'J!Jjl!:ti~~,s'Illost Spanish farmers used~relatively small 9.u~miti~~Qfbo!h. 
organic and chemical fertiliserS prior to the Civil Wl!l".-ln-tl:le..~orth, 
~lirgher aiid better distribution of rainfall permitted mixed husbandry and 
59 The real gap of course was even larger, given the fact that much of Spain's wheat land 
was sown only once every two years. 
60 See chapter 11. 
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advanced systems of compost production to be practised, which helped 
to reinforce the self-sufficiency of much of its agriculture. On the irri-
gated land, especially in the Mediterranean, labour-intensive methods 
of obtaining organic fertilisers were substituted first by the imports of 
guano, and later by chemical fertilisers. By contrast, the Interior lacked 
sufficient rainfall for intensive livestock husbandry and had low chemical 
fertiliser consumption. Consumption of such fertilisers, however, did 
permit a growth in cereal output through an extension of the area culti-
vated, with yields remaining stagnant. Finally, in Andalucia, changes in 
crop mix (with a greater diffusion of olives on marginal cereal lands), 
and the introduction of chemical fertilisers, allowed some small 
improvements in cereal yields. 
This suggests a major contrast between the relatively heavy consump-
tion of chemical fertilisers in the small areas of dynamic intensive com-
mercial agriculture, and the small quantities of chemical and organic 
fertilisers used elsewhere.61 Valencian rice and orange growers, as their 
admirers noted, had little to learn from foreign technology or methods. 
The same was perhaps less true of Spanish sugar beet production, but 
farming methods were significantly more advanced than those of the 
traditional cereal farmers. 62 However, in these examples, greater ferti-
liser usage was only one of a number of inter-related changes, and with-
out accompanying changes in other areas, such as the provision of irri-
gation, introduction of new crops or strains of seeds, or improved 
marketing systems, the use of chemical fertilisers would have been con-
siderably smaller. By contrast, the relatively low consumption of arti-
ficial fertilisers on the large areas of dry cereal farming appears connec-
ted to the low level of response of the traditional seed varieties, a 
problem not solved until the 1960s. This technical bottleneck implied 
that only three alternatives existed to increasing agricultural productivity 
on Spain's secano: irrigation, mechanisation of labour tasks in cereals, 
and growth through labour-intensive crops such as the olive and vine 
which were suitable on these soils. These will be considered in turn in 
chapters 6, 7 and 9· 
61 The exception was the North where intensive systems of organic fertilisers were used 
until the end of the period. 
62 One contemporary noted that 'the introduction of this crop has promoted more the 
use of fertilisers and machinery than all the other crops in Spain together' (EPAPM, 
7/2/1909, no. 614, p. 73)· 
6 Intensive cultivation and irrigation -
a solution to low productivity? 
The potential advantage to Spanish fanners of a long growing season 
(hot summers and mild winters), especially on the Mediterranean coast, 
is limited by summer drought. From the Roman period, if not before, 
small irrigation schemes using simple technology and surface water had 
allowed some fanners to overcome this restriction, producing higher 
yields and a wider variety of crops. These irrigation systems had been 
greatly extended during the Muslim occupation and new crops (rice, 
oranges, mulberries, sugar cane and cotton) introduced. The first sec-
tion of this chapter shows that the general international interest in the 
construction of major irrigation schemes at the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries was shared by many Spaniards, 
and seen by some as the key to solving the nation's agricultural prob-
lems. However, significant problems existed in the extension of irri-
gation fanning. In the remainder of the chapter, I compare the success 
of an area of traditional irrigation, Valencia, with the difficulties in 
extending the area of irrigation in a relatively new area, that of the Ebro 
valley. 
Although intensive irrigation cultivation had existed for centuries in 
Valencia, the half century prior to the Civil War saw fanners not only 
extending the area, but also introducing high-value crops (especially the 
orange), and changing production methods (fertilisers, selected seeds, 
machinery, tube-wells, etc.) in response to changes in factor and prod-
uct markets. By contrast, the extension of irrigation in the Ebro Basin 
suffered frequently from both insufficient water during summer months, 
and lack of technical assistance to farmers. This resulted in traditional 
cereal rotations and olives being grown on irrigated land. It was not 
until the experimental farming in Zaragoza at the end of the nineteenth 
century showed the possibilities of sugar beet that new crops began to 
play a more prominent role. I conclude that although irrigation was 
essential for improved productivity, water alone was not enough. New 
inputs - fertilisers, seeds, machinery - were also required, together with 
crops that could be sold profitably. In this respect the extension of irri-
126 
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fable 6.1. Irrigation systems in Spain, 1916 
<;urface water 
I. Diverted from rivers, streams, canals, etc. 
~. As above, but raised mechanically 
3. Diverted from deposits, reservoirs, lakes, etc. 
Sub-total 
Groundwater 
4. Springs 
5. Wells and pumps 
6. Horizontal shafts 
7. Artesian wells 
Sub-total 
Total 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (1918, 2, pp. 398-9). 
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Area % of 
(hectares) total 
857,090 62.7 
26,913 2.0 
80,690 5·9 
964,693 70.6 
239,268 17·5 
98,516 7.2 
36,664 2·7 
27,300 2.0 
401,748 29·4 
1,336,441 100.0 
gation in Spain, although naturally limited by government budgetary 
constraints and the technical shortcomings of fanners, perhaps faced a 
greater short-tenn barrier in the lack of potential crops and markets. 
Water resources, irrigation and crop production in 
Spain 
The irrigation technology used in Spain in the 1760s relied mainly on 
simple channels constructed to divert wate~ from sp~gs, streams ~r 
rivers. In a few cases, such as the Canal Impenal of Aragon, or the Acequta 
Real del Jitcar, ambitious and expensive canals had been constructed, 
although they were not always used exclusively f~r irri,gatio.n. Else~here, 
such as around Valdepenas or the Vinaroz-Berucarlo plam, nonas and 
senias were a conspicuous part of the landscape. 1 The most complete 
statistical breakdown of irrigation systems before the Civil War was that 
of 1916 (table 6.1), which shows that still over four-fifths of the area 
irrigated (82.2 per cent) received water by simply diverting surface or 
spring water (groups I, 2 and 4, and hereafter referred to a.s 'traditio~al 
irrigation'). Water which had been stored for later use (a~ m reserv01rs, 
group 3) accounted for less than 6 per cent, and the drawmg of ~und­
water by systems other than springs, only 12 per cent. Unhke, for 
1 Townsend (1791, 2, p. 287) and Cavani1les (1795-7, 1, pp. 36-9)· 
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example, the Nile in Egypt, Spanish rivers had substantially less water 
in the summer months than the winter, precisely the time of year when 
irrigation was most in demand. 
Along the Mediterranean coast, a number of highly developed surface 
irrigation schemes had existed for centuries, often involving complex 
water management systems and intensive crop cultivation. During the 
nineteenth century, the State attempted to encourage new irrigation 
schemes by providing financial incentives and creating the framework 
for local water management by farmers themselves. In particular, the 
Ley de Aguas of 1879 allowed tax concessions on newly irrigated land, 
permitted expropriation of land when public water with a flow of more 
than 200 litres per second was used, and established the legal framework 
for self-governing water boards. The legislation of 1883 for the first time 
provided state subsidies of up to 50 per cent for all major construction 
work, and loans of a further 50 per cent, at an annual 3 per cent interest, 
to irrigation associations for the preparation of land for irrigation pur-
poses. The result was that the 1880s witnessed a construction boom in 
reservoirs, with eleven finished during the decade, although their size 
was generally smalP However, it was enough to lead two distinguished 
Italian hydraulic engineers, Zoppi and Torricelli, to note enthusiastically 
in their report to the Italian Government in 1883 that:3 
We are fully persuaded that Spain, from the point of view of the technique of 
irrigated crops and of the necessary equipment is so far advanced that no other 
European State can rank with it. The fact which drew our attention and which 
led us to investigate the causes was the great development of irrigation works in 
Spain and especially in the costly form of artificial lakes. At a number of points 
on the peninsula new reservoirs are under construction or projected, and con-
sortia have already been formed for their utilization. 
Yet despite the enthusiasm of Torricelli and Zoppi, the new schemes 
undertaken were usually financial failures and, as table 6.2 shows, con-
~!!J:l~!i(;m"yy~~,~I'?~,R~<:>E~~"the F.irst World~ar. Jot,Sluin Costa, the 
leadmg Sparush writer on Irrigation policy in the nineteenth century, 
noted that the high initial investment required in hydraulic projects and 
the long-term payback implied that only the government was capable 
of financing the building of reservoirs and canal systems. Costa ident-
ified two potential areas of profits from irrigation: the distribution of 
water, and the added revenue obtained by farmers from their greatly 
increased production. Private companies could only benefit from the 
2 The two largest were Puentes (irrigation) and Villar (drinking water) (Nadal Reimat, 
1981, p. 152). 
3 Cited in Ferrari (1926, pp. 398--9). 
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former (and smaller of the two), and this had frequently not been suf-
ficient to cover costs, leading to a number of important financial failures 
in the construction industry.4 By contrast the State could benefit also 
from the greatly increased tax revenue which irrigation would bring. 5 
One limitation to irrigation, as is apparent in table 6.2, is that the 
principai hYdr.a@ic~!lchem~~:9f me period 179O-19Jl~Qnsisted Qfbuild-
ing canals, nQt reservoirs. By the late nineteenth century, the provision 
ordistrlbution channels alone was not sufficient as growing demand for 
water meant shortages during the periods of maximum demand (i.e. the 
summer).6 Although one potential, short-term solution was the better 
organisation of water usage by farmers, in the long term, reservoir con-
struction was required to store the winter rains. In this respect, the 
building of major reservoirs in a number of countries (for example, 
Egypt, India and the United States) offered examples of the potential of 
the new construction technologies, and Spain sent engineers to report. 7 
Although Spain had a long history of construction of small storage dams 
and barrages, the greater size of dams required to meet demand posed 
formidable technical and financial problems. In the first instance, dam 
construction was often required in inaccessible parts of the country at 
the headstreams of rivers, implying an additional large investment in 
the provision of suitable infrastructure. A second factor was that Spain, 
especially in the Mediterranean area, was prone to flooding that could 
increase normal river flow by a thousand times. This meant that the 
capacity of the dams had to be much greater than would otherwise be 
required.8 Finally, heavy flooding contributed to soil erosion, a problem 
exacerbated in Spain in the nineteenth century by deforestation, which 
in turn led to large quantities of sediment building up in the reservoirs. 
For example, one recent study has shown that whilst topsoil loss in the 
Loire valley is only 10 tons/km2 a year, in the Segura valley (Murcia) it 
4 The financial difficulties involved in canal and reservoir construction were numerous, 
with the most notorious being perhaps the Canal de Urge!. See Uaurad6 (1884, 2, pp. 
410-23) and Zulueta Gomis (no date, pp. 72-1I0). 
5 Costa, basing his calculations on the experience of the Canal de Urgel, suggested that 
the potential tax revenue from the Tamarite and Sobrarbe canals would provide 
between 5 and 6 million pesetas which, at 5 per cent interest, would allow a government 
expenditure on these projects of at least 100 million, or 500 pesetas per hectare irrigated 
(Costa, (191Ib, p. 234). In table 6.2 it can be seen that the Tamarite (Canal Arag6n 
y Catalufia) in fact cost 593 pesetas per hectare when measured by the area actually 
irrigated, or 304 pesetas per hectare when the area of potential irrigation is used. 
• There were similar complaints in the eighteenth century. For example, before being 
taken over by the Canal Imperial in 1775, the Canal Tauste had problems irrigating 
during the summer months (Uaurad6, 1884, 2, p. 355). 
7 Nicolau and Puig de la Bellacasa published studies in 1905 and 1908 on irrigation in 
Egypt and the United States. In return, a large number of foreigners visited Spain. 
8 Houston (1950, p. 61). 
Table 6.2. Principal canals and reservoirs in Spain, 1914 
A. Canals 
Cost Potential area Actual area Cost per hectare Date Length (millions irrigated 
finished (km) pesetas) (hectares) 
Imperial de Arag6n (2) 1790 96 23.10 28,000 Tauste (2) 1790 45 4·55 9,000 Castilla" (I) 1848 227 17·45 n.a. Urgel (2) 1861 144 28.08 69,000 Delta derecho de Ebro (2) 1866 29 11.20 12,400 Eisa (I) 1870 42 2·55 13,000 Henares (3) 1870 37 5.65 11,500 Arag6n y Catalufta (2) 1910 124 31.94 105,000 Delta izq. de Ebro (2) 1912 27 10·50 12,600 
B. Reservoirs 
Cost (millions Size 
Date finished pesetas) ('000 m3) 
Villar (3) 1880 2.05 21,900 
Campofrio (4) 1883 2.04 2,570 
Puentes (5) 1884 3.46 32,360 
Santillana (3) 1908 2.65 45,000 
La Pefta (2) nearing completion 6.60 18,000 
Riudecanas (6) nearing completion 2.84 3,446 
Alfonso XIII (5) nearing completion 2.21 23,112 
Talave (5) nearing completion 2·74 19,892 
Buseo (7) nearing completion 2.28 7,502 
(I) Duero basin; (2) Ebro; (3) Tajo; (4) Guadalquivir; (5) Segura; (6) Tarragona; (7) Ncar. 
"The Castilla canal was constructed principally for communication purposes. 
Source: Based on Bello (1914, pp. 28-31 and 44-53). 
irrigated irrigated 
(hectares) (pesetas) 
28,000 825 
6,700 506 
n.a. n.a. 
60,000 407 
7,500 700 
1,500 196 
8,500 491 
53,854 304 
4,000 553 
Irrigation: capacity (hectares) or usage 
drinking water 
industrial 
12,000 
drinking and hydroelectricity 
16,000 
1,500 
improved irrigation 
improved irrigation 
10,500 
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reaches 130 tons/km2 •9 In 1900, Spain had a reservoir capacity of only 
some 78 million cubic metres, a figure which had increased to 3,620 
million by 1940, and had reached 42,201 million in 1980.10 
The first step towards meeting Costa's demands for more action 
by the State was the Plan Nacional de Obras Hidraulicas of 1902, 
which attempted a national approach to measuring and planning the 
country's water assets. In all, 296 new hydraulic constructions, which 
would have increased the irrigated area by 1,469,922 hectares and 
provided work for some 250,000 families, were planned. However, 
according to Lorenzo Pardo, the 1902 Plan was badly conceived as 
it treated each construction separately, and failed to provide an overall 
plan of the country's needs. ll Not only was the Plan badly conceived, 
it lacked any budgetary work, and was presented to a State which 
lacked the political will to finance even a small pan of it.12 As a 
result, the speed of new irrigation projects coming into operation 
remained slow. Fr?~.,.:ll!,_~~,~i.~ated 1'23 million hectares irrigated in 
!904, the area bad grown to ()iify i. S' niillion by ··i932·;~"an·"aiinual 
increase of 0.7 per cent - about the same as tiie"'!:o1ruarea 
cultivated. 13 .. 
By the Second Republic, some 29 per cent of the total value of crops 
was produced under irrigation, and included products such as oranges, 
rice and cotton. 14 However, in terms of the area and output, it was the 
traditional crops, such as cereals, legumes and vegetables which were 
the predominant irrigated crops (table 6.3). At first sight this appears to 
be a misallocation of resources, with farmers planting low-value crops 
(cereals, legumes, etc.) instead of higher value ones (such as oranges). 
However, this was not often the case, as the area under low-value crops 
can also be explained by the fact that they were often grown in rotations 
9 Cabo (1986, p. 307). 
10 AEA ano 1980 (p. 10). The minimum size of reservoirs considered is 500m3 • 
11 Ministerio de Obras PUblicas (no date, I, p. 20). 
12 Although it was partly revised in 1909, 1916 and 1919, it was not fully replaced until 
the 1933 Plan. By that year, only 30 projects had been completed, and a further 17 
were under construction (ibid., p. 24). To help coordinate demand for water in a 
catchment basin, the Government passed two decrees in May 1926, one to permit the 
establishment of water authorities in the major catchment areas, the second to create 
the first authority, in the Ebro basin. The decree forced all major water users to join 
a confederation, a self-governing body which aimed to maximise the use of the water 
resources. The confederations were given statutory powers to expropriate land, and 
tax any increase in property values caused by its activities. For government budgetary 
priorities, see Harrison (1976). 
13 Calculated from Jimenez Blanco (1986a, cuadro 19). 
14 Estimated from AEPA (ana 1932). 
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Table 6.3. Output and yields on irrigated and non-irrigated land, I932 
Irrigated lands 
Value of Average Average 
total yields yields 
Area output Output with without 
sown (millions (pesetas! irrigation irrigation 
(ha) pesetas) hectare) (tons) (tons) 
Vegetables' 174,186 769 4>415 
Potatoes 137,182 381 2,778 14.81 10.67 
Wheat 237,138 249 1,050 1.97 1.05 
Oranges 74,638 235 3,151 16.26 n.a. 
Sugar beet 72,533 150 2,070 25·60 13.70 
Rice 49,670 107 2,150 6.41 n.a. 
Barley. 123,541 95 765 2.15 1.43 
Bananas 5,122 90 17,621 35.20 n.a. 
Beans 78,134 90 1,151 1.14 0.46 
Maize 95,988 90 936 2.25 1.36 
Onions 21,973 76 3,464 26-46 12.22 
• Includes all the 'huerta'. 
Source: AEPA (ano 1932). 
with higher value crops, or that the farmer had no real alternatives given 
the shonage of irrigation water in summer.15 
In the absence of labour-saving technologies, the greater demand for 
labour on irrigated land would lead to diseconomies of scale, and 
encourage cultivation in small units, raising total labour productivity, 
but not hourly productivity.16 However, the provision of irrigation sys-
tems would not necessarily encourage market-orientated production, or 
produce backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy. The 
experience of a civilization such as that of medieval China, shows that 
sophisticated irrigation schemes were quite compatible with traditional 
technology and a relatively high level of self-sufficiency.17 High pro-
15 For the importance of wheat in rotations, see especially Garrabou (1985, pp. 29 and 
3~· . .~ 
16 As Zulueta Gotnis asked, 'What owner stops to calculate what his hourly wage IS. 
The same writer notes that landowners were able to triple rents of irrigated land by 
subdividing it into small lots (Zulueta Gomis, no date, p. 102). 
17 Jones and Woolf (1969, p. I). In Murcia, the mulberry tree in the seventeenth century 
accompanied a self-sufficient, cereal-based agriculture, its sale providing the peasant 
with the 'liquidity to pay the rent, possible debts and, increasingly, taxes' (Perez Picazo 
and Lemeunier, 1987, p. 565). 
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ductivity could only be achieved therefore with commercial high-
value crops, otherwise subsistence agriculture was likely to be 
practised with high output per unit of land, but with low labour 
productivity . 
The re~t. .. of thiscl1,a.pt,er argues that the relatively slow progress in 
eXt'end' ' .. ' . die area . . ted".cannot.be,,' ·wried."sOlety· '",;,:.,. of 
._---.. ..m&, ... -", ,..y:pga exp,m1et'.W.L_ 
~ernment budgetary priorities 01:" the technical skills of Spanish engin-
,,~~;jl~s,i1sQ,.h~dt9.1<:a,ro,lQ \J~.~,.~~.~,~~' ~ffic~e~#~·~~d. ·W:~E.e\\'. 
crops with different cultivation techniques if the irrigation systems. were 
to'beprofit~bl~" lp'the;words'ofCosta:'~" , .. ' ,'"--''-''' 
,""'1"'~'" " •. :..,-- "'.' ,"". ,'- <it 
the hydraulic policy concerns the nationalization of water and its ... storage by 
the State, but it also implies the establishment of technical schools ... where 
learning is through practical experience ... the use of chemical fertilisers, the 
rotation of cereals with legumes without fallow, whether with irrigation or 
secano, the intensive cultivation of meadows and market-gardens, and the com-
bination of arable with livestock breeding. 
The extension of traditional irrigation: the case of 
Valencia 
It was perhaps in Valencia that irrigation-based cultivation techniques 
and water management schemes were most sophisticated. Many of 
the important schemes in Valencia were already in existence before 
1800, and consisted of directing the water from the main rivers 
(Turia and Ncar) along canals and channels on the coastal 
lowlands, before they emptied into the sea. Almost all the hydraulic 
works had been built and operated privately, using some form of 
communal water management organisation. 19 To assess the success 
of Valencian irrigation in increasing productivity, three crops are 
examined: rice, oranges and mulberry leaves (silk production). It will 
be argued that the small scale of the irrigation systems and farms 
meant that it was the farmers themselves who instituted change rather 
than the State, which limited its activity in the period under dis-
18 Costa (19IId, cited in Femandez Clemente, 1990, p. 73). 
19 Undoubtedly the most famous water management system, which dates from Muslim 
times, was that of the lower Turia for irrigation of the market gardens around Valencia. 
The irrigation needs of the seven main canals were detennined by the atandador. Irri-
gation rights belonged to the land, and could not be sold or separated from it. An 
individual's abuse of his rights implied that another farmer went without water. At a 
weekly meeting, the famous Tribunal de las Aguas (Water Tribunal) dispensed judge-
ment on conflicts arising from infringements of water rights. The Tribunal still meets, 
every Thursday in the doorway of the Cathedral. No appeals against its judgements 
are accepted, nor are written records kept. 
Intensive cultivation and irrigation 135 
cussion to the construction of a small reservoir and two research 
stations. 20 
Rice 
Between 1796 and 1932 the area of rice in Valencia doubled, with an 
annual increase of 0-46 per cent.21 A large part of this expansion took 
place on land which had previously been marshes or lagoons, areas 
which were regarded by the government as health risks because of 
malaria. Of particular importance was the reclamation of lands from the 
Albufera lagoon, in the Ribera Baja, which allowed a further 6,163 hec-
tares of rice to be sown between 1796 and 1920.22 These reclaimed lands 
were only suitable for rice and were cultivated in relatively large units 
using wage labour. They required large quantities of fertilisers to avoid 
soil exhaustion. 
The high prices and significant employment opportunities with rice 
also encouraged farmers to grow the crop on the Ribera Alta, higher 
land than the Ribera Baja, and of better quality.23 Here rice was grown 
in rotation with other crops in small units using family labour. As the 
mainstay of the local diet, its small harvest fluctuations resulted in it 
becoming an ideal subsistence crop for farmers, permitting them to 
dedicate the rest of the rotation to more risky commercial crops. Two 
potential problems faced rice growers: the concern of the government 
and local authorities over creating large areas of stagnant water near to 
towns and villages, and the massive amount of water needed for rice 
cultivation.24 Although official concern declined as the incidence of 
malaria was reduced during the nineteenth century - the result of better 
20 The Plan provisional de obras hidraulicas of 1902 planned ten reservoirs to be built by 
the State, but only that of Buseo in 1915 had been completed, although that of Maria 
Cristina (1925) had also been built privately (Piqueras, 1985, p. 138). 
21 Calculated from table 6.4. Between 1730 and 1796 the annual rate of growth had been 
0.83 per cent (Mateu Tortosa, 1987, p. 50). 
22 Calatayud (1986, p. 452). Writing of the 5,000 hectares recovered between 1863 and 
1927, Piqueras notes that 'nothing less' than 6 million tons of infi1l, carried in small 
boats was required, 'reminding one of the great works in China' (Piqueras, 1985, p. 
134)· 
23 The area of rice fell in the Ribera Baja from 63 per cent of the provincial total in 1796 
to 50 per cent in 1920, against that of the Ribera Alta, which increased from 22 to 26 
per cent. The other main area was in the immediate vicinity of Valencia (the Horta). 
Calculated from Calatayud (1986, pp. 451-3)· 
24 Cavanilles suggested that rice cultivation required six times more water than market 
gardening (huerta) (cited in Calatayud, 1986, p. 463). In reality, as Calatayud suggests, 
interest in rice cultivation was related to its profitability, and official petitions to extend 
the area occurred frequently after some natural disaster, making it difficult for authorit-
ies to refuse (ibid., pp. 465 and 480). 
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drainage and manuring techniques - legislation was passed in 1860 
and 1861 to limit the extension of cultivation. The strong growth in 
cultivation during the first half of the nineteenth century created severe 
problems of water supplies, leading to conflicts between different organ-
isations drawing on the waters of the River Jucar. These were tempor-
arily solved by the 1845 Ordenanzas, which created a single administrat-
ive unit for both the traditional area irrigated by the Acequia Real del 
JUcar and that of its extension, completed in the late eighteenth century 
by the Duque de Hijar.25 Sufficient to meet existing demand, the new 
water management system was insufficient to allow extensions in irri-
gation until the reservoir constructions of the twentieth century. Finally, 
the late nineteenth century saw growing international competition in 
rice markets, which also discouraged farmers from extending the area 
of rice much further (table 6-4). 
The restrictions on extending the area cultivated led to attempts to 
increase yields, and contemporaries from the 1880s claimed that the 
region had the highest rice yields in the world (table 6.5).26 High yields 
were achieved not so much from the intensive use of labour, but rather 
the increasing use of factor markets to obtain fertilisers and seeds. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, the intensive use of organic fertilisers 
in the early nineteenth century required large quantities of labour for 
collection and spreading, and explains the early use of guano in the 
Valencia area which reduced labour costs. The use of guano had allowed 
a major increase in the area of rice on land previously considered mar-
ginal because of lack of manure, and at the same time total average 
yields increased between 1800 and 1886.27 From the mid-nineteenth 
century, the area grew only slowly but, after farmers overcame the initial 
difficulties in adapting chemical fertilisers to rice, yields increased 
strongly (table 6-4). 
A second factor to explain the growth in rice yields from the mid-
1880s was the increasing knowledge of seed varieties. The harvests of 
1884 and 1885 suffered badly on account of flooding, cholera and a 
plant disease called 'straight head'. 28 At the time, a number of theories 
25 Calatayud (1984, pp. 295-322). 
2. Amongst others, see Crisis AlTOcera (1887, pp. 56-7); Morote (c. 1914) and Font de 
Mora (1939, p. 117). It should be noted, however, that the area cultivated in Spain 
was much smaller, being 38,000 hectares in 1909/13, against 32 mi11ion in India, 
3 million in Japan, 269,000 in the USA, 145,000 in Italy and 109,000 in Egypt. 
27 The majority report of the Crisis AlTOcera of 1887 believed that yields in the Ribera Baja 
in 1800 were only about 1.4 tons, and the use of guano 'doubled or on occasions tripled' 
rice yields (p. 31), which would imply that the yields given in table 6.4 for 1770 and 
1796 are too high. 
28 Fallada del alTOz or cabeza anhiesta. 'The disease appears on muddy, badly drained 
soils, with a high content of organic material and is especially prone in periods of excess-
ive rain' Angladette (1969, p. 596). In 1885 the rice varieties badly affected were 
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Table 6.4. Rice cultivation in the province of Valencia 
Area Yield (tons Total production Price 
(hectares) per hectare) (tons) per ton 
1770 14,792 3·0 44,376 n.d. 
1796 16,620 2.2 36,564 n.d. 
1860 26,169 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1881 23,448 3·8 87,930 272 
1903/12 28,334 5·8 163,518 236 
1922 31,412 6.3 198,382 n.d. 
1932 31,106 7.2 223,963 326 
Conversions for units used in sources: I hectare=12.03 hanegadas; I cahice=2.01 hecto-
litres and I hectolitre=62.5 kilograms (Crisis alTocera, 1887, p. 186; and Sanz Bremon, 
AMA, legajo, 259)· 
Sources: For 1770, Mateu Tortosa (1987, pp. 50 and 70-1 (taken as 2 cahices/ 
hanegada)); for 1796, Cavanilles (1795-7, I, p. 177); for 1860, Sanz Bremon 
(1875:1979, p. 228); for 1881, Sanz Bremon (1881:1979, pp. 255-9); for 1902, Minis-
terio de Agricultura, Industria, Comercio y Obras Publicas (no date, p. 28); for 1903/ 
12, Ministerio de Fomento, Direccion General de Agricultura, Minas y Montes (1915, 
p. 217); for 1922, GEHR (1991, pp. 1077 and 1081); and for 1932, AEPA (aiio 1932, 
pp. 226-7)· 
Table 6.5. Rice yields in various producer countries, 
1909113 and 1924/8 (tons per hectare) 
19091r3 1924/8 Growth (%) 
Spain 5·0 6.2 +24 
Italy 3-3 4.6 +39 
USA 1.8 2.1 +17 
India 1.5" 1.4 -7 
Japan 3·2 3·5 +9 
Egypt 2.8 3·1 +11 
" 1914/18. 
Source: FAO (1963, pp. 13-14 and 19-20). 
were put forward, including the exhaustion of the soil through improper 
use of chemical fertilisers and seed failure. Considerable efforts were 
made to introduce new varieties, especially from Asia and Italy, together 
with attempts to improve existing strains. In 1924, the first hybrid was 
Antellano, Caruso and Uavoreta de Algemesi; in 1895 Bomba; and in 1910 and 1911 Amon-
quili (Carrasco Garcia, 1952, p. 60). 
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achieved in the EstaciOnArrocera de Sueca, and average yields in Valencia 
reached 7 tons per hectare by the Civil War.29 
These changes in chemical and biological technologies were only 
partly matched by those in the mechanisation of cultivation. From the 
late nineteenth century, it was widely believed that Valencian rice was 
uncompetitive on world markets because of high labour costs. Attempts 
were directed towards reducing labour inputs, and success was signifi-
cant in some operations, as one writer noted in 1914:30 
a few years ago the farmer only used hoes (azadas) or the old roman plough 
painfully pulled by a pair of mules, threshing was done almost exclusively by 
animals, and only the constant use of artificial fertilisers gave this crop a special 
air of progress .... in little more than twenty years the use of the mouldboard 
has become widespread, harrowing perfected, and the use of mechanical thresh-
ers is becoming more frequent. 
Despite these changes, rice remained a labour-intensive crop before 
the Civil War. One problem to mechanisation was the small size of many 
of the farms, being usually only about one hectare. This fact, and the 
damp nature of the soil, made it impractical to harvest by machine.31 
Threshing was easier, with the first all-purpose threshers being adapted 
for rice, before a local engineering firm started producing machines 
exclusively for the crop. The small size of some farms was overcome by 
the use of a rental market for portable machines.32 Finally, the improve-
ment in tillage machinery required an increased supply of energy to 
operate them efficiently, and the province of Valencia witnessed large 
imports of stronger animals from Brittany and Gascony.33 
To assess the impact of these changes in technology on rice pro-
duction, table 6.6 brings together a number of different estimates of 
costs between 1768 and 1933.34 
29 Carrasco Garcia (1952, p. 97). 
30 L6pez Guardiola (1914, p. 180). 
31 Ibid. (p. 188). Another problem in introducing harvesters was that the value of grain 
lost in the operation exceeded the savings achieved by mechanisation (Font de Mora, 
1939, p. 139)· 
32 These modifications were carried out by Gordillo and Marti, and the first locally-
produced machines by the firm, Hijo de Domingo G6mez, in Valencia. By the Civil 
War, there were almost 200 threshing machines operating in the province (ibid., p. 
143)· 
33 See R Janini in his work entitled El peifeccionamiento de /os metodos de cultivo del arroz 
en la provincia de Valencia como causa del cambio de su poblaciOn equina, Valencia, 1914. 
34 A relatively large number of profit and loss accounts exist for rice production after 
1860. The 1863 figure has been chosen because it is from the Ribera Baja and that of 
1878/83 for the reasons given in Crisis Arrocera (1887, pp. 19-23); Maylin's estimate of 
c. 1905 has been ignored because of the absence of fertilisers, and Font de Mora (1939) 
and Carrasco Garcia (1952) because they lie outside our period. 
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Table 6.6. Changes in relative costs in rice cultivation (per cent} 
1768 1863 1878/83 1933 
Seedlings 20·5 10.0 6·5 6.8 
Fertilisers 18.1 26.0 29·4 12.2 
Labour and 
other costs 41.7 47·4 38.2 53.8 
Rent 19·7 16.6 25·9 27·2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: 1768, for the Valencian huerta, Valacarcel (1768, cited in Mateu Tonosa, 1987, 
p. 72); 1863 and 1878/83 for Sueca (Ribera Baja), Crisis arrocera (1887, Apendice H); 
and 1933, Garcia Gisben (1933, pp. 106-7). 
Fertiliser costs per unit of output show a steady increase in their 
share over the century prior to 1883, before falling sharply because 
of the more efficient chemical fertilisers. The relative cost of seed fell 
significantly, probably on account of better transportation and more 
scientific selection. The share of rent, after remaining relatively stable 
over the first part of the period, increased over the second half and 
reflects the growing crop yields. Finally, labour and other costs 
reached their peak in 1933. Within this category are also included 
work animals and machinery, the use of which increased as the period 
progressed. However, labour costs appear to have risen both in rice 
and orange production between 1880 and 1936, and was perhaps the 
cause of the growth in small holdings on irrigated land from the late 
nineteenth century in the region of Alzira.35 Although high wages 
threatened the capacity of producers to compete in world markets, it 
did allow a notable increase in local disposable incomes.36 In con-
clusion, rice production provides an example of high productivity, 
achieved by farmers responding to changes in factor and product 
markets.37 It also illustrates the complementary nature of inputs, as 
will also be seen in the case of orange growing. 
Oranges 
Although the first orange plantation had been noted in 1791, the amount 
of land given over to oranges grew slowly until the last quarter of the 
35 Calatayud (1989a, cuadro 7). 
36 Wages reached 15 pesetas a day for six hours work for transplanting and harvesting 
(Font de Mora, 1939, p. 288). 
37 It should be noted that, despite having the world's highest yields, the last decade of 
the period saw high domestic tariffs and a system of expon bounties in operation. 
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nineteenth century. From then it grew rapidly, with an annual growth 
rate of 3.8 per cent a year between 1881 and 1932 (see table 6.7). Three 
explanations are usually given for this rapid growth: the improvement 
in transportation and the introduction of refrigerated boats, leading to 
a rapid growth in external demand (see chapter 9), the standardisation 
of the product, and the improvement of water supplies for irrigation. 
The orange was predominantly an export crop, with only 28 per cent 
of production in the period 1927-31 being sold on the domestic market. 
According to one writer:38 
the lack of uniformity of the fruits was the greatest threat to future demand. It 
has been the introduction of grafting and the use of varieties initially produced 
spontaneously that has allowed the birth of the great trade in citrus fruit. 
Other problems of standardisation, such as the selling of under-
ripe or frost-damaged fruit, were more difficult to solve, and required 
government legislation if the sale of poor quality products were not to 
undermine consumer confidence.39 The establishment of a number of 
different varieties, which offered the consumer a choice of fruit (oranges, 
mandarins, and so on), and which lengthened the season, were para-
mount to its success. 
Table 6.7 shows that whereas the area under cultivation grew rapidly, 
average yields remained stagnant. Unlike the case of rice, the rapid 
extension of the area was often initially from inferior soils to better ones, 
as the orange slowly displaced other crops on traditionally irrigated 
lands. However, like rice producers, growers had difficulties in adapting 
the new chemical fertilisers to their soils in the mid-1880s. Once this had 
been mastered, yields were maintained with heavy inputs of chemical 
fertilisers.40 
As noted above, by the mid-nineteenth century there was a shortage 
of water in the River Ncar to allow an extension of irrigation on new 
lands, and the presence on existing irrigated land of intensive crop 
rotations made an immediate switch to oranges risky. However changes 
in tube-well technology provided an alternative. Madoz in the 1840S 
had noted the extensive use of norias and senias along the banks of the 
River Ncar to draw on groundwater, but it was after the 1880s that 
growers, using the new industrial technology, developed wells of ever 
38 Font de Mora (1954, p. 11). 
39 The decrees of 1930 and 1935 dealt with the marketing of the fruit. The main unre-
solved problem in this period was that an apparently mature orange (i.e. of the correct 
colour) could be bitter. Unlike some fruit, oranges do not ripen naturally after picking. 
40 Arevalo y Baca (1886, pp. 5--6). 
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Table 6.7. Orange cultivation in Valencia 
Yield Price 
Area Production (tons per (pesetas % of national 
(hectares) (tons) hectare) per ton) production 
1881 6,200 93,000 15.0 100 58 
1902 11,021 198,378 18.0 80 32 
1922 20,000 389,000 19·5 n.d. 48 
1932 40,518 603,590 14·9 144 52 
Sources: Sanz Brem6n (1979, pp. 271-4); Ministerio de Agricultura, Industria, Comer-
cio y Obras PUblicas (no date, p. 28); GEHR (1991, pp. 1085 and 1089:; and AEPA 
(ano 1932, pp. 226-7). The last source gives yields per hectare of trees ID fuJJ pro-
duction as 20.8 tons, 'young' trees 6.1 tons and mandarins 19.2 tons. 
greater depths on unirrigated land of poor quality.41 As Calatayud has 
suggested, the technology was not always interchangeable as the deeper 
tube-wells needed relatively large areas to be profitable, unlike the old 
norias. This implied that these tube-wells were the work of rich farmers 
or landowners, although by the twentieth century it was common to 
find the use of both limited companies and cooperatives of small far-
mers.42 Once the crop's profitability had been established, it started to 
displace other crops on better, already irrigated land. 
The sinking of tube-wells was expensive, as was the establishment of 
orange groves on account of the heavy labour requirements and the 
delay before the first full harvest.43 On the larger farms these costs were 
often offset by leasing or share-cropping arrangements, although for an 
irrigated crop, the orange was often grown in relatively large ~ts. If 
crop yields and labour demand per hectare changed little dunng the 
41 Madoz (1849, vol. 15, p. 323). The first steam pump had been introduced in Carcaixent in 1850 . The growing use of tube-wells in the late nineteenth century was noted by Sanz Brem6n (1979) and Uaurad6 (1884). For summaries of these changes see Garra-
bou (1985, pp. 51-2 and 98-107) and Calatayud (1990). 
42 Calatayud (1990, pp. 207-10). See also L6pez G6mez (1974, p. 197] and Garra~o~ 
(1985, p. 106). Maylin (1905, p. 162) notes that the land was of the poorest quality 
and thus had a low opportunity cost. This was in contrast to the Lower Segura, where 
the growth of oranges took place on land owned by small market-gardeners (Calatayud, 
1989b, p. 100). I 
43 Font de Mora (1954, pp. 305-7) notes that annual costs were greater than ~ua 
income until the seventh year, and that planting costs were only fully absorbed ID the 
twelfth year. Water from tube-wells was relatively expensive (and hence not used for 
rice cultivation) at 36 pesetaslhectare for each irrigation in 1916. By contrast water from 
the Acequia Real del JUcar was an armual 6-12 pes~tas per ~~ct~e for cequiaje (another 
12 pesetas was required in the land of the extension) (MlnJSterIO de Fomento, 1918, I, 
pp. 365--6). See also Palafox (1985, pp. 325-31). 
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period 1880-1936, the high returns per hectare (table 6.3) encouraged 
a rapid extension of cultivation. 
Silk 
In contrast to the Valencian farmers' success in increasing the output 
of rice and oranges, commercial silk production proved to be a failure. 
The production of raw silk for weaving involved the breeding of silk-
worms (sericulture) and the reeling and throwing of the silk from their 
cocoons - tasks which were ideally suited to small-scale production. 
Although usually irrigated, the mulberry tree had small water require-
ments and this fact, together with the low cereal prices in the seven-
teenth century, had led to a considerable growth in its cultivation.44 By 
the mid-eighteenth century, however, Valcarcel noted that farmers were 
uprooting their mulberry groves for other crops, and leaving just enough 
trees to mark the extent of their properties, and thereby seriously dimin-
ishing oUtput.45 The mulberry therefore tended to be found within a 
polyculture, with the farmers using the leaves to feed the silkworms. 
However, by the beginning of the 1760s the production of raw silk was 
in decline in the Valencia region. It has been suggested that behind the 
debate over the health risk associated with rice production, there lay a 
conflict between the interests of silk producers and the large absentee 
owners on one hand, and the peasants who wished to cultivate rice on 
the other.46 The success of rice farming implied a considerable growth 
in the use of irrigation, to the consequent detriment of the mulberry 
which suffered from the excess of water in neighbouring fields. 47 As we 
have seen, rice had the advantage for small farmers in that it required 
a large labour force, provided a secure harvest of a basic food, and was 
more easily sold than silk. 48 
Both the agricultural and industrial branches of silk production were, 
therefore, in decline in Valencia, even before the outbreak of the disease 
pebrina, in 1854. The risk of disease could be reduced by using micro-
scopes to ensure that the cocoons were not contaminated. This technol-
ogy was generally not available to growers, who preferred instead to 
purchase cocoons from abroad, thus greatly increasing costS.49 By the 
44 In AIzira the ~~berry increased from 132 hectares (1,583 hanegadas) in 1650, or II 
per cent of the 1lT1gated lands, to 1,164 hectares in 1672, or 65 per cent (Peris AIbentosa, 
1989, p. 196). 
45 Cited in ibid. (p. 198). 
46 Peris AIbentosa (1989, p. 215). 
47 Martinez Catallin (1896, p. 17). 
48 Peris AIbentosa (1989, p. 215). 
49 Melgares (1887, p. 14). 
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late nineteenth century, heavy pruning in Valencia led to reduced yields 
of mulberry leaves of between 115 and 160 kilograms per tree in the 
Ribera del jUcar, and between 35 and 70 kilograms in the Huerta of 
Valencia, compared with 288 to 345 kilograms in other parts of Spain.50 
A second 'failure' on the part of the producers concerned labour organ-
isation. One period of intense work, the feeding of the silkworms, lasted 
about six weeks, and required significant amounts of family labour. By 
contrast, in Valencia, the reeling and throwing of the silk was done ~y 
outside labour because it coincided with peak demand for labour m 
other crops. 51 The difficulties of matching the labour requirements of 
a multi-cropping farming system with the supply of family labour was 
overcome in Japan in the twentieth century; in Valencia, by contrast, 
farmers preferred to change their cropping systems. 52 
The failure of the Valencian farmer to overcome these problems can 
only be explained by the growing attraction of other crops such as rice, 
citrus fruit and market gardening. In the province of Murcia, and 
especially in the huerta of the provincial capital, significant attempts 
were made to benefit from the international advances in sericulture, and 
the mulberry remained important until the 1950s.53 It is difficult to 
accept that these initiatives would not have occurred in Valencia if more 
profitable opportunities had not been available to farmers. 
The introduction of new irrigation: 
the case of the Ebro Basin 
The region with the greatest irrigated area in Spain by the Civil War 
was the Ebro Basin, where flow-irrigation systems diverted water from 
the River Ebro and its many tributaries along a number of canals (see 
table 6 . .8). In general, these canals were built ahead of demand, as the 
report of the Junta del Canal Imperial de Arag6n of 1789, La Ripa, 
suggests:54 
It is sad to see the large and fertile lands that still remain uncultivated despite 
for many years being able to be improved by irrigation . . . Of the aforesaid 
uncultivated lands, some are communal lands belonging to towns, and others 
belong to private owners. 
50 Martinez CataIan (1896, p. 14)· 
51 Peris AIbentosa (1989, pp. 54-5)· .. 
52 Nghiep and Hayami (1979). In Japan the period of cocoon culture was traditionally 
April-June, but was changed to July-September. . . . 
53 The EstaciOn Sericicola was created in 1892, although It only really started operatmg m 
1902 (perez Picazo and Lemeunier, 1987). 
54 Cited in Fernandez Marco (1961, p. 107). The Canal was also constructed for 
transport. 
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Table 6.8. Actual and potential irrigation in the Ebro Basin, I884 and 
I9I3 
Potential area for irrigation % of area irrigated 
Canals 1884 1913 1884 1913 
Imperial 26,368 28,000 55 100 Tauste 9,990 9,000 60 74 Urgel 90,000 69,000 58 87 
Ebro (right bank) II,780 12,400 51 60 
Arag6n y Cataluiia n.a. 105,000 n.a. 51 
Ebro (left bank) n.a. 12,600 n.a. 32 
Sources: Uaurad6 (1884, 2, p. 437) and Bello (1914, pp. 28--9). 
Over a century later, a similar situation existed with the Canal de 
Urgel, one of the largest constructions in Spain. Here, a considerable 
area that should have benefited from irrigation remained uncultivated; 
and, on much of the land that was irrigated, farmers continued to 
grow traditional secano crops using extensive rotations with fallow. 55 
Therefore, as Uaurad6 and Otero noted, the need by the end of the 
nineteenth century was not so much to extend the area under irri-
gation, but rather improve that already existing, and introduce more 
intensive systems of production. 56 Undercultivation (or lack of 
cultivation) was the result of three distinct problems. The first was 
the seasonality of water supplies, with the risk of summer drought 
making it impossible for farmers to switch from traditional cereal! 
legume rotations or olives into more profitable ones. Of the 384,746 
hectares of irrigated land in the Ebro Basin in 1904, almost 100,000 
hectares suffered from seasonal shortages. 57 Improved water supplies 
could be obtained by better organisation, and especially by the con-
struction of reservoirs. 
The second factor was the question of crop mix. The traditional 
cereal/legume rotation would only be changed if a more valuable crop 
was available, which in turn was a question both of market oppor-
55 Ministerio de Agricultura, Industria, Comercio y Obras PUblicas (1904, p. 91). 
56 Uaurad6 (1884, vol. 2, p. 439) and Otero, (1885, cited in Gennm and Forcadell, 1988, 
p.89). 
57 Provinces taken as Ueida, Huesca, Navarra, Teruel and Zaragoza. These problems 
were not unique to this region however, as the Henares Canal (provinces ofGuadalajara 
and Madrid), Which. was completed in 1863, had the capacity to irrigate some 10,000 
hectares of land dunng most of the year - the exception being precisely the months of 
drought. 
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tunities and a farmer's ability to change production techniques. Out-
side a few small areas of market gardening in the region, new crops 
did not appear until the experimental farm in Zaragoza was estab-
lished. Under the direction of Otero and Rodriguez Ayuso, farmers 
were encouraged in 1892 to plant red clover, alfalfa, and especially 
sugar beet. 58 The delay in introducing sugar beet in Spain can be 
explained in part by market factors (the reliance on colonial supplies, 
especially Cuban, and the indigenous sugar cane industry), and in 
part for the need for advanced, costly technology associated with the 
extraction of the sugar. 59 Sugar beet, as with rice or oranges, required 
much greater quantities of fertilisers than the traditional cereal legume 
rotations, and local supplies of manure in Zaragoza were quickly 
exhausted, encouraging the use of chemical fertilisers. Information on 
this was provided by the local experimental farm, together with advice 
on the most suitable seeds and cultivation methods. In contrast to 
Granada (the other major centre of sugar beet production at this 
time, where initial advice on cultivation and manufacture came mainly 
from foreign technicians who were often unacquainted with the com-
plexities of irrigation technologies), the experimental farm in Zaragoza 
sought to find the best cultivation methods for local conditions. 60 
The result was that the sugar yield obtained from the beet was higher 
than that produced by farmers in Granada, and this allowed the 
region to capture a greater share of the market. 
A farmer's ability to introduce changes in cultivation was limited 
by his previous experience (normally extensive cereal rotations or 
viticulture), lack of capital (the result of low productivity in traditional 
agriculture) and lack of available labour (traditional low population 
density associated with regions of secano). The problem of education 
was dealt with by the Granja-Instituto in Zaragoza, although here, as 
elsewhere, private institutions (namely sugar beet factories) also 
played a major role. The abnormally high profits of 1898-9 and 1899-
1900 encouraged the widespread adoption of sugar beet and, in order 
to guarantee supplies, mill owners were willing to provide farmers 
with the necessary skills, together with seeds and loans, contracting 
in advance to buy their production. By 1932, the province of Zaragoza 
58 Ministen'o de Agricultura, Industria, Comerci'o y Obras PUblicas (1904, p. 272). 
59 Sugar was first produced from sugar beet in Granada in 1882, and technology 
(machinety and technical skills) was brought from France by a local chemist and 
doctor. After initial difficulties, the technology had been copied by nine others by 1889/ 
90. See the excellent study by Martin Rodriguez (1982, p. 104). 
60 Granja-Instituto de Zaragoza (1906, pp. 399-400). 
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had over 24,000 hectares of sugar beet, with a crop value of nearly 
50 million pesetas.61 
Conclusion 
The contrast between the Ebro valley and Valencia provides import-
ant insights into the problems relating to irrigation in the pre-Civil 
War period. The advantages of irrigation to farmers were essentially 
twofold: the ability to grow crops with higher value-added than those 
found in dry farming, and the greater potential for reacting positively 
to changes in commodity prices. Both factors are apparent in Valencia 
and help to explain why highly intensive agriculture, based on small 
farms, also enjoyed high labour productivity, as well as creating back-
ward and forward linkages to other sectors. In the Ebro valley the 
situation was different. A less favourable climate for fruit farming, 
the often uncertain water supply in summer, and a long tradition 
of using dry-farming techniques, all meant that adopting irrigation 
technologies was far from easy. The high infrastructural costs made 
irrigated cereals or artificial pastures unprofitable although, with the 
exception of sugar beet, there were few alternatives. In this situation, 
improved labour productivity depended not so much on the intensive 
cultivation of small farms, such as was found in Valencia, but rather 
on the introduction of mechanical labour-saving technology in the 
production of cereals and sugar beet.62 Perhaps surprisingly, although 
the country was already self-sufficient in wheat by the 1930s, the 
increased production of irrigated cereals seems to have been official 
policy. Thus the 1933 Plan of the Ministerio de Obras PUblicas envis-
aged extending the nation's irrigated lands by some 1,206,670 hec-
tares over a period of twenty-five years, of which almost two-thirds 
would be devoted to wheat. In reality, the area irrigated grew by only 
300,000 hectares, and infra structural costs dictated the need to grow 
higher value crops. 63 
Irrigation therefore proved to be no Iniracle cure for the problem 
of low productivity. Indeed, three of Spain's more successful irri-
gation-fed crops, namely rice, sugar beet and oranges (which between 
61 This represented 30 per cent of national production. Other provinces in the Ebro valley, 
Navana, Huesca and Teruel accounted for an additional 20 per cent (AEPA, afio I932, 
pp. nO-I). 
62 For Zaragoza, see EPAPM, (1921, p. 81) and for Ueida (Canal de Urgel), see Zulueta 
Gomis, (no date, p. 85). 
63 A further 271,665 hectares of 'improved' irrigation was plarmed. The total area irrigated 
in Spain grew from 1.5 million hectares in 1930 to 1.83 million in 1960, and reached 
2.2 million in 1980 (AEA, ano I980, pp. 36---7). 
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them accounted for 200,000 hectares of irrigated land), were all in 
difficulties before the end of the 1920S. In the case of rice and 
oranges, yields were the highest in the world. ~owe~~r, Spanish 
orange exports were just entering a period of major cnSlS, and the 
export levels of the early 1930S would not be repeated until the 1950s. 
The domestic market for rice was saturated by the late 1920S and, 
to reduce stocks, a system of export bounties was establi~he~ in 
1927.64 Finally, in order to avoid overproduction and to mamtam a 
high level of government revenues, a trust, the Sociedad General 
Azucarera de Espaiia was established as early as 1903 to control output 
of sugar and, indirectly, the area given over to sugar beet.65 • 
Irrigation was slow to appear in Spain, both because of the ~lgh 
cost of the infrastructure and the difficulties in providing technical 
information to the farmers to change crop systems and market their 
farm produce. Furthermore, as irrigation techniques afIecte~ only 
about 5 per cent of agricultural land, they could only proVIde an 
indirect solution to the specific problems of the secano. Here, as we 
shall now see, improved labour productivity depended on 
mechanisation. 
64 An internal tax was paid by consumers to finance the exports, or some 25 per cent of 
production. The scheme was in operation between 1927/30 and 1933/35 (Font de Mora, 
1939, pp. 356--65)· 
65 See Martin Rodriguez (1982, p. 281). 
7 The reluctance to mechanise 
In chapters 5 and 6 we saw the difficulties in improving crop yields 
through the use of chemical fertilisers and irrigation. With dry farming, 
small quantities of artificial fertilisers allowed an expansion of output 
through an extension of the area cultivated, but yields stagnated. By 
contrast, the lack of adequate water supplies, suitable crops and the 
inexperience of farmers, all contributed to limit the growth of irrigation 
to a relatively small area of Spain. As non-irrigated land accounted for 
71 per cent of gross crop output in 1932, the best chance of increasing 
labour productivity, as in much of the United States, was through 
mechanisation. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I look at the cause of the 
delay in the use of reapers and threshers in the cereal harvest. I argue 
that even as late as the First World War, cheap labour and relatively 
expensive draught energy made mechanisation unprofitable in large 
areas of the country. In the final section the rapid modernisation of 
the country's olive oil presses from the early 1900S is linked to the 
international demand for better quality oils. The general conclusion 
is that farmers were 'rational' in their choice of techniques, adopting 
only those that promised to be profitable. Cheap and abundant 
labour, a weak farm machine industry, and high farm prices main-
tained through tariff protection, all contributed to the slow mechanis-
ation of the secano. 
Technical choice: the cereal harvest prior to 1900 
Gregory Clark has observed that 'farm workers in the northern United 
States and in Britain in the early nineteenth century were extraordinarily 
productive and well paid by the standards of Eastern Europe and of 
medieval England', and that little or none of this can be explained by 
superior technologies, but rather by higher work intensities. I For north-
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em France, George Grantham has shown the potential for improving 
labour productivity growth in cereal farming, estimating an increase of 
177 per cent between 1750 and 1862.2 By contrast, I argued in chapter 
that labour productivity r~J:l1a~~d stiilailtili-Spam-iliitil tlie'rurif"Of 
'the tweiifiem'centUrY~'and on the eve of the Civil War it has been esti-
mated thattaOOill"prbduCrivitYwas, only 58 per cellt of that achieved in 
centraCiii<I:iiOrthern Eui'ope?'Why did Spanish cereal farmers fail to 
ch~;g~: ~s those in northern France or England appear to have done? 
If differences in work effort identified by Clark are hard to explain, 
Grantham argues that improvements in labour productivity in northern 
France between 1750 and 1800 (and probably as late as 1840) were 
almost all attributable to tillage operation, namely the suppression of 
the fallow and the use of better ploughs and improved plough teams.4 
In Spain, as we have seen, the planting of crops instead of leaving the 
land fallow was impossible given the nature of dry farming. With respect 
to ploughs, although there were attempts to introduce new models, the 
arado romano (scratch plough) dominated until the turn of the twentieth 
century.5 This delay can be attributed to the fact that the new ploughs 
worked the soil deeper. When used for spring tillage, this reduced soil 
moisture and thereby adversely affected yields. Farmers in Spain, there-
fore, could only use ploughs that had been developed for more humid 
climates for their autumn ploughing. By contrast, where work animals 
were concerned, a slow change had been occurring from the seventeenth 
century which was eventually to affect all of Spain's secano - namely, 
the replacement of oxen and cattle by mules. By 1865, mules were more 
important than oxen as work animals in the Mediterranean region, the 
Ebro valley, La Mancha, and a few provinces of Castilla-Le6n, such as 
Palencia and Burgos. In others, including Burgos, Le6n and Zamora, 
together with Extremadura and Andalucia, oxen still predominated. 6 
However, everywhere the numbers of mules were growing and this 
change, together with the light weight of most traditional ploughs, 
2 Grantham (1991; table 13.3). Heavy soils are considered as 60 per cent of the total, 
and light ones the remainder. The greater part of the productivity increase was achieved 
during the nineteenth century. . . . . 
3 Moore (1945). O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura indicate an even grea~er productlVl~ 
gap between Spain and selected central and northern European countries, as noted In 
table 1.7. . . 
4 Grantham (1991, p. 35) estimates that three-quarters of labour productiVity growth 
between 1750 and 1800 was attributable to tillage operations, against a quarter for 
harvest and threshing. . 
5 See Moral Ruiz (1979, pp. 43-6) and Simpson (1987, pp. 279-81) for the delay In 
diffusion of mouldboards in Spain. 
6 Simpson (1987, cuadro 3). 
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helped offset the apparent decline in the number of work animals per 
hectare cultivated after 1750. 
Between 1862 and 1929, labour productivity in French cereals almost 
tripled, due mainly to improvements in harvesting and threshing.7 In 
these operations there were fewer barriers to a relatively rapid transfer 
of technology; yet, in general, Spanish farmers failed to mechanise much 
before the First World War, for reasons which I shall now discuss. 
The timing of the wheat harvest was critical because if it was collected 
too early, the wheat would be green and therefore difficult to separate 
from the husk and fetch lower prices, whereas a late collection risked 
the grain being lost on the ground.8 Traditionally, the wheat harvest was 
the time of maximum labour demand in the agricultural year, and the 
labour supply was swollen with large numbers of workers not included 
in the agricultural census figures. It was the supply elasticities of these 
part-time labour groups (women, children, industrial workers, migrant 
labourers, and so on) which determined wages and the profitability of 
mechanisation. In general, three methods can be distinguished for cut-
ting the standing wheat: the use of the sickle, the scythe, and mechanical 
reapers. 
Although mechanical reapers were being manufactured commercially 
in the United States by the early 1830S, the industry grew little in that 
country until the 1850S when rising wheat prices coincided with an 
increase in the cost of harvest labour. 9 In the southern provinces of 
Spain, some farmers showed an interest in the use of mechanical reapers 
during the 1850S and the newspaper La Agricultura Espanola of June 
1865 claimed that seventy-six such reapers were already in operation in 
the province of Sevilla. lo Interest was not limited to Sevilla, as in the 
following month seventeen orders for reapers had been received by the 
manufacturers Parsons (associates of Wood) from the province of Jaen 
alone. ll Yet the Junta Consultiva Agronomica's major study of wheat 
farming in 1886/90 records that only 'eight or ten reaper-binders' existed 
in Sevilla, and in Jaen none are mentioned. 12 Indeed, it was probably 
only in Girona (the Ampurdan), Huesca, Navarra, Sevilla, and Zaragoza 
7 The period 1862-92 would see the diffusion of the reaper in France, with the 'triumph' 
of the binder taking place between 1892 and 1929 (Grantham, 1991, p. 356). 
8 The standing wheat was harvested in Spain between June and the end of August, 
depending on local climate conditions. 
9 The classic work on the mechanisation of the wheat harvest in the United States is 
David (1975). 
10 The manufacturers were Garret, Wood, and MacCormick (Heran, 1980, p. 190). 
11 Heran (1980, p. 191). Similar trends appear to have taken place in Valladolid and 
Albacete at this time. See Garrabou (1990, p. 47). 
12 Direcci6n General de Agricultura, Industria y Comercio (hereafter DGAIC) (189Ia, 
vol. 3, Sevilla: p. 145 and vol. 2, Jaen: p. 13). 
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Table 7. I. Late nineteenth-century wheat harvesting costs (in pesetas) 
Huesca Sevilla Zaragoza 
1886/90 1864 1886/90 
A) With sickle (per hectare) 
n.d. n.d. I. Using day wages 35·0 
2. Using piece-work 30.0 30.7 43·9 
B) With mechanical reaper" 
Annual no. of days worked 15 30 25 
Total fixed capital investment 1,100.0 1,150.0 825.0 
Annual costs: 
3. Mules 375.0 285.8 400.0 
4. Labour 915.0 1,305.0 1,100.0 
5. Maintenance at 10% 110.0 115·0 82.5 
6. Interest at 5% 55.0 57·5 41.3 
7. Depreciation at 10% 110.0 115.0 82.5 
Total annual costs 1,565.0 1,878.3 1,706.3 
8. Area reaped (hectares) 90.0 144.0 57.0 
9. Cost per hectare 17·4 13.0 29·9 
C) Break-even point 
287.5 206·3 I) Fixed annual costs (5+6+7) 275·0 
2) Variable costs per hectare C3+4/8) 14·3 11.1 26·3 
3) Cost by traditional method (AI) 35·0 
4) Cost by traditional method (A2) 30.0 30·7 43·9 
Break-even point 
Case AI (cI/(c3-c2)) in hectares 13·3 
Case A2 (cI/(c4-c2)) in hectares 17.6 14.6 11.8 
a Models used: Huesca - Wood's reaper with mechanical rake; Sevilla - McCormick-
Burgess and Kay; and Zaragoza - Wood. 
Sources: For Huesca: DGAIC (189Ia, 2, pp. 156---9); for Zaragoza: DGAIC (189Ia, 3, 
pp. 477-80); for Sevilla; La Agricultura Espanola, 23 July 1864, cited in Heran (1980, p. 
181). 
that the numbers reached double figures. 13 Early interest had quickly 
faded. 
In table 7.1 a cost comparison has been made between collecting .the 
harvest by using traditional methods (the sickle) and by a mecharucal 
13 It is difficult to be sure of the number of machines in existence from isolated press 
comments. For example, one writer in Arjona Gaen) claimed in 1901 to have ~wned 
a reaper for 15 years (although none is mentioned in DGAIC, 1891), and that ~s was 
one of twelve working in this one partido (Serrano, 1901, p. 177) .. Hues~a WIth 200 
reapers and about 30 binder-reapers, appears to have been the prOVInce WIth the most 
machines in 1886/90 (DGAIC, 1891a, 2, Huesca: p. 157)· 
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reaper in the provinces of Huesca, Sevilla, and Zaragoza during the late 
1880s. An attempt has also been made to establish at what scale of 
production it would have become profitable to mechanise the harvest 
operation (i.e. the 'break-even' point or 'threshold' farm size).14 The 
method consists in dividing all costs into fixed and variable, and the 
break-even point can be shown as 
Break-even = fI(t-v) 
where f represents the fixed costs associated with the reaper, t the cost 
of collecting the harvest by traditional methods, and v the variable cost 
of using a reaper. 
The break-even point, or land area below which it was theoretically 
more profitable to use hand harvesting with a sickle rather than a mech-
anical harvester, was between 13.3 and 17.6 hectares in Huesca, 14.6 in 
Sevilla, and H.8 in Zaragoza. Although these figures refer to the area 
sown and not to the area cultivated, it is clear that large areas of central 
and southern Spain had farms that were of a sufficient size to accommo-
date reapers. Furthermore, fields in these areas tended to be large and 
open, and were sufficiently well drained to cause a minimum of 
additional investment requirements in adapting the landscape to the 
machinery. 15 However, it would be a mistake to suppose that farmers 
were inefficient because they were not using the new technology. In the 
case of Se villa, if the costs in table 7.1, which refer to 1864, are corrected 
for 1886/90, then the break-even point becomes 26 hectares where the 
harvest was collected by hand and labour paid by time, and 50 hectares 
where collected by hand using piecework. Furthermore, if the reaper 
worked at a speed of less than 3.5 hectares a day over the thirty days 
that one assumes it to have been operational, then it would always have 
been cheaper to reap by hand using piecework. Therefore, the higher 
harvesting costs using traditional methods in the Ebro valley (Huesca, 
Navarra, and Zaragoza) encouraged the diffusion of the reaper in these 
provinces, whereas the supply of a cheap and abundant labour force in 
Andalucia (Sevilla) restricted its introduction. However, other factors 
also explain the reaper's slow diffusion. 
14 Figures for reaping and threshing costs in the 1880s are provided by provincial agrono-
mists and quite likely come from direct observations of machinery. However, given the 
wide range of farming conditions found, not to mention the significant performance 
differences of individual machines, the statistical exercises here can only provide general 
conclusions on the degree of profitability. For a discussion of the 'threshold model' 
and the diffusion of the reaper, see especially David (1975), Olmstead (1975) and 
Olmstead and Rhode (1995). I' These are some of the reasons suggested for the delay in introducing the reaper in the 
United Kingdom in comparison with the United States (David, 1975, pp. 233--88). 
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A major concern for farmers was the question of maintenance and 
repair. Whereas the mid-west of the United States emerged during the 
1850S as a 'substantial regional manufacturing sector bound by demand-
links reaching backward from commercial agriculture', Spain imported 
its technology, and there was a general lack of skilled mechanics, 
especially outside the main cities.16 In the late 1880s it was noted that 
only the manufacturers Pinagny of Pamplona and Elizalde y Compaftia 
had tried to produce reapers in Spain, adapting the technology to the 
needs of the country. By the early twentieth century, however, no dom-
estic manufacturers appear to have been producing reapers. 17 Thus, 
while the farmer in the American mid-west during the second half of 
the nineteenth century was able to mechanise knowing that an abundant 
supply of skilled labour existed and supplies of spare parts were cheaply 
and quickly available, a delay of two months was reckoned the norm for 
'every part' in Spain. IS The situation was neatly summed up by Costa 
in 1880:19 
it would be against the most rudimentary laws of logic to think that a country 
could suddenly jump from the mule, the Egyptian plough and threshing boards, 
to the steam engine, HOWaI (sic) plough and Ransomes threshing machine. In 
the United States of America, the iron and coal industries live together inti-
mately with agriculture, but in Spain we cannot expect anything similar for a 
long time. 
As the harvest was a time-bound operation, the delay of even a week 
could be disastrous, and the difficulties of using mechanical reapers 
given the local conditions are reflected in the significant amount of 
abandoned machinery mentioned in the texts.20 
16 Ibid. (p. 198). See also Pinilla Navarro (1990, pp. 313-15) and, for Portugal, Reis 
(1982). In a wider context, the British Commercial Attache in 1906 wrote with respect 
to motor cars that 'there appears to be some difficulty in Madrid in getting repairs 
done, and complaint is made of the delay necessary to replace broken parts from Paris, 
and this would be still more the case from the United Kingdom' (Parliamentary Papers 
no. 3957, p. 83)· 
17 The reaper produced by Pinagny was a small McCormick adapted for a single animal 
and known as La Segadora Navarra, whilst that of the Elizalde y Compania, Nueva 
Espaiiola, needed a total of four draft animals to work the 2 or 2.5 hectares in eight 
hours (DGAIC, 1891a, vol. 2, Navarra: p. 494, and vol. I, Burgos: p. 259)· EPAPM 
(1901 p. 177) and British Parliamentary Papers (1906 no. 3957 p. 95) both claimed 
that no reapers or binders were made in Spain. By 1912, there was a small domestic 
production of threshing machines as shown below. 
18 Serrano (1901, p. 177). 
19 Costa (19IIa, p. 144). 
20 The reasons are not always clear. Leon's two reapers were reported as working 
infrequently; in Valladolid, the reaper was abandoned because it was not easy to obtain 
certain repairs for parts which 'frequently broke', and the early reapers in Zaragoza 
were largely forgotten, 'either because of the lack of expertise of those that handled 
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Table 7.2. Relative prices of animal and human energy in different 
countries, r860 
Feed cost Agricultural 
(per week) labour (per week) Relative cost 
Britain 15s 9s 7d I horse = 1.56 labourers 
United States SI.03 S3·80 I horse = 0.27 labourers 
Spain 9.70 pts 5.0 pts I mule = 1.94 labourers 
Sources: Britain and United States - Christensen (1981, table 2); Spain - Simpson 
(1987, cuadro 5). 
Another factor that restricted the diffusion of the reaper in Spain was 
that, while it saved on labour, it did so at the expense of animal power. 
Before the internal combustion engine, most energy in agriculture was 
powered either by human labour or by draught animals, and it was the 
relative costs of these different forms of energy that determined the most 
suitable production systems. Christens en has calculated the relative cost 
of labour and animals in the United States and Great Britain in 1860; 
in table 7.2 this has been extended to include Spain. Although these 
estimates can be t;egarded as only approximate, the relatively high labour 
costs in the United States encouraged the diffusion of labour-saving 
technology, whereas in Spain the greater costs of animal power led to 
the continuation of manual techniques. 21 
In the three examples shown in table 7.1, two mule teams were 
required and the demand for animal power, like manual labour, tended 
to be highly seasonal, with the grain harvest already a period of peak 
demand (for transporting grain and threshing). Even if the 1891 census 
shows an exaggerated decline in livestock numbers, it seems probable 
that disposable animal power per unit of cultivated land was appreciably 
lower in the late nineteenth century than it had been in 1850, or was 
to be in the twentieth century. If this indeed was the case, farmers might 
have been faced with the prospect of having to rear extra animals, at a 
large fixed cost, which had only limited use outside the harvest, or face 
the uncertainty of renting livestock at a period of peak demand. The 
labour supply, by contrast, was growing and if nominal wages increased 
them, or owing to the machines complexity' (DGAIC, 1891a, vol. 2, Lean: p. 231; vol. 
3, Valladolid: p. 394, and Zaragoza: p. 478), 
21 The shortage of work animals was considered 'a perennial problem' in Spain (British 
Parliamentary Papers 1948, p. 27). For the 1850s, see Garcia Sanz (1979-80, p. 55). 
For the high cost of animal-produced energy, see, for example, EPAPM (1915, no. 
943, p. 721). 
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in a few areas in 1860/90, this was offset by rising wheat prices, at least 
until the 1880s.22 
The lag in the use of reapers in the nineteenth century was not just 
a Spanish phenomenon but a European one. According to Collins, reap-
ing machines in France in 1892 cut only 1 I.5 per cent of the standing 
corn, whilst in Germany the figure was 6.0 per cent (1895), Holland I.I 
per cent (1882), Belgium 4.1 per cent (1880), and Britain 56.4 per cent 
(1874) - although not long before, in 1861, this last figure had been only 
6.8 per cent.23 Therefore, with the exception of BritaiIl~§1?run,.appears to 
have been in line with otheiEuropean coWiiriesmnot m~chan.J~ing this 
process'<iliiUigtlie runeteepth century. Yet, as Collins has also shown, 
the expansion of cereal cUltivation in Europe during the nineteenth cen-
tury took place in many areas faster than the available labour force, and 
this encouraged a 'switch from lower to higher working capacity tools', 
with the heavy hook and scythe replacing the sickle in almost all Europe, 
with the exception of Italy, Portugal, and Spain.24 
The Junta Consultiva Agronomica's study of 1886/90 suggests that the 
scythe and voliant were only found in those areas bordering the Pyrenees 
and limited areas of Tarragona and Teruel, being very rare elsewhere. 
As Collins notes for Britain, the significant savings in the primary oper-
ation (cutting), was to a certain extent reduced by the greater quantity 
of labour required for the secondary operations. Thus, in Huesca, the 
costs and labour required for a hectare were:25 
Piecework/sickle 
Day-work/sickle 
Day-work/scythe 
30 ptas 
35 ptas 
30 ptas 
4 harvesters + 1.5 helpers 
5 harvesters + 2.0 helpers 
2.5 harvesters + 2.0 helpers + boy or female helper 
However, there were other costs associated with the scythe, namely 
the greater loss of grain falling to the ground during the harvest.26 In 
Huesca the savings per hectare in using a heavier reaping hand tool 
were 5 pesetas and in Lleida 6 pesetas - savings which would have been 
eliminated if the grain lost on the ground exceeded only 3 per cent of 
22 Wages appear stagnant in Andalucia (Bemal, 1988, pp. 206-7 and Simpson, 1985a, p. 
240) and Murcia (Perez Picazo, 1991, p. 71). By contrast in Castilla, it has been sug-
gested that wages increased by a third between 1862/4 and 188517 (GEHR, 1988, p. 
49) and in Cataluna by between a third and a half (Garrabou, Pujol and Colome, 1991, 
pp. 40-1). 
23 Collins assumes an area of 60 acres (24.28 hectares) per reaper (1969, table 3). This 
rate would imply that 21.6 per cent of small grains (wheat, barely, rye and oats) in 
Spain in 1932 were cut mechanically. 
24 Ibid. (1969, p. 85). 
25 DGAIC (189Ia, vol. 2, Huesca: p. 157). 
26 Ibid. (vol. I, Ciudad Real: p, 377). 
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the harvest.27 As there was not a radical change in the ratio between the 
size of Spain's agricultural labour force and the area sown until the First 
World War, the vast majority of farmers rarely considered the scythe as 
a serious alternative. 
Unlike northern Europe, threshing was done in Spain immediately 
after the harvest, and either involved animals treading the grain with 
their hooves or a threshing board being pulled over the grain by the 
animal. 28 The final task involved winnowing, which was traditionally 
done by tossing the grain in the air and letting the wind separate out 
the chaff.29 The grain was then ready for storage and sale. 
The first threshing machines introduced into Spain in the 1860s were 
not a success, owing partly to the fact that Spanish farmers, unlike those 
of northern Europe, fed their animals on the straw, which had to be cut 
into fine pieces and crushed.30 However, even when this problem was 
overcome, the number of machines in the 1880s was small, virtually all 
being found in Andalucia, with a few in Arag6n.31 Their operating costs 
and the break-even point have been calculated from the Junta Consultiva 
Agronomica's figures for 1886/90 in five different provinces, and are 
shown in table 7.3. According to these calculations, the break-even point 
in Sevilla, excluding repairs and maintenance, was 2,440 hectolitres (or 
227 hectares of sown wheat), Cordoba 3,142 hectolitres (304 hectares), 
Cadiz 1,766 hectolitres (262 hectares), Huesca 1,913 hectolitres (172 
hectares), and Zaragoza 4,133 hectolitres (366 hectares). If annual main-
tenance and repairs are assumed to have amounted to 10 per cent of 
the capital cost of the machine, the area required in Sevilla increases to 
378 hectares, Cordoba 507, Cadiz 437, Huesca 287, and Zaragoza 610. 
According to a study of Portugal's Alentejo at the end of the nineteenth 
century, it was the size of the area required to feed the threshing 
machines, rather than their capital cost, which delayed the introduction 
of the machines, with the break-even point being 'normally above 4,000 
hectolitres, with some authors suggesting a figure of 6 or 7,000 being 
27 Calculated from ibid. (vol. 2, Huesca: p. 157 and Ueida: pp. 270--1). 
2. In the North, the small quantities of wheat were threshed using a flail. 
29 In some areas, by the end of the century, a winnowing machine (aventado) was used. 
Perhaps rather than on cost grounds, this machine allowed the operation to be done 
when there was no wind (see, for example, DGAIC, 1891a, vol. 2 Huesca: pp. 159-
60). 
30 The Fomento agricola of Jerez de la Frontera sent corn to Ipswich for tests, and the 
subsequent trials in 1865 of a Ransomes machine in Sevilla proved successful (Abela 
y Sanz, 1877, pp. 535-52). 
31 In 1881 it was estimated that of 52 machines in Spain, all but three were found in 
Andalucia (La Gaceta Industrial, 1882, cited in Ministerio de Industria y Energia, 1988, 
p. 99). By the end of the 1880s there were also some operating in Aragon. 
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Table 7.3. Late nineteenth-century threshing costs 
Cadiz Cordoba Sevilla Huesca Zaragoza 
A. STEAM THRESHERS' 
Hours of work 585 420 384 400 1,000 
I. Labour costs 
Operator 180 300 272 225 500 
Others 1,147 1,470 1,984 1,015 2,200 
Total 1,327 1,770 2,256 1,240 2,700 
2. Machine costs 
Fuel 1,350 471 600 2,500 
Oil 68 104 180 400 
Total 1,418 1,350 575 780 2,900• 
3· Capital expenditure 
Machine costs 10,000 15,000 13,500 13,500 13,500 
Interest 5% 500 750 675 675 675 
Deprec.lO% 1,000 1,500 1,350 1,350 1,350 
Total 1,500 2,250 2,025 2,025 2,025 
Total (1+2+3) 4,245 5,370 4,856 4,045 7,625 
Output of wheat 6,525 9,942 4,224 2,400 7,000 
(hectolitres) 
Full cost of threshing 0.65 0·54 1.15 1.69 1.09 
(pesetaslhectolitre) 
0.80 Variable cost (i.e. (1+2)/ 0.42 0.31 0.67 0.84 
hectolitre) 
B. THRESHING USING TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
Cost per hectolitre 1.27 1.03 1.50 1.90 1.29 
C. BREAK-EVEN POINT FOR USING STEAM THRESHERS 
Excluding maintenance 1,766 3,142 2,440 1,913 4,133 
costs (hectolitres) 
Including maintenance 2,944 5,236 4,067 3,189 6,888 
costs' (hectolitres) 
Provincial wheat yields 6·74 10·33 10·76 11.11 11.29 
(hectolitreslha) 
Break-even point in hectares 
I. Excluding maintenance 262 304 227 172 366 
costs 
2. Including maintenance 437 509 378 287 610 
costs' 
a No attempt has been made to assign a value to the better quality of grain and straw 
obtained by using a threshing machine. 
• Machine costs for Zaragoza have been estimated. 
, Based on the assumption that maintenance costs amounted to 10% of capital costs. 
Sources: For Cadiz, DGAIC (189Ib, I, pp. 299-300); for Cordoba, DGAIC (189Ib, I, 
pp. 419-22); for Huesca, DGAIC (189Ib, 2, pp. 159-62); for Sevilla, DGAIC (189Ib, 3, 
pp. 145-51); and for Zaragoza, DGAIC (189Ib, 3, pp. 481-6). 
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necessary'.32 Naturally, production costs in Spain and Portugal were 
different, but table 7.3 gives a figure greater than 4,000 hectolitres in 
the three examples from Andalucia. 
\(4i{~7~~~~~:Ei=w~~~$ 
theIr absence m most regIons of Spam. However m SeV11Ia, ana perhaps 
ili other parts of Andaiucia, tiie"·'u~e'or- threshing machines at the end 
of the nineteenth century appears to have been greater than that of 
reapers. To explain this, table 7.4 summarises the demand for laboUI 
and animals on a hypothetical estate in Sevilla, with 300 hectares of 
wheat and 150 hectares of barley. This table shows that the cheapest 
method of harvest collection and threshing was to use foUl reapers and 
a steam thresher (option 3), and the most expensive was to collect the 
grain by hand (and pay laboUI by time), and thresh using traditional 
technology (option la). At first sight, greatest efficiency could therefore 
be achieved using the more advanced technology. However, demand 
for work animals varies significantly from 2.03 animals days/hectare in 
options 4a and 4b, to 5.5 animal days in option 2. Whilst the mechanis-
ation of reaping increased the demand for animals, table 7.4 shows that 
steam threshing reduced it. As both the harvest and threshing were car-
ried out in periods of peak demand for work animals, it is likely that 
the possibilities to hire would be low, and the cost of maintaining an 
extra six mules for only two months' work annually would have been 
excessive. 33 As table 7.4 assumes that all animals were fully employed 
throughout the year, the speed of mechanical diffusion would depend to 
a certain extent on the alternative employment available for the animals 
outside the harvest. Finally, the introduction of the reaper and thresher 
would seem to complement each other, given the saving of animal 
energy with the latter. 
Technical change: the cereal harvest 190~1936 
The first farm-machine census was undertaken in 1932. It shows that 
although regional distribution remained very uneven, reapers and 
threshing machines were widely used (table 7.5 and maps 13 and 14). 
Here I exclude the North as this was not an important region of small-
32 Reis (1982, pp. 405-'7). 
33 G6mez Mendoza (1982, pp. 108-9) gives an average cost for Spain of 3,500 pesetas 
(3,350 fixed and 150 variable) for the period 1878/87. 
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Table 7.5. Regional distribution of harvest machinery, I932 
Area of 
cereals' No. of No. of ha! 
('000 ha) reapers threshers reaper 
North 211 30 808 7,033 
Mediterannean 761 3,153 624 241 
Andalucia 1,331 5,711 567 233 
Interior 5,640 61,447 3,000 92 
Spain 7,943 70,341 4,999 113 
• Excludes maize and rice. 
Source: AEPA (ano 1932, pp. 320-1). 
ha! 
thresher 
269 
1,219 
2,347 
1,880 
1,589 
grain farming and, although it had the greatest density of threshing 
machines, the machinery was usually small and manually operated.34 
A number of explanations can be advanced to explain the level of 
mechanisation in the cereal harvest of 1932. First, the growing use of 
reapers and threshing machines worldwide from the late nineteenth cen-
tury led to three developments: technical improvements of the machin-
ery, development of economies of scale in production, and increasing 
competition between machine producers as markets grew. Conse-
quently, prices had a tendency to fall, and the machinery to become 
more efficient. Although national production scarcely existed in Spain 
prior to the First World War, it can be assumed that some of the benefits 
were obtained by farmers through imports.35 Problems remained how-
ever. Machinery was regarded as being twice as expensive in Spain than 
in the country of production, in part because of freight and com-
missions, but also because of Spanish tariffs and high internal transport 
costs. The problems of a lack of suitably qualified labour and spare parts 
also continued, which made some foreign equipment unsuitable for 
local conditions.36 
A second factor was the growth of institutions which facilitated the 
spread and use of the machines. The province of Navarra, despite being 
34 See Villares (1982, pp. 365-7). 
35 In 1912 national production of threshing machines was 30, and winnowing machines 
2,000 (Ministerio de Fomento, 1912, vol. I, p. 372). Garrido claimed that domestic 
production prior to the First World War had been sufficient to halve the prices of 
imported machinery (EPAPM, 1920, no. 1136, p. 54). 
36 In 1910 over a dozen threshers of Rushton Procter & C' were abandoned in just one 
small region centred on Navarra because they were considered too complicated, 
required experienced mechanics to operate and regarded as unprofitable. Many were 
for sale, often after only one or two years of use, at half or less than their original cost 
(EPAPM, 1910, no. 675, p. 275). 
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perhaps an unlikely candidate, had the third largest number of reapers 
and the second largest number of threshers (per hectare of cereals) of 
all the provinces. As early as 1910, local industrialists 'anticipated a 
lucrative business' in renting threshing machines, and companies were 
formed for this purpose in the towns of Artajona, Mendigorria, Peralta, 
Caparroso, Carcastillo, Echauri and Melida.37 However, it was to ?e 
the cooperative movement which would account for much of the dif-
fusion of machinery with, for example, some 130 reapers and reaper-
binders in the town of Sesma, or 'more than 150' belonging to the mem-
bers of the Caja de Carcastillo prior to the First World War.38 In 
particular, the high concentration of cooperatives especially in areas of 
small farmers in the Interior, helps to explain the wide diffusion of 
mechanical reapers, although threshing machines still remained a rarity. 
If, on the one hand, manufacturers were gradually able to produce 
technology more appropriate to local conditions, and the numbers of 
mechanics and skilled labour in the countryside grew, on the other hand 
farmers in some areas were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain 
labour at harvest time. This was the result of two factors, namely the 
continuing extension of the area cultivated (as shown in chapter 5) and 
the beginnings of the rural exodus at the turn of the century. The 
increasing land to labour ratio raised labour costs in some areas. Maps 
13-15 and table 7.6 suggest a clear correlation between wage levels and 
the diffusion of the machinery. Given that the cereal harvest was a 
period of peak labour demand in rural areas, one would expect 'maxi-
mum' wages to show a better fit than 'minimum' wages for 1931.39 My 
initial results indicated, perhaps not surprisingly, that the first machine 
census probably underestimated the. number of reapers in Spain, 
especially in the provinces of Albacete, Avila, Castell6n, and Granada.40 
When a constant was applied to these four provinces (see table 7.6), the 
number of hectares per reaper and level of agricultural salaries showed a 
much closer relationship. The fact that minimum rather than maximum 
wages in 1931 fit better can be explained by higher value crops distorting 
the picture. With threshing machines, the correlation is not as strong, 
37 However as the machines used were the inefficient Rushton type, no profits were made 
(EPAPM, 1910, no. 675, p. 275). A rental market also existed in yal~ado~id a,s early as 
1904, as some 12 or 14 reapers were hired to break the harvest smke m Vlllalon of that 
year (Instituto de Reformas Sociales, 1977, p. 127). 
38 EPAPM (1911, no. 738, p. 521). 
39 I estimate 5 and 6 pesetas per day for Avila, between 5 and 8 for Girona, and 7 and 
10 for Madrid. 
40 The number of machines and the hectares of cereals per reaper were reported to be 
respectively: Albacete 66 and 5,505; Avila 30 and 3,687; Caste1l6n 4 and 13,064; and 
Granada 36 and 6,318. For 1908 I also apply a constant for Baleares (48 and 2,036), 
Salamanca (134 and 1,801) and Toledo (210 and 2,000). 
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Table 7.6. Wage levels and the diffusion of cereal harvest machinery in 38 
provinces" 
A. Reapers 
(Dependent variable: hectares per reaper in 1932) 
Independent variables Constant R' N 
1908 wages 1,155·5 
-354·9 
(1.85) (-1.17) 0·96 38 
1908 wagesb 950.6 -326.0 
(3.1)** (-2.22)* 0·99 38 
1931 wages (min.)' 101.8 
-133·9 
<3·42) (-2.07)* 0·96 38 
1931 wages (max.) 801.1 -54·2 
(2.30)* (-I.IO) 0·96 38 
B. ThreshersI 
(Dependent variable: hectares per thresher in 1932) 
Independent variables Constant R' N 
1908 wages 18,191 -6794.8 
(4.13)** (-3.16)** 0.66 38 
1931 wages (min.) 10,439.8 -1>396.2 
(4.8)** (-2.69)** 0.64 38 
1931 wages (max.) 6,842 
-339·2 
(2·90)* (-1.07) 0·58 38 
* Statistically significant at I % level. 
** Statistically significant at 5% level. 
a The North is excluded, as are the provinces of Almeria and Segovia, as no machinery 
was reported. Dummy values given to Albacete, Avila, Caste1l6n and Granada. 
b Dummy values also given to Baleares, Salamanca and Toledo. 
< 1931 has been used for maximum and minimum wages because no figures for 1932 were 
available. 
d Soria alone has been given a dummy value. 
Sources: For wages in 1908, see Rodriguez Labandeira (1991, p. 454) and Anuario 
Estadistico de Espaiia (1933, vol. 17, p. 551). 
but still strong enough to force consideration of wage levels as an 
important factor in the diffusion of machinery. 
In conclusion, labour productivity in cereal farming over this period 
was positively related to agricultural wages, at least for harvesting and 
threshing activities. Why did wages not increase faster? In part, this was 
because agriculture in Spain was a residual employer, implying that 'the 
size of the population it had to support ... was governed not by the 
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size of the labour requirement but by the numbers seeking work'.41 The 
agricultural labour supply was therefore influenced positively by rural 
population growth, and negatively by the migration of labour in 
response to better employment opportunities in urban areas, and by 
emigration overseas. The low labour productivity in agriculture found 
by Clark in southern and eastern Europe was perhaps the consequence 
of the low opportunity cost of this labour, caused primarily by the small 
size of urban centres and the weak industrial base. In the next chapter 
I shall consider in greater detail why labour in Spain did not leave the 
land faster than it actually did. Here, just one aspect of it is considered -
namely the belief that cereal tariff policy in Spain slowed the rural 
exodus. 
Between 1886/90 and 1930/5 the area sown with cereals and legumes 
(crops which directly benefited from protection) grew by 1.56 million 
hectares, or 19.8 per cent.42 If tariffs encouraged an increase in output, 
which under conditions found in Spain implied an extension in the area 
cultivated, we would expect population to be retained in agriculture in 
those areas which saw such a growth. Table 7.7, however, suggests no 
obvious correlation. Over half of the country's cereal land in 1930 was 
found in areas which had seen a fall in population greater than the 
national average.43 In particular, it is worth highlighting the case of Cas-
till a-Lean which saw a growth of 25 per cent in the area sown, but also 
a fall of the same magnitude in the size of the farm population. 
There was, however, one large area where it does appear that the 
growth in the area cultivated was accompanied by a growth in popu-
lation, namely La Mancha, Western Andalucia and Extremadura (in 
reality, the province of Badajoz). These regions saw the area sown 
increase by a third (or the equivalent to just over half the national 
increase), whilst the population grew by 11 per cent. If the impact of 
other crops (viticulture in La Mancha, olives in Andalucia) was also of 
importance in explaining these changes, it would appear that cereal 
tariffs perhaps helped retain labour. Yet if this is correct, this poses a 
paradox, as it would appear that in areas of small farms cereal tariffs 
encouraged both an extension in the area cultivated which was 
accompanied by a significant fall in farm population; by contrast, it 
would be in the areas of large estates and day labourers, in the south 
of the country, where the extension in cultivation would be 
41 Collins (1987, p. 36). 
42 GEHR (1983b, p. 318). This figure excludes the Canary Islands. 
43 Northern Meseta, Ebro valley, Mediterranean and the North, representing 54.5 per 
cent of cereal lands. 
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Table 7.7. Changes in area sown with cereals and legumes and in the size 
of the agricultural labour force, 1886/90 and 1930/5 
% change in 
% change in male agricultural % of Spain's 
area sown labour cereal land 
La Manchaa +35·7 +15·9 18.2 
Extremadura +35·3 +2·4 9·3 
Western Andalucia +34.0 +4.0 8·4 
Northern Mesetab +24.8 -24·6 23.8 
Ebro Valley +21.2 
-17·3 11.9 
Mediterranean +6.8 -11.2 8·9 
North +3·4 -17·4 6.8 
Eastern Andalucia +4·3 +15·5 9·4 
Salamanca -20.1 -18·9 3·3 
SPAIN' +21.2 -6.2 100.0 
a Includes Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca and Toledo. 
b Includes Avila, Bwgos, Guadalajara, Le6n, Madrid, Palencia, Segovia, Soria, 
Valladolid and Zamora. 
'Excludes the Canary Islands. 
Sources: GEHR (1983b, pp. 308-16) and Censos de poblacion. 
accompanied by a growth in the labour force.44 Clearly, something other 
than just the price of wheat was determining the rate of outmigration, 
a point to which I shall return in part IV. 
Mechanisation and product quality: olive oil 
Andalucia was Spain's major olive oil producing region, accounting for 
51.7 per cent of the area cultivated (983,462 hectares), and produced 
62.2 per cent of the nation's olive oil (219,343 tons) in 1931/5. Labour 
requirements were highly seasonal, with almost 80 per cent of demand 
occurring between the months of January and May, and related to the 
harvest.45 In addition, labour was also required in processing the oil, 
which occurred during the same months. An added problem for farmers 
was that annual yields fluctuated significantly thereby causing annual 
fluctuations in both the demand for wage labour and the need for pro-
cessing and storage facilities. 46 The increasing regional specialisation in 
44 Bernal (1985) pointed out that emigration was greatest in areas of small holdings, and 
that in the areas of large estates, labour actually increased. 
45 Sindicato Vertical del Olivo (1945, pp. 130--2). 
46 Between 1900 and 1935 average annual production was 178 kilograms of oil per hectare, 
with a standard deviation of 73 kilograms, and a coefficient of variation of 0.41. 
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the crop therefore meant that even small farmers were dependent on 
non-family labour during the peak harvest demand. 
A mechanical alternative to the labour-intensive task of harvesting 
was unavailable, and the grower's potential in improving labour 
productivity was consequendy limited. However, once again when 
organising harvest labour, the farmer could choose between speed, 
which inevitably resulted in some damage to the crop and spillage, or 
maximum output at the expense of hiring more labour. Speed was 
achieved in two ways: by beating the olives to the ground with long 
poles (instead of using ladders and collecting by hand), and by paying 
labour piece-work rather than day work. For contemporary agronomists, 
'improvements' in harvesting methods became synonymous with the 
need to increase the care in collecting the fruit, which would bring about 
a decline in labour productivity. In general, however, farmers aimed to 
harvest in the shortest time possible, not just to reduce costs, but also 
to protect the crop from disease, pests and theft. In contrast, farm work-
ers were often more concerned with maximising total harvest earnings, 
even if this meant working more days at lower hourly rates. 
The productivity of harvest labour therefore varied according to the 
form of labour contract established (piece-work or day work), method 
of collection, and the acquiescence of the labour force. It also varied 
according to harvest size. A recent study of traditional methods in the 
olive harvest has noted that when a harvest doubles from one year to 
the next, a harvester is able to collect approximately fifty per cent more 
in an hour.47 In conclusion, although some writers noted improvements 
in harvesting methods towards the end of the period (i.e. picking instead 
of beating the fruit), these were usually limited to those farmers for 
whom quality was important (in the production of olives for consump-
tion or virgin olive oil). In any case, these 'improvements' could, and 
were, reversed in periods of low oil prices and/or high labour costs. 
In contrast to the limited changes in harvesting productivity, the cen-
tury prior to the Civil War wimessed significant developments in the 
processing of olives. In Andalucia, changes were noted in the oil mills 
in the 1870s, with cyclical-shaped stones being substituted by conical 
ones which increased surface contact.48 However, it was the changes 
that occurred at the very end of the century, coinciding with the growth 
in exports of olive oil for culinary purposes, that transformed the indus-
try. The old wooden presses, especially the beam presses (vigas), were 
replaced with ones worked by hydraulic systems, factories for the chemi-
47 LOpez Ontiveros (1978, pp. 194-5). 
48 Manjarres y Bofarull (1896, p. 105). 
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Table 7.8. The modernisation of Spain's olive oil presses, 1890-1930 
Modern' Intermediate Traditional Number 
(%) (%) (%) 
1890 3.6 16·7 79·7 5,427 
1900 9·8 21.6 68.6 5,064 
1910 21.6 23.8 54·6 5,226 
1915 28.2 21.6 50.1 4,567 
1922 39.6 22.0 38.3 5,279 
1930 54.1 21.4 24·4 7,951 
a 'Modern' refers to all hydraulic presses, 'intermediate' to the husiUo and 'traditional' to 
rineOn and viga presses. Given the greater capacity of the hydraulic presses, the table 
underestimates the impact of the speed of diffusion. A detailed description of the different 
types of presses can be found in Simpson (1985a, pp. 162-82) and Zambrana (1987, pp. 
141-51). 
Source: Direcci6n General de Contribuciones, Impuestos y Renras (1857-1930), cited in Zam-
brana (1987, p. 149). 
cal extraction of oil from the residue (orujos) became increasingly 
common after 1860, and a totally new operation, refining, was 
introduced. 
Between 1888 and 1931/5, the area under olives in Spain increased 
from 1.15 million hectares to 1.90 million which, even excluding the 
moderate increase in crop yields, required an increase of about 65 per 
cent in the country's olive processing capacity.49 In fact, the number of 
presses increased by only 46 per cent, implying a growing concentration 
in the processing of the fruit, as the new presses were installed not just 
to process the fruit from the growing area of cultivation, but also to 
replace the older ones (table 7.8).50 
The 'modem' hydraulic presses offered a number of advantages to 
producers. In 1901, the provincial agronomist in Sevilla, Noriega y 
Abascal, compared the production costs of manufacturing olive oil using 
three different presses: the beam (viga) press, a single animal-powered 
hydraulic press, and a more advanced steam-driven press. By examining 
the first two in detail, the economic benefits in using the new technology 
can be established (table 7.9). The capacity of the two presses was about 
150 tons a season for the beam press, and 315 tons for the hydraulic. 
With a yield of 1.25 tons a hectare (the average for Andalucia between 
1926 and 1935), then the area that these mills could process would have 
49 The year 1888 is used because of the difficulty in establishing an earlier figure. 
so Because of the nature of the source (tax returns), the number of presses are likely to 
be underestimated. See Pequefio y Muftoz (1879, p. 333) and Zambrana (1987, p. 160). 
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Table 7.9. Product cost of oil manufacture using beam and hydraulic 
presses in Sevilla, 1901 
Case I 
Mill: I rulo (conical stone) 
Beam (viga) press 
Case 2 
Mill: 2 rulos 
Hydraulic press 
Original capital outlay: 12,500 pesetas 
Olives processed: 151 tons over 120 days 
Original capital outlay: 18,898 pesetas 
Olives processed: 315 tons over 120 days 
Annual production costs (pesetas) 
Fixed 
Variable 
Total 
Olive oil production (tons) 
Manufacturing costs per ton (pesetas) 
Variable costs per ton" 
Wage costs per ton 
Case I 
810 
1,488 
2,298 
35.8 
64·08 
41.49 
17·57 
Case 2 
1,291 
3,085 
4,376 
7706 
56.37 
39·74 
12·75 
"Variable costs have been taken as all labour, work animals, fuel and materials used in 
processing. The value of the residue (orujo) is 900 pesetas in Case I, and 1,890 pesetas 
in Case 2. 
Initial capital costs compare with a figure of 1,000 pesetas per hectare for an olive grove 
in full production in this part of Spain at the turn of the century (Benitez Porral, 1904, 
P·90). 
Source: Adapted from Noriega (1981, pp. 320-5). 
been 120 and 252 hectares respectively. These areas were significantly 
larger than most olive faons, and it would have been necessary for mill 
owners to process olives from other growers. 51 If it is assumed, as Nori-
ega does, that the two mills were fully operational for four months, then 
the hydraulic press was more cost effective, producing olive oil at 56 
pesetas a ton, compared with 64 pesetas a ton with the beam press. In 
years of harvest failure press owners could hope for little more than to 
cover operating costs and make a marginal contribution towards fixed 
cost. However, there is virtually no difference in variable costs between 
the two presses, and the figures given by Noriega in 1901 suggest that 
other factors must explain the rapid growth in hydraulic presses during 
the first third of the twentieth century.52 
51 See, for example, Zambrana (1987, pp. 184-5). 
52 Furthermore, given the age of many of the beam presses, most would have been fully 
depreciated. 
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In the first instance, labour costs were 27 per cent less with the 
hydraulic press, and the rapid diffusion of this type of press can in part 
be explained by the growing wage inflation, especially during and after 
the First World War. Between 1898/1905 and 1926/35 the production 
of olive oil almost doubled, yet total labour requirements, despite the 
lack of mechanisation in harvesting, increased by only a third because 
of technological change. 53 According to Bernaldo de Quiros, these 
changes in production methods altered labour opportunities for migrant 
labour, and the 'immense' flow of migrant labour from the 'cold 
interior' during the winter months for the olive harvest declined rapidly, 
especially after the olive harvest failure of 1930/1.54 
Yet although hydraulic presses produced cheaper oil and reduced 
labour requirements (an important factor given the growing concen-
tration of the crop in some areas, and the highly seasonal nature of 
its demand for labour), it seems likely that it was the question of 
product quality which stimulated the diffusion of the presses prior to 
the First World War.55 The hydraulic presses allowed both a greater 
control in the pressure being applied, essential for the production of 
virgin oil, and also reduced significantly the length of time the olives 
were stored prior to processing. As a result, although from the late 
nineteenth century Spain lost its traditional export markets to cheaper 
vegetable oils, the improved quality of its products was instrumental 
in gaining new ones for human consumption. As the Spanish consul 
in Nice noted in 1911:56 
From the time that the first oils arrived here from the Peninsula, very primi-
tive in manufacture, very strong and without interest for the trade that is 
done here, until today, when the qualities have greatly improved, we see with 
pleasure imports constantly growing. As qualities have improved, so too have 
prices. 
Improved quality was not just the result of changes in mills and 
presses. Storage facilities were increased, not only to meet the extra 
demand, but also to keep separate the olive oil from different pressings. 
If the new mills were initially related to the export market, the greater 
economies of scale associated with the hydraulic presses implied that 
53 The acrual figures are 95 per cent and 32 per cent respectively, and refer to the prov-
inces of Cadiz, Cordoba, Jaen and Sevilla. Output has been calculated from Zambtana 
(1987, pp. 384-90) and labour inputs from Simpson (1992b, p. 16). 
5. The provinces cited were Guadalajara, Soria and Teruel (Bemaldo de Quiros, 1973, 
p. 104)· 
55 In the example given by Noriega, the quantity of oil obtained per ton of olives was 
very similar for all presses, a fact which is consistent with the stagnant industrial yields 
found during the first third of the century in Andalucia. 
56 Cited in Zambrana (1987, p. 155). 
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domestic consumers would in time also benefit. Unlike wine producers, 
the greater scale of production allowed significant capital investment at 
the manufacturing stage, improving product quality and creating new 
export markets. The limits to this growth will be discussed in chapter 
9. However, this section has shown that farmers, even in Andalucia, 
were willing to adapt relatively quickly to new techniques when market 
conditions were favourable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the changes that took place in three 
agricultural operations: cereal harvesting, cereal threshing and olive pro-
cessing. In some tasks, such as olive processing, diffusion of the new 
technology proceeded relatively quickly from the turn of the twentieth 
century as a response to new market opportunities. Only by changing 
the traditional presses and mills were farmers able to compete in inter-
national markets. By contrast, with cereal harvesting and threshing, 
changes were slower and varied across regions. By the 1930S a new gen-
eration of farm machinery, namely tractors and combined harvesters, 
were also beginning to appear. In the case of fixed machinery, new 
sources of energy (steam, gas, petrol and electricity) were in turn 
applied, and the machine's productivity, be it in cereal threshing, olive 
pressing or pumping irrigation water, grew spectacularly from the turn 
of the twentieth century. Yet despite these possibilities, mechanisation 
was limited in comparison with other countries in Western Europe, and 
labour productivity remained low. 
1}l:~ !!p,eedof wecl1ll.!lisation in Spanish agriculture Can be explained 
by'the delay jn me. rele.ase, of la.ooW: to other sectol1l. of tl1~"" ec:OiiQiiiy; 
arid' therefore a sufficient pool of labour existed to meet demand, e~~n 
at seasonal peaks. This was only part of the story, however. Relatively 
high domestic cereal prices raised the cost of draught animals, which in 
turn created a disincentive to substitute human energy for animal. 
Second, not only did farm implements remain expensive because of 
tariffs on imports, but the lack of domestic mechanics provided a 
serious barrier to diffusion. If farmers could not efficiently operate 
their machines, they would not encourage others to buy, which in turn 
discouraged both domestic industry and the training of mechanics. 
The lack of a domestic farm equipment industry would delay the all-
important adaptation of imported machines to local conditions, and pre-
vent access to the backup required by enterprising farmers who had 
bought machines from the foreign sales' representatives. Levels of 
human capital remained limited, as farmers only slowly changed their 
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production methods. 57 Agricultural mechanisation in Spain therefore 
was slow to bring about change in the sector, which in turn failed to 
create industrial demand. The contrast with California during the same 
period could not be greater: 58 
Early successes bred other innovations as skilled mechanics and other special-
ized inputs flowed into the new area of opportunity. The maturation of distri-
bution networks and repair facilities, along with increasing farmer familiarity 
with one type of machinery, lowered the barriers to adopting the next generation 
of equipment. The result of this dynamic process was to accelerate mechaniz-
ation and strengthen the impact of agricultural development in California as 
backward linkages stimulated urban employment and manufacturing. Like a 
magnet, agglomeration economies encouraged producers to locate near each 
other, reducing costs and enhancing the exchange of ideas. 
Instead, the abundant labour supply in Spain's south, especially 
Andalucia, 'choked off the incentive to invent new technologies', 
making the region more reminiscent of the American South than Cali-
fornia. 59 It is not clear to what extent cheap labour (or fragmented, small 
farms in the northern Interior) 'choked off' the domestic farm-machine 
industry, or whether a more dynamic machine industry would have 
speeded up agricultural mechanisation. All that can be said at present 
is that Spanish farmers did respond to changes in factor and product 
prices, and the delay in mechanisation was not simply the cause of back-
wardness in the agricultural sector, but rather the consequence of the 
limited development achieved by other complementary sectors of the 
economy. 
57 For a broader study of the question of human capital and economic growth in Spain, 
see NWiez (1992, especially ch. 7)· 
58 Olmstead and Rhode (1988, p. 87). 
59 Whatley (1987). 
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8 The growth of the home market and 
agricultural specialisation 
It is thus that through the greater part of Europe the commerce and 
manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause 
and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country.' 
The role of cities in providing a stimulus to change in the agricultural 
sector has received much attention from historians and economists in 
recent years.2 If towns required labour productivity in agriculture to 
increase, so that 'a rising proportion of the workforce can find employ-
ment in secondary and tertiary activities without prejudicing the supply 
of food or raising its price inordinately',3 agriculture was equally depen-
dent on urban demand to permit greate~J;£ectii1ISatI~!l' economies ~f 
~ale, and to absorb sUl'£lus labour. 11ius, as students of the First Agri-
CUftUral Revolution have noted, ffie introduction of mixed farming in 
northern Europe was closely linked to the growing urban demand for 
meat and dairy produce, which encouraged a reallocation of resources 
towards livestock. In this chapter I examine the interconnection between 
the rural and urban economies and argue that if there were obsta~les 
to increasing labour .E.roductIvity in Spanlsliagnciutiire;iiioan deiiiim'd 
was also a weak stimulant to agricultural cfiange:---=:::-...-------" 
In the firSt sectiOIlI snow that despIte Important changes in per capita 
jpcome, diets were ~w to diversIfY in th!: )'ea~ ,Qt.j.?E_ to the Ci\jl,W!!!.> 
with consumption of oasic staples accounting for bom-aJarge part of 
~ture :~rie ~:~~ the low cOfi~ml?~ 
senor foo s as eat lSf datry proauce. THe secon<I sectIon 
examines the extent 0 lcnfafill prbleCtlOn' and government inter-
vention in commodity markets were factors m raising food costs and 
reducing real urban wages. Wheat and meat produce m partta:mlrwere 
highly protected m Spain, although evidence suggests that internal 
prices were not much above those of other countries, such as France, 
, Smith (1970, p. SIS). 
2 See, for example, the classic work by Fisher (193S), together with Bairoch (1988), de 
Vries (1984), Ringrose (1983), Williamson (1988) and Wrigley (1967 and 1985). 
3 Wrigley (1967, p. ISI). 
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Germany or Italy. In the third section I argue that livestock producers 
suffered from both ~ant I2~Pi~; C'RSunlption of meat in urban" 
areas and Weait17rb~8!:owth ~~a y. owever, meat was relatrvely 
expensive "tl'f'S'ifaiiiQue to suPplY-SI e problems, both m hvestock-Pr<>=" 
ductlon and in transportation, meat processing and marketing. In the 
final section I consider the question of whether agriculture was slow to 
release labour, or whether urban demand was insuffiCl~J,lti'Q~ittra~ 
E"Vldence uom rural-urban wage gaps suggest that, until 1914, urban 
growth was held back by a reluctance to migrate, but that this was not 
the case there~fter. 
Low incomes, poor diets 
Despite serious measurement difficulties, there can be little doubt that 
Spain was a poor coun n the eve of the Civil War. In one recent 
estimate, parus, real GDP per capitamI'929'\VaS"OnIy 68 per ce~~ of 
~~! __ ~fJt~££~t2[giat~9reat 'B~~~fii, 16 per cent of...,!.lW. of 
France and 57 per cent of that of Germany.4 The direct result .2i!bis 
was that for most-spanIardS-dIets were-poor. The low calorie int~nd 
sllOrtage -o"failiffiiil proteiii"iiiMearierranean dietS-in general- and in 
diets in Spain in particular - is shown in table 8.1. 
Yet it is also true that the limited modernisation of the Spanish 
economy prior to the Civil War had produced some major changes. 
In particular, P!:!'::!-..9.t.,~E~cosura has estimated that GDP per 
head dou~m... 18S2761 1!!l4.-!~3735. 5 This increase was 
at'coiiii;-aliied 9.Y structural ch . '------rn-urbanisation 
~a: _~:ae~iu.~ent in agriculture. Therefore, it is of interest 
to aSk to what extent die poor diets that most Spaniards had in 1936 
in fact represented an improvement over those of the previous half 
century, especially given the apparent important increase in per capita 
income. 
The food balance she_~£_th~_t __ ~ c;~_~~~ted for 1900 g!ves a daily per 
capit~Llll!£..,!~<:5:_2.t2J.Q_2~_fllIQri~_~ •. or 2,733 calories when measured in 
equivalent adult male units. In chapter 1 this was considered as about 
the minimum for an a~cultural society, and emphasis was placed on t~.~joYi·co~sumptiQ~--ofs~perror -2oods, su~ as meal,. dairy produce 
and sugar. Yet low calorie intake did not imply that no dietary changes 
took place. In the first place, there was a slow improvement in l?roquct 
-------"--................ -......... ,~''' ..... ,,~ ~-...--
4 Prados de la Escosura (1992, p. 36). 
5 This is equivalent to an annual increase of 1.0 per cent; Carreras gives a more modest 
growth of 65 per cent, or an annual growth of 0.7 per cent (Prados de la Escosura, 
1995, Table E.2; Carreras 1989c, pp. 556-7). 
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quality. .as. m3!l.l!fi£twing.~ation system~}m.eroved, !lnd 
government legislation curbed some of the worst abuses in the food 
processing industries:...!It chapter 7, for example we saw the improve-
ments in olive oil presses, and the question of wine adulteration has 
been discussed elsewhere.6 From the late nineteenth century, the intro-
duction of roller milling provided a much finer flour, and significantly 
improved bread quality.7 
Second, we can note the growth in consumption of non-essential 
f~2~!' :Thus between 185~/9 ana_..!!2..079d!~L ca1?i!~. consumR,tiQl1 of 
c~~_~_~.~as~.~tl>.Y.~ .. llLP.~l~~~....£2.9~~d 
~~~ __ (hetween 1850/9 and 1900/9) b~ 124J?er cent. However, in all 
cases the base figures were very small, and consumption was concen-
trMed in the major cities.s Furthermore, with the exception of sugar 
from the late 1880s, these shifts in cO,wlumprion did not benefit 
S,Eanish agrjculture. Of much greater importance for domestic agricw-
ture was the demand for livestock produce, and here the critical 
factor was the stagnation in herd size between 1750 and 1936, causing 
the potential supply of meat er ca ita to fall to onI 68 per cent in 
1917 an r cent in 1929, of what it had been in 1865.9 The 
reiat:i8ftship between growth hi pet c!lJSita income an,rineM70nsump-
non aE£ears, therefore, to have Eeen neganve,-at lea~ 
reco~~ry during*t'lie lffif tliifd'oT'me twentieth ~tury. I shall return 
to this subject shortly. 
Between 1900 and 1936, total daily calorie consumption increased to 
2,426 per person~r 3,155 per equivalent adult male, representing a 
growth of 15.7 per cent.IO This is a significant increase. If the minimum 
requiremeru for an adult male doing no work is taken as 1,725 calories, 
this implies that there was a .4~£ent increase in available calories 
6 Simpson (1985a, p. 115; 1985b). 
7 Nadal (1987, pp. 25-30) and Perren (1990). 
8 Simpson (1989a, p. 377). 
• Taking the herd size (live weight) to have been 100 in 1865, it was 98 in 1750, 87 in 
1917 and 105 in 1929 (Garrabou and Sanz 1985, cuadro 20; GEHR 1978, apendice). 
One possible source of error lies in the month in which the census was carried out: 
1865 (November) was perhaps exaggerated in comparison with 1929 and with 1933 
(March), with the former maybe including the annual newboms, but the latter not. 
The date for the 1917 census is not known (GEHR, 1991, pp. 81-2). The 1865 census 
includes the number of animals under six months (i.e. added to the national herd since 
March), and so, if this category is excluded, then the size of national herd in 1865 was 
still not surpassed until 1913 in the case of cattle, 1917 for swine, 1921 for goats, and 
1939 for sheep. In tenns of live weight per person, there was a significant fall. 
10 Age distribution given in Nicolau (1989, p. 69); coefficients of calorie distribution esti-
mated by Fogel (cited in Bekaert, 1991, Table 2). 
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which could be used for workY In part, this is likely to explain the 
greater labour productivity in a' ~~~'!::~I]._.J.2~_~d 123.0. 
s e 1.4. though consumption of basic foods such as 
cereals and potatoes increased, the implication is that changes in per 
capita income and urbanisation also led to greater variety in diets. 
Between 1900 and 1930 consumption oflean meats grew by 35 per cent, 
milk 127 per cent, sugar 152 per,5~!...~d ~.?!!~:..!2!.£~!,,>~~!.:..:~.,.~e~'.~" 
2!lce again, ba~!.~.ers. w~.!e!!".~~~~~.,~s table 8.1 snows, ~ 
Spanish diet, like the Mediterranean one in ge~rak remained very poor 
in comparison with no op.e...ln general, it 
was V1 de endent 0 cereals otatoes and vegetables for protein, 
with meat and dairy roducts remain~~'~~~;:'~-'""''~'~-'-'''-'''''''-''''''' 
e question of why diets in Spain were so poor in the 1930!£~~ 
simply be a questi2!LQf the level of econol!!i£..g.eY~QR.1!!~!!t .. JE..~J!i.§h",. 
for example? CoiiSum~d 23 per cent more calories ..£~.!!t.Ei...Yi~ul!6 95..per 
c~~ore }!lE-tJ,and 228 per cent mor~ siiga~~en thougl:l GDP per 
~lta in the two countries was not ye:[y difi:~nt.f'3 Table 8.2 shows 
clearly that, either because urban wages in Spain were significantly lower 
than elsewhere, or because there were inefficiencies in the product;ign 
and supply of food, Spanish consumers were conslsteniliJVor~e off t!!!n 
in most other area§'"uf ~"pe. In the next two sections I consider two 
pOSslbdlties: first, that high cereal tariffs in Spain seriously distorted 
resource allocation; imd second, that the Io~ !evel ot ur§am~!1tion giP 
~t petrolt SU'ffiC'ient agriculturar specialisation in meat and dairy 
c .... ..,...- ----.............. -.-produce. 
--
What price self-sufficiency? the case of wheat 
From the late nineteenth century, Spain was not alone in protecting its 
wheat growers by tariffs, but levels were consiaereQ excepiionaITy nigh 
and help ea produce soiiie-on~;urope:;s rugnest· breadiiri'ce's~r4To'com­
pare the real level of protection between countries is notoriously difficult 
11 From 1,000 surplus calories in 1900 to 1,430 in 1930. For minimum requirements, I 
have assumed that for 17 hours a day a person required the absolute minimum to 
sustain life (i.e. BMR 1.27), and for the remaining 7 hours undertook very light activity 
(for example, standing still but not strolling, the equivalent ofBMR 1.4). BMR is taken 
at the bottom of Fogel's range, at 1,350 calories. See Fogel (1991, pp. 40-42) and the 
Appendix at the end of this book. 
12 Simpson (1989a, cuadro 5). 
13 In 1933 real GDP in Ireland was US$2,680 (1990 PPP), against USh,840 in Spain 
(Prados de la Escosura et al., 1993). For diets, see table 8.1. 
14 The tariff and the domestic tenns of trade for wheat farmers are considered in chap-
ter 10. 
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Table 8.2. Relative purchasing power" of building workerl in Europe, 
January 1930 
Bread' Potatoes Meat" Milk Sugar 
Spain (4)' 1.79 3·93 0.27 1.79 0·73 
Italy (7) 1.48 3·73 0.25 2.19 0·43 
France (4) 2·34 6.04 0.29 2·53 1.07 
Gennany (6) 3.10 11.82 0·50 4.48 2.10 
Britain (7) 3.40 8.68 0.71 2.85 2.71 
Austria (3) 2.05 6.58 0.36 2·55 1.23 
Ireland (3) 2·79 13·11 0.64 3.28 2·43 
Low Countries (4) 2·93 13·67 0·53 4.56 1.74 
Denmark (I) 2.41 12·50 1.14 6.06 4.00 
Sweden (3) 2·37 15.83 0.89 8.64 4.52 
Estonia (2) 1.94 6.60 0.36 2.20 0.94 
Poland (4) 3.00 12.27 0·39 2.81 0.83 
Czechoslovakia (3) 3·25 12.21 0·55 3·77 1.30 
" Purchasing power measured in kilograms or litres of product that wages from one 
hour's labour could buy in major cities. 
• Building workers' wages have been taken as an average between skilled (albaniles) and 
unskilled (peones). 
, Bread is from wheat flour, except in the case of Austria, Estonia, Gennany and 
Poland, when rye bread has been used. 
d Meat refers to an average of beef, lamb, pork and veal, except when infonnation is 
lacking, namely Denmark (lamb), Britain (veal), Ireland (pork and veal) and Sweden 
(pork). 
'The number of urban centres used are given in parentheses. 
Source: Direcci6n General de Trabajo (1931, cuadros !xiii and !xiv), which in turn is 
based on International Labour Office publications. 
given the variety of methods that protection might take, the problems 
in converting currencies, and the significant dietary variations between 
countries. Comparing tariff levels alone is not enough.15 The real level 
of protection enjoyed by Spanish farmers is perhaps best reflected in 
Table 8.3, which shows the country to have been rinJ.!ally self-sufficient 
~~~~~~_2~~2~m,~~~\l~ha£!~!h~S!~£~~§iher 
levels of pro~9!Q~£s:.2!'.5!i.!!gJ:QJJ~.Qm~pn. 16 Therefore, domestic self-
15 For example, Spain supplemented its tariffs from November 1921 by strict import 
quotas for wheat and maize and, therefore, in the words of Liepmann, 'Spain's corn 
duties ... had only limited practical value for judging her corn-import policy, and the 
large decreases of her corn imports in post-War periods' (Liepmann, 1938, p. 101). For 
Spanish tariff policy see EPAPM (1928, pp. 257--60) and Montojo Sureda (1945, pp. 
15-47)· 
,. The IIA does not allow a figure for 1909/13 to be calculated, as the figures for pro-
duction refer to post First World War boundaries and imports to the pre-War frontiers. 
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Table 8.3. Indices of wheat protection and self-sufficiency in five European 
importing nations, 192519 
Estimated tariffs 
as % of inter- Income from customs 
Self-sufficiency in national prices receipts as % of total 
wheat (%) (1927) imports (1922/30) 
Spain 96.9 19.6 19.2 
France 86.2 23.0 7.8 
Gennany 83-9" 29·0 8.0 
Italy 74.0 27.0 5.6 
Great Britain 21.2 9.2 
"Includes both wheat and rye. The level of wheat self-sufficiency was 61.3% and rye 
99·7%· 
Sources: IIA (various years); Liepmann (1938, pp. 64, 68, 72 and 101); Tena (1992, 
p. 333)· 
sufficiency was achieved at a cost to the consumer, as domestic prices 
remained above international ones. Figure 8.1 compares the internal 
wheat price in Spain with the English price, which is taken as the 'world 
price', and has been converted into pesetas at the current exchange 
rate. 17 Whereas between 1870 and 1877 Spanish wheat l?ri~es were 
chea er than 'world' rices: thlswoulcr-not"httthe'case'forthe rest of 
- P . ___ ... P. __ ... _ .. __ ._ ........ ... -- .... 3' .. f17, ............................ "; ... , .......... "-.... "' ..... ~ .. "" 
the period. Only during the First Worlu war, when Bntlsh pnces rose 
on accountof shipping difficulties, did the price difference fall much 
below 20 per cent. If Spain had, by the 1930s, achieved self-sufficiency 
in bread grains, this was achieved through low levels of food consump-
tion, high food prices and, as I argue in chapter 10, low incomes for 
many of Spain's farmers. 
Spain was not alone in protecting its wheat farmers. Other countries, 
such as France or Germany, did so too, but they also enjoyed relatively 
high agricultural productivity. In the case of France, Lindert has shown 
that the silver price of wheat grew from being 5 per cent ~~e: than 
that in England during the 1870S, to arou~~._~~~r .. ~])?~~_~~~.~~._~e 
1820S and .!.2.~_!!!_<?_~!r..,~?~~~i~!~:~.~~~~~f!~c.,(!~!....fr°La~ ~k~!,~.~h 
experience. IS Lindert also reminds us that the om ws ept me 
17 Since much of the wheat consumed in Britain was imported, there is no need to include 
freight in the calculation. Unlike GEHR (1980), which showed the costs (and profi~s) 
of shipping from England to Barcelona, my interest here is simply to illustrate the pnce 
'gap' between the two countries. A moving three-year price average is used. For a wider 
comparison of international wheat prices between 1880 and 1905, see Palafox (1991, 
cuadro 1.3). 
18 Lindert (1991, table 2.4). 
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Figure 8.1 Spanish wheat prices as a percentage of 'world' prices 
(three-year averages used) 
Sou~ces: Mitchell and Deane (1962), GEHR (1980) and Paris 
Eguila2 (1943) for prices; Carreras (1989, pp. 390-1) for exchange 
rates. 
domestic price of wheat in England significantly above that of other 
European c~~tries between about 1710 to 1846. Indeed, the gap 
between Bn~au:' and othe: co~ntries in this earlier period appears 
remarkably slmdar to that Identified in figure 8.1, between Spain and 
the '\~70rld price'.19 It hardly needs mentioning that the period 1710-
1846 IS not normally considered one of agricultural failure in England. 
It seems unlikely that higher bread prices caused by tariff protection 
~ould ma~e a really significant difference to household budgets in Spain 
ID the pe~od. 1891-1936.20 However, even if cereal protection in Spain 
was not Significantly above that of its neighbours, the low incomes of 
the country implied that its impact on aggregate demand would be 
larger than in Germany or France, given its greater weight in family 
budgets. 
A second factor, perhaps of even greater importance in the long run, 
19 Ibid. (table 2.4). 
20 Fraile (1993). 
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was the question of the low opportunity cost of growing cereals in Spain 
compared with that in north~rp Eur2Q..~_A~_ the rest ortFiis cnapfei-liiid 
the next will argue, there were few alternatives to cereal-growing in 
much of arid Spain. 
Urbanisation and cOlDDlerciallivestock fanning 
From the late nineteenth century, a major factor in productivity 
growth in northern European agriculture was the movement of 
resources away from the production of bread cereals, where demand 
tended to be stagnant and farmers faced growing international compe-
tition, and into other commodities where profitability was greater. 
The result was a sizable increase in the output of meat and dairy 
produce. Thus, in Great Britain the area devotedto'-wheat'"icliby a 
half, and the number of cattle increased by 30 per cent between 1870 
and 1910. In France, whilst the value of cereals stagnated, the output 
of meat and dairy produce increased by 48 per cent between 18651 
74 and 19051I4. In Germany there was no fall in the area of wheat 
and rye, but the number of cattle rose by a third between 1873 and 
1913.21 In Italy, the number of cattle increased by 40 per cent 
between 1880 and 1910, and there were significant increases in the 
numbers of pigs, sheep and goats.22 In Spain, by contrast, livestock 
numbers appe~~?_ lla~~reF "~.'!E.~.-#i~ .. ,!=:'Iii~.~.~~_~ ~I9i7-an~ 
12.~9.t~2 .. Q1:~ .. ~<:>.I?-~l?~~on 0 . Ivest<?~~ l'.!gg:!!SgQ!l:~o nnaragncuTtural 
output &:~ ona verY. sfQwJ£:iom 27 per cent ini897li§oI'to 30 
per cent in 1929133.23 By contrast, the area of wheat grew throughout 
most of the nineteenth century, and increased by 24 per cent between 
190519 and 1930/4.24 
There can be few doubts that this failure to switch resources out of 
bread grains and towards meat and dairy produce was a major cause of 
the low productivity of agriculture in Spain. Furthermore, the low levels 
of milk and meat consumption shown in table 8.1 illustrate vividly the 
poor living standards of many Spaniards. That said, it seems difficult to 
blame the poor performance of livestock husbandry just on tariffs, as 
domestic wheat prices were at the most 40 per ~nt higher thanJhe 
21 Tracy (1989, pp. 51, 76 and 100-1). In all countries there was a dramatic decline in 
sheep flocks in the face of imported foreign wool, and a major increase in pigs. 
22 The number of pigs increased by 28 per cent, sheep by 40 per cent and goats by 36 
per cent (Mitchell, 1992, pp. 347-8). 
23 Simpson (1995a, table 2). 
24 Calculated from GEHR (1991). 
186 Markets and institutions, 1880-1936 
world price (i.e. prices in the United Kingdom), and the difference 
would be considerably less if the comparison were made with Germany 
or France (figure 8.1). Instead, the slow growth in livestock output 
appears to have been caused by other factors which I shall now examine. 
From the turn of the twentieth century, if not before, it was believed 
that th~re ~as a positive correlation between meat consumption, rising 
per capIta mcome and the level of urbanisation. Thus, Flores de Lemus 
argued that individuals with incomes of less than 1,250 pesetas a year 
consumed some 15 kilograms of meat annually, compared to 24 kilo-
grams for those enjoying incomes of between 1,250 and 3,000 pesetas, 
and 42 kilograms when incomes were between 3,000 and 6 000 ~ , 
pesetas. According to tax returns and data from slaughterhouses, meat 
~Q~~t,lJllJ2tiQrr.was~eJU..e.!iti!!_urbJ!~l.~~as,_~_t:h 33 ·.2JsilpS!:ams }2er person 
b~mg cQD.S1llm.Q .. J!lJhe"p!:QYin.Q.al .. !dl12itals_ UL!22.4.t. more than double 
the figure (15 kilograms) to be found in the rest of Spain.26 As in Italy, 
consumption of meat in most rural areas was perhaps only a third of 
that in urban areas by this time.27 
.On the demand side, ri~jng...ll§"._.capita....incame.s.....iUld......urbanisatiQn 
m.I~.!Jhe!"~fqt~ .. btL~ffl?~~.!~g ... !9_ .. haye. .. inc.tea.wLde.m!!I}.4._~nd_leQ...m. a 
gr~~!n ~c:"!~~.-?L!i:y~.§,t~£tlll:odllcts~ Yet evidence .. ~.!1gg~.~!Ltha~Son­
sumptIon ofmeaU!!....~adrid,. a~~!J)e~hap.~.!!!..£!!!~~5}!!es, ~~ittle, 
and that urban growth m Spam was slow compared with other European 
countries. : 
. Table .8.4 brings together a number of estimates of meat consumption 
m Madrid over the period covered by this book. By their nature, these 
figures have to be considered as approximations, but they do illustrate 
two major features of Madrid's (and probably Spain's) meat market. 
First, ~.P0E..~_!!!..le~§!....~'!~£!..Q!Jlf . $~pita 
25 F' f or mcomes 0 between 6,0~0 and 12,000 pesetas the figure was 59 kilograms, between 
I~,OOO and 24,000 pesetas It was 70 kilograms, and above 24,000 pesetas it was 85 
kilograms. As expected, the elasticity of demand declines with the increase in income: 
1,250/3,000 pesetas -to 3,000/6,000 pesetas +0.7 
3,000/6,000 pesetas to 6,000/12,000 pesetas +0.4 
6,000112,000 pesetas to 12,000/24,000 pesetas +0.2 
Calculated £r<:>m Flores de Lemus, (1908, cited in GEHR, 1978-9, p. lI8). Prados de 
2. la Escos~ gives average pe~ capita GDP in 1908 as 614 pesetas (1995, table D.5). 
Cons~pnon was ~atest ~ the largest cities, being 44.8 kilograms per capita in 
Madri~. and 42.9 kilograms m Barcelona (Comisiim Extraparlamentaria para la Trans-
formacwn de los Impuestos de Consumos, vol. 4, cited in GEHR 1978-9, p. Il9). These 
figI1res exclude rural household production. 
27 In 1916 ~eat c~nsumpti~n in Madrid was estimated at 35 kilograms per person com-
par~d With 13 ~lograms m rural areas (Ministerio de Fomento. Direcci6n General de 
Agncultura, Minas y Montes, 1920). Toniolo argI1es that urban meat consumption in 
Italy was 'at least three times that of the average for the country as a whole' (1990 p. 
33)· ' 
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Table 8.4. Changes in meat consumption, Madrid, various years between 
I757 and I930 (kg per person) 
Population 
Beef" Mutton PorI( Total of Madrid 
1757 5.8 20·9 7.0 33·7 
142,000 
1860 16.0 6.8 8·5 31.3 298,4
00 
1900 21.2 5·5 6.2 32.9 
539,800 
1930 18.2 6.5 4.2 28.8 
952,800 
" For all years, the coefficient of 0.717 for beef has been used to convert carcase weight 
to lean meat. Note that the 1900 and 1930 figures for beef also include 1.7 kg and 
4.0 kg, respectively, of veal. 
b The coefficient of 0.803 has been used to convert carcase weight to lean meat. 
Sources: For 1757, Ringrose (1983, tables ll-4, VI-4, D-5); for 1860, calculated from 
Femandez Garcia (1971, pp. 98-9); for 1900 and 1930, GOmez Mendoza and Simpson 
(1988, Apendice 2); for conversion of carcase weights to lean meat, see Sanz Egafia 
(cited in G6mez Mendoza and Simpson, 1988, Apendice 2). 
consum£tion in Madrid stagnated. Second, in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury the predomiflantme"iirconsUmea"'was mutton, while a century later 
it was beef. Information from other cities is scarcer, but in Zaragoza per 
capita consumption increased by just 5 per cent between 1871/82 and 
192 5/35.28 
If urban per capita meat consumption was barely growing (so 
minimising the impact of growing urbanisation on the livestock sector), 
the number of people living in Spanish cities was also relatively small in 
the early twentieth century. This had not always been the case. Bairoch 
has argued that the countries which underwent early industrialisation -
namely England, France, Switzerland, Belgium and the United States-
did so from a relatively low level of urbanisation, whereas the more 
heavily urbanised countries, 'notably Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
P...QrlUgal fi~rpm~iP:Q:Qi~t~=~y"~9'p~!S~,?9'!iiaeed,--asde 
Vries has shown, Spain experienced a fall in its urban population from 
923,000 (11.4 per cent of the toUiiTl!!I~~J.§'7.~:~§"o'l!6per-Ceiit)Tn 
i7SQ!O 
From the second half of the eighteenth century there was a renewal 
in Spain's urban growth. It appears strongest in the centres of 10,000 
inhabitants or more; taken together, these grew from approximately 7·6 
2. Pinilla Navarro (1990, p. 644)· 
2' Bairoch (1988, pp. 331-2). 
30 De Vries (1984, tables 3.2 and 3.7). De Vries defines urban centres at 10, 000 or more 
inhabitants. 
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per cent of total population in 1750 to 35.9 per cent in 1930. However, 
there are good reasons for considering this an unsuitable indicator given 
the large numbers of agricultural workers to be found in populations of 
this size in Spain. The 1950 census, for example, which contains wor-
mation of the employment structure of municipalities of 10,000 inhabi-
tants or more, shows that .male agricultural emI!loyment was ~er 
cent, a figure that increases to 27.6 per cent if the iiidustrial 
provinces of Barcelona and Vizcaya (mduaing Bilb~d the cities of 
MadrlQiiii(fSevllla are excluded."-
A better measurement of urbanisation are the 50 provincial capitals, 
which grew between 1787 and 1930 'nearly three times as fast as the 
countryside (1.14 per cent compared with 0.38 per cent per year)'.32 
The share of total Eopulation found in these 50 towns increased from 
I~r cent in 1800 to 22 per cent in 1930. Importantly, the 1950 census 
mdicatestnat'-agri~witearorOnJf 11.8 per cent of male 
employment in provincial capitals. However, the obvious shortcomings 
of using provincial capitals as a proxy for urbanisation is that it misses 
some important industrial and commercial centres which were not prov-
incial capitals, including Gij6n, Cartagena and Jerez de la Frontera. Fur-
thermore, changes in the size of the provincial capitals cannot readily 
be used for international comparisons. 
As we have noted, it was the largest cities which were the most 
important markets for agricultural products, with per capita con-
sumption of meat and groceries being considerably greater than in the 
smaller towns or rural areas. But on this measure, there is no doubting 
Spain's relative decline: in 1750 Spain could boast six of Europe's forty 
largest urban centres (Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Sevilla, Valencia 
and Cadiz): by 1850, this figure had fallen to three (Madrid, Barcelona 
and Valencia); by 1950 the figure had fallen to just two (Madrid and 
Barcelona).33 
In part, this decline can be attributed to the much slower growth 
in the Spanish economy compared to some other European nations. 
However, if the comparison is made using countries at similar levels of 
development, Spain still appears to be less urbanised than most. Table 
8.5 brings together information on per capita incomes, distribution of 
the active population, and two indicators of urbanisation (per cent of 
population in cities of more than 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants). At 
31 Calculated from the Censo de Poblacifm (1950, 2). Nationally, the active male population 
was 53.4 per cent in 1950. For the agro-cities of Andalucia, see chapter 2. 
32 Reher (1990b, p. 284). 
33 Chandler and Fox (1974, cited in Hohenberg and Lees, 1985, table 7.2). Europe here 
includes Russia. 
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.imilar levels of per capita income, Spain had a considerably smaller 
.hare of its population in major towns compared to other countries, 
with the exception of France. It had significantly less if the absolute 
numbers living in the 'great cities' (those of more than 100,000 
inhabitants) are considered.34 In conclusion, although Spain had been 
a more urbanised society than the countries in northwest Europe in the 
sixteenth century, this was not the case by the nineteenth or twentieth 
centuries. If, as has been suggested here, cities played an important role 
in encouraging agricultural specialisation, then the stimulus for Spanish 
farmers would have been considerably weaker. 
To what extent, then, was the slow growth in meat products caused 
by the lack of demand, and to what extent to supply constraints? If 
demand was indeed rising faster than supply, we would expect prices 
to have risen against that of bread. Figure 8.2 shows how the inelastic 
demand for bread led to its price rising significantly against that of meat 
following the poor harvests of 1856/7, 1867/8 and 1882.35 However, by 
the mid-1880s, and especially from the turn of the century, relative 
p.ri.~earl~ mox~q m. EY.~1¥~1.9£~:m~li~11lls-arS(arts-wrih 
what we know about national wheat consumption and livestock num-
bers. After growing from an annual 159.4 kg/person in 1908/12 to 168.8 
kg/person in 1918122, wheat consumption then fell to 150.8 kg/person 
over the following decade. As early as 1926, Flores de Lemus had noted 
the growing imJ20rtance of feed grains compared with those used for 
b~ead-making, a;d~suggested that"thls "was-io"l)eihefiitiirefor'cereal 
"-'--'---....-~-"-,,-.-'".-.~ ._".,.", ''''''''''''-,,,,,,, "<~"- -"''L'"'' 36' ' , '" ., .'" <'''''''' " . 
farmers, given the im..Q.ossibility of exportinlt wneat.. The government 
reacted to rising meat pric~sbyafIowiligTmPorts'aveiaging 282,800 tons 
of maize each year between 1920 and 1933 - the equivalent of 44 per 
cent of the domestic harvest. Nationally, farmers were therefore slowly 
diverting resourceS into livestock production. However, during the first 
third of the twentieth century, urban wages in Madrid increased about 
twice as fast as meat prices, and therefore the stagnation in per capita 
consumption in this city suggests that any improvements in living stan-
dards led to the purchase of other superior foods or consumer goods 
rather than meat.37 In other words, even though diets were poor in meat, 
consumers were not willing to increase consumption at any price. The 
34 The table also suggests that the supposedly rapid decline in agricultural employment 
in Spain between 1910 and 1930 appears inconsistent with the much slower growth in 
urbanisation. See Simpson (1995a, pp. 185-6). 
35 By contrast, the rise in 1892 and 1898 was caused by the fall in meat prices. 
36 Flores de Lemus (1926). See also Jimenez Blanco (1986b) and GEHR (1988, p. 61). 
37 Reher and Ballesteros (1993, Apendice I) and G6mez Mendoza and Simpson, (1988, 
Apendice 3). Note also that, as table 8.4 suggests, there were shifts in preference for 
different types of meat. 
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Figure 8.2 Bread-meat price ratio in Madrid, 1850-1930 (five-year 
averages used; 1848/52=100) 
Source: Calculated from Reher and Ballesteros (1993, pp. 139-42). 
evidence, albeit slight, would seem to suggest that low meat consump-
tion was primarily a supply problem. 
Ringrose argued that Madrid's per capita meat consumption in the 
mid-eighteenth century was high by European standards, a factor he 
attributes to favourable natural resources for livestock production.38 By 
1930 this clearly was not the case. The predominance of mutton in 1757 
was a consequence of the Mesta and transhumance sheep farming of 
the Interior. The rising production costs from the late eighteenth cen-
tury, and the collapse in wool prices in real terms from the second 
decade of the nineteenth, quickly eroded the favourable conditions for 
extensive grazing, thereby adversely affecting the supply of mutton.39 
From the turn of the nineteenth century onwards, the decline in rural 
industry and the increasing penetration of cereals from the Interior 
encouraged greater livestock specialisation in the North. This region 
supplied not just animals for urban markets, but also work animals for 
farming and transportation elsewhere in the Peninsula.40 As early as 
1802, Pedro Sanchez noted for large areas in Galicia that:41 
38 Ringrose (1983, pp. 122). The author cites Viftas y Mey (1965, pp. 75-9)· 
39 Garcia Sanz (1978) and Uopis (1982). 
40 For this specialisation, see Dominguez Martin (1988, pp. 103-28) and Puente Feman-
dez (1992, ch. 3). 
41 Sanchez (1802). 
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. . . cattle everywhere are bred for sale outside the region, and if more are not 
sold, it is because of obstacles to the trade. Therefore it could be said that 
instead offactories, this kingdom [i.e. Galicia] has the equivalent to industry in 
cattle. This is the farmer's great treasure, and his principal resource. From their 
sale he obtains almost all his subsistence needs. 
The North had 7.3 per cent of the agricultural land area, but 36 per 
cent of livestock output in 1929/33. Rainfall was sufficient to provide 
good quality natural pastures, allowing hay to be produced for winter 
fodder. This was supplemented by the production of animal feed, 
especially maize, grown in intensive rotations. Of the animals sold in 
Madrid, the North supplied directly 25 per cent of beef animals and 57 
per cent of real calves in 1926.42 Indirectly, the region was responsible 
for an even greater share as it provided young animals for other prov-
inces, where they were subsequently fattened and sent to the metropolis. 
However, despite this specialisation, meat consumption per capita in 
Madrid on the eve of the Civil War was similar to that some two centur-
ies earlier. Livestock specialisation in this region was not hampered by 
natural resources, but rather by the very small herds and farms, leading 
to high levels of self-sufficiency and difficulties in obtaining economies 
of scale to reduce marketing costs. 
Outside the North, the biggest problem facing livestock farmers was 
undoubtedly that of the availability offeed, both because of the poor qual-
ity grassland, and because of the high opportunity costs of irrigated land.43 
With the extremely low population densities of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, problems of summer droughts and poor pastures 
had been successfully solved by extensive grazing and transhumance. 
During the nineteenth century, population growth and a price structure 
that encouraged the production of bread grains made this solution much 
less attractive. Furthermore, poor natural pastures were not easily sup-
plemented by other forms of feed. As late as 1929, the area of artificial 
pastures and fodder crops in the whole of Spain was only 26.7 per cent of 
the total sown area. By contrast, in France the figure was 44.2 per cent, in 
Italy 31.6 per cent and in Great Britain 74.0 per cent - all countries which 
also benefited from better natural pastures than did Spain.44 As a result, it 
was the small animals - sheep, goats and pigs - which supplied the bulk of 
the meat and much of the milk produced outside the North. 
42 Sanz Egaiia (1927, pp. 2-3). 
43 This was especially so in urban areas, where high population densities favoured dairy 
farming, but where market gardening and fruit farming were often more profitable 
(Agenjo Cecilia, 1956, p. 3). 
.. [lA Yearbook (1930-1). Figures refer to barley, oats, maize and 'all artifical pastures 
and other forage crops'. 
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The difficulties facing dairy farmers were perhaps even greater than 
hose facing meat producers (although, given the low level of specialis-
ltion, many farmers supplied both dairy and meat products). Tradition-
llly, because of its bulk and short life, milk was consumed n~ar centres 
)f production and often on the farm. Lactations were sh~rt, YIelds sma~l 
md relatively large quantities were used directly for reanng calves. This 
is shown in table 8.6, where regions have been listed according to unit 
price for milk, and the Interior, because of its great diversity, split into 
three distinct areas. The region with by far the greatest output, the 
North had the lowest prices and the second lowest yields. 
Co~ditions over much of the North were favourable for livestock hus-
bandry, and milk provided an important addition to.local d~ets.45.~ow­
ever off-farm demand varied greatly across the region, bemg mmunal 
in ~uch of Galicia, but greater in the industrial areas, especially Bilbao. 
In Galicia, cattle were kept less for their milk and more as work animals 
and for meat. As a result, average yields in this region in 1933 were just 
767 litres per animal. By contrast, in the Basque provinces of Guipmcoa 
and Vizcaya urban demand led to an average yield of 2,300 litres per 
animal.46 At'the other end of the scale, where natural conditions were 
unsuitable for dairy cattle and milk output was consequently small, milk 
prices and yields were considerably higher than in the North .. ~igh 
yields were obtained in urban dairies and feedlots,. whe~e speclal~sed 
milk-producing animals were kept, and there was lIttle, ~ no gra~mg. 
The country's highest yields therefore tended to be found m Madrid or 
Barcelona, and urban milk was considered a luxury item, often only 
used for medical purposes. 47 If these two provinces are excluded, then 
the natural conditions found in Andalucia, the Mediterranean and the 
Interior led to approximately equal quantities of goat's and cow's milk 
being produced.48 Finally, a few regions, especially in the Pyren~es, were 
able to combine areas of relatively good natural resources for hvestock, 
with reasonable prices. 
By the late nineteenth century the development of refrigeration and 
pasteurisation technologies, together with growing urban demand, pro-
vided the possibility of linking centres of milk production in the North 
45 See chapter 2, p. 53. . . 4. Source as for table 8.5. Much of Castilla-Le6n's output was produced under condltlons 
similar to those in Galicia, namely relatively good rainfall but weak demand. . 
47 In about 192 5 the Asociaci6n General de .Gan.aderos note~ that, 'rn:en~ year~ ago mtlk 
was not consumed in most parts of Spam Without medical prescnpnon ... (p. 50): 
48 Ministerio de Agricultura (1934, pp. 98-103). Hthe provinces ofBarcel?n~ and MaW?d 
are included, then goat's milk represents only 43 per cent of the totaLWlthin Anda.Iucla, 
the Interior and the Mediterranean, four provinces (out of 40) - Barcelona, Glrona, 
Madrid and Valencia - accounted for 48 per cent of the production of cows' milk. 
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Table 8.6. Regional variations in milk yields and output, 1933 
Regional Regional 
output as % output as % 
Yield per cow Price (pesetas of total (in of total (in (litres) per litre) litres) pesetas) 
Andalucia 2,402 0·73 2·3 3·7 Extremadura and 2,285 0.60 4·2 5·5 Centre 
Mediterranean 2,536 0·53 12·9 15·0 Ebro valley 1,940 0·50 5·3 5·8 Castilla-Le6n 1,001 0.52 4·8 5·4 North 1,085 0·42 70.5 64.6 
Spain" 1,244 0·46 100.0 100.0 
a Spain excludes the Canary Islands. 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura (1934, pp. 98--9). 
with the cities of the Interior. Thus, in 1904 La Universal Exportadora 
was founded to collect fresh milk in the province of Santander and sell 
~t in.Ma~d, ~ dis~an~e of about 500 kilometres (300 miles). Although 
It faded m this obJectIve, other new dairies were started after 1910.49 
Santander also saw a rapid increase in the number of dairies for the 
production of milk products, not just butter and cheese, but also pow-
dered .and condensed milk. In neighbOuring Asturias, dairies were even 
more Important with two (La Covadonga de Gijfm and that of Domin-
~ez Gil~ ~ac~ employing over 200 workers by 1900.50 One aspect of 
~s specI~hsat1on was the improvement of livestock breeds through the 
m~~duct1on of foreign animals. By 1927, only 35 per cent ofSantander's 
mtlking cows were local breeds, 43 per cent were imports and the rest 
~ed. 51 Th~ high level o~ specialisation in milking cows in'this province 
m turn permItted a lucratIve trade in the sale of animals to urban dairies 
elsewhere in the Peninsula. 
Y~t, on the eve of the Second Republic, most of Madrid's supply 
contmued to be produced within the city or its immediate environs 
rather than in the North.52 Furthermore, national output of cheese: 
.9 !he fail~e was in part due to financial reasons, and in part due to the difficulties ~erent In the early technology (Puente Femandez, 1989, pp. 269-70). For other dair-
50 les see Puente Femandez (1992, p. 177). 
51 Carmona and Puente Femandez (1988, p. 200). 
Puente Femandez (1989, p. 189). 
52 Lama y Aren~ (1~2?, pp. 4~). He notes only one farm, El Henar, which produced 
or collected IIl1lk (It IS unclear) In Santander to sell through its retail outlet in the Calle 
de Alcala. See also Garcia Femandez (1975, p. 46). 
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utter, and evaporated and condensed milk was still very limited. In 
933, Santander was able to dedicate some 30 per cent of its milk pro-
luction to the manufacture of condensed and evaporated milk, Galicia 
8 per cent to cheese production, and Asturias 20 per cent to butter, 
lut these were the exceptions. Nationally, over 80 per cent of milk was 
onsumed as liquid milk, a figure which reached 90 per cent outside the 
~orth.53 In conclusion, the amount of liquid milk transferred from areas 
If surplus (i.e. the North) to areas of shortages and high prices 
especially Madrid and Barcelona) was small on the eve of the Civil War 
,ecause of transportation problems. Similarly, the quantities consumed 
,y specialised dairies for processing in areas of production also remained 
mall. 
Although the nature of Spanish livestock farming was changing in the 
)eriod prior to the Civil War, especially with respect to improved breed-
ng, better feeding and veterinary knowledge, progress was slow. With-
)Ut the possibility of cheap feed, intensive feedlot farming was limited 
:0 the larger cities. In the North, the small fragmented farms found it 
iifficult to produce sufficient feed to support anything other than very 
Imall herds of just three or four animals. A lingering suspicion, however, 
~emains that livestock and dairy production developed slowly because 
)f market failures. In particular, the construction of the cooperative 
;laughterhouse in Porriiio (Pontevedra) in 1928 was a direct result of 
farmers' frustration with marketing arrangements, and the first packing 
b.ouse using chilling techniques, that of Merida (Badajoz), did not 
appear until 1927.54 Finally, in Santander the major source of capital 
and technological expertise in dairying was not local but that of the 
multinational, Nestle. Given the large supplies of relatively cheap milk 
in the North, it is perhaps surprising that more was not devoted to the 
production of evaporated and condensed milk. The problem seems to 
have been the small scale of farms and the high costs of transport. The 
fact that new and developing livestock technologies for dry lands were 
developing quickly elsewhere held out possibilities of greater pro-
ductivity increases in Spain, but the real benefits would not be felt until 
the late 1950s, as we shall see in chapter lI. 
Urbanisation and the rural exodus 
Was Spanish urbanisation retarded because agricultural workers were 
slow to respond to higher urban wages, or did labour remain in the 
53 Ministerio de Agricultura (1934, p. 106). 
5. The Merida experiment, organised by the livestock organisation (AsociaciOn General de 
Ganaderos) soon failed. See Sanz Egail.a (1948, p. 425). 
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countryside because of the weak urban and industrial demand? For 
example, in the case of Italy, O'Brien and Toniolo have written that: 
The poverty of the rural population before 1914 may be more realistically 
attributed to the fact that Italy's industrial and urban economy (and the inter-
national economy as a whole) had not deVeloped rapidly enough to pull under-
employed labour from the countryside of Mediterranean Europe. 55 
In France, the debate also has a long history. 56 In a recent article, 
Sicsic has attempted to provide a solution by looking at wage-gaps 
between city and farm, a method I shall now consider for Spain. If 
labour markets were efficient, it would be expected that the difference 
in real wages for comparable labour skills between city and farm would 
be relatively small, and that this 'wage-gap' would remain stable over 
time as rural labour responded quickly to changing urban demand. If 
growing urban demand was not met by appropriate rural migration, 
then the gap would tend to rise as employers fought for an inadequate 
pool of labour; by contrast, if labour moved off the land faster than 
employment opportunities grew in the cities, the gap would be 
reduced. 57 
In table 8.7, urban semi-skilled day wages have been divided by day 
wages in agriculture to show the wage gap between sectors. If we accept 
that (a) these labour categories are compatible over time, and (b) that 
the data contain no major biases, then there would seem to have been 
a widening wage-gap between 1860 and 1896, which then starts closing 
slowly. The wage-gap is almost as large (or as small) in 1930 as it was 
in 1860. Of the twelve subregions, only three experienced wage conver-
gence between 1860 and 1896 (Extremadura, Upper Ebro and Galicia), 
and only one (Lower Ebro) experienced wage divergence between 1914 
and 1930. These trends appear compatible with employment figures. 
Whereas between 1860 and 1910 approximately two-thirds of the active 
labour force was found in agriculture, the figure falls to just under half 
by 1930. Furthermore, as we saw in chapter I, labour productivity in 
agriculture grew only slowly in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, stagnated between 1891/5 and 19091I3, and then increased by 
approximately 60 per cent by 1929/33. In other words, the relatively high 
wage-gap between 1896 and 1914 occurred at a time when agricultural 
productivity was stagnant, and the number of male workers in the sector 
grew between 1887 and 1910 by 17 per cent. In industry and construc-
55 O'Brien and Toniolo (1991, p. 409). 
5. See especially Kindelberger (1964), Ruttan (1978), O'Brien and Keyder (1978) and 
Heywood (1981). 
57 Sicsic (1992) and Williamson (1987). 
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Table 8.7. Urban-rural wage-gap, a various years, 1860-1930 
1860 1896 1914 1930 
Eastern Andaluciab 1.25 2.11 1.65 1.33 
Western Andalucia 1.51 1.99 1.69 1.31 
ANDALUciA 1.35 2.05 1.67 1.32 
Galicia 1.50 1.49 1.72 1.46 
Biscay 1.73 1.80 I.S7 1.56 
NORTH 1.63 1.65 1.64 I.SI 
Catalufta 1.46 1.94 1.64 1.26 
Levante 1.59 1.67 1.74 1.37 
MEDITERRANEAN I.SI 1.67 1.74 1.37 
Castilla-Leon 1.68 1.90 1.84 1.69 
Extremadura 1.53 1.36 1.79 1.70 
Centre (excluding Madrid) I.S8 1.65 I.S7 1.40 
Madrid 1.30 2.24 2.36 1.54 
Upper Ebro 2.18 1.71 1.33 1.22 
Lower Ebro 1.39 1.63 1.53 I.S5 
INTERIOR 1.60 1.75 1.68 1.53 
SPAIN 1.53 1.80 1.67 1.44 
a Calculated by dividing urban wages (nominal and day), by agricultural day wages. 
b Subregions as given on page xvii, except Catalufta (Baleares, Barcelona, Girona, 
Ueida and Tarragona) and Levante (Alicante, Castell6n, Murcia and Valencia). 
Source: Simpson (199Sb, p. 199)· 
tion, by contrast, output grew by 75 per cent and employment by only 
8 per cent between 1887 and 1910.58 
Table 8.7 clearly has major limitations in explaining rural outmi-
gration. In the first instance, the measure is in nominal rather than real 
day wages. However, as shown elsewhere, if urban consumers had 
greater expenditure than those in the countryside, and therefore the 
rural-urban wage-gap was smaller than indicated in table 8.7, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the long-run movement in the shape of the 
wage gap was any different.59 Second, rural-urban migration was just 
one option; by the late nineteenth century, emigration had become a 
real possibility for some southern Europeans on account of falling trans-
port costs and increased information. For some agricultural workers, 
the going rate for building workers in Buenos Aires might have been a 
more relevant factor than for that in Spain's own cities. When emi-
58 Prados de la Escosura (1995, table D.4) and Nicolau (1989, p. 78). 
59 Simpson (199Sb, pp. 187-90). 
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gration is considered, however, our findings concerning labour surplus 
and low productivity in agriculture between 1890 and 1910 appear to 
be reinforced. Recent work by Sanchez Alonso suggests that the impact 
of net emigration on population growth was small between 1882 and 
1904, with a net loss of only 185,000 people. Over the next decade, the 
figures increase dramatically, reaching 819,000. Between 1914 and 1921 
there was a net return of 241,000, followed by a loss of 133,000 between 
1922 and 1930.60 Perez Moreda and Tortella have noted that it was 
emigration, rather than more regional outmigration to the cities, which 
attracted rural labour prior to 1914. From the First World War, how-
ever, this situation changed dramatically, with a rapid growth in the 
country's major cities (Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao).61 Although a 
strong rural exodus was only apparent from about 1905, with labour 
moving intially in large numbers overseas but then also to Spanish cities, 
there were also apparently some good reasons (apart from official policy) 
why labour chose to remain in agriculture. 62 
In the first instance, it is perhaps worthwhile stressing the advantages 
of agricultural employment in the period prior to the First World War. 
For the risk-averse peasant, access to even a relatively small area of land 
would protect the family from the wild fluctuations in bread prices 
which were frequent especially prior to the 1880s. Furthermore, rural 
society held out rewards for the hard-working and diligent farm worker. 
In particular, the existence of a 'farm ladder' permitted young adults to 
start their working lives as landless labourers, and slowly move their way 
up the ladder to become full property owners.63 Although no infor-
mation prior to the Civil War exists for Spain, in France it has been 
suggested that hired agricultural labourers had either become self-
employed in the sector (by renting land or by becoming an 
owner-operator) or had moved to towns by the time they reached 30 
years of age.64 If the prospect of gaining access to their own land seems 
to have encouraged labour to remain in French agriculture, it also seems 
to have been common to large areas, although not all, of Spain. Andalu-
cia, where farm labour actually increased in absolute numbers prior to 
the Civil War, was probably a case apart. 
60 Calculated from Sanchez Alonso (1995, cuadro A3.6). 
61 perez.Moreda (1985, p. 58) and Tortella (1985, p. 78). See also Sanchez Alonso (1995, 
especially pp. 45-7 and 135-42), Mike1arena (1993, p. 225) and Arango (1987, pp. 229-
32 ). 
62 According to Sanchez Alonso's (1995, cuadro A3.6) estimates, gross emigration aver-
aged over 100~000 a year only from 1904 and net emigration averaged over 50,000 only 
from 1905 (with the exceptions of 1889 and 1896). For contempories' concern over 
depopulation and emigration, see Robledo (1991, pp. 17-22) and Sanchez Alonso 
(1995, ch. 2). 
:: F~r .example, for France, Sicsic (1992) and for the United States, Wright (1988). 
SICSIC (1992, p. 680, based on Garden, 1988). 
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It has frequently been noted that in those areas of the North and 
Catalufia where systems of primogeniture were practised, emigration 
and internal labour movement was frequent. By contrast, the existence 
of partible inheritance codes probably acted as a disincentive. The Laws 
of Toro (1505) established that on the death of either parent, 47 per 
cent of all the property that the parents had contributed on marriage 
had to be divided equally amongst all the surviving children, 33 per cent 
could benefit one or more of the legitimate heirs, and only 20 per cent 
could be left to other parties.65 As a result, in large areas of the Interior, 
both land and the family house were divided to provide each member 
of the household, thereby helping them to avoid total dependence on 
wage labour. The implication of this was more far reaching than perhaps 
is realised today. As the anthropologist Behar has noted for one village 
in the proVince of Leon: 
In fact, Leonese labradores (farmers) could rest secure in the knowledge that 
they gave their children rights not only to a piece of the house but also to a 
strong communal web of use-rights over village properties of meadow, wood-
land, and waste. Leonese labradores, like the English yeomen E.P. Thompson 
has written of, 'could risk the practice of partible inheritance without condemn-
ing (their) children to poverty' in those villages where 'the grid of communal 
inheritance was strong'. 66 
However, the sale of the village commons in Spain from the mid-
nineteenth century affected the distribution of land wealth and probably 
eroded the position of those near the bottom of the farm ladder. 67 
Another factor of importance in retaining labour was the question of 
lease law. Spanish historians have frequently drawn attention to the 
large areas of land that were leased, often using short-term contracts of 
two, three or four years. 68 Whilst most historians have derided the leases 
as being inefficient because they failed to allow tenant farmers time to 
accumulate capital, or compensate them for any improvements made, 
they did at least have the virtue of identifying clearly landlords' property 
rightS.69 This, in turn, encouraged landlords to lease land, and permitted 
labourers or small farmers greater access to land. 
By leaving their farms to work for cash, farmers were able to com-
plement earnings from holdings which otherwise would have been too 
65 The Civil Code of 1889 changed the shares to one-third for each category. In practice, 
informal mechanisms of property transfer took place, which might allow children access 
to land before parents died. See Reher (1990a, p. 74). 
66 Behar (1991, p. 34) and Thompson (1976). 
67 See, for example, Garcia Sanz (1985a, p. 38). 
68 Leases were rare amongst vines and tree crops. The length of the lease was determined 
by and large ·by the length and nature of rotations. 
69 The question of what investments would have been profitable if farmers had access to 
capital is, however, usually ignored in these studies. 
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small and to provide the investment necessary to advance to the next 
rung on the ladder. Evidence suggests a significant temporary move-
ment of people within Spain. Thus, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, if not earlier, Galicians set out each year in their thousands 
for harvest-work in the Interior and Andalucia.70 Ringrose has drawn 
attention to the importance of fanners in providing seasonal transport 
services to the economy.71 On the eve of the First World War, some 60 
to 70 per cent of Asturian miners were also farmers.72 Lastly, an import-
ant study of the Castilian town of Cuenca gives annual inmigration 
between 1844 and 1847 as 13.7 per cent of total population, and outmi-
gration as 16.2 per cent, suggesting both a highly mobile population and 
an integrated urban-rural economy. 73 
If labour had started leaving the land in small numbers from the 
1880s, the numbers increased significantly from about 1904. Thus, net 
annual migration represented more than 5 individuals per 1000 in five 
of Spain's 48 provinces between 1878 and 1887, in seven provinces 
between 1888 and 1900, in 24 between 1901 and 1910, in 16 between 
19II and 1920 and in 22 between 1921 and 1930.74 Blanca Sanchez 
Alonso has argued that the rate of emigration was strongly linked to the 
level of cereal protection (tariffs and the relative strength of the 
peseta).75 If it can be assumed that protection in its various forms kept 
workers on the land, the major post-1904 increase in labour movement 
(first in emigration and then a few years later in migration to urban 
centres), must have been caused by other factors. 76 The trigger for the 
rapid increase was probably the severe harvest failures of 1904 and 1905 
which, because of heavy imports, reduced the value of the domestic 
wheat harvest to 80 per cent of what it had been between 1901 and 
1903.77 Production recovered after 1906, but the outlook for viticulture 
remained poor throughout the decade on account of both low prices 
and diseased vines (phylloxera). By contrast, real salaries in urban 
70 Meijide Pardo (1960). 
71 Ringrose (1970). 
72 Direcci6n General de Minas, Montes y Agricultura (1911, cited in Schubert, 1990, p. 
124)· 
73 Reher (1990a, p. 249). 
74 Calculated from Mikelarena (1993, Apendice 3). The Canary Islands have been 
excluded. 
75 Sanchez Alonso (1995, pp. 185--92). Construction and levels of exports are also con-
sidered crucial in the receiving country, Argentina. 
76 The 1906 tariff was introduced to offset the decline in real levels of protection caused 
by the stronger peseta. 
77 Calculated from GEHR (1980, p. 197; 1991, p. 1186). For a graphic description of the 
drought in these years in Andalucia, see especially Diaz del Moral (1977 pp. 206-13), 
and for the labour conflicts in the Interior, see Instituto de Reformas Sociales, (1977). 
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ltres began to improve, increasing by 19 per cent in Madrid between 
:>3/8 and 1909/14.78 
Conclusion 
a recent article on European agriculture, Van Zanden has noted 
It:79 
may be concluded that by 1870 the level of agricultural productivity was 
;hly dependent on the extent of the structural transformation of th~ econ-
ly and of the level of demand from the urban sector. To put It more 
llltly, a highly productive agriculture was always a part of a well-developed 
momy. 
The case of Spain provides some evidence for this assertion. Resource 
ocation in Spain was heavily concentrated in the production of basic 
)ds; in pan this was because of slower urban development. However, 
: have also observed that, in the case of Spain (and indeed other 
~ons of dry farming), the correlation between urbanisation and 
ecialised farming was not as strong as in northern Europe. By 1914, 
estock production in the United Kingdom, constituted some 75 per 
nt of agricultural output, in Germany 66 per cent, and in France 45 
r cent. By contrast, the figure for both Italy and Spain was only 32 
r cent.80 This cannot be explained simply in terms of greater urbanis-
.on or greater per capita incomes. In much of Spain, the decline in 
ternational cereal prices from the 1880s could not be offset as easily 
in northern Europe by switching resources into livestock farming. By 
ntrast, in Spain's North, where climatic conditions favoured livestock, 
e small-scale nature of farms and geographical isolation from the 
ajor urban areas, hindered specialisation. In this case it was weak 
arket integration and farm size, rather than simply poor resources, 
rich affected productivity. 
Prior to the twentieth century, labour was reluctant to leave the agri-
Iltural sector, despite the apparently sizable premiums to be earned in 
e cities. Short-term migrations can allow us to dismiss the notion that 
Jour was not mobile. The most likely explanation for the delay in the 
ral exodus was that, with the exception of Andalucia, most agricul-
ral workers either had access to their own land, or believed that at 
me future date they would have such access. Only when some natural 
saster affected family incomes, such as when phylloxera attacked vines 
Reher and Ballesteros (1993, Apendice I). 
Van Zanden (1991, p. 226). 
O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992, table 3)· 
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in many areas of the country (from about the 1880s), or when urban 
wages were clearly increasing significantly faster than cereal prices, did 
labour begin to leave the land in large numbers outside the traditional 
areas of rural migration, namely the North and Catalufta. 
9 Agricultural exports and the 
international economy 
The growth of the international economy during the nineteenth century 
presented farmers with the possibility of specialising for the export 
market, thus avoiding the limitations imposed by low per capita 
incomes, or weak infrastructure of the domestic market. It allowed 
Spanish farmers to dedicate resources to the production of those goods 
where Spain enjoyed a comparative advantage in international trade 
which, in the half century prior to the Civil War, included wines, olive 
oil and oranges. 
In the first part of the chapter I survey recent research on foreign 
trade which shows that a large share of Spanish trade was of agricultural 
produce, and that the size of the export sector in Spain was small by 
European standards. The main part then discusses the limitations to 
export growth for wine, olive oil and oranges. In the case of the first two 
products, foreign markets were limited by both foreign governments' tax 
discrimination and consumer preference. On the supply side, where low 
entry costs allowed quick responses to short-term upswings in demand, 
the longevity of both crops discouraged the uprooting of plants at times 
of weak prices, thereby delaying a return to more stable prices. Finally, 
both the vine and olive appear to have shared similar characteristics as 
tropical food products, namely relatively inelastic supplies of cheap 
labour and suitable land, which had a tendency to depress long-term 
prices. The orange differed notably from these two crops as it was 
quickly accepted by consumers in industrial societies, did not compete 
directly with domestic producers (except in the United States), and had 
high entry costs. However, these favourable characteristics were offset 
by the limited potential area for orange cultivation, and the small size 
of output compared with that of Spanish agriculture as a whole. 
Spanish agriculture and export markets 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Spanish economy 
became steadily more open. Exports, measured as a percentage ofGDP, 
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grew from just 2.9 per cent in 1830 to 13.4 per cent by 1890. From 
1890 however, the growth in world protection (not least in Spain itself), 
saw the share fall steadily, to 11.8 per cent in 1910, 8.8 per cent in 1920 
and 7.7 per cent in 1930.1 The fact that the Spanish economy was rela-
tively closed in 1929 insulated it from some of the effects of the world 
depression, but in the long term the failure of the country to export has 
to be seen as one of the causes of the slow growth of the economy. The 
export sector in Spain remained small both in comparison with other 
European countries during the period, and in comparison with Europe 
and so-called 'Third World' countries at similar levels of per capita 
income.2 Despite its small size, the export sector grew at a similar speed 
to other European countries between 1815 and 1913 (an annual rate of 
3.5 per cent in real terms), producing a per capita growth rate of 2.9 
per cent.3 In the case of nineteenth-century Spain, therefore, it was the 
small size of the export sector, rather than its rate of growth, which 
hindered export-led development.4 During the first third of the twenti-
eth century, the speed of growth was to decline markedly. 
The contribution of agriculture to Spain's export performance was sig-
nificant, as in most developing countries. Until 1880, food products 
accounted for between 50 and 60 per cent of total exports, after which they 
began to lose ground, accounting for only 40 per cent by 1913.5 Between 
1913 and 1929, total Spanish exports declined by 0.5 per cent annually, 
allowing agricultural produce once again to account for over 50 per cent. 6 
Although Spain did not have the same high level of product concentration 
in its exports as in many LDCs, the vine and the olive predominated 
during long periods (table 9.1).7 Finally, the growing integration of the 
international economy during the second half of the nineteenth century 
opened up new markets for some products while also threatening some 
old established ones. As a result, Spain's traditional export products, such 
as merino wool, spirits and flour, found it increasingly difficult to compete 
in world markets, whilst exports of wines (until the 1890s), olive oil, 
oranges, almonds and cork, grew strOngly. 
1 Prados de la Escosura (1988, pp. 207 and 228). 
2 Ibid. (tables 1-7, 5.10, and 6--2). See also Tortella (1992, p. 66). 
3 Prados de la Escosura (1988, pp. 181 and 183). 
• For a discussion of export size and rates of growth, see Hanson (1977 and 1986). 
5 Prados de la Escosura (1988, pp. 198). 
6 Ibid. (p. 235); Tena, (1989, pp. 348-51). These figures perhaps underestimate the 
importance of agriculture, as some of the manufactures and semi-manufactures 
exported, such as cork, were based on domestically-produced raw materials. The agri-
cultural export performance provides a good insight into the competitive nature of the 
sector and its response to the market. 
7 Hanson (1977, Appendix table 2) shows that of 20 LDCs in 1900, 13 had a single 
expOrt product accounting for 50 per cent or more of the total. 
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Table 9.1. Principal agricultural exports as share of total exports 
1792 1827 186519 188519 190519 
1. Products of the vine 
Grapes 1.0 1.2 
Raisins 1.3 5·5 4.1 2.6 1.8 
Table wine 3·3· 16.6· 14·4 34·3 4·1 
Sherry 13·4 3·9 1.4 
Spirits 15·8 6.0 
Total 20·4 28.1 31.9 41.8 8·5 
2. Wool 27·5 9.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 
3. Products of the olive 
Olive oil 1.1 17·0 7·3 2·7 2·5 
Olives 
4. Oranges 2·7 1.7 2.2 5·9 
5. Almonds 1.3 2.0 
6. Wheat and flour 3.6 7·9 
7. Cork 2·9 3·0 2·4 4·3 
8. Livestock 2·5 2·5 2·5 
Total 49·0 65·2 56.1 53-3 27.6 
• Less than 1%. 
• Refers to both table wines and sherry. 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (1982, table 7; 1988, tables 2.10 and 6.6). 
Table 9.2. Proportion exported of various 
crops' total production, I90I/9 and I930/5 
(% by volume) 
1901/09 193015 
Wine 20·9 10.8 
Olive oil 16.2 22·5 
Almonds· 10·5 23.1 
Oranges· 58.9 69·1 
Raisins· n.d. 110.8' 
• Refers to 1902 and 1927/31. 
• Refers to 1931 and 1932. 
, For an explanation of this figure, see Mori11a Criu 
(1989, pp. 180-1). 
Sources: AEPA, AP A and Direcciim General de 
Aduanas, various years. 
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The individual shares of agricultural commodities in the export 
market are perhaps understated in table 9.2, as it is based on volume 
not value. In general, it was the better quality products (and hence those 
with greatest unit value) which were exported.8 For some products, such 
as sherry, raisins, grapes and oranges, a very large share of output was 
for the export market. Although extending the area under irrigation and 
increasing labour productivity in cereals was often difficult, large areas 
of seeano were suited to cultivation of the vine and olive. I shall now 
discuss the limitations to export-led growth for each commodity. 
Europe's first wine lakes 
The effects of the late nineteenth-century agricultural depression, which 
affected so many European farmers, were delayed in viticulture because 
of the significant short-fall in French output caused by phylloxera. How-
ever, from the 1890s, a combination of replanting of diseased vines in 
France, growth of production in countries where the vine had previously 
been unimportant, and rapid and widespread improvement of yields 
caused problems of overproduction, which depressed wine prices over 
much of the first third of the twentieth century.9 World output, which 
reached 120 Inillion hectolitres in 1890, increased to 145 million 
hectolitres in 1900 and had reached 196 million by 1934138.10 
Unfortunately for growers, most wine was also consumed in producer 
countries. France, the world's largest producer, was responsible for 51 
cent of world imports in 1909/13, and 62 per cent in 1925/9. During 
this latter period, France was importing seven times more wine than it 
exported. 11 
For Spanish producers, the French market changed significantly 
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Between 1900 and 
1906 French domestic output recovered to such an extent that growers 
in the Midi were forced to sell at cost or below in five out of those 
seven years. 12 Low prices became the rule rather than the exception, and 
French growers attempted to reduce unit costs through the relocation of 
production to more suitable areas, and by adopting new technologies -
chemicals, labour-saving machinery and new hybrids. Yields, which had 
stood at some 18 hectolitres per hectare on the eve of the phylloxera 
8 Given the unreliable nature of nineteenth-century production figures, no earlier dates 
can be provided. 
9 Pujol Andreu (1986, pp. 322-3). 
10 Salas Roca (1954, pp. 29-36, cited in Pujol Andreu, 1986, p. 323). 
11 IIA Yearbooks, 1931 and 1934. 
12 Warner (1960, p. 18). 
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outbreak in 1860, increased to 30 hectolitres by 1915120, and reached 
between 37 and 40 hectolitres by the 1930s. Between 1918 and 1939, 
the size of the average vineyard doubled from 2 or 3 hectares to between 
5 and 6 hectares. 13 Finally, the demand for strong, full-bodied wines for 
blending was increasingly met by Algerian, rather than by Spanish 
wines. In 1878, Algeria's total annual production was only I million 
hectolitres but this had increased eleven-fold by 1925/9, with 77 per cent 
being exported to France under preferential agreements. 14 
Initially, the problem of overproduction was less serious in Spain 
because phylloxera was devastating the vines there, leaving output lower 
in the period 1900-7 than it had been during the previous eight years, 
balancing almost exactly the decline in exports. 15 However, both wine 
prices and domestic consumption remained depressed. 16 From a maxi-
mum of perhaps 2 million hectares in the late 1880s, the area under 
vines fell to a minimum of 1.24 million in 1914, before recovering to 
1.46 million by 1935. Output slipped from about 20 per cent of the 
world total in 1890/4 to just over 10 per cent in 1930/34.17 
In the twentieth century, without the benefit of an abnormal short-fall 
in a major producing country, Spanish growers needed either to increase 
market share, or to extend the size of the market. It failed to do either, 
and the country's share of the world trade in wines slipped from 
approximately half in the 1880s to less than a quarter by 1925/9. The 
world market for cheap table wines outside France remained limited, in 
part because producer countries restricted imports to protect domestic 
growers (the case of Italy), and in part because non-producers placed 
tariffs on wines both to increase government revenues and to protect 
other domestically-produced alcoholic drinks (as in the United 
Kingdom). For Spain, exports never recovered the high levels (by 
volume or value) achieved in the 1880s (Figure 9.1).18 
It is possible that improved product quality might have allowed Spain 
to extend its market. However, the experience in France was for exports 
of quality wines to decline, from roughly 60 per cent of production of 
vins de eru in 1869/77, to 30 per cent in 1913, and 10 per cent in 1939.19 
13 Loubere (1990, pp. 23 and 63--6). 
14 Warner (1960, p. 15) and HA Yearbooks. 
15 Wine production in Spain in 1892/9 averaged 20.9 million hectolitres, and in 1900/7 
17.9 million. Exports were 5.6 and 2.5 million hectolitres, respectively. 
16 See Zapata (1986, I, pp. 266--71). 
17 Pujol Andreu (1986, cuadro 5) and Simpson (1985a, p. 95). 
18 The recovery suggested in Figure 9.1 during the First World War is only apparent 
because nominal rather than real prices have been used. No adequate price deflector 
exists for Spain prior to 1913. 
19 Warner (1960, p. 85). 
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Figure 9.1 Wine exports by volume and value, 1860-1930 
Sources: Direcci6n General de Aduanas and Balcells (1980, pp. 375---9) 
The market for fine wines in Spain, although growing, was still very 
small on the eve of the Civil War. 20 The question of quality control and 
brand names belongs, for the most part, to a later period.21 
Therefore, the vast majority of producers competed in the market for 
table wines, where price rather than quality was the determining factor. 
In Spain, two distinct responses by growers can be noted in their 
attempts to reduce unit costs. In some areas, often those of traditional 
intensive production, labour and capital inputs were increased to raise 
ou~ut per hectare. In other areas, usually of more recent production, 
urnt costs were reduced by making economies in the use of labour and 
capital. This can be illustrated by looking in some detail at two of 
Spain's leading areas of production, Barcelona in Catalufia, and Ciudad 
Real in La Mancha. 
In the pre-railway era, Barcelona benefited from being able to export 
quality wines and brandy, making viticulture an important factor in the 
development of the regional economy. Ciudad Real, by contrast, was 
20 See Pan-Montojo (1994, pp. 83-91 and 351-3). In a breakdown of wine oUIput in 1932, 
21 some 94 per cent of oUIput was d~stined for vin ordinaire, (AEPA, aiio 1932, pp. 128-9). 
The first ~ontrol ?oard (appe~~ controUe) for sherry was established in 1935. For 
~ore details on this, together WIth mtemational attempts to control the trade, see Gon-
zalez Gordon (1972, pp. 40-52), Cabral Chamorro (1987) and Unwin (1991, pp. 310-
25)· 
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geographically isolated in the middle of the country, about 200 kilo-
metres from Madrid.22 Railway construction and the growth of French 
demand led to an era of prosperity for both areas, although by the early 
1880s, Barcelona still had roughly twice the area under vines as Ciudad 
Rea1.23 Phylloxera first appeared in Barcelona in 1882, but the high wine 
prices encouraged farmers to spend heavily to try to contain the disease. 
These attempts were abandoned when prices fell sharply from 1886, and 
by the 1890S over half the province's vines were either dead or dying. 24 
By 1909, when all its vines had been destroyed, conditions were 
regarded as still sufficiently attractive to replant 116,000 of the original 
132,755 hectares with American root stock. In Ciudad Real, by contrast, 
phylloxera arrived later, infecting little more than 3,000 hectares in 
1909, and its progress remained very slow, with some areas remaining 
immune from the disease right up to the Civil War.25 This regional dis-
parity in the impact of phylloxera was due to differences in climate and 
soils, the hot summers and loose soils of La Mancha, which hindered 
the louse's reproduction and movement. Risks of disease were consider-
ably lower and viticulture grew rapidly, so that during the half century 
prior to the Civil War, the area under vines in Ciudad Real almost 
tripled while that in Barcelona declined by 10 per cent.26 
Traditional viticulture in the province of Barcelona used a system of 
sharecropping, the rabassa morta, which had in previous periods encour-
aged landless peasants to settle on uncultivated land and plant vines. 
The small area of most of these holdings insured that the sharecroppers 
cultivated intensely, using high labour inputs to maximise yields. The 
appearance of phylloxera marked 'the end of traditional viticulture. 
~cience and new technology, together with an intensification of capital 
mvestment, would become unavoidable'. 27 It drove up both fixed and 
variable costs, as it now became necessary to plough or dig the land 
deeper before planting, and the vines were more dependent on fertilisers 
than before. In part, changes in production methods helped reduce the 
planting costs, such as the use of new machinery to remove the dead 
vines, or ploughs which were able to operate at depths of 0.5 and 0.6 
metres. However, this machinery could not be provided economically 
by the small growers themselves and had to be rented. Thus, although 
22 Measured from Valdepeiias, the main wine centre of Ciudad Real. 
23 In 1883 according to the Ministerio de Fomento (1886, p. 10), Barcelona had 130000 
hectares of vines and Ciudad Real had 67,000. ' 
24 See especially Camero i Arbat (1980). 
25 Jimenez Cuende (1934, p. 7). 
2. Barcelona had 121,000 hectares and Ciudad Real 177,000 hectares in 1935 (AEPA, ano 
1935)· 
27 Balcells (1980, p. 60, cited in Zapata, 1986, I, p. 395). 
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some of the increase in planting costs shown in table 9.3 is the result of 
wage inflation, which approximately doubled, sharecroppers found that 
a significant part could not now be met by using unpaid family labour. 
Where the plough could not be used to plant new vines because of 
the steep terrain, such as in the Priorat, viticulture was abandoned and 
population declined. 28 
It was the much greater fixed costs, which resulted from the need 
to replant diseased vines, that brought about the difficulties in wine 
production in Barcelona in the interwar period while leaving Ciudad 
Real almost untouched. In Barcelona the vineyards were no longer self-
generating and required significant preparation of the soil and greater 
use of fertilisers. They also depended on the ability of the grower to 
select the right hybrid and graft vines - and the plants themselves had 
a shorter commercial life.29 Finally, the new vines were much more 
prone to the dangers of oidium and mildew, especially in the damper 
climate of Barcelona. This made spraying with sulphur and copper sul-
phates (,Bordeaux mixture') necessary, further increasing off-farm 
inputs. In Ciudad Real, phylloxera was much less prevalent, and when 
it did strike, growers often continued planting European vine stock, and 
used the same extensive planting techniques as previously.30 Further-
more, the climate made mildew and oidium rare, and farmers regarded 
the chemicals as an unnecessary expenditure. The much lower density 
of vines in La Mancha (due to the summer droughts) greatly facilitated 
the use of ploughs for annual cultivation, reducing to a minimum the 
use of hand labour. Finally, vineyards in Barcelona were significantly 
smaller than those in Ciudad Real. 31 
28 Perpinya i Grau (1932). 
29 Grafting was, however, a skill which the region had enjoyed, unlike most of the country, 
in the pre-phylloxera period (ExposiciOn Vinicola Nacional, 1878-9, p. 293). The new 
vines' commercial life was only about twenty years. 
30 As late as the I960s, a government publication noted that 'the Manchego vinegrower 
has an improper tendency to utilise on all occasions indigenous plant stock (viniferas 
francas) instead of American varieties, reckoning it more economical, an activity which 
runs the risk that plantings might be devastated by premature attacks after five years 
of planting' (Fernandez Martinez, 1963, p. 32). By 1978 some 45 per cent of the prov-
ince's vines were still grown on European root stock (Ministero de Agricultura, Catas-
tro, Ciudad Real, 1979, pp. 71-3). 
31 One estimate for the Penedes (Barcelona) suggests that vineyards averaged 2.5 hectares, 
which was perhaps a quarter or a half the size of those found in Ciudad Real (Garrabou 
et aI., 1992, p. 35; Ladr6n de Guevara Flores, 1988, p. 129). In 1964, when the area 
of vines had shrunk to 40,000 hectares in Barcelona, and increased to 205,000 hectares 
in Ciudad Real, some 86 per cent of holdings in the fortner and 54 per cent in the 
latter had less than 10 hectares, whilst some 71 per cent of all vines in Barcelona and 
only 19 per cent in Ciudad Real were on holdings of this size (Primer Censo Agrario de 
Espafia, 1964, p. 32). 
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Table 9.3. Wine production costs in Barcelona and Ciudad Real, 1888 
and 1925 (pesetas per hectare) 
1888 Barcelona 
(I)" (2)' Total 
Planting costs 361 180 541 
Annual costs 265 84 349 
Total' 403 
Wine production (hectolitres) 24 
Production cost (pesetas per hi) 16.8 
Wine price (pesetas per hi) 22.0 
Labour unit costs (male/day) 2·75 
1925 Barcelona 
(I)" (2)' Total 
Planting costs 1,695 586 2,281 
Annual costs 450 197 647 
Total' 875 
Wine production (hectolitres)d 28.96 
Production cost (pesetas per hi) 30.2 
Wine price (pesetas per hi) 21.1 
Labour unit costs (male/day) 6.0 
"(I) Labour costs (and plough cost where appropriate). 
b (2) Non-labour costs. 
Ciudad Real 
(I)" (2)' Total 
68 18 86 
103 10 II3 
122 
10 
12.2 
16.0 
1.75 
Ciudad Real 
(I)" (2)' Total 
II7 36 153 
177 20 197 
212 
15·12 
14.0 
21.0 
3·0 
'Total costs have been calculated by adding 10% of planting costs (5% depreciation 
and 5% interest) to annual costs. Taxes and rent have not been included. 
d 1923/7 average. 
Sources: For Barcelona, planting costs taken from Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1923, 
pp. 154-'78) where they refer to neighbouring Tarragona; annual costs in 1888 from 
Archivo del Ministerio de Agricultura (Leg. 259, Exp. I 'Barcelona'), and in 1925 from 
EPAPM (1926, p. 295). 
For Ciudad Real, planting costs taken from DirecciOn General de Agricultura, Industria 
y Comercio (I89Ib, p. vii); annual coSts in 1888 from AMA (Leg. 259, Exp. I 'Ciudad 
Real'), and the 1925 figures have been estimated assuming that (a) wage labour in this 
province increased at the same rate as in Barcelona between the two dates (this prob-
ably exaggerates wage increases, see Simpson (I985a, p. 293)), (b) non-labour costs 
doubled and (c) unlike Barcelona, production techniques remained unchanged (see 
text). 
Yields for 1923/7 taken from AEPA, although EPAPM gives 40 hectolitres for Barce-
lona, and wine prices, from Paris Equilaz (1943, p. 42); it has been assumed that 
I arroba = 16.5 litres, and the wine strength in Tarragona was 13°. 
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Figure 9.2 Movements in wine prices and wages, Barcelona, 1865-
1930 (both series are nominal) 
Sources: Balcells (1980, pp. 375-9) for wine prices in Sant Pere de 
Ribes; Garrabou et al. (1991, pp. 40-2) for male agricultural wages in 
Penedes. 
Table 9.3 shows that, although yields in the province of Barcelona were 
almost double those of Ciudad Real by the mid-1920S, costs were over 
four times as high. Wine prices are difficult to calculate accurately given 
the lack of product homogeneity and differences in contemporary esti-
mates, but if wine from Barcelona was sold at a premium over that of 
Ciudad Real, it was not sufficiently great to offset their higher costS.32 
Figure 9.2 gives a more dynamic picture of the problem facing wine 
producers in the Penedes, a major area of viticulture in Barcelona. From 
the First World War, when replanting had been concluded, rural wages 
grew considerably faster than wine prices. Even if some farmers were able 
to operate without recourse to the labour market, the graph illustrates an 
important decline in relative living standards and the attraction of off-
farm employment, especially as urban wages were higher than rural. From 
116,000 hectares of vines in 1909, the area of wines in Barcelona hardly 
32 See Simpson (1992a, pp. 126-7). This premium appears to have existed only for the 
better wines and, as most prices were determined by alcoholic strength, La Mancha's 
producers enjoyed an advantage. 
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grew prior to the Civil War, and by 1950 had fallen to 70,000 hectares. By 
contrast, the population of Barcelona increased from 587,000 in 1910 to 
1.28 million in 1950. 
The only alternative for growers in Barcelona, and indeed for all areas 
oflabour-intensive viticulture in Europe, was to improve product quality. 
Despite concerted efforts by government research agencies (such as the 
Instituto Agricola Catal(Jn de San Isidro) and the growth of cooperatives, 
especially after the First World War, many growers found it difficult to 
compete with the low-cost producers of La Mancha.33 The abundance of 
suitable land and cheap labour in the Interior seriously undermined the 
profitability of labour-intensive viticulture in the periphery. In the 
Interior, as with cereals, Spanish farmers responded to competition by 
extending the area cultivated and keeping capital and labour inputs per 
hectare low. 
Unfortunately for Spain, the advantage of having large areas oflow-cost 
suitable land and cheap labour was one shared with an increasing number 
of other producer countries, and in particular Algeria, which by 192417 
was exporting more than France, Italy and Spain combined.34 Much of 
this overproduction of wine during the early part of the twentieth century 
stemmed from the growth in output from regions such as La Mancha and 
Algeria, where the crop's opportunity cost was low, phylloxera's presence 
minimal and labour cheap.35 However, competition with traditional pro-
ducers came not only from new low-cost producers such as La Mancha or 
Algeria, but also from product adulteration. Alcohol produced from wine 
was relatively expensive, and this encouraged fraud using cheaper raw 
materials, especially from the sugar beet industry.36 
In conclusion, Spanish wines competed almost totally in a market 
where quality was low, consumption limited to producer nations, and 
where conditions were not dissimilar to those faced by producers of 
tropical crops, namely low entry costs and elastic supplies of land and 
33 For the growth of research institutions and cooperatives, see Pujol Andreu (1986, pp. 
334-7) and Pan-Montojo (1994, pp. 359-73)· 
34 An annual average of 7.98 million hectolitres against a combined 6.87 million hecto-
litres from France, Spain and Italy (IIA Yearbook). The vast majority of Algeria's wine 
went to France. 
35 Opportunity costs are difficult to measure, although for La Mancha (taken as Albacete, 
Ciudad Real, Cuenca and Toledo) wheat yields averaged only 0.6 tons per hectare in 
190911914 (Torres, 1944, pp. 247-72), against a national average of 0.9 tons in all 
Spain, 0.7 tons in Algeria, 1.1 tons in Italy and 1.3 tons in France (calculated from 
Malenbaum, 1953, pp. 236-9). Lewis notes a figure of 700lb per acre (0.8 tons per 
hectare) for tropical countries in 1900 (1978, p. 188). In some regions of Algeria, phyl-
loxera was still absent in the 1920S (Lachiver, 1988, p. 443). For La Mancha, see below. 
36 Congreso Nacional de Viticultores (1925, pp. 21-6). 
214 Markets and institutions, 1880-1936 
labour.37 Whereas the extension of cultivation in areas such as La 
Mancha enabled Spain to enjoy a moderate expansion of exports 
between 1913 and 1928 in a stagnant world market, the experience of 
viticulture in the period 1900--50 in general was de crise en crise, caused 
by the planting of vines in large areas of the Mediterranean, where wage 
labour was cheap.38 Greater specialisation in viticulture therefore had 
its limitations, and the contribution of viticulture to agricultural final 
output declined from about 12 per cent in 1891/5 to 8 per cent in 
1929/33.39 
Olive oil 
The olive was another crop of major importance both for the domestic 
and external market, with about a fifth of total output exported in the 
decade prior to the Civil War. In the nineteenth century, most of the 
Spanish olive oil exported was of poor quality, and used for industrial 
purposes, namely lighting, as a raw material in the manufacture of soap, 
and as a lubricant for machinery.40 The growth in exports during the 
nineteenth century was halted in the last quarter with the availability of 
other cheaper and more efficient vegetable oils.41 Between 1880 and 
1896 the domestic price of olive oil fell by approximately 20 per cent 
of what it had been in 1861/79, in part because of the increase in these 
substitutes, and in part because of the maturing of olive trees planted 
in earlier periods. In the 1880s some French companies installed them-
selves in Tortosa (Tarragona) and began manufacturing high quality 
olive oil (aceites finos), by lightly pressing newly picked fruit, which 
allowed Spain to compete in a quite different market - that of culinary 
oils.42 A few years later, encouraged by the depreciation of the peseta, 
a similar development began to appear slowly in Andalucia, causing 
major improvements in the processing technology of olives.43 The old 
wooden presses were replaced by hydraulic systems, better storage 
methods facilitated greater hygiene, and the separation of oils from dif-
ferent pressings (which in turn required an increase in the number of 
37 See Lewis (1978, especially chapter 7). Lewis notes: 'Price in the shon run is deter-
mined by cunent demand and supply. Price in the long run moves to the level deter-
mined by alternative opponunities' (p. 189). For the low opponunity cost of land, see 
note 35 above and Congreso Nacional de Viticultores (1925, p. 23). 
38 For expons, see Palafox (1986, pp. 186-92), Prados de la Escosura (1988, pp. 236-9) 
and Tena (1992, p. 346). The quote is from Lachiver (1988, chapter 8). 
39 Simpson (1995a, appendix, Id). 
40 Crisis agricola y pecuaria (1887-9, vol. 3, no. 132, p. 31). 
41 Zambrana (1987, chapter 7). 
42 Mangrane Escargo (1967, p. 22). 
43 EPAPM (1923, nWn. 1289, p. 220). 
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storage tanks) gave producers the ability to compete in the new market. 
The impact of these changes led to improvements in both product qual-
ity and labour productivity in the industrial process, as discussed in 
chapter 7. Finally, the appearance of refineries, especially in the ports, 
allowed shippers a much greater control of the quality and product 
homogeneity . 
As a result, olive oil exports grew from a low of 16,700 tons in the 
decade 1886/95, to 74,400 tons in 1926/35. However, the six major mar-
kets for Spanish olive oil between 1865 and 1935 - Italy, France, Cuba, 
Argentina, United States and Great Britain - illustrate once again the 
limitations of the export market for Spanish producers, as five of the 
six countries were either in the Mediterranean (and therefore producers 
themselves), or had large Mediterranean immigrant populations. 
Market size was therefore limited by taste and cultural experience.44 
Furthermore, despite being the world's largest exporter in the first third 
of the twentieth century, Spain failed to establish brand names or an 
international reputation for quality as effectively as the French and Ital-
ian competition. As late as 1926/35, over two-thirds of Spain's olive oil 
was still exported in bulk, much to France and Italy, to be sold under 
their own brand labels.45 As one writer noted:46 
Of all the countries of production, those which have commercial fame for quan-
tity and quality of their oils are France and Italy; all the rest, including our 
Spain, which sends them our best oils to be mixed with their domestic pro-
duction, are considered in the markets as producers of inferior oils. 
Even though Spain was able to dominate the world market for olive 
oil during the First World War to such an extent that its government 
was forced to legislate to retain supplies for domestic consumers, its 
market share was rapidly lost after hostilities ceased. 
Spanish producers therefore tended to compete on cost rather than 
quality. The milling and pressing of olives required an investment which 
could not be substituted easily by labour and which, by allowing econ-
omies of scale, gave the larger producer an advantage over the smaller 
one. This led to a greater concentration of production as small pro-
ducers sold their fruit to the larger manufacturer.47 Technical change 
in manufacturing undoubtedly: increased product quality and opened up 
new markets, but most costs were related to cultivation and harvesting. 
Estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1921 suggest that only 10 
44 The sixth country, Britain, was of declining imponance from the late nineteenth cen-
tury as cheaper vegetable oils were used for industrial purposes. 
45 DirecciOn General de Aduanas, various years. 
46 Lamarca (1922, p. 5). 
47 See the case of Carbonell in Cordoba in Zambrana (1987, chapter 4). 
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Table 9.4. Production, area and yields in olive oil production, I90I-I935 
Agricultural Industrial 
Production Area yield" yield" 
'000 '000 kg per kg per 
hi index ha index ha index ton index 
1901/12 2,121 100 1,448 100 787 100 187.7 100 
1913125 3,243 153 1,679 116 1,031 131 189·3 101 
1926/35 3,920 185 1,921 133 1,006 128 193·6 103 
" Agricultural yield refers to olives produced per hectare. 
" Industrial yield refers to the quantity of oil obtained from one ton of olives. 
Source: Zambrana (1987, cuadro 6, p. 71). 
per cent of the off-farm price of olive oil could be attributed to the 
manufacturing process.48 Therefore, 90 per cent of the cost of olive oil 
was based on the use of extensive areas of relatively infertile soil and 
some of Europe's cheapest labour. Between 1901/12 and 1926/35, the 
area under olives grew by a third and agricultural yields increased by 
28 per cent. However, these changes in yields are deceptive as an 
important part of the increase was achieved by having a greater pro-
portion of the nation's trees in full production, and by farmers increas-
ing their annual variable costs (such as extra ploughings, hoeings, and 
greater care in harvesting) to take advantage of temporary favourable 
prices (table 9.4). When conditions were not so favourable, such as in 
the 1950S, yields fell once again.49 
Although the short-term supply curve for (unadulterated) olive oil 
was relatively inelastic (given the time it took for the trees to become 
productive), this was not true over the medium or long term. Within 
the international market for olive oil, the elastic supplies of land and 
labour in Andalucia (the country's principal region of production) gave 
Spain a considerable cost advantage. As a result, olive oil production 
declined in France and stagnated in Italy during the first third of the 
twentieth century, and both countries imported a growing amount of 
olive oil and oil producing seeds, both for domestic requirements and 
48 Cordoba 12.8 per cent (Direccion General de Agricultura y Montes, 1923, pp. 355-7), 
Zaragoza 10.6 per cent (ibid., p. 129), Huesca 10.4 per cent (ibid., p. 137), Madrid 
9.3 per cent (ibid., pp. 12-13), Jaen 6.9 per cent (ibid. p. 289) and Malaga 6.3 per cent 
(ibid., p. 309). See also Simpson (1985a, pp. 199-201). 
49 Falling from 1.83 tons of oil per hectare in 1931/5 to 1.61 tons in 1955159 (Barciela, 
1986, p. 422). 
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re-export. 50 However, by the late 1920S other areas of low-cost pr~­
duction were increasingly capturing market share. Thus, Greece, Turu-
sia and Algeria, which in 1910/14 had accounted for 22 per cent of inter-
national trade, saw their share increase to 30 per cent in 1929/33 and 
38 per cent in 1934/38.51 
Finally, the possibility of adulterating olive oil by mixing it wi~ oth:r 
vegetable oils, tended to stabilise prices and make supply elastIc. This 
fact, together with the high levels of substitution in th~ n~n­
Mediterranean countries, meant that the olive's growth potentIal, hke 
that of the vine, would depend significantly on the domestic market. 52 
Valencian oranges 
The problems associated with wine and olive oil, namely the difficulties 
of extending the market internationally and the tendency for supply to 
run ahead of demand (on account of the abundant supplies of suitable 
land and cheap labour in the Mediterranean region) were not present 
with citrus fruit. Exports, principally oranges, faced buoyant demand 
and the area cultivated was severely limited, both by climate and 
(initially at least) by the heavy capital investment required. The result 
was a highly prosperous regional agriculture, based on irrigation and 
intensive cultivation techniques. 
The orange was introduced into Spain during the Muslim occu-
pation, but it remained of only marginal importance until the. mid-
nineteenth century, when the estimates for both the area cultIvated 
and quantities exported show a rapid growth until the Civil War. By 
the Second Republic (1931-6) Spain had a total of 73,000 hectares 
of oranges, but although the tree was found in a total of 30 provinces, 
three-quarters of total production came from the provinces of Valen-
cia and Castellon.53 Production was highly geared to the export 
50 French imports of olive oil increased from an average of 18,800 tons in 191.0114 to 
27,200 tons in 1929/33; exports increased from 4,600 to 10,100 tons. In Italy, Imports 
climbed from an average of 5,500 tons to 52,500 tons, and exports from 34,100 tons 
to 58,900 tons. Domestic output fell by over 50 per cent in France and ~c~ased by 
about 10 per cent in Italy between 1905/14 and 1925/34 (lIT yearbooks, Cited m ZaJ::?-
brana, 1987, pp. 296--7). For olive oil production, see Mitchell (1992) and Toutam 
(1961). 
51 Calculated from Zambrana (1987, p. 296). 
52 As a basic necessity, demand had a tendency to be both price and ~come inela~~c. 
Sagrista (1961, pp. 18-19) estimates a price elasticity of -0.39, and an mcome elasnclty 
of 0.44 for olive oil in the Spanish domes.tic market betwee~ 1913 and 1950. . 
53 Valencia produced 52 per cent of the nanonal crop, Castellon 24 per cent, Murc18 8 
per cent, Alicante 7 per cent, and Malaga 2 per cent. Figures refer to 1932. 
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Table 9.5. Growth in orange exports 
Exports 
in tons Rate of growth (%) 
1850/4 7,072 1850/4-1870/4 10·9 
1870/4 55,825 1870/4-1890/4 3·0 
1890/4 101,493 1890/4-1910/4 8.4 
1910/4 509,825 1910/4-1930/4 3·1 
1930/4 936,648 1850/4-1930/4 6·3 
Sources: DirecciOn General de Aduanas (various years). 
market, with perhaps 85 or 90 per cent of the crop sold overseas.54 
From a low base in 1850154, exports grew strongly during the next 
two decades at an annual rate of 10.9 per cent. During the Great 
Depression, this slowed to a still relatively healthy 3 per cent. In the 
two decades prior to the First World War, growth again reached 
almost 10 per cent, to be followed once more by a slowing in the 
pre-Civil War period. Exports peaked in 1930 and, in tenns of 
volume, were unaffected by the Depression in the 1930S. In contrast, 
prices fell significantly during 1934 and 1935, but this appears to have 
been caused by a decline in product quality on account of frost, 
rather than changes in international demand. 55 
Although second to the United States in tenns of production, 
Spain, was by far the world's largest exporter of citrus fruit, account-
ing for just under half of the total in 1929/33.56 From this position 
of strength, the potential threat of Spain's major customers (such as 
the United Kingdom or France) turning to their colonies for an 
exclusive supply was minimal. Neither these countries, nor Spain's 
other major markets (Gennany, Belgium, Holland), produced close 
substitutes to the orange and, although markets were not always free 
from tariffs or controls, the political incentive to protect them was 
much reduced in comparison with products such as wine or olive oil. 
Furthennore, as the case of Britain shows, the consumption of 
oranges and other fresh fruit had a tendency to be income elastic, 
5. Font de Mora (1938, p. 309) suggests a figure of 12 per cent of the production for the 
domestic market. 
55 Abad Garcia (1985, p. 249). 
56 Some 45 per cent in 1909/13 and 47 per cent in 1929/33 (calculated from the HA 
Yearbooks, 1931 and 1934). Indeed, as lemons and grapefruit were of importance within 
the general category of citrus fruit in international trade, yet hardly figured in Spanish 
exports, the country was responsible for well over half the world's trade in oranges. 
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and thus benefited from the growing prosperity of the Western world 
from the mid-nineteenth century.57 
To explain the success of the orange, it is also necessary to .examine 
its production requirements. Barriers to entry were much .higher for 
the orange than for viticulture or olives on account of Its greater 
demands on climate, capital investment and human capital. To over-
come drought, it was necessary to provide an adequate ~gation 
system which usually involved some levelling of the land. Given that 
most fanns were small, some of these costs could be absorbed by 
the use of unpaid family labour working during the off-season. How-
ever, because the principal means of extending the area of oranges 
in Valencia during the first third of the twentieth century was through 
the use of tube-wells and pumps, and because the land required large 
quantities of artificial fertilisers, a significant amount of capital was 
also required. 58 No return on these investments would be made poss-
ible until the first crop - some four or five years after planting. The 
extension of orange cultivation therefore resulted in important back-
ward linkages with chemical and fann machinary industries. Finally, 
the greater complexity of fanning operations (such as the. need for 
irrigation, the use of fertilisers and pesticides, and the grafting of the 
most suitable stock) required a level of expertise that was, for the 
most part, absent from Spain's agricultural sector. . . 
Because orange production also had important forward lmkages m 
the packing and marketing of the fruit, the rapid growth in exports 
affected more than just the growers. At least a further 50 per cent 
of value was added to the fann-gate price for oranges before they 
left Spain. 59 The orange, therefore, not only produced high fanning 
profits and productivity, but also had important backward and for-
ward linkages, which were a major component of the deve.lopment of 
the regional economy in the period 1880-36. At a natIonal level, 
however, its importance was limited; by 1929/33, the 73,~00 he~tares 
of oranges represented only 0.5 per cent of the nation s cultl\~able 
lands, and production was equivalent to 2.9 per cent of final agncul-
tural output.60 
57 Thus in the period 1920--38, the income elasticity of demand.for orange~ was ~.9, and 
between the same dates, annual per capita consumption m the Uruted Kingdom 
increased from 4.5 kilograms to 10.2 kilograms (Stone, 1954, pp. 122 and 1~4) .. 
58 Palafox (1985, cuadro 15.4) gives plantation costs f~r the orange at .the begmnmg ~f 
the twentieth century as 2.4 times greater than the olive. See also the unportant contn-
butions of Calatayud (1989a, 1989b and 1990). . 
59 In 1907 it has been estimated as 56 per cent, in 1914 as 77 per cent and m 1926 as 63 
per cent. See Simpson (1992a). 
60 Simpson (1995a, Appendix). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that Spain, despite enjoying a comparative 
advantage in world markets for products such as wine, olive oil and 
citrus fruit, found difficulties in achieving export-led growth. In the case 
of wine and olive oil (and especially wine) abundant supplies both in 
Spain and elsewhere of adequate land and cheap labour led to low entry 
costs for producers. This factor, together with the ease of product sub-
stitution in international markets, restricted growth potential. The 
nature of production was such that producers were unwilling to uproot 
plants during periods of low prices, and so surpluses were a frequent 
problem. Olive oil suffered from similar problems, although these were 
slightly mitigated by the longer-term nature of the initial investment, 
together with the need for relatively large quantities of capital for the 
transformation of the fruit. However, producers of both crops suffered 
from product adulteration and cheap substitutes.61 In the case of the 
orange, these negative factors were absent, and the crop enjoyed import-
ant backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy. How-
ever, by the Civil War, citrus fruit remained relatively unimportant 
within Spanish agriculture as a whole. Despite an apparent comparative 
advantage, the three crops, which together contributed 20.5 per cent of 
net agricultural output in 1897/01, saw their share fall slightly to 17.7 
per cent in 1929/33.62 Therefore, the switch of resources from cereal 
dry-farming (where improvements in yields were difficult) - into more 
labour-intensive vines and olives was limited by the relatively small size 
of the export market. 
61 As late as 1981, rapeseed oil intended for industrial uses was sold as olive oil, causing 
the death of almost 1,000 people and leaving many more permanently affected. 
62 Simpson (1995a, p. 199). 
10 The political economy of Spanish 
agriculture 
To an economist, whether soil is fertile or mediocre and whether 
resources are abundant or sparse will be determined not by intrinsic 
physical properties of the land, but by the level of demand, the state 
of knowledge, and the organization of property rights and markets. 1 
It has been argued in this book that Spanish farmers responded posi-
tively to movements in commodity and factor prices. Decision-making, 
whether by small dairy farmers in Galicia, wine sharecroppers in Cata-
lufia or latijundistas in Andalucia, seems to have been economically 
rational and based on information relating to the cost of factors, com-
modity prices and the degree of risk which each farmer thought appro-
priate. Yet, if farmers responded rationally to product and commodity 
prices, why was it that the sector's low productivity resulted in both high 
consumer prices and low farm incomes? Self-sufficiency was achieved in 
basic foodstuffs, but diets remained heavily concentrated on cereals, and 
farm incomes, if growing at all, remained low. In short, agriculture prior 
to the Civil War cannot be considered an overall success. 
In chapter 8 I argued that cereal tariffs resulted in high food costs 
and that the impact of urbanisation and growing per capita incomes 
was limited for the livestock farmers on Spain's secano, because of poor 
pastures and expensive fodder crops. Chapter 9 extended the study to 
wine and olive oil, and showed that the possibilities for export-led 
growth were also limited. In this chapter I consider the problem of 
dry-farming from another angle, that of institutional reform. Given that 
farmers appear to have been economically rational and that natural 
resource endowment was generally poor, could incomes be improved 
by changes in the organisation of property rights and markets? 
The first section considers cereal protection in terms of its impact on 
farm incomes. Government intervention was successful in reducing 
price instability, but was insufficient to give many producers much 
more than meagre living standards, especially in the Interior. If the 
1 Wright (1986, pp. 6-7). 
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government really believed in the importance of preserving family farms, 
as it so often claimed, what was required was the consolidation of far-
mers' highly dispersed fields and the development of a dynamic cooper-
ative movement. Neither were pursued with any enthusiasm before the 
Civil War, and a cereal policy based on commodity prices alone ben-
efited the larger, commercial farmers, rather than the small family 
operators. 
Ironically, the most serious attempts at land reform, during the 
Second RepUblic (1931-6), were aimed at dividing land holdings still 
further. Directed mainly at southern Spain, the reforms had a social 
objective only, but they would have undermined the region's compara-
tive advantage, namely the large units of production and their potential 
economies of scale. Furthermore, there were serious domestic and exter-
nal demand constraints on any significant increase in the output of 
products most likely to have been produced by the reforms. At best 
it could only have been a temporary measure to alleviate the chronic 
underemployment of the region, with the only real solution being to 
raise rural productivity through off-farm migration. 
Tariffs and farm incomes: the case of wheat 
The removal in 1765 of the legal regulations concerning the domestic 
wheat market led in time to a reallocation of resources, permitting an 
increase in output and a significant increase in the quantity traded 
through the market. However, the logic of free trade was not extended 
to the international market. As Sanchez Albornoz has shown, from 1820 
government policy successfully reserved the internal and colonial mar-
kets for domestic cereal producers.2 However, by the 1880s the impact 
of falling production costs in countries of recent European settlement 
(especially North America) and the decline in rail and sea freight, threat-
ened to weaken the links between the Spanish Interior and its traditional 
markets on the coast (such as Barcelona and Valencia). Although Span-
ish prices remained stable, world prices fell significantly, and the tariff 
now effectively provided farmers with a minimum price, ending the 
higher prices that farmers had traditionally enjoyed after a harvest fail-
ure.3 In Spain, as elsewhere, this had serious implications as greater 
stability in prices produced greater instability in farm incomes, on 
account of harvest fluctuations. The First World War saw an extension 
in government intervention, with attempts to fix maximum and l1lini-
2 Sanchez Albomoz (1963). 
3 For a useful summary of tariff legislation, see EPAPM (1928, no. 1529, pp. 257-60). 
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num prices. By the end of the war, Spain had become virtually self-
ufficient in wheat, and the tariff was supplemented from November 
:921 by strict import quotas, and maximum and minimum prices set 
vithin the country. For only three of the years between 1922 and 1935 
.... ould imports rise above 5 per cent of the national harvest (1928, 1929 
lIld 1932), remaining negligible for the rest.4 Despite the dubious suc-
:ess in becoming self-sufficient in wheat and stabilising consumer 
)rices, the clamour for still greater protection and reports of distress 
lmongst thousands of wheat farmers during the 1920S, brings into ques-
ion the suitability of this policy measure.5 
Farmers complained that, in trying to stabilise the market by fixing 
iVheat prices, government policy benefited the middlemen and not them-
~elves. In years of good harvests, there was no mechanism to force millers 
:0 pay the official prices - and millers, so the farmers claimed, were adept 
It 'creating' grain shortages. Such shortages were allegedly created by 
~eeping wheat off the market, thus forcing the official flour and bread 
Jrices upwards, whilst at the same time benefiting the millers through the 
~heaper grain imports that the artificial scarcity encouraged.6 The official 
price series does not support this claim, although the frequency of com-
plaints, the dependency of many farmers on a limited number of mill 
Jwners, and the clear opportunity for fraud all suggest that, for the smaller 
farmers at least, their bargaining powers were limited.7 
Although industrialists complained of high bread prices, the farming 
lobby believed, especially after the First World War, that the protection 
they were receiving was less than that enjoyed by industry. The result 
was, according to Torres, that relative prices moved against farmers, 
benefiting industry (as well as flour millers).8 In the absence of a com-
prehensive list of consumer and industrial prices, it is difficult to show 
whether Torres was correct or not. Table 10.1 suggests that whereas 
wheat farmers were less successful than industry in increasing prices 
during and after the First World War, the high wheat prices of .192 7/9 
had allowed them to recover against most other producers, WIth the 
4 Montojo Sureda (1945). See also Pinilla Navarro (1992, pp. 418-20). , 
5 For the Interior, see especially Instituto de Reformas Soclaies (1977), Senador Gomez 
(1915), Castillo (1979) and Hermida Revillas (1989). . 
6 Wheat, flour and bread prices were fixed for much of the 1920S (MontoJo Sureda, 1945, 
pp. 18-19). 
7 For a study of wheat and flour prices in the inter-war period, ~ee P~af?X (1991, pp. 
320--2). The fact that the products were not homogeneous prOVIded slgruficant op~o~­
tunities for profit-making arid probably implies that bread prices are shown as .a mml-
mum. During the war and shortly afterwar~s, high milling profit~ were .obtamed by 
circumventing the law on producing only a smgle type of flour. See m particular, Mon-
tojo Sureda (1945)· 
8 Torres (1934, p. 231). 
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Table 10.1. Movements in commodity prices in Spain, I9I3-I935 
1913115 192012 1927/9 1933/5 
Wheat 100 172 156 152 
Flour 100 168 155 153 
Woollen textiles 100 177 151' n.d. 
Cotton textiles 100 250 225" n.d. 
Cement 100 186 190 192 
Steel 100 385 143 196 
Iron 100 360 141 165 
Sulphuric acid 100 193 173 IIO 
Asturias coal 100 419 154 175 
Petrol 100 155 74 98 
Superphosphates 100 276 122 145 
Sugar 100 241 171 177 
Coffee 100 151 195 217 
"Figure refers to 1927 and 1928 only. 
Sources: Carreras (1989a, pp. 216-34) and Paris Eguilaz (1943, pp. 31--67). 
notable exceptions of cotton textiles and cement. It would seem that 
this was only temporary, as by 1933/5 wheat was once again slipping 
back against most other commodities. In conclusion, if relative prices 
did move against the farmer between 1913 and 1935, the movement was 
slight, being limited by government intervention. As chapter II shows, 
it was only from the mid-1950S that cereal farmers faced a significant 
movement in domestic terms of trade against them. 
Spain was certainly not alone in increasing government intervention 
in agricultural markets during the First World War, and nor was it alone 
in the establishment of a government monopoly for wheat marketing in 
1936. However, if intervention to balance supply with demand was 
regarded as necessary, not only were the price levels at which this was 
set probably too high, the instrument of intervention also left much to 
be desired, as I shall now discuss. 
In chapter 5 it was shown that the diffusion of more efficient ploughs, 
seed drills, improved seed selection and the increased use of chemical 
fertilisers still failed to raise average wheat yields. Farmers had con-
sidered that these resources could be better used for extending the size 
of their farms. Hence, although the area cultivated grew in size, the yield 
per hectare did not. 9 However, within Spain there were major regional 
9 'It is common amongst our peasants that as soon as their harvests allow them to save 
a few pesetas, they invest them in making more extensive their properties ... ' Caoovas 
del Castillo and Gamazo Abarca (1915, p. 15, cited in Hermida Revillas, 1989, p. 19). 
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differences. The area under wheat on the secano (dry-farming) changed 
little in Andalucia and the Mediterranean areas between 1905/9 and 
1930/4, but it increased by a third in the Interio~ (table 5 .. 5). Wheat 
yields stagnated in the Interior, but showed modest mcreases m Andalu-
cia and the Mediterranean. 
The Interior accounted for 72 per cent of Spanish wheat produced 
under conditions of secano in 1930/4, and was the region where the prob-
lems of increased international competition and falls in domestic 
demand for the product were most difficult to overcome. In the first 
instance there were few alternatives to wheat on non-irrigated land. 
The ten:porary relief which some cereal farmers ~ad e~joyed ~uring.the 
1880s through diversification into wine productIon (vmes bemg sUIted 
to the secano conditions and intensive in labour requirements) was short-
lived. Although the area of vines fell by only 2 per cent between 1888 
and 1931/5, this was attributable to a significant incre~se in large-scale 
viticulture in one area, La Mancha. If La Mancha IS excluded, the 
region's vines fell by a third, and apart from a few small, select ~rea.s of 
the Interior, viticulture did not recover from phylloxera. Imgauon, 
which allowed intensive farming of cash crops such as sugar beet, was 
also rare outside the Ebro valley. 
It is clear from the limited information available that farms in the 
Interior were both small and heavily fragmented. In 1909, the leading 
agronomist of Castilla-Leon, Cascon, noted that a typical small farmer 
had about 30 hectares, of which between a third and a half was rented. 
The land was divided into about forty different lots, and only half was 
sown bieImially with cereals, being worked with two mules. The farmer, 
according to Cascon, could do 'little more than survive' . 10 In ~959, w~en 
a full Cadastre was finally available, 90 per cent of all owners m Casttlla-
Leon occupied just 20 per cent of al~ land, and the size of I~verage ~arms 
of the remaining 10 per cent was sull only 52.6 hectares. Even m the 
mid-1960s, a government study of the region noted ~at :uthough ~ farm 
of 25 hectares was 'very small', it was the average SIze m most villages 
surveyed. 12 .., • • 
As table 10.2 shows, the regIon of Casulla-Leon m the Intenor com-
bined a high dependence on extensive cereals (an average of 49 per cent 
10 EPAPM (71111909, no. 610, p. 3). Casc6n argued for a concentration of holdings 
together with a reform of lease law. . 
11 The Cadastral figure, calculated from Malefakis (1970, a~~endix C, t~ble F); Malefakis 
does not include the province of Salamanca in his defimnon of Casnlla-Leon. The 90 
per cent of owners refers to holdings of less than 10 hectares... , 
12 Ministerio de Agricultura (1966, p. 48). The survey refers to mne vtllages chosen at 
random' in the Interior. 
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Table 10.2. Dry-farming cereals and farm size in Spain, I930S 
Extensive Average 
cereals as % of Agricultural wheat yield 
final agricul- Area cultivated land per male (tons per 
tural output" per farmer (ha)- worker (ha)' hectare)d 
Casti1la-Le6n 49·0 I5·3 9·9 0·92 Lower Ebro 36.7 22.8 9·9 0·95 Extremadura 35·3 74·7 9·5 0.92 Centre 37·6 38.7 IO·9 0.70 Upper Ebro 32.3 I5·2 7.6 1.28 Interior 40.6 22.8 IO.I 0.87 Andalucia 27·4 43·3 5·2 0·99 Mediterranean IO.O I3·7 4.0 0.89 
Spain' 25·5 22·4 7·I 0.89 
a Figures are for I929/33 and include net production of wheat, barley, oats, rye and 
legumes. 
- Derived from the number of farm owners given in the I920 census divided by the 
area cultivated in I922. 
: F~gures for male labour in agriculture are for I930 and area cultivated for I931. 
Yields of wheat on unirrigated land (secano), I930/4. 
, Spain is here taken as the sum of the Interior, Andalucia and Mediterranean. 
Sources: S~pson (I995a, appendix 2C); Rodriguez Labandeira (I99I, pp. 440--3); and 
AEPA (vanous years). 
of output in 192 9/33) with small farms and low yields. 13 The yields in 
Extremadura and the Centre were no better, but the considerably larger 
farms gave the owners greater econoInies of scale (as in parts of 
Andalucia). In the Upper Ebro, farm size was similar to Castilla-Le6n 
b,ut this was offset by a greater diversity in the agriculture, and whea~ 
YIelds were almost 40 per cent higher than in Castilla-Le6n. Cereal far-
mers in the Lower Ebro probably followed those of Castilla-Le6n in 
order of hardship, but farms were 50 per cent larger and dependence 
on cereals was significantly less. 
The problems facing Casc6n's small farmer of the Interior can be 
better .understood in an international perspective. In the major wheat-
exportmg areas of countries such as the United States Canada 
Argentina and Australia, the average size of all farms on the' eve of th~ 
13 IT Sal~anca, which had large areas of latifundios, is excluded, the dependency on 
extensIVe cereals falls mar~ally to 43 per cent, the quantity ofland per farmer remains 
~t IS hectares, average Yields fall to 0.9 tons per hectare whilst the area of wheat 
mcreased by 33 per cent between I905/9 and I930/4, of which 94 per cent can be 
accounted for by the growth in area sown. 
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First World War was almost 100 hectares. 14 This comparison, however, 
fails to take into account the area under wheat and its relative import-
ance for local farm incomes. The long-term capacity of wheat producers 
to change and increase productivity can be examined using the example 
of the United States. 
In the first instance, the centre of wheat farming in the United States 
moved over time. The nineteenth-century pioneer farmer in the Mid-
west, for example, had originally depended heavily on wheat, before 
switching later to a more specialised 'corn-and-livestock economy' .15 
Likewise California, having been the nation's second largest wheat pro-
ducer in 1889, was only the twenty-third largest producer some twenty 
years later. This was mainly due to farmers specialising in irrigated fruit 
and vegetable crops instead. 16 The movement out of wheat and into 
other higher value crops was also the road taken by many grain farmers 
in northern Europe during and after the late nineteenth-century 
depression - an option not readily available to the farmer of the Spanish 
Interior, as we have seen. 
Those areas that finally did specialise in wheat in the United States 
were of relatively late settlement, when mechanisation was already 
encouraging economies of scale. 17 Using the USDA published accounts 
of 'typical' farms in 1930, which take into account the different regional 
crop and livestock mix, and using only those farms where wheat 
accounted for at least 45 per cent of farm income, average farm size was 
just over 200 hectares, of which 80 were sown with wheat. Just as 
in Castilla-Le6n, these were family farms, with off-farm labour account-
ing for only 17 per cent of costS.18 Even if Casc6n's typical farmer of 
1909 had been able to enlarge his farm subsequently, he would still have 
been been more dependent on wheat while sowing considerably less 
than his counterpart in the United States. Furthermore, fragmentation 
I. Figures are 85 hectares in the United States, II7 hectares in Canada, I02 hectares in 
Austra1ia and 78 hectares in Argentina (Offer, I989, table 6.2). 
15 Bogue (I963, ch. VII). 
16 Olmstead and Rhode (I988, p. IOI). Dec1irIing soil fertility was also to blame. 
17 For example, in the state of Kansas, which moved from being the sixth leading producer 
in I889 to become the leading producer in I9I9, average farm size increased from I55 to 
283 acres between I880 and I930 (United States Department of Agriculture (hereafter 
USDA), I932, pp. 53 and 743). 
18 I930 was the first year. If I947/9 is taken, the base year used by the survey, then the 
average farm was almost 250 hectares, of which 9I hectares were sown with wheat, 
producing 58 per cent of incomes, and with labour accounting for I3.8 per cent of costs 
(USDA, I956). The farms used were 'wheat - small grain -livestock farms, northern 
Great Plains', 'wheat - roughage - livestock farms, northern Great Plains', 'winter 
wheat farms, Southern Plains' and 'Wheat - pea farms, Washington and Idaho'. From 
I933 with the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the US farmer's planting decisions would 
become more dependent on government intervention. 
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of holdings in the Spanish Interior meant that the upper limit that a 
family could work was considerably smaller than in the United States 
or other regions of recent settlement. 
If farmers were unable to switch into higher value crops, the key to 
remaining competitive in cereal farming lay in mechanisation which 
. , 
mcreased the potential area that a family could work and, with the 
advent of the tractor, reduced the need to produce feed grains for work 
animals. According to Parker and Klein, mechanisation and the move-
ment westward allowed labour productivity in US wheat cultivation to 
increase four-fold between 1840 and 1910.19 The introduction of tractors 
contributed to a further 70 per cent increase in productivity between 
1910 and 1930, and another 135 per cent between 1930 and 1950.20 
In Spain, high wheat prices helped maintain profitability, and the fact 
that they were set at levels for the less efficient producers of the Interior 
implied considerable profits for the large-scale operations in Andalu~ 
cia:21 A policy choice of high wheat prices can also be perceived as a 
dehberate measure to protect the small family farmer. However, experi-
ence from other countries in this period suggests that high prices were 
not eno~gh for the small farmer. What was also required was a strong 
cooperatIve movement which would give farmers greater economies of 
scale in the purchase of inputs (chemical fertilisers, machinery, seed 
corn, capital, and so on), and allow them to produce greater profits in 
the commercialisation of the product. 
Perhaps the most successful cooperative movement set up by wheat 
farmers was in Canada, where 'the homestead system fostered the 
growth of well-organized rural communities, strong cooperative insti-
tutions, and powerful agrarian political movements'.22 In particular, 
rural protests at the turn of the twentieth century over transport prob-
lems a?d grain sales led farmers to create 'a vertically integrated system 
of busmess to compete with the private marketing system. '23 The large 
numbers of medium-sized farmers used their voting rights to lobby for 
the necessary government legislation to produce institutions that would 
allow some of the profits from exported grains to be channelled back to 
farmers. The legislation also created a wheat grading system which 
helped farmers to compete in international markets.24 
19 Parker and Klein (1966, p. 533). 
:~ Figures refer to all wheat, rye and rice grains (USDA, 1982, p. 52). 
Be)mal (1981, p. 65), Tedde de Lorca (1985, p. 309) and Zapata (1986, vol. I, pp. 814-15 . 
22 Solberg (1987, p. 51). 
23 Ibid. (p. 131). 
2. ~e Canadian wheat c~operatives were not egalitarian, but rather institutions firmly 
linked to the market, whIch attempted to capture for farmers the profits associated with 
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In Spain, the number of cooperatives grew spectacularly after the 
1906 Law of Sindicatos Agricolas. By 1920, the national association - the 
ConfederaciOn Nacional Cat6lico-Agraria (CNCA) - had 500,000 mem-
bers. These were to be found in areas where small farmers predomi-
nated, especially the region of Castilla-Leon and the Ebro valley, and 
aimed both to 'save' the peasants and agricultural workers from social-
ism, and provide economies of scale in the purchase of inputs and off-
farm sales. 
One of the most successful cereal cooperatives, that of Villalon 
(Valladolid), built warehouses and, in 1920, a flour mill so that members 
could benefit both from easier sales and higher prices 'without the need 
for intermediaries'.25 This cooperative's aim was to protect the numer-
ous small farmers against:26 
the abuses of buyers and sellers which try to obtain at miserly prices the produce 
of the countryside, and to sell to the farmer at enormous profits machinery, 
fertilisers and everything else necessary to live and work on the land. 
Even if 'miserly prices' or 'enormous profits' were an exaggeration, 
cooperatives had the potential to play a major role in the transition of 
an agricultural society to an industrial one, by helping farmers capture 
a greater part of the profits gained in the storage and selling of the 
product. However, if the potential profits for cooperative members were 
so great, it needs to be asked why, when the CNCA claimed some 2,700 
cooperatives in 1937, it still had only eleven flour mills.27 
In the first instance, the construction and running of flour mills was 
both expensive and difficult, as the FederaciOn de Sindicatos Agricolas 
Cat6licos de la Rioja had found in the early 1920S after flour prices col-
lapsed.28 Yet it is also clear that the cooperatives faced considerable 
opposition, as the case of the Sindicato Agricola de Cervera (Ueida) 
shows. Here the first attempts by the cooperative to store grain in order 
to benefit from the higher spring prices led to a boycott by local millers, 
who were also legally able to prohibit the movement of grain out of the 
province. After the construction of a cooperative flour mill, the provin-
cial governor prohibited the sale of flour outside the province, and 
the grain trade. At times they were criticised for benefiting the large and medium-sized 
farmers at the expense of the smaller ones. 
25 Voz Social (abriJ 1931, cited in Castillo, 1979, p. 324). In total, 327 members belonged 
to the Cooperativa Harinera. 
2. Voz Social (1922, cited in Castillo, 1979, p. 324). 
27 Exposicion al Generalismo (de la CNCA), 1937 in Voz Social (die. 1937, cited in full 
in Castillo, 1979, pp. 475--9). 
28 The flour mill had been bought in 1920 because of high milling profits in the early 
postwar years. Falling prices were accompanied by bad management (Casti11o, 1979, 
pp. 267-8). 
230 Markets and institutions, 1880-1936 
shortly afterwards, in 1923, it was destroyed by arson, being rebuilt once 
more the following year.29 The success of the Cervera cooperative can 
be attributed not just to the determination of its members, but also to 
the support of an influential outsider (the Count of Laverne), and the 
credit conceded by the Servicio Nacional de Credito Agricola of more than 
I million pesetas. The failure of most cooperatives to obtain the active 
support of the politically influential and a source of adequate credit 
meant that their achievements would remain much more modest. In 
this respect, the absence of a democratic political tradition, which 
involved the active participation of smaller farmers, left the cooperative 
movement being controlled by the larger landowners, whose interests 
naturally differed. This is in complete contrast to the situation in France 
where the cooperative movement not only helped to supply farmers with 
cheap inputs and the marketing of their produce, but was instrumental 
in influencing government policy in promoting policies specifically for 
the small farmer. As one French historian has noted:30 
. . . if technical changes - the mechanisation of arable and pastoral farming or 
the drive for ever greater production and productivity - have been the most 
visible aspect of the transformation of rural France, the spread of new forms of 
cooperation and association has been no less important. 
The result was that farms in France of between 5 and 50 hectares 
accounted for some 42 per cent of the total in 1929, a figure which had 
increased to 60 per cent in 1955 and remained at that level in 1983.31 
In Spain the corresponding figure was about 28 per cent in 1959.32 
Whereas in France in the mid-1980s, four out of five farmers were mem-
bers of at least One cooperative, in Spain in 1970, only 0.1 per cent were 
members.33 This is not to say that the French model of family farms 
was the ideal to which Spanish farmers should have aspired. Because 
of climatic conditions a farm of 25 hectares in France was usually much 
more productive than a similar sized one in Spain. However, unlike 
Spanish farmers, those in France and Canada adopted an institutional 
framework which was compatible with the family farm. This reduced 
the necessity of having to rely solely on a system of price support which, 
2. The new mill had a daily capacity of 10 tons, and included grain silos able to store 
2,000 tons (EPAPM, 151111928, no. 1518, pp. 24-5). 
30 Cleary (1989, p. 167). 
31 Ibid. (p. 13). 
32 This figure has to be considered as only very approximate, given the lack of official 
statistics on land ownership. See Malefakis (1970, appendix B and C). 
33 ~leary (1989, p. 114) and Schubert (1990, p. 223). This figure for Spain seems excess-
Ively small. However, there is no doubting the small number of farmers involved in 
cooperatives and the latter's organisational weakness. 
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by its very nature, benefited larger farmers more than the smaller ones, 
and was at the expense of the consumer. 
This picture of small, inefficient cereal farmers in the Interior should 
not lead us to assume that farm incomes or wages were the worst in 
this region of Spain. They were not, and labour productivity was only 
just below the national average. Furthermore, in Castilla-Le6n (the 
region identified as having the highest dependency on cereals and the 
greatest number of small farms) labour productivity was above the 
national average, and between 1887 and 1930, Castilla-Le6n and the 
Ebro valley lost about a sixth of their agricultural labour force (table 
7.7). The real limitation to agriculture in much of the Interior was the 
lack of any alternative to extensive cereals; furthermore, the rural exodus 
that took place before 1936 was not fast enough to increase land-labour 
ratios sufficiently to produce the mechanisation required to reduce unit 
costS.34 
Andalucia and the question of land refonn 
Until 1931, agricultural policy remained strongly influenced by large 
landowners; however, with the proclamation of the Second Republic, 
the composition of the Cortes changed dramatically and urban and 
socialist values predominated, at least initially.35 But instead of aiming 
to help the small cereal farmer, policy was directed towards a land 
reform to help landless labourers, especially in the country's south. The 
nineteenth-century changes in property rights had favoured the latifund-
istas (large landowners), and wheat farmers enjoyed the sort of scale of 
production that was absent in Castilla-Le6n.36 There is no evidence that 
the latifundistas were inefficient in their allocation of resources, but the 
highly skewed distribution of property - and the fact that in 1930 some 
58.5 per cent of the active male labour force in Andalucia depended 
on agriculture - led to widespread underemployment and provided the 
background to Europe's strongest rural anarchist movement. Indeed, 
whereas male farm labour fell by 12 per cent between 1887 and 1930 
in the North, Mediterranean and the Interior, it increased by 14 per 
3. A second restriction, that of the consolidation of scattered holdings, was of little import-
ance until the 1960s. See Aiario Trigueros (1991, especially pp. 83-91). 
35 Of the three elected governments berween 1931 and 1936, the first and third were 
dominated by parties of the Left, and the second by parties of the Right. 
36 See especially Bemal (1979). The low population density in La Mancha meant that 
the social demand for access to land was less. Extremadura, by contrast, showed charac-
teristics similar to Andalucia. For the calculations in this section, only Andalucia is 
considered, although I exclude the province of Aimeria, where property was more 
equally distributed. 
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cent in Andalucia, with growth being especially strong in the areas of 
latifundios.37 It was the demands in Andalucia of the small farmers and 
landless for changes in property rights - essentially the breaking up of 
the large estates - which put the 'land problem' on the top of the politi-
cal agenda during Spain's first real experience of democracy - the 
Second Republic of 1931-6. 
As Malefakis has shown, there are major difficulties in measuring 
property distribution in Spain. One method is to use the category lab-
elled patronos agricolas in the 1920 census, which can be taken as a proxy 
for the number of farmers, and from which farm size can be calculated. 
Table 10.2 shows that farms were, with the exception of Extremadura, 
much larger in Andalucia than elsewhere. However, the large number 
of smallholders greatly reduces average farm size. Another source, the 
Cadastre, identifies landowners, and states that there were some 5,320 
owners holding an average of over 725 hectares each and comprising 53 
per cent of the seven latifundio provinces of Andalucia. Although the 
Cadastre gives no indication of land use, it records that 7,872 property 
owners (or 1.8 per cent of the total) produced 53 per cent of the taxable 
income.38 The existence of so many large-scale cereal farming oper-
ations should not have placed the region at a disadvantage relative to 
other world producers. 
Not only did this region avoid the problems associated with extending 
the area of cereals on increasingly marginal soils as in the Interior, it 
also had a more diversified agriculture, with cereals and legumes 
accounting for only 29.3 per cent of output, against 41.0 per cent in the 
Interior. By contrast, the olive was responsible for 23.0 per cent of the 
total in Andalucia, compared with 3.8 per cent in the Interior.39 At the 
turn of the century, output from olive groves was 50 per cent greater 
per hectare than that from land under cereals and, as the former were 
more intensive in their use of labour, farms tended to be smaller.40 
The collapse of the monarchy and formation of the Republic in April 
1931 coincided with considerable unrest in the countryside. In particu-
lar, the failure of the 193011 olive harvest, with the estimated loss of 3.7 
million days' employment in the province of Sevilla alone, provided an 
immediate economic justification for anarchist and socialist groups to 
revive and intensify their traditional claims of direct access to land and 
37 Calculated from Censos de poblaciOn. If Almeria is included, the figure is II per cent. 
See especially Bemal (1985). 
3. Carrion (1975, pp. 70-87). AB Malefakis (1970, p. 403) notes, this actually underesti-
mates the concentration of land and wealth. 
39 See table 2.4 and Simpson (1995a, appendix 2C). 
40 See table 3.2. For labour demand, see below; for farm size, see Simpson (1985a, pp. 
225--9)· 
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better working conditions.41 The newly elected government acted 
quickly, passing legislation which restricted the market for labour, and 
thus indirectly increasing labour's bargaining power and farmers' 
costS.42 The result was that, until the Left's setback in the elections of 
November 1933, 'Spain had probably been the only nation in the world 
in which wages had actually risen during the Depression' .43 
Yet it was the attempts by the Second Republic to introduce a land 
reform that were to be the most controversial. The belief that a land 
reform was needed was not new - most, if not all, political groupings 
initially supported the idea. However, opinion differed on why it was 
necessary, being seen by some as a means of improving economic 
efficiency, by others as a form of income redistribution, benefiting the 
landless and smallholders, and by others as a political manoeuvre to 
remove the influence of the traditional property-owning class from pol-
iticallife.44 Furthermore, there was considerable argument over the form 
that reform should take, especially concerning such problems as the type 
of properties to be expropriated, forms of compensation, speed of 
implementation and the structure of the new ownership (individual or 
collective). However, all the Republic's governments faced, on the one 
hand, the demands by the landless and smallholders for a rapid redistri-
bution of land and, on the other, the inability of the State to provide 
adequate compensation to landowners. As Malefakis notes, govern-
ments had the option of either a slow reform in which owners would 
have been fully compensated - but at the risk of disturbances by the 
peasantry - or a rapid reform in which the legal niceties concerning 
property rights might be overlooked and with the main opposition 
41 EPAPM (22/1/31, no. 1663, p. 47). Significant fluctuations in the size of the olive h.ar-
vest were common, but the harvest in 193011 in Andalucia was unusually small, bemg 
just 8.4 per cent of that for the previous year, and 13.1 per cent of those for the previous 
five years. . 
42 The list of legislation is long and continued throughout the Repubhc, although the 
presence of a right-wing coalition government between November 1933 and February 
1936 implied that laws were not always fully implemented. Of particular importance was 
the law of municipal boundaries (Ley de tbminos municipa!es), which gave preference to 
local over migrant workers, thus increasing their capacity to organise and reducing the 
landowners' ability to refuse employment to militant workers. A labour contract law 
introduced a system of arbitration in which employers, workers and government were 
all represented (and which naturally had a tendency to favour workers' intereslS until 
the end of 1933). The 1919 decree for an eight-hour day and a forty-hour week was 
extended to agricultural workers (Martin, 1990, p. 305). Restrictions on the use of 
cereal harvesting machinery also occurred on occasions, such as in the province of 
Sevi11a in 1931 (EPAPM 30/6/31, no. 1684, pp. 461-3). 
43 Malefakis (1970, p. 329). 
44 Examples can be found in the speeches presented to the Cortes. See, for example, Peces-
Barba (1932). 
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coming from landowners.45 In general, the government was to alienate 
both categories and please no one. 
The economic justification for land reform lies in the possibility of 
increasing labour productivity. Development theory and historical 
experience suggests that small, family-run farms are more efficient at 
maximising output than larger ones using wage labour, as they are more 
likely to provide extra labour for tasks such as ploughing or weeding, 
with less need to organise, motivate and control. 46 The inverse relation-
ship between farm size and labour productivity was fully appreciated by 
contemporaries. According to the calculations of one influential author 
in the mid-nineteenth century, the diseconomies of scale associated with 
the latifundios in Andalucia implied that output declined from 84 pesetas 
a hectare on a farm of 564 hectares to 50 pesetas on one of 4,760 hec-
tares.
47 Likewise, figures provided by Pascual Carrion suggest that a 
significant growth in output would have been obtained with a shift from 
extensive to intensive cereal and olive rotations (table 10.3). Finally, 
given that much of the fixed capital investment in traditional agriculture 
was intensive in labour, it would be more economically rewarding for 
the smaller farmer to undertake projects such as terracing, digging irri-
gation and drainage ditches, and investing in tree crops. These argu-
ments therefore implied that, even iflarge estates attempted to maximise 
profits by using large-scale extensive farming systems, land reform 
would not only increase output, but lead to a significant reduction in 
underemployment and greater income equality. 
In 1929/33, labour productivity in Andalucia was only 59 per cent of 
that achieved in the North, 61 per cent of that in the Mediterranean 
and 70 per cent of that in the Interior.48 A major cause of this low 
productivity was the region's crop mix because extensive crops 
accounted for only 24 per cent of arable output in the Mediterranean, 
36 per cent in the North and 58 per cent in the Interior, but 63 per cent 
in Andalucia.49 As cereals, legumes, olives and livestock provided some 
77 per cent of total agricultural output in 1929/33, and probably even 
45 Malefakis (1970, pp. 393-5). 
46 Family labour tends to be considered on small farms as a fixed cost, implying that the 
family unit would benefit fully from the extra oUput obtained through extra hours 
worked. By contrast, a farmer using wage labour would try to maximi§e net profits 
and, therefore, would not usually employ labour for tasks where its marginal cost was 
greater than the marginal revenue. 
47 Hidalgo Tablada (1864, I, pp. 241--8) in which 1 hectare is calculated to equal 2.66 
aranzadas. The small family farm had its supporters in writers such as Campomanes, 
Caballero, Costa and Carrion. 
48 See table 2.3. The figures here include Almeria. For problems associated with estimat-
ing labour productivity, see chapter 2. 
49 Simpson (1995a, appendix 2C). The figures include all cereals, legumes and olives. 
o 0 
o 0 o ... 
.of tf 
o 0 
o 0 
:91:"--
o 0 
:Q:Q 
m ... 
"'0 \Or--m ... 
o '" o 0-~v 
"! "! 
...... 
... ... 
o 0 
"'''''' 1'1 ... 
o 0 
o '" r--m 
o '" 
"'1'1 1'1 ... 
Markets and institutions, 1880-1936 
more of employment, the implications of a potential land redistribution 
need to be considered in more detail. 50 
As we have seen, by the time of the Second Republic, Spain was 
self-sufficient in wheat, and per capita consumption was falling. Despite 
the fact that a successful land reform might have increased wheat pro-
duction, demand is unlikely to have risen - although domestic bread 
prices probably would have fallen. Even with the major assumption that 
wheat production could have been increased without incurring prohibi-
tive adjusnnent costs in tasks such as maintaining soil fertility, the pro-
vision of working capital to small farmers, or in education, a significant 
fall in wheat prices would have probably been politically unacceptable 
given the situation of farmers in the Interior. A second factor was the 
question of efficiency. It was precisely in the areas of latifundios that 
farm size approached those of the New World. From our knowledge of 
the Interior, a land reform which converted the landless into small cereal 
farmers would neither have been economically efficient, nor would it 
have improved welfare significantly. Finally, the realities of the 1932 
reform were that, of the very little land that was redistributed, farms 
seldom exceeded ten hectares - significantly less even than in Castilla-
Lean or the Upper Ebro.51 
With the olive, any land redistribution might well have led to an 
increase in output, as greater care would have been expected in such tasks 
as weeding and pruning.52 Yet, as noted in chapter 9, there were limits to 
the export market, and although some 18 per cent of domestic olive oil 
production had been exported in the period 1925-9, demand collapsed 
after 1929. Furthermore, within Spain, increasing per capita incomes 
were responsible for only 31 per cent in the larger output during the first 
third of the century, and consumption per capita peaked in 1930.53 
In conclusion, a land reform is unlikely to have increased the competi-
tiveness of farming under conditions of secano, but rather quite the 
50 See table 2.4 and Simpson (1992b). 
51 Matallana, noting Casc6n's study of 1909 (see page 225, note 10), suggested that the 
small fanners of the Interior were poor with 30 hectares, those to be settled under the 
proposed law of 1931 would receive only between 5 and 30 hectares, and little or no 
capital would be made available (EPAPM, no. 1698, 15110/1931, pp. 755-60). The 1932 
law made no mention of minimum size. The figures for land distribution is given in 
Malefakis (1970, pp. 281, 346 and 378). There is no way of knowing how many of the 
receipients were already landowners. 
52 The olive in any case was found on significantly smaller units than with cereal 
production. 
53 Exports accounted for 37 per cent of the growth in output, population growth 32 per 
cent, leaving a further 31 per cent which can probably be attributed to changes in 
incomes (based on 1898/1902 and 1928/32). For per capita consumption between 1926 
and 1956, see Barbancho (1960, p. 299). 
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reverse. Furthermore, although income distribution would have ben-
efited from a redistribution of property in the short term, the real diffi-
culties in raising output per hectare on the secano were likely to lead to 
both falling incomes (as relative prices moved against cereal producers) 
and high consumer prices because of low labour productivity. Castilla-
Lean serves as a model of the limitations facing smallholders under con-
ditions of secano. The only real long-term alternative would have been 
to accompany land reform with irrigation. However, the very high capi-
tal costs associated with settling farmers made this an unrealistic solu-
tion, especially to governments obsessed with the concept of a 'balanced 
budget', such as those of Spain in 1931-6. Lastly, even if the so-called 
'Technical Commission's' solution had been adopted in 1931, which 
suggested that lands should be leased to the landless and smallholders 
whilst remaining legally the property of the latifundistas, it is debatable 
whether this could ever have been more than a temporary solution. 54 
The problem with Andalucia was that the agricultural workforce was 
growing rapidly at a time when demand for basic agricultural commodi-
ties was slowing. With or without reform, the rural exodus of the 1950S 
seems inevitable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that government policy did not contribute to 
overcoming the limitations imposed by a poor resource base. Thus, on 
the one hand, high prices discouraged the movement of resources out 
of agriculture. In this respect Spain was by no means an exception in 
Europe but, as one of Europe's least efficient cereal producers, it 
required the highest level of protection. On the other hand, few policies 
were developed to encourage a dynamic cooperative movement such 
as existed in neighbouring France, despite the many comments on the 
importance of the peasantry as a social group. By concentrating on price 
intervention, all farmers benefited although, as EEC policy has shown, 
it benefits mainly the larger producer and is costly to the consumer. In 
Spain over this period it was the large cereal farmers who enjoyed econ-
omies of scale in production, who influenced price negotiating at a 
national level, and who sold a larger proportion of their crops, who 
benefited the most. 
It would appear, following the argument of Gavin Wright quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, that the slow growth of Spanish agricul-
54 For the Technical Commission, see especially Carri6n (1975, pp. 373-93) and Male-
fakis (1970, pp. 172-85). 
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ture was not the result of poor soil or scarcity of resources, but rather 
'the level of demand, the state of knowledge, and the organization of 
property rights and markets'. On Spain's secano, greater efficiency could 
have been achieved by a faster rural exodus and mechanisation. Yet in 
Spain, as elsewhere, the social cost of emigration was high. Change was 
also against the interests of many large landlords because low pro-
ductivity certainly did not necessarily imply low profitability. Much of 
the land in Castilla-Le6n was worked in small fanns but an important 
area was rented from large landowners. In Andalucia and Extremadura, 
the skewed property distribution, the lack of an effective and legitimate 
channel for political protest, and a low and declining land-labour ratio, 
led to both low levels of disposable income and a delay in mechanis-
ation. Here the smaller farmers and landless labourers eked out a 
meagre existence, putting their hope in anarchism and a redistribution 
of landed property which would solve the problem of low incomes. 
However, given the land-labour ratio, land reform would have been of 
only temporary assistance and could have only briefly delayed the rural 
exodus. 
One final question needs to be considered and that is whether lower 
tariffs would have led to a more efficient allocation of resources and to 
an increased internal demand for industrial products. Certainly bread 
prices would have been lower but, as Fraile has argued, the impact on 
consumer purchasing power would have been small. 55 Lower prices 
would certainly have increased the rural exodus, but the evidence is not 
clear by how much. As we saw in table 10.2, the region most dependent 
on cereals (49 per cent of final output in 1929/33) was Castilla-Le6n, a 
region that saw some 18 cent of agricultural male labour leave between 
1887 and 1930. By contrast in Andalucia, where extensive cereals rep-
resented 27 per cent of output, male labour in agriculture increased 
by 11 per cent. Lower prices would have driven more labour out of 
Castilla-Le6n, but it is not known what levels would have been required 
to reduce the labour force in Andalucia. Furthermore, the release of 
labour from agriculture only increases GDP if alternative employment 
is available. Although we can be reasonably certain that lower farm 
prices would have driven labour even faster into Spanish cities, it is 
much less clear how quickly alternative employment opportunities 
would have been created. Not only does history provide a large number 
of examples of regions with high unemployment and low wages which 
failed to industrialise, it also shows that labour released too fast would 
have simply increased unemployment, reduced urban wages and 
55 Fraile (1993). 
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increased social discontent. 56 Finally, it has been suggested that lower 
tariffs would simply have increased imports, and thereby have had an 
adverse impact on the balance of payments. 57 However, given the low 
opportunity cost of much of the secano this is questionable. A more 
likely scenario is that output would have remained roughly stable, but 
that land rents would have weakened (falling instead of rising) and 
greater mechanisation taken place. In conclusion, although lower cereal 
prices in Spain, as elsewhere, would have reduced the size of the agricul-
tural population, decreased the price of bread and increased farm mech-
anisation, it is questionable whether such a policy would have had a 
significant impact on economic growth. 
56 For the question of cheap labour and industrialisation, see especially Mokyr (1991). 
Alien (1992, ch. 13) argues the case for labour having been released from agriculture 
too fast in England in the eighteenth century. By contrast, Wi1liamson (1994, table 
13.1) shows that cities grew more slowly in Spain during its period of fastest growth 
(1900-10) than in other European countries. 
57 See, for example, Pinilla Navarro (1994). 
Part V 
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traditional agriculture 
11 The modernisation of Spanish agriculture, 
1939-1965 
The slow changes in Spanish agriculture during the first third of the 
twentieth century ground to a halt in the early 1930s. For the next two 
decades agriculture, together with the rest of the economy, declined and 
then stagnated.~ .. c;h;u:lte.t:" •• l,arg:ue,that this, .loQg ,.q~f!~~,,_ in 
agricultural <?!ll£g!_~i;l;;mQt,.he,iull;Y:A~xpt~i»~cl .. Q;y:. eimer . the}936-:9 Civil 
War or gove~~!jplc;.t'lention .. in.. ~romodity market~, ,w,llich disp:>.rted 
inceI1Mes;r§JB~Q~~.;w.d..J;om.W1lPtiQij.. !nstead, otl)er:f~,ct()rsJ .~~~~ 
~spaiii'"Slnternat!0.~~,~s.()I~!i()!t,!!!ld"t?e decline in forei~~!I'B:~e,~hicfi 
in~sfrTcteaffieimports .of fertili~ersand machinery, provide The 
beiC~~~~gQn"'Qf why recovery to,~k longer than in most other 
European countries. Only from the early 1950S was growth renewed, 
ai'io"OY"I96'() agricultural modernisation was once more clearly taking 
pla~e:'----"""""''' ".-~ ... , -, '-'''''-''.''''''''-><''''''''~'' .... , .h" .. <,.,_ ,n., ",_. 
--n!s'''chapter also considers how three major bottlenecks to agricul-
tural growth in the pre-Civil War period were finally overcome. First, 
the process of outmigration was renewed from the early 1950s, leading 
to a rapid rise in rural wages, with the domestic terms of trade 
moving against wheat farmers. For the medium and large wheat 
farmer this did not imply falling incomes, as mechanisation allowed 
costs to be cut. Only by the late 1960s would improved seed technol-
ogies and cultivation methods raise yields. Second, I consider the 
question of livestock farming, a sector where unfavourable natural 
resources (poor pastures and summer droughts) and small farms (in 
the North), had made supply relatively unresponsive to growing 
incomes prior to 1936. This problem was solved by a greater willing-
ness to permit imports to overcome shortages. This period also saw 
~Eapi~_S!Qwth.Qi~~,.m.&l~5.!"p,<?~~try industrieswnere new tec~()!­
ogies.allow~~ intenslvep,r.()dH£YQn. Finally, the attractions of hydro-
electric power encouraged a boom in reservoir construction, which 
produced both an extension in the area irrigated and improvement 
in water supplies. 
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Table 1 I. I. Exports and imports of leading 
agricultural commodities, I926/35 to I95I/6 
1926/35 1940/9 
Oranges +837 +266 
Olive oil +74 +18 
Wine +3,155 +553 
Grapes +45 +5 
Onions +139 +32 
Bananas +132 +20 
Almonds +22 +9 
Potatoes +62 -46 
Rice +43 +7 
Raisins +14 +2 
Wheat 
-93 -387 
1951/6 
+732 
+33 
+903 
+38 
+87 
+114 
+26 
-18 
+49 
+5 
-248 
All figures in thousands of tons, except wine which is in 
thousands of hectolittes. 
+=ExpOrts. 
-=Imports. 
Sources: DirecciOn General de Aduanas (various years). 
A return to traditional agriculture: Spain's retreat in 
the 1940S 
Self-sufficiency in foodstuffs prior to the Civil War had been achieved 
largely on the basis of low standards of consumption. The 1940S and 
early 1950S saw a significant fall in living standards . anda~ 
dret~~. Although m~ 'QY.ll~~r·disruPtedagncultu~i '~~tPut'by"divertiiig· 
resources away from the sector to other users and .d&..aU:Q~.gtJ?ital 
e'll1jpl!!~~k.1'1lr~!~<l~!P-J.s~~~,3. ggod ,4.eal less .thll11: .. Ql;~t suffe;ed 
J>,ymany countries in the Secon"hW.ad Wm:.. However, although the 
magnitude of the physical destruction was not as great, the recovery 
from war in Spain was slower than in most other European countries, 
with GDP per head not regaining the 1929 level until 1954 (1929 being 
the peak year prior to the Civil War). In agriculture, output of most 
commodities shows a similar delay in recovery, leading one agricultural 
historian to write that 'twenty long years were needed to reach levels of 
food consumption which had already been achieved between 1931 and 
1936'.1 
In fact, iof0I1:ll~tion on agri~!tq[al Ol.ltpllU~~y~ry .uorelia.!?!e from the 
- -~ __ , __ n- .-. • - ~-.. ____ ~,_. 
1 See Barcie1a (1986, p. 423 and pp. 383-8) for the impact of the Civil War on Spanish 
agriculture. GDP figures are from Prados de la Escosura (1995). 
The modernisation of Spanish agriculture, 1939-1965 245 
ltbreak of the Civil War to the early 195os. One indicator of change, 
at of foreign trade, shows fliaf1raaitionarexports;'such-as citrus fruit, 
iv~ oil, fresIn;eget~-mct'"Wine;-feHosigtlifi:eantly during· the· 1940S 
lble 11.1). '~~~$>fi<1~-h1:dicmJr "is-the extent of the black market 
iscussed belo~)o;-in«(the·tact·°tliit"ihe 1940S are still rememberea 
day as being 'ye~ of hunger': Ini948~1:heBriti!lhtrade commissioner 
Madrid-nored that:2 
lilst the population has gone on steadily increasing at the rate of one per 
nTp:~:i~~::m.e..1Qtal:Jlgfti:1llmtar::oiiiput.1lar:ranen by'io per cent and cereal 
o'"duction by about 30 per cent.. 
~~_v""'''''''''',''~'-'" ~ . ....-<,;;",;:;;r!. ... " ... , ..... "'~"'O·"'" '. ~ <.?< - ..... - >;"'''''"........, . .....,..,., ,,", 
This l'.~r.~~,was an exaggeration oah;ho\lgh~as I have.saig,the in-
~~cjes.".o£ .. g()Vemmentofficial >statistics make· any·.measurement 
~~.:]'he cause of the fall in production is normally attrib~t:ed to 
TO quite different factors:tliesnontrge Ooniipufs;>especialIYWorlrani-
als and FertiIisers,anagoveffihtt!l1t prlceitltel'\l'e1tticro. 
AJ'be stmnlige- ofinptitii'WaS the result Of the hew regime's attempts 
self-sufficiency, its insistence on maintaining an overvalued peseta, 
Id its unwillingness (or inability) to obtain lines of foreign credit.3 
he result was an acute shortage of foreign exchange, and strict 
IpOrt controls for foodstuffs, fertilisers, raw materials and capital 
>ods. The decline in draught aninlals can be linked to the Civil 
rar, although the droughts of 1940 and 1945 also hindered recovery.4 
rith little foreign currency to purchase machinery, the 4,000 or so 
actors that had existed on the eve of the Civil War had either been 
~stroyed in the fighting, or were worn out by the late 1940s.5 The 
~cline . in oi!!~~el!.,~l!~~p~rpho~p.llaJ~ fet:t~~isers consumption during 
le 1 9~1~~~\!as _~!~() the X~~Ett of.iOlP()rt J~s1!ic~~ns (table 11.2).6 Only 
ith the gradual liberalisation of foreign trade 'from 1951 were the 
lortages overcome. 
The response of farmers to the fertiliser shortages was mixed, and 
Ilked closely to product markets. In the case of oranges - a major 
Ireign exchange earner and also a very heavy consumer of fertilisers -
lltput fell by 30 per cent between 1926/35 and 1940/9. According to 
United Kingdom Overseas European Survey (hereafter OES): Spain (1949, p. 21). 
Historians have long debated whether the country's disastrous attempts at se1f-
sufficiency were simply the result of circumstances or the goal of the new Franco 
regime. For a brief introduction to recent works of this period, see Harrison (1993)· 
Contemporaries argued that the conflict caused a shortage of some 300,000 mules, 
leading to an increase in the use of cattle as work animals (Naredo, 1989, pp. 53 and 
56). 
OES (1949, p. 23)· 
Spain was able to maintain exports of potash, even during this period. See Castro (1957, 
pp. 52-3). 
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Table 11.2. Consumption of mineral fertilisers,a I908-
I960 
Nitrogen Potash Phosphorus 
1908 14 5 54 
1930/5 71 25 166 
1945 11 31 86 
1952 117 45 188 
1960 243 69 287 
a In thousands of tons and at 100% concentrated equivalents. 
Source: Gallego (1986, p. 224). 
government statistics, the area actually grew by 7 per cent during the 
same period, suggesting that fertiliser shortages affected yields and no' 
the area cultivated. However, an American citrus fruit specialist ha! 
argued that there had been a significant decline in the area cultivated 
especially after the frost of 1946. This fall, he claimed, was n01 
recognised in the official statistics as farmers failed to notify th~ 
authorities when they took the land out of cultivation, in order to proteC1 
their fertiliser quotas, which were distributed according to the are~ 
officially registered as citrus fruit. 7 As late as 1949 orange producers still 
faced fertiliser restrictions, leaving them no option but to supplemenl 
government rations by purchasing on the black market.8 Even so, givel1 
the increased supply of oranges for domestic consumption at this time, 
fertiliser shortages seem unlikely to have been responsible for the decline 
in exports shown in table I I. I. Instead, the cause appears to have beel1 
the postwar interruptions to international trade, especially in the 
French and German markets, which could not be offset by the favour-
able exchange rates that producers received from the Spanish 
government. 9 
Official wheat statistics show that the area sown fell by 15 per cent, 
and production by 23 per cent between 1926/35 and 1939/52. It is often 
argued by historians that low official prices for wheat encouraged far-
mers to switch into other crops where prices were not fixed, or to declare 
smaller harvests than they actually collected, with the difference being 
7 United States Department of Agriculture (hereafter USDA) (1950, pp. I and 12). 
8 Ibid. (p. 4). 
• In October 1949 the exchange rate varied between 13.14 pesetas to the dollar for the 
export of iron ore (an export which the Spanish government did not want to encourage), 
to 26·3 pesetas for goods such as books and leather. For oranges the rate was between 
16·5 and 17·5 pesetas. Because of multiple exchange rates, 'the "cost of production" 
of a commodity has little influence on its competitiveness in international trade' 
(USDA, 1950, p. 64). 
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sold on the black market. 10 However, as prices were much higher on the 
black market than the official one, considerable fortunes were made 
dUrlilg'iliese~years:especi~l1YJ)ythe medium and larger .farmerS? \V~o 
iiaaa~siirplus" losell, and who had the social connectIons to avoId 
prosecution. lI If estimates for prices and quantities sold on the black 
market are taken into account, as figure 11.1 shows, returns per hectare 
in the 1940S were actually extremely high. Given the existence of the 
black market, it appears to have been shortages in fertilisers and draught 
animals that led to stagnant output in the face of rising demand, rather 
than just low official prices set by government intervention. When price 
restrictions began to be lifted during the early 1950S, and greater sup-
plies of imported fertilisers and machinery became available, many ~ar­
mers were shown to have accumulated significant cash reserves whIch 
could be invested. 12 
For cereals it seems to have been the lack of inputs, especially ferti-
lisers, rather than government price policies, which led to the shortfall 
in agricultural output during the 1940s. However, as Amartya Sen has 
argued, hunger is as much about food entitlement as it is about food 
production. 13 This is suggested by real wages which by 1950 ~ad fallen 
to perhaps half their pre-Civil War level (another factor boosttng profits 
of those farmers who could sell on the black market), and which forced 
wage earners to take extra employment and work longer hours. Accord-
ing to one source: 14 
... it is estimated that the wages in the towns amount in terms of real values to 
less than 50 per cent of the pre-Civil War level. Family earnin~, h?wev~r, have 
not fallen in the same proportion as most workmen take extra Jobs m their spare 
time and members of the family who did not work before now do in a wide 
variety of ways, often on a casual basis, in order to eke out the basic earnings. 
The combination of higher bread prices and falling real wages resulted 
in many consumers taking measures to reduce uncertainty in food sup-
plies. The much reported 'return to the land' led to the numbers 
10 Barciela (1986 pp. 390-8) and Garcia Gonzalez and Barciela (1983). 
11 The smaller f~ers had greater problems, although Pin-Rivers, in his c~assic book ~n 
the village of Grazalema in the Sierra de Cadi2 in 1954, note~ that, 'smce the pnce 
paid by the government for the grain collected bears no relanon to the real pnce, a 
farmer who made an honest declaration every year would soon be bankrupt' (1971, p. 
20). For the importance of the black market for larger farmers, see Naredo (1981). 
12 For the growth of farm savings, see OES (1949, p. 23). A later report suggested that 
the 'extremely low level offertiliser consumption over the 'past .fifteen year:' has p~bably 
contributed more than any other single factor to the detenoranon of Spanish agnculture 
since 1936' (OES, 1952, p. 27). 
13 Sen (1981). . .,. , .gh 
14 OES (1949, pp. 120-1). Another important factor mfl~encmg enndement n t 'Yas 
the double figure inflation during the 1940s. For a bnef survey of real wages durmg 
this period, see Carreras (1989b, pp. 11-5). 
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production, 1940/2 to 1970/2 (three-year averages and constant prices 
used; the wheat price reflects the size of the black market) 
Source: Garcia Gonzalez and Barcie1a L6pez (1983, cuadro 3). 
employed in agriculture increasing by 22 per cent between 1935 and 
1945, with the primary sector's share of the total active population 
increasing from 44.6 to 50.3 per cent. 15 This increase represented a 
change in attitudes towards the market, leading to an increase in self-
sufficiency. Of the highly commercial orange groves of Valencia, one 
report of 1950 states: 16 
In rural Spain one has the impression that this is not basically a money econ-
omy, but rather the large portion of the real earnings of the people is obtained 
from home-grown produce. It is this factor which stabilises what would other-
wise be an impossible situation, considering the wage rates and prices of 
food. 
The impact of diminished food supplies and falling real wages led to 
a decline in both food consumption and welfare. For the period 1953/ 
6, when the situation was much improved on earlier years, Barbancho 
estimated a daily per capita consumption of 2,250 calories, similar to my 
estimate for 1900.17 Yet it would be wrong to believe that consumption 
15 Alcaide (cited in Carreras, 1989b, p. 29). Urban growth declined slowly from an annual 
growth rate. of 2.25 per cent between 1920 and 1930, to 2.2 per cent in the 1930S, and 
2 per cent m the 1940S and 1950S. Figures refer to provincial capitals. 
16 USDA (1950, p. 79). 
17 Barbancho (1960) and Simpson (1989a). 
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patterns did not change. Barbancho himself noted that the high cost of 
animal fats after the Civil War encouraged the consumption of olive oil 
in some provinces, where previously it had hardly been consumed. 18 
Likewise, given the absence of export markets, orange producers had 
to take the domestic market more seriously, and consumption rose from 
an annual average of 11.6 kilograms to 22.8 kilograms per person 
between 1926/30 and 1941/5.19 
Jbe 1940S was an interesting, if sad period of Spanish agriculture. 
The strong demand forlrasicfOoas ana"'aos€iice,§rstocks produced 
pr~eritY"for those farmers that were able to, sell Imappreciable part 
of thelr-pr9duCe~'-on~die::6I~u::k markf:t.F9r those that could not, it 
resulted in an increase in self-sufficiency and low levels of consumption. 
The renewal in agricultural growth and the transformation of tra-
ditional agriculture oeganonce'moreifi'tne-e·ii'ly i§50s.--rwo· pomts 
Sl'ro't:rttTirc;made"nere"which"wil1"@e' ~Ihirilied -in mort detail in the 
remainder of this chapter. First, if the key to economic development 
was to raise la~~oductivnym~cultU~~s ~,teedWasadirevea: 
Between 1949/51 and 1959/61 it rose by an annuaC3.8"per-ceiif;'ana 
from 1959/61 to 1969/71 annual growth reached 6.6. per cent.20 ,.Ih!S 
~~~ caused .E~a~y_E.r in~!:~1!!!~4...me~nis!!!i<?!!J?!.~~~!!~!..!,lI:~~" 
in response to rising real wages caused by the gradual, but sustamed, -, 
decline in the agricultural population (see below) ._.~J;~Qnd. the stl::!!.C~e 
?.( ~J(an!~_~~9!1tl,lll:,~b.~!l,g.~.~U!~m~~~.~~Jn~tc:~Ll?li!P~BI~., !:?y_,~e 
extensive cro.p.~ .. QLth~,sec,g1l,g (short fallow cereals, legumes, vmes and 
oll'Ves)'to o~e wl}~€!more {nt~n&i'le..prQgp.£!i9jL§y.~!.~~~ ~~J.iy'~~!~ck 
pla¥~d, ~. aomiOant role ..... Whereas in 1929/33 cereals, vines and olives 
still a'ccowlieii"for'nalfof final output (i.e. total output net of seed corn 
and animal feed), this had fallen to just a quarter by 1965.21 This, as 
we will see, was caused by the development of intensive livestock farm-
ing and the extension of (and improvements to) irrigation. 
The rural exodus 
The total number of male workers in agriculture fell from 5.35 million 
m-' 1956-'(4 7.6 per~centoft1r~-'active'lab6titroYc-e) 'to 4:70 rnillion'Tf6;6 
percent) 'by 1960. A decade later the figures stooaatoruyB :t:9'oInimon 
(22. 8 pe;ceii'tf"TIifee~~hatfIeft~fOi·tIie:~o~~~s: -nrl?t<:'fJ:Y"frans':. 
18 Barbancho (1960, p. 92). 
19 Ibid, (p. 291) and Ros6n Perez (1948, p. 121). 
20 See table 1.5. 
21 Simpson (1995a, appendix I) and AEA, (ana 1980, p. 610), 
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forming cities. or f~r_J??~«7!!!~gE,!~£c:'.~jac;tl!~!!illLw,~~ms~~~~~ 
The cause of this rural exodus is complex but four broad explanations 
~"b~"p~t forward. First, th~estru~tjQn oLthe.-ana£elmt·~t 
~d. thej~11'la~ro.~' .. 1lIl)1;>itioll_of.bec.omip.,g .. P!()E~I"!Y....2~~1~.m.,m.er the 
defeat of the .~~P'y,plica.ngO¥emmellt.m.1939·clwJ.ged.anitudea.towards 
i:h~'i~~d:' ~~~e£jl!IJYmthe areas.oHatifundios. According to Barciela, of the -6.3miilion hectares of land that had been occupied during the 
Republic and the Civil War, some 5.8 million were simply reoccupied 
by their previous owners without any legal controls. 23 
Second, there was a trend towards direct cultivation by landowners, 
especially after the passing of legislation in 1942 which provided signifi-
cant protection to tenants, and thereby discouraged leasing arrange-
ments. As a result, in Andalucia on the eve of the Civil War, some 70 
or 80 per cent of the land was leased; by 1950, 65 per cent was cultivated 
directly.24 The possibility for landless labourers to progress up the farm 
ladder by way of rental agreements was thus now seriously weakened 
and, according to Naredo, it was wage labourers rather than property 
owners who made up a large share of the migrants of the 1950s.25 With 
their hopes of access to land destroyed by the events of the Civil War 
and the move to direct farming, a third factor was the serious erosion 
Df rural real wages during the 1940s, which meant that labour was more 
willing to consider the alternatives that arose in the 1950s .. Finall¥~ lls, 
most Spanish. emigration-WltS'temporary, even fromthe'·late ninete~nth,. 
;:entury, .theincr~!l~mg.d.~.malldsr.fQr~~4JabotU:".in.ll.Q~.t;UEurope 
tfecamctii"more attractive: option,thanLatiP- Atnerica.26 
'The nature of off-farm migration can be seen in table 11.3. After the 
:tgriculturallabour force had declined in all four regions between 1910 
md 1930, it then increased significantly over the next two decades so 
:hat, taking the period 1910 and 1950 as a whole, the agricultural labour 
:orce actually increased in three out of the four regions. As a result, 
mrplus labour in agriculture in the mid-1950S was estimated to be 'as 
1igh as two million people' .27 This renewal of surplus labour in the 
lector appears to have been both a cause and a symptom of the low 
)roductivity in the Spanish economy at this time. By contrast, the period 
2 Employment figures from Nicolau (1989, pp. 78--9). Figures for the rural exodus are 
from Leal et al. (1975), which also includes an excellent section on the difficulties in 
interpreting the statistics of these years. 
3 Barciela (1986, pp. 400-1). 
4 Naredo (1977, p. 36) and Garcia de Oteyza (1952), both cited in Barciela (1986, p. 
406). 
5 Naredo (1977, p. 112). 
6 Baines (1994, p. 533). 
7 OES (1957, p. 10). 
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ble 11.3. The rural exodus, 191(}-1970 
No. of male fann labourers (% change) 
1910-30 1910-50 1950-70 1910-70 
rth -27 +7 -40 36 
diterranean -28 -13 -49 -56 
:rior -21 +2 -50 -49 
ialucia -3 +20 -43 -31 
tin -20 +4 -46 -44 
~rces; Population censuses. 
50-70 saw a strong outmigration in all areas, ranging from 40 per 
1t in the North to 50 per cent in the Interior. 
A solution to low-yield wheat farming 
we saw in chapter 5, a major characteristic of traditional Spanish 
leat farming prior to the 1960s was the virtual stagnation o~ crop 
:lds making changes in output highly correlated to changes m the 
:a ;own. This remained true even from around the time of the First 
orld War when the extension of the area cultivated became increas-~ly depe~dent on the availability of fertilisers an~ improved tillage 
uipment. A sudden shortage in the supply of these mputs, as occurred 
er the Civil War, led to a rapid fall in the area cultivated and a return 
a situation similar to that which existed in the decade prior to the 
rst World War (table 11.4)·28 
Before the use of hybrid wheat varieties there were physical restric-
~ns to the extent that yields could be increased using dry-farming 
:thods. A study of the North Meseta in the Interior in 1965 illustrated 
at using existing seed varieties, work practices and cost-price trend~, 
minishing returns quickly set in when only modest amounts of fertl-
ers were applied.29 This technological barrier to increasing yields 
uld not be solved by the farmer alone, but rather required state inter-
ntion, either in developing new varieties for local conditions, or 
For mineral ferti1iser usage, see table 11.2. 
By 1965 at least two-thirds of the area under wheat received both nitrogen and phos-
phate mineral fertilisers. Of 30 fanners studied in the North Meseta, all of whom used 
32 kglha of nitrogen and 33 kg/ha of phosphate, 'n~ correlation could be fo~d b~rn:een 
increased yield and increased fertilizer rates exceeding 30 kglha ofphosp~ate (SlndlCato 
Nacional de /os Cereaies, 1965, cited in International Bank for Reconstrllcnon and Devel-
opment and Food and Agriculture Organization (hereafter IBRDIFAO), 1966, p. 145)· 
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Table 11.4. Changes in wheat area and yields, various periods, 1905 to 
1980 
Area sown" 
('000 ha) 
1905/14 3,805 
1939/50 3,828 
1926/35 4,610 
1951/60 4,300 
1961/70 4,069 
1971/80 2,970 
"Includes both secano and irrigated areas. 
Sources: AEPA and AEA (various years). 
Production Yields 
('000 tons) (tons per ha) 
3,330 0.88 
3,238 0.85 
4,128 0·90 
4,180 0·97 
4,637 1.14 
4,624 1.56 
through a change in policy which encouraged resources to move out of 
wheat production altogether. As table 1I.4 shows, it was only in the 
1970S that the traditional wheat production systems based on extending 
the area cultivated to meet increasing demand can be said to have finally 
~d~ It~i '~:i~~~~~:m1!r~hii~~;~!~~~~~ia;~2~e~;~~ t:lire-e:.nittiS'.Tcr- ". ","""" .' "," ,." ' ..•. , ",," ,"J.-'" ~,~,.'".',.,,, >~" 
'-AIi:~the~~~onsideration must be the reduction in the area of unsown 
fallow and a shortening of rotations. Progress was slow and was achieved 
in the post-Civil War period (through'-betterrertilising-'afidMtrnprovee~ 
tlnagernachitH:ry> ()nly on th~ b~tt;;soil~~ ;uch as the campzfia'in An(fal-
uCla:"Onemajor constraint on wider cultivation of the fallow was the 
difficulty of introducing mechanisation with traditional legumes. This 
was eventually overcome with the introduction of new crops which 
could withstand mechanised cultivation techniques, especially sun-
flowers, whose area of cultivation increased from just 11,000 hectares 
in 1965 to 792,000 hectares a decade later. Even so, non-irrigated cereal 
land in Spain today still remains unsown between a half arid a third of 
the time. In conclusion, the speed of mechanisation in reducing labour 
inputs, rather than increasing yields, was still by far the most significant 
factor in improving labour productivity in cereals even in 1965. 
As already noted, between about 1936 and 1950 a combination of 
foreign exchange shortages and falling real wages meant that the 
30 As the combined area sown of wheat and barley changed little, it seems to be improved 
wheat strains, rather than the abandoning of marginal land, that was the cause of the 
better yields from the mid-1960s. 
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country's stock of farm machinery remained (at best) stagnant. How-
~er, fr2~,_!!>-,e.~~!L!2.?0s, .~_~,~~~~~~~l,~~the ~!al ~xoduswas 
accompanied by nsmg realWages, wnlch m turn reduced the threshold 
atWli'iai1ii't)Our-savrng"machmery became financially viable. On the 
supply side, considerable technical advances had occurred over the pre-
vious two decades. For example, the tractors of 1950 now came 
equipped with rubber tyres, electric starters and lighting systems; they 
were diesel-powered, had a hydraulic lift and 'live' power connections 
to other equipment, making them more energy efficient and consider-
ably more reliable and versatile than the pre-Civil War models.31 The 
cost of this technology had fallen in real terms by the 1950s, even thOUgh 
tb;eigll uumtiTactiitl!!l'S ploduced"nIaehirres'in Spain wtrteti were sold at 
25 to 30 per cent more than elsewhere as late as 1966.32 
Table 11.5 shows the impact of growing unit wage costs between 1953 
and 1967, and the potential for savings through mechanisation for differ-
ent crops, at three distinct levels of technology. Level 3 represents the 
most advanced technology, which in the case of winter cereals (all small-
grain cereals except rice), includes a 90 h.p. tractor and self-propelled 
combine harvester. Level I refers to traditional methods while level 2 
refers to intermediate technology (a 50 h.p. tractor, reaper-binder and 
threshing machine). Reducing labour costs through mechanisation 
proved simplest with small grains, given the ease in mech~ising the 
harvest and threshing processes. At the extreme, a worker usmg a self-
propelled combine harvester processed the production of a hectare in 3 
or 3.5 hours, compared with 100 or 130 hours using traditional 
methods.33 By contrast, the harvesting of olives and grapes could not 
be mechanised, and only small tractors were able to be used amongst 
the plants. As a result, rising wages led farmers to reduce labour inputs, 
even though yields would be adversely affected.34 
Given the large p()~~n!i_al. ~a.vings tlu:ough mechanisation,the number 
0£l.I!£l9nJ9~~':J~~Qlll,.l~~Q-~05()8oo b~12?0 ~d I96?, and 
reached 130,!29"W.1964.,.m,terms of horsepower per hectare cultivated, 
me'increase-was even faster, growing from 1.9 to 9.9 h.p. between 1950 
31 Gray (1975, vol. 2, pp. 52-7) and Naredo (1989, p. 55)· 
32 IBRDIFAO (1966, p. 150). This was still below the mark-up price on imported tractors, 
'which in the case of British and Italian models averaged over 60 percent'. In 1963 not 
only were import quotas in place, but duties amounted to 40 per cent of factory cost 
(ibid., pp. 147 and 150). 
33 Naredo (1977, pp. 42-3). 
3. Martinez Alier (1971, ch. 2) and Naredo (1977, p. 44). For earlier periods of reducing 
labour inputs to cut costs during times of low prices, see Zambrana (1987, p. 61) and 
Simpson (1985a, p, 250). 
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Table 11.5. Changing labour costs per hectarff' with mechanisation, I953 
and I967 
Level of Increase Index base Cropb mechanisation' 1953 1967 1953--67 (level 3=IOO)d 
Small grains I 654 3,277 2,623 716 
2 168 910 742 202 
3 82 448 366 100 
Fallow I 130 625 495 516 
2 37 203 166 173 
3 21 II7 96 100 
Olives 904 4,912 4,008 133 
2 637 3,659 3,022 101 
3 633 3,641 3,008 100 
Vines I 718 4,083 3,365 133 
2 485 3,004 2,519 100 
Legumes I 498 2,617 2,II9 148 
2 322 1,817 1,495 100 
Potatoes I 1,762 9,058 7,296 132 
2 1,312 7,274 5,962 108 
3 1,203 6,742 5,539 100 
Oranges I 1,919 9,941 8,022 200 
2 1,263 6,992 4,019 100 
Almonds I 783 4,346 3,563 II4 
2 671 3,805 3,134 100 
• Measured in nominal prices. 
b All crops secano, except oranges which were irrigated. 
: Level I = traditional technology; level 2 = intennediate; level 3 = most advanced. 
Level 2 for vines, legumes, oranges and almonds. 
Source: Naredo (1977, cuadro 5). 
and 1960, and reaching 25.4 h.p. by 1964. Finally, whereas there existed 
one ~actor for every 406 agricultural workers in 1950, this had risen to 
one m 85 in 1960, and to one in 35 by 1964.35 
This potential for labour-saving in small-grain cultivation allowed the 
medium and large farmers to maintain, or even increase profits, even 
though the terms of trade were moving slowly against wheat. Naredo 
has estimated that farmers using advanced cereal technologies (i.e. level 
3) faced an increase in costs between 1953 and 1967 of 1,764 pesetas a 
35 In tenns of horsepower per worker, the increase was 0.01, 0.4, and 1.3 respectively. 
Horsepower refers to tractors and motocultivators only. Labour includes male and 
female (AEA, ano 1980). 
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lectare, which was more than offset by a rise in income of 2,393 pesetas, 
leaving a modest growth in profits of 629 pesetas in 1967. Level 2 saw 
:osts increase by 2,171 pesetas per hectare, producing a minimal growth 
in profits of 222 pesetas. Finally, if the farmer failed to change tra-
fitional methods, operating costs would have increased by 4,225 pesetas 
per hectare, leaving the farmer with a deficit of 1,832 pesetas in 1967.36 
The scope for cost reduction through technolo~cal change occurred 
at a-i:lme wh~~[Erice~~rwli'eat' reil' by'about40 percent between 
1953 and 1967. When th'e'sllgntl)1'Oetter"Yieldsana'tne'oigIiefpnces 
paiOo1i"1'h~ market are taken into account, wheat output in real 
terms fell from 722 pesetas per hectare in 1952/4 to 597 pesetas per 
hectare in 1966/8 (figure 11.1).37 In conclusion, while consumers saw a 
fall in real bread prices, the growmglaooUrshortages'andhigherwages 
ih the countrisiae" 'were-TorcmifUie" larger producers to"'mechanise, 
Wliiariii1Ufi1'allowed'ilieni'to'protect'their profits. Givelftlie potential 
for-meCIianiSation~'tlie' 'm~dium'an(rlarger cereal farmers would be 
much more willing to accept a decline in agriculture'S terms of trade, 
than they had been in the 192os. 
Despite these potential savings on labour, for every farm worker with 
a tractor, there were 34 without one in the mid-1960s. Most cereal far-
mers did not mechanise because of the small size and fragmented nature 
of their farms, although some would enter into co-ownership of machin-
ery, or use contractors. For cereal farmers working units of 10 to 30 
hectares, the increase in wage costs would not affect them directly, as 
approximately 80 per cent of their labour was provided by the family, 
involving no cash outgoings. Therefore, although these farmers often 
could not mechanise profitably, the increase in real wages only mini-
mally affected profitability. Of greater concern for these farmers were 
commodity prices and the fall in real wheat prices which implied a sharp 
fall in real incomes, By 1960, the emigration of farmers, as opposed to 
wage labourers, becomes noticeable.38 
After the Civil War the government introduced a number of measures 
to help the smaller family farmer, the most important being the 1952 
law that provided the legal framework for consolidation of fragmented 
holdings (Ley Experimental de Concentraciim Parcelaria). In the subregion 
of Castilla-Le6n, various studies suggest that by the 1950S it was land 
36 Nominal prices are used and average yields are for the whole 1953--67 period. The 
increase in labour costs is as shown in table 11.5, and the growth in non-labour costs 
was 1,398 pesetas (level 3), 1,429 pesetas (level 2) and 1,602 pesetas (level I) (Naredo, 
1977, cuadro 7). 
37 Garcia GonzaIez and Barciela LOpez (1983, cuadro 3). 
38 Naredo (1977, p. II2). 
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fragmentation, rather than the small size offarmers' landholdings, which 
was the major retarding factor to mechanisation. Thus, in a study of 
some 150,000 hectares in the Duero valley (provinces of Salamanca, 
Soria and Valladolid), the average operating farm was 34.5 hectares, 
although almost two-thirds of land was in farms of over 60 hectares. 
However, average field size before consolidation was just 0.6 hectares.39 
In 1966 it was estimated that the minimum area required for a 40 h.p. 
tractor to be profitable in Spain was 45 hectares, but in fact there was 
only one tractor for every 188 hectares in the Northern Meseta (which 
includes this part of the Duero valley).40 Overcoming fragmentation was 
a slow process at first, with little more than half a million hectares having 
been consolidated by 1962, leaving Spain with a much higher level of 
fragmentation than most other countries in Europe (table 11.6). How-
ever, over the next two decades the area consolidated reached 5.5 
million hectares.41 By 1984, some 59 per cent of Castilla-Le6n's land 
had been consolidated, and the region accounted for 61 per cent of 
Spain's total consolidation, partly because of its traditionally highly frag-
mented holdings, and partly because of the homogeneity of the land.42 
Finally, the threat of land reform did not disappear entirely with Fran-
co's victory, and the Institute Nacional de ColonizaciOn appears to have 
enjoyed more success than the 221,000 hectares expropriated between 
1939 and 1964 would suggest. As de Janvry has reminded us, the simple 
existence of the legal machinery for land expropriation can, in some 
circumstances, be enough in itself to change production systems.43 
The intensification of livestock husbandry 
Following Engel's Law, rising real wages (together with the decline in 
the relative price of wheat) led to both a switch in budgetary spending 
away from food as a category, and within the food category, towards 
those products with a higher elasticity of demand, such as meat. 
l3.e1W~!lJ9SS.,.and.~.I.a§,s,.~~!.I?.~!:.,.£!p.ita incomes increased by 41 per 
~ real wages (agricultural) by 92 'p'~T~cenf,-'and'~bYtlie""iiiid-i9'OoS 
39 After consolidation average field size rose to 4.6 hectares (Garcia de Oteyza, 1963, pp. 
25-34)· 
40 IBRDIFAO (1966, pp. 140 and 142). For Spain, the average was one tractor per 145 
hectares of arable. 
41 Alario Trigueros (1991, pp. 84 and 100). 
42 Ibid. (1991, cuadro 4) and Sevilla Guzman (1979, cited in Alario Trigueros, 1991, p. 
94). See also Behar (1991, pp. 293-300), who argues that the process of consolidation 
represented the final success of the individual over the village community in this region. 
43 OECD (1969, p. 272) and de JanVty (1981, p. 232). In this case, changes on the latifun-
dies were encouraged by the favourable conditions for large-scale agriculture from 1939 
to the mid-1960s. 
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Table 11.6. Fragmentation of agricultural land, c. I960a 
% of holdings 
Average number with over 10 
of plots per farm plots 
Spain 14 33' 
Germany 10 31 
Greece 7 37' 
Turkey 7 16 
Porrugal 6 14 
Belgium 5 14 
Italy 4 6 
Holland 3 6 
Ireland 2 0 
a The FAO world census includes 38 countries giving an average of 
4.3 plots per farm with 9% of holdings having over 10 plots. None 
of the countries surveyed approached Spain in terms of the level of 
fragmentation. 
• Ten plots or more. 
Sources: OECD (1969, p. 18) and FAO (1960, v, p. II3)· 
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demand was boosted further by some 15 million foreign touristS.44 The 
first household budget study of 1958 suggests that food consumption 
accounted for as much as 53.4 per cent of expenditure, a figure that 
had fallen to 44.4 per cent just ten years later. Within the food budget, 
cereals fell from 18.5 per cent to 13.8 per cent of the total; by contrast, 
meat increased from 17.6 per cent to 26.3 per cent. Although meat 
prices increased faster than the general price index, consumption per 
capita increased by 72 per cent in the seven years between 1957/9 and 
1963/5, eggs increased by 90 per cent, milk by a more modest 3 per 
cent, whilst the consumption of cereals fell by I I per cent.45 This growth 
in demand for livestock produce was met in three ways: through 
increased supplies of feed for animals, improved livestock productivity, 
and by recourse to imports. I shall look at each briefly in turn. 
As early as 1926, the distinguished economist Flores de Lemus had 
observed a tendency in Spanish cereal farming for the output of animal 
feed to grow faster than that of bread grains, a situation which he 
believed would have to continue if the problem of domestic saturation 
44 Per capita income (Banco de Bilbao estimates in 1970 prices) and farm wages ru:e found 
in both Carreras (1989, p. 562) and Maluquer de Motes (1989, p. 523). Tounsm had 
doubled to over 30 million by 1972 (Harrison, 1985, p. 155)· 
'5 AEA ano I980, (pp. 652-3) and Barciela (1989, p. 159)· 
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No figures are available for the period 1936-9 
Sources: GEHR (1981) and Barciela (1989) 
of wheat markets in that period was to be solved. Figure 1I.2 shows the 
domestic s~pply (national production plus imports minus exports) of 
the five major cereals - wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats. By taking 
only wheat and rye as bread grains, I am exaggerating the importance 
~f feed grains during the early twentieth century, as maize remained an 
Important bread grain in parts of the North. The figure shows that the 
supply of feed increased more quickly than bread grains from about the 
First World War to the Civil War, the trend was then reversed until the 
late 1950S when it grew quickly once more. By the 1960s, other animal 
~eeds ~ot shown in the figure, such as oil seeds, were becoming increas-
mgl! . lmp.ortant, with the area under sunflowers growing rapidly. In 
addlt1~n~ Imports of soya grew from virtually nothing in the early 1960s, 
to 1 ~lllhon tons by the end of the decade. By the mid-1960s, the animal 
feed mdustry was becoming firmly established in Spain. 
Increasing ~e supply of feed was essential to meet the growing 
demand fo~ hvestock products, but in itself was not enough. With 
ce~eal~, falling demand and rising labour costs could be offset by mech-
a~ISatlOn; but the situation facing livestock and dairy producers was very 
different. The potential gains from introducing new breeds or feeding 
methods carried far greater risks for the fanner. This was because whilst 
l~bour saving technologies allowed farmers to cut production costs 
dIrectly - and were therefore easier to measure - meat producers had 
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to recover their investment at some future date in potentially unstable 
markets.46 In many countries, the role of government was essential in 
carrying out research for livestock breeders, but in Spain the sector 
received less support than other areas of agriculture, even in 1965.47 
By the 1960s a number of important production changes were appar-
ent. In the mid-1950s the first hybrid chickens were introduced into 
Spain and the poultry industry started an unprecedented increase in 
output and productivity. Production was located close to urban areas 
and feed was bought off-farm. In Spain, poultry production increased 
from 12,688 tons in 1960 to some 500,000 tons in 1970, and domestic 
consumption soared accordingly (table 11.7). 
In the case of pigs, it was not until 1963 that domestic production 
reached the 1929 figure, but improved breeding and feeding systems 
allowed much younger animals to be slaughtered, saving the fanner on 
feed. As a rough measure of productivity, I have divided total carcase 
weight produced each year by the total number of sows kept for breed-
ing.48 This exercise gives a figure of 195 kilograms per breeding sow in 
1935, which had risen to 215 kilograms by 1965, before doubling over 
the next five years. This productivity growth was also reflected in the age 
of the animals. Those over a year old that had been kept for fattening fell 
from almost half the national herd in 1929, to 26 per cent in 1965, whilst 
a decade later the figure stood at three per cent. 
In both poultry and pig production three factors appear relevant to 
explain the rapid growth in output: first, the introduction of high yield-
ing breeds and better knowledge concerning optimum conditions for 
fattening; second, the use of imported feedstuffs (which helped offset 
Spain's poor resource base); and third, growing vertical integration and 
economies of scale which allowed improvements in production technol-
ogies to be passed onto the consumer in the form of lower prices~Th!:, , 
~<?}.<; of fo~i~ s<lWit&JID.d.J~£h!l()12gy:~~~!:<:"S!:,!,S~I!~ .~ •. ~~_£h@~~~ 
As table 1I.7 shows, growth was significant, although more modest, 
in the production of beef and dairy products. Carcase weights and milk 
yields were improved through the import of selected breeding stock and 
46 Guaranteed prices for meat were only introduced in 1964 (OECD, 1969, p. 263). 
47 'At the moment, government technical effott continues strong in such traditional crops 
as wheat, vines and olives, but is relatively weak in key sectors such as livestock, pasture 
and fodder production, and honiculture' (lBRDIFAO, 1966, p. 42). See also Buxade 
Carbo (1982, p. 86). 
4. AEA (aiio 1975, pp. 409 and 423). Unlike San Juan (1986, p. 327), I include a figure 
for young animals that have been reserved for breeding. Where no figures are given for 
animals between two months and one years, I assume it to be 1.8 times the figute for 
animals over 12 months. No figute has been included for animals younger than two 
months. 
4. San Juan (1986). 
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Table 1 1.7. Meat and dairy production and fann-gate prices, I95Q-I970 
A. Domestic production per capitaa 
Beef Mutton" Pork 
1950 3-3 0·7 5·1 
1955 4·8 0·7 6·4 
1960 5·3 0·7 8·5 
1965 5·7 0·7 8·3 
1970 9.2 0·7 14.6 
B. Fann-gate prices (1965=100) 
Beef Lamb Pork 
1950 24 24 36 
1955 34 38 45 
1960 53 53 58 
1965 100 100 100 
1970 99 99 91 
a Meat in carcase weight and measured in kilograms. 
" Mutton also includes goat. 
'Eggs are measured in dozens. 
Poultry Eggs' Milk" 
0·3 7·4 51.9 
0·4 8.2 59·3 
0·4 9·9 60.1 
7·4 15·2 60·3 
14.8 20.2 74·9 
Poultry Eggs Milk 
n.d. n.d. 37 
n.d. 61 46 
n.d. 80 76 
100 100 100 
87 91 115 
d Milk is measured in litres and refers to liquid milk for consumption. That destined 
for industrial use is not included. 
Source: Calculated from AEA (1980, ch. 16-18). 
the use of artificial insemination. For some fartners, the fall in relative 
cereal prices encouraged the production of meat and milk, and animals 
which had previously been kept essentially for work increased in average 
weights, and had more regular and frequent calving. 50 However, the 
problem of scale in Spanish livestock fartning (noted in chapter 8) 
remained. As late as 1974, 77 per cent of breeding and milking cattle 
were found on fartns with less than six animals, a figure which increased 
to 89 per cent when only animals for fattening are considered. 51 
Even though domestic beef production grew by 18.5 per cent between 
1959/62 and 1963/5, imports increased from an average of 9.8 per cent of 
domestic consumption to 25.6 per cent.52 By the early 1970s, domestic 
producers had responded, and beef and veal production was responsible 
50 For a description of this change in one village in Le6n, see Behar (1991, p. 38). Behar 
notes that traditionally cows calved only once every two years, making for a very irregu-
lar supply of milk. 
51 San Juan (1986, pp. 368-9). 
52 OECD (1969, p. 220). 
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once more for over 90 per cent of consumption, with better carcase 
weights and calving ratios leading to an increase of 56.5 per cent in the 
amount of meat produced per breeding animal between 1960 and 
197012.53 However, of equal importance was the fall in pork and poultry 
prices relative to beef and lamb, which from the late 1960s lead to a 
rapid increase in consumption of these products, encouraged by the 
'efficient and expanding pig and poultry industries'. 54 
If the changes in pork and poultry production were not unique to 
Spain, but rather were part of an international movement in technology, 
their impact in Spain was especially great, given the traditionally low 
levels of per capita meat consumption. The ability to achieve major 
economies of scale in contrast to traditional livestock fartning, and the 
possibilities of importing large quantities of feed, released Spanish pro-
ducers from the natural and institutional resource constraints which had 
plagued the agricultural sector since the decline in prosperity of the 
Mesta. In just a decade, from 1960 to 1970, livestock increased its con-
tribution to final agricultural output from 30 to 40 per cent. 
The extension of irrigation 
The final area in which Significant changes appeared was irrigation. 
',,- ••• - # .~. "'~"H'V"-'''m'\i ,'sW'tion6freserVorrs The FrmcoJ.,e~~ .. QMt,Il, a.ssl e,C()i) . <;M~' ' .... ,. ,. C" .• 
.~~·rrnga~oE,.,§~s.~m§~(tiPle 11.8). Although the prin~i~al goal of 
such (1evelopment was hydro-electric power, the area of rrngated land 
also increased by 600,000 hectares .,i4J.'p~( ceIl~J,LbetWeen 1950, alfd 
1965. Better water supplies, together' with improved seed strains, and 
grownlg domestic and export markets all led to an important growth 
in output. Thus, whilst in 1932 some 29 per cent of agricultural final 
production can be identified as coming from irrigated lands, the figure 
had risen to 40 per cent in 1965.55 This is reflected in the perfortn-
ance of such crops as alfalfa, which saw output grow by 77 per cent 
between 1955/59 and 1965/69, maize (63 per cent), sugar beet (50 
per cent), oranges (73 per cent), peaches (Ill per cent), apricots (72 
per cent), pears (90 per cent) and apples (74 per cent).56 Of equal 
importance to fartners were the improvements in the food processing 
industries, distribution networks and retail outlets. b-t:b!: . .s:ruL .. QfJ;}:l~ 
...p.~ripci, foreign capit!ll, !lI!q .. technology were makin~" all i~portant 
",., """""l"~_'_~_Y>." "'" _~ -, ,'~ 
53 San Juan (1986, p. 62) and Fondo para la OrdenaciOn y Regulaciim de Precios y Productos 
Agrarios (1981, p. 7, cited in San Juan, 1986, p. 367). 
54 mRDIFAO (1966, p. 13). 
55 Calculated from AEPA (ano I93Z) and IBRDIFAO (1966, p. 44)· 
56 AEA (various years). Not all output of these crops was found on irrigated land. 
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Table 11.8. Reservoir capacity in Spain, 1900-1970 (million cubic metres) 
1900 1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Norte 35 127 610 1,861 2,614 3,334 
Duero 1,371 1,626 1,722 2,790 3,173 6,394 
Tajo 24 341 370 757 3,285 5,708 9,390 
Guardiana 10 52 52 60 1,821 3,974 4,034 
Guadalquivir 633 1,565 1,820 2,026 2,981 4,579 
Sur 41 132 132 132 219 219 
Segura 38 365 365 365 885 911 918 
Near 47 55 1,404 1,500 1,516 1,637 
Ebro 729 1,323 1,488 3,204 3,665 5,886 
Pirineo 6 6 6 6 6 183 478 
Canarias 5 5 10 
Total 78 3,620 5,621 8,364 17,515 24,949 36,879 
Source: AEA (1980, p. 10). 
contribution to SR!!ID~sJQQgin<lY.StJies.57 Finally, between 1950 and 
" ..... " ....... " .. V'... . ,",' .' '. . " .... "" .• " .... ' .'ll' ..... '."-'-.".-"-~ 
122<:> ):l;1~,!!J:!~.~.Qfw:J)aQ .P.QpylaUQJlM Cm mumClpa ltles greater an 
20,000) in!:,r~a~e4fi;om40 ,p~., C~,Jlt.tO., 5~.p.et: . cent.. !I1l:i!>s?lu te terms 
the growth was from 1I.4 million to 18.7 million inhabitarlis.-·"" 
, .... ~" .... ,"""'.,." .... ,~_~,.,~,., ..... ~ .• ~.'''' ...... "..."'' __ '''.-<" .v.-.-..",._""""" .. ""·,.,....""".."..··· ........ u·,,"-.. ,.., ...... ,, ...... ' -",<,'" ... ' "".~''', ~-, ",,",,-, '''''''"'''-"'§'' ... 
.. ~." .. --,.~~.--- .~, 
Conclusion 
~~S1:1.IE:!t~L.£h!!!~~,"_~"~,R!in"h~~~~.~.}2?9,, ,~,~~i,.,.!~~5 .. ~!!~ .. g~ 
rapId, and ~ cOg}PinatiWl.ci1e~,change.and.outmigra.ti.~ed 
@l:l.q-ur ptoducrlvity."li"urthermore, unlike the 192os, the process was 
allowed to continue, so that by 1990 Spanish agriculture employed just 
10.5 per cent of the active population. 58 Yet even if the 'Siesta' was 
clearly over by 1965, the productivity gap between Spain and northwest 
Europe was as large as it had been at the end of the nineteenth century. 
However, the rapidly declining share of agriculture in Spain's economy 
implied that the importance of this 'productivity gap' for economic 
development was also diminishing. 
57 Peinado Gracia (1985, ch. 6). 
58 If fishing is included, the figure is 11.2 per cent (AEA aifo I990, p. 16). 
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~~een abou!..~.15-«;Um.d19SQ .SpmPsh. agri<;;Yln.u:~.!lJ!£<;e$.sMlyincreased 
its output to fee~!lJ?Qm!.j!ti91L\vJili;h..had.trip1edJn,.size. Furthermore, 
by the 18808 the supply offood from one year to another remained fairly 
constant, ~d price fl\l<:,!l1a!i()Il:~. f.()t:c()n.!lmnt!J:'.~. W.~r.~£on$id,eJ:'ably less 
than they had-be~ii'Qnly _ a fe~L.decades earlieI .. Yet, even in the early 
I950s;·SpaiD. was still a poor country. It was 1'-~J:'d?9th.!>.~~~\lse a large 
s1!are of it~. active population.w.as.eiliployed:in..agricu.ltunl, .. and because 
~l~Ulf.producti~jnJ:he. seaQr_~ere. con!lpiCYQ~~Jx."'~I()w tQQ§e 
fow.:ui .. Jn....richeL . countries. Thus, in 1950, half the active labour force 
was still employed in agriculture;0iiIY8 quarter hved m urban Ceiitres 
of more than 100,000 mhab11iiits-and agriculture's share of GDP 
r~mained at about 3<>Per cent. However, perhaps the most conspicuous 
evidence of the 'failure' of agriculture was to be found in people's diets. 
These were high in carbohydrates and low in animal protein, with the 
quantity of calories consumed per capita/day derived from milk, meat, 
fish and eggs being only 250 in southern Europe compared to 940 in 
northern Europe in the mid-1950s. Furthermore, to obtain this poor 
diet, the inhabitants ofltalY~HG.te~~c;!,. §P!!!!! .• ru1,qJ;'.Qroigar:speni:'ahout 
40t050'per'centofiheir per capita inc<>'IJ:leQPJ()()d",comparedto only 
3~'percenr'm]i()rm~m,];~9pe:C' .~ 
If'l11e'"'figuresfoi"i950 represent a recovery from the disastrous years 
of the Civil War and its immediate aftermath, they still reflect the conse-
quences of excessive government intervention in all aspects of the econ-
omy (chapter 11). By 1960 the economy, and agriculture in particular, 
was performing considerably better, and the advances that had taken 
place during the interwar years were once more occurring. But the vital 
question remains: WhL~~i~~.~~<;Eltqre nQu19_.b.ettert.. 
It is true that low yields in traditional dry-farming and livestock pro-
1 Yates (1960, table 2.1 and p. 85). Northern Europe taken by Yates to be the United 
Kingdom and Scandinavia. 
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Table 12.1. Average wheat and milk yields in Europe, I909!I3 and I96I/5 
Wheat yield Milk yields 
(tons per hectare) ('ooos litres per cow/year) 
1909/13 1961/S 1909/13 1961/S 
Denmark 3·3 4. 1 2,6 3·7 
Holland 2,4 4·4 2·7 4.2 
Belgium 2·S 3·9 n,d. 3·7 
United Kingdom 2.1 4.0 L9 3.6 
Gennany 2·4 3.2 L8 3·1 
Switzerland 2,1 3·3 2·7 3·3 
Ireland 2·S 3·3 L9 2·3 
Sweden 2.1 3·4 n.d, 3·4 
Norway 1·7 2.6 1.5 2·9 
Austria L4 2.6 n.d. 2·7 
France 1·3 2·9 1.6 2.6 
Italy LI 2.0 I.S 1.9 
Finland 1.1 1.7 L4 3.2 
Greece 1.0 I·S n.d. 0·9 
Spain 0·9 LI 0·9 1.4 
Portugal 0·7 0.8 n.d. 2·S 
Sources: Yates (1960, p. 197); FAO Yearbooks; and Simpson (199Sa). 
duction in the Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Greece, France 
and Spain (table 12.1) were caused bY!h~J!!:<;;~.AA(:tJJ!1~~dictability of 
summer r~infall and, toa·lesser""exten!~~?~X,~R.2Q!.,,~2i!!: 2 Yet simply to 
argue that poormmIflil resource endowments account for Spain's agri-
cultural backwardness, or even that of the Mediterranean region, is 
insufficient for three reasons. First, one Mediterranean-like economy -
that of California - was able to surge ahead from the 1860s and stand 
at the forefront of technical change in agriculture and intensive livestock 
farming. 3 Second, poor natural resource endowments cannot explain 
how Spanish agriculture eventually managed to overcome obstacles and 
achieve rapid productivity growth from the 1960s. TIllrd, poor natural 
resource endowments have everywhere restricted agricultural output to 
some degree. Perhaps the extreme case in Europe is that of Ireland, 
where unfavourable agricultural resource endowments and institutions 
were responsible for large-scale emigration from the 1820S. 
2 The most recent historian to stress the role of resource endowments as an obstacle for 
change in Spanish agriculture is Tortella (1994a, pp. 8-9). 
3 For technical changes in Californian agriculture see, for example, Olmstead and Rhode 
(1988, pp. 86-1I2) and Scheuring (1983, ch. 9). A more recent case is that of Israel. 
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he real pr2El~!!l."WJlfLnPt £In.c..of-RQ.Q!..ri,dd$~Jll1t.nl.tb~lhJU,~w.~ 
SiCaI oUtPut per hectare was also acc?I1]J),!l9i(!~L!?Y..R9.9rJ.a.bpurpro­
tiVtty:-t)f"th~''SeVenteen''Eui'6pean'' coUntries shown in table 12.2, 
Ui"hlRi the second lowest output per hectare, and only Yugoslavia, 
tugal and Greece had lower output per male worker. Furthermore, 
differences in labour productivity between Spain and the leading 
opean countries were as great in 1980 as they had been a hundred 
11 earlier.4 
·et,. ey~n tp,ough the 'gap'. between lab0':l!:J?,E?~1,!'7~yi~.JD,~p.a.m.and ... / them -E~rope\v:ast(f remam;'agnculfure in Spain be~an a.p~o~ess 
:iiiing€; m", t}i!~:S::'iW9i]Q~jJIYjransf()l'lne4 ~~,,~s~~i~~,,~etween 
97~ i91)4l~6 the agricultural labour force declmed by about 1.2 
.... -_. • .• '~'-"~. -. nil.e.l.ao. ~'.'. r."'·"roductivi ., "ew 1:;;" .,.' ·erce. fit. -ove'r 
.1on (23 per cent) w ......... ~:l:!~E .. "... .,tygr, ... .v}!','Z4.J2,,,,,,,y",,,,,,,, 
neXtlif'te'eii"Years'employment fell by another 1.8 million, leavmg the 
:or with just 16.5 per cent of the total active labour force. Labour 
ductivity over this period grew by a further 129 per cent. Even faster 
wth in the rest of the economy resulted in agriculture's contribution 
}DP falling from 38.07 per cent to 6.9 per cent between 1890 and 
o· the consequences for the economy of the labour productivity 'gap' 
, 5 
1 northern Europe were therefore now much reduced. . A second 
manent change was that of diet. Table 12.3 shows that this gap\vas 
;ing by the 196oii:"'By"die-i980s, the major dietary clifIerences 
ween~.iE .ao,ci. ~orthern Europe were caused not so much by 
5mebut rather by cultural preferences. 
IT~~~$.l?Jlpj~!t.a.gpcu.lture has been ab.1e :!q~a,~H;e.rapidly, s,~ce 
.!92.~~.J,he.~ll" ha~tQ, .. be . .aske4 why1;bi~. <i!4,,!!.0~,~ccu~,.~,~rh~~. 
o factors clearly were not responsible. First, as I have argued m ililS 
,k, farmers responded rationally to changes in factor and product 
;es, and if farming methods changed only slowly it was usually 
ause of some sound economic reason. E!{llanationsthat the farmers 
:e simply 'inefficient' appel!!JQl?~ ... YJ1iy~~~~~~.o~~:~~!~§ii~ £~~r'd 
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~~,~,!!t(!y.did not change overnigh~ ~lld.~~refore 
~;:~~~~;fl~~~dS.l~ui1~~lr:a!ktr~ite:~:m~6~tilir9,fi~l 
relopment of agriculture prior to 1950 and the growth experienced 
~rwards. These factors are,:. fatn.1.,~ize anq. ~.~~lt;~ .m~,~~~..2!_E!;l.r~ 
ountries include Denmark, France, Gennany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
ingdom. See table L 7· 
~r GDP figures see Prados de la Escosura (199S, table D. 4) and for employment see 
EA (aiio I980, p. 16). 
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Table 12.3. Dietary changesa in five European countries, 1951/3 to 1979/81 
Cereals 
Potatoes' 
Sugar and 
honey 
Fats and 
oils 
Meat" 
Fish' 
Eggs 
Fresh fruit 
Total calories 
per day 
Protein of 
vegetable 
origin 
Protein of 
animal 
origin 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979181 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
1951/3 
1964/6 
1979/81 
Spain" 
122.6 
102·5 
u8·5 
104.4 
106·3 
112.0 
10.6 
22.0 
31.0 
15·3 
23·0 
22.6 
14.2 
28.6 
68·3 
9·9 
14.6 
4·7 
10·3 
15.8 
66.8 
90 .9 
127·0 
2,490 
2,806 
3,294 
52 .0 
48.0 
44.8 
17.8 
29·2 
51.0 
Italy 
146.4 
131.3 
183.6 
40 .5 
42 .5 
41.2 
14.2 
25·9 
34.6 
12.0 
17·6 
26·3 
17·5 
36·9 
73.1 
4·4 
5·5 
6·9 
9·6 
11.4 
69·4 
102·3 
129·1 
2,480 
2,818 
3,688 
50 .6 
49·9 
54·7 
21.3 
34.1 
50.2 
France 
u6.4 
88.6 
105·9 
121.9 
101.0 
79.8 
26.3 
34. 1 
42 .2 
15·7 
23·5 
29. 1 
60.6 
77·3 
99·9 
5.8 
7·7 
u.o 
11.1 
14.6 
50 .7 
75·9 
68.2 
2,840 
3,108 
3,52 9 
49.8 
41.8 
38.1 
43.0 
56.4 
70 . 1 
UK 
96.7 
76 .5 
94·5 
104·4 
101.6 
102.6 
42 .7 
50 .6 
44·9 
21.2 
22.6 
13·2 
55. 1 
69·5 
74·9 
9·9 
9·5 
12·4 
14·7 
13·0 
56·9 
44·7 
55·5 
3,1l0 
3,233 
3,249 
39.8 
35·7 
36.2 
44·9 
52·9 
53·9 
Germany 
98.9 
72 .6 
92 .8 
172·3 
1l1.4 
80.7 
25·6 
33·7 
44·4 
22.6 
26.5 
29. 1 
41.2 
66·5 
97·7 
6·9 
6.6 
8.0 
13·7 
17.0 
70.1 
100.0 
104.8 
2,880 
2,927 
3,351 
38.4 
29·3 
32 •8 
39.2 
50 .8 
59·9 
a Based on net per capita food supply. Units are in kilograms except for proteins which 
are in grams. 
" 1952/3 figures used. 
'Includes other roots and tubers. 
d Includes offal. 
, Estimated edible weight. 
Sources: FAO (1971 and 1984) and FAO Production Yearbook (1968). 
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outmigration, the ~~5:...Qf.£.QmP~r.~!~:~:e advantage in foreign trade, and 
IeveLsofmvesnnent in research and aevelO~--~--".-w--.. --.. --'·'--
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Pann size and scale 
Although the question of scale has long been recognised as a problem 
in the development of Spanish agriculture, the simple division of the 
country into large areas of minifundios and latifundios is not enough to 
explain the failure to close the productivity gap with other countries. 
Some of Spain's most efficient farmers were to be found within both 
categories. Thus by the mid-1960s, the growing numbers of machines 
(such as combine-harvesters) attest to progress on the larger estates. At 
the other extreme, the fact that Spain accounted for half of the world's 
exports of oranges on the eve of the Civil War, and about a third in the 
period 1960/9, reflects the capacity of small farmers, often with less than 
two hectares at their disposal, to react to international demand.6 Yet 
land distribution and farm organisation did affect labour productivity. 
At the one extreme, the small size of farms in the North, especially in 
Galicia, was an important constraint on specialisation. As ever, Spanish 
statistics make any accurate measurement impossible, but a few figures 
illustrate the difficulties. Given that the regional specialisation was in 
cattle, the presence of minifundios in land holdings was also extended 
to herd size. Thus, the 1865 census estimated that the average herd size 
in Galicia was 3.1 animals; by 1974 this had increased to just 4.5 ani-
mals.7 The low livestock densities caused by the physical isolation of 
many farmers, and the small numbers of animals that most farmers 
could market hindered both the formation of cooperatives and access 
to the higher incomes of urban markets. 
A second problem was that, with the exception of the area of latifun-
dios, farms of even an apparently reasonable size suffered inefficiencies 
because of fragmentation. One of the most cited agricultural works, 
Memoria sobre el fomento de la poblaciOn rural by Fermin Caballero, first 
published in 1863, had as its main theme the need to consolidate frag-
mented holdings. The. <::oslS of the excessiv-efragmentation-intherune,. 
teenth century were essential1yJ!rnit~g,. t9 ... !hetiIJ:l~. taken by farmers to 
tr"1iVe1rrom'oiiefieldto another. They increased sigzlificatitly, however, 
6 The figure in 1960/9 was 31.4 per cent in tenns of volume and 26.4 per cent in value 
(FAO, Trade Yearbooks). In 1962, 60 per cent of Valencia's oranges were found on 
holdings of less than 5 hectares, and a further 18 per cent between 5 and 10 hectares 
(Primer censo agrario de Espaiia, Valencia, p. 14). 
7 Dominguez Martin (1990, p. 191) and Ministerio de Agricultura, (1974, pp. 61, 167 
and 175). 
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when the possibilities for mechanisation began to be considered seri-
ously from the turn of the twentieth century. Land fragmentation was 
especially serious on the secano where, as we have seen, improved labour 
productivity was achieved by increasing the land to labour ratio. Yet 
legislation to encourage consolidation was only passed in 1952, and pro-
gress over the next decade was slow, with only 580,000 hectares being 
consolidated. By the 1960s, the problem of land fragmentation was 
worse in Spain than in most other European countries (table II.6). 
However, between 1963 and 1971 the area consolidated was 2.9 million 
hectares, and in Castilla-Le6n, the region where initially most consoli-
dation occurred, average field size increased from 0.3 hectares to 2·5 
hectares.s By this time, the rural exodus, land consolidation, and mech-
anisation - together with price support for cereals - had all helped this 
region to enjoy Spain's highest rate of labour productivity.9 
Finally, the large estates of absentee landowners in Andalucia and 
elsewhere provided comfortable incomes to their owners achieved 
through protected markets and a cheap, abundant labour force. Cer-
tainly the latifundistas appear to have responded to market signals but 
the result, as in the southern United States, was not propitious to long-
term growth. 10 If property was held in large farms which theoretically 
might have been mechanised much earlier, the region of Andalucia had 
very low land to labour ratios, even by Spanish standards (table 10.2). 
The incerui'le..tQ.me.chanise.was.mereforeseriQusly restricted, and the 
<ipji~t¥...tQ.deyeI9p._.a.!l. agriC:\lltJ,lral-machine~toolsjtlQ.1!!!!!Y.l~l. 
In all three of these cases there was a need for State intervention to 
alter property rights. In Spain, as elsewhere, governments were not 
adverse to changing property rights when it suited them. The large sales 
of church and municipal lands, and the failed attempt at land reform 
during the Second Republic provide only two examples. Yet the Spanish 
governments were slow to appreciate the inevitable demise of the agri-
cultural sector as industrialisation took place, and to provide a more 
representative government which reflected urban interests. The conse-
quences of this latter omission were, of course, a major factor behind 
the Civil War. While it would be unusual in the extreme to expect large 
farmers to legislate against their interests, a number of instances can be 
cited when they acted particularly harshly against the sector which they 
claimed so fervently to support. It took, for example, between 1763 and 
1926 to provide the legal framework to settle the problem of the foro in 
Galicia, which finally allowed the occupiers of the land full legal pos-
8 A1ario Trigueros (1991, pp. 84 and 131). 
9 Molina Ib8fiez (1993, pp. 51--9). 
10 For Southern USA, see especially Whadey (1987)· 
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session (chapter 3). The attempts at creating cooperatives were, in Com-
parison with a country such as France, especially weak (chapter 8). The 
subdivision of property in north-western Spain increased travel time for 
farmers and, by the early twentieth century, was increasingly acting as 
a restriction to mechanisation. The latifundios in the south might have 
become more productive if there had been more fiscal or legal restric-
tions on the leasing of land, thereby encouraging direct cultivation. Fur-
thermore, with direct cultivation, mechanisation was more likely to 
occur. Mechanisation and migration would also have been helped by 
greater levels of literacy in the region. In a recent article, Clara Eugenia 
Nuftez has shown that, prior to the 1931-6 Republic, Andalucia suffered 
not so much from a lack of educational resources but from their poor 
distribution. Money tended to be spent providing good' quality edu-
cation for a minority rather than basic primary education for all. 11 Nat-
urally, all these points would have threatened some groups' interests. 
Few pieces of legislation do not. What stands out in the Spanish case 
is that in the period of the Restoration of the monarchy (1874-1931), 
there was virtually no real help from the State to increase the output 
and efficiency of the small and medium-sized farms, and none to under-
mine the privileged position of the large landowners. There were two 
notable exceptions to this statement, namely tariff policy and the decline 
in the real burden of taxation from the late nineteenth century.12 But if 
both these policies helped the smaller farmers, they benefited much 
more those who produced the largest surpluses, namely the big land-
owners. The logic of government policy has recently been pointed out 
by Comin, who noted that the Spanish State in the twentieth century 
has combined low levels of public expenditure (relative to other western 
European countries) with very high levels of regulation of the econ-
omy.13 Regulation costs little, and has tended to benefit commercial 
farmers and industrialists - groups which would undoubtedly have had 
to pay more if the State had invested more in transport infrastructure, 
education, and health care. 
The rural exodus 
In the mid-1950s, just before Spain's second ruraLe;xodus began in. earn-
~1~ was estimated thatsurpius agricultural labour accounted f~;'-as 
11 NUiiez (1991, especially pp. 129 and 145). 
12 For the decline in the tax burden for agriculture, see especially Comin (1987, p. 450; 
1995, figure 13). 
13 Comin (1990, Table I). He notes (p. 438) that 'so long as it did not cost the Treasury 
anything, economic intervention by the Spanish state was limitless'. See also Tortella 
(I994b, pp. 350-1). 
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lany as 2 million workers, or 'over one-third of the total' .14 Surplus 
Ibour implies that agricultural output would not have been affected by 
s reallocation to other sectors of the economy, and economists have 
[aimed to have found it existing in most societies at one time or 
nother. 15 Although the existence of surplus labour in Spanish agricul-
Ire is impossible to prove, it is noticeable that contemporaries rarely 
()mplained of labour shortages. There are two characteristics of excess 
lbour in Spanish agriculture over the period. In the first instance, 
!!:cess labour was found within the agricultural sector as a result of the 
~latively long periods of seasonal unemployment. Annual labour 
emand per hectare for crops such as cereal, olives and vines was often 
mall. In the Interior and Andalucia, there was little inter-cropping, and 
le second half of the nineteenth and first third of the twentieth century 
ras characterised by increasing crop specialisation, which accentuated 
le seasonal demands for labour. Dairy farming, which has traditionally 
een a major employer oflabour in northern Europe, was conspicuously 
bsent in Spain's secano. The crowded Spanish plazas on many week-
ays represented not a work-shy labour force, as many northern Euro-
ean visitors believed, but rather the hapless victims of a highly seasonal 
griculture. Whereas workers in countries such as France or Britain 
ften had as many as 270 days' employment a year, workers in southern 
:pain had perhaps less than half that number.16 Finally, seasonal unem-
loyment was rarely off-set by part-time employment outside agricul-
llre. Therefore, it seems that there was much less scope over most of 
ural Spain for households to respond to a growing supply of marketed 
ommodities by increasing their work efforts, as de Vries has recently 
uggested occurred in Europe and the United States between the mid-
eventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries.17 
I OES (1957, p. 10). 
i For example, Schultz (1945, pp. 91-5) claims this was the situation in the United States 
in the interwar period. 
, O'Brien and Toniolo (1991, pp. 398-9) suggest 265 days a year for male farmers in Italy 
and the United Kingdom, and 220 days for landless labourers in Italy. For Andalucia I 
have estimated about 130 days a year on the eve of the Civil War (Simpson, I992b, 
p. 16). 
, The recent provocative article by de Vries (1994) on the 'industrious revolution' con-
tributes two interesting alternatives to the debate on why Spain was a latecomer. Was 
it because, as I argue above, there were greater restrictions on the productive employ-
ment of household labour even though there was an increase in the supply of goods 
offered in the market place? Or was it caused by demand restraints for manufactured 
goods after 1850 as a result of households withdrawing wives and children from the 
paid labour force because, as occurred in the more developed economies, 'a new set 
of ... commodities associated with hygiene and nutrition, the health and education of 
children, and the achievement of new standards of domesticity and comfort in the home 
came to appear superior to the available range of market-supplied goods and services' 
(p. 263). Much more research is required before we can confidently discuss the relative 
importance of these two factors in Spanish economic development. 
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Table 12.4. Relative changes in the number of male workers in European 
agriculture between 1880 and 1970a 
1880-1 1930-1 1950-1 1970-1 
Spain 100 93 118 64 
Belgium 100 75 54 20 
Denmark 100 92 83 40 
France 100 95 71 45 
Netherlands 100 124 131 57 
Ireland 100 77 59 34 
Italy 100 119 113 42 
Norway 100 163 146 61 
Portugal 100 104 125 77 
Sweden 100 108 78 30 
UK 100 75 65 41 
a Dates as given, except Spain 1877, Belgium 1947, France 1954 and 1968, Netherlands 
1947 and Ireland 1926. 
Sources: Mitchell (1992); for Spain, Nicolau (1989). 
If labour appears to have been underemployed in many regions, it is 
also true that wages were low in the agricultural sector because there 
was simply too much labour. As shown in chapter 8, emigration prior 
to the turn of the twentieth century was relatively low and urban growth 
sluggish, despite what appears to have been a significant difference 
between agricultural and urban wages. Table 12-4 suggests that Spain's 
agricultural exodus was not especially slow between 1880/1 and 1930/1 
when considered within a European context. Furthermore, as this book 
has shown, there was considerable regional diversity. In particular, the 
active population of Andalucia increased by 10 per cent compared to a 
fall of 13 per cent in the rest of the country. Given what I have said 
about the level of productivity in this region, the low level of mechanis-
ation and the low land to labour ratios, it is clear that population growth 
was not a catalyst for agricultural improvement. If labour in Andalucia 
had left at the same rate as in other regions, then not only would mech-
anisation have occurred faster, but the need for the controversial Land 
Reform would have been less. 
A second consideration is that Spain differed from most other Euro-
pean countries in that the ~1!~L~!g~~-'!U:y!!,s,.!:~Y~~~<:lg1:!ringJh.~rio.<! 
1930(1 anc:i !95,~1.I. Despite a rapid decline after 1950/1, over the period 
1880/1 to 1970ii, only Ponugal lost labour at slower rates. By 1964, 
some 34 per cent of the active population was still in agriculture in 
Spain, compared to 25 per cent in Italy. Both figures are considerably 
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above the 18 per cent in France, 11 per cent in West Germany, 9 per 
cent in Holland, 6 per cent in Belgium and 4 per cent in the United 
Kingdom. 
Finally, and most imponantly, it was neither the speed of the rural 
exodus nor the absolute numbers employed in agriculture that reflected 
the weakness of Spanish agriculture. Rather, it was the fact that until 
the 1960s improved productivity in Spanish agriculture was heavily 
dependent on reducing labour inputs. Given the imponance of extens-
ive cultivation in Spain, productivity increases were achieved essentially 
by mechanisation, which in turn required increasingly greater land to 
labour ratios (table 12.2). Between 1890 and 1960, the ratio increased 
by just 20 per cent in Spain, whilst in Italy the increase was some 30 
per cent, in Germany 42 per cent, in Denmark 60 per cent, in the 
United Kingdom 95 per cent, in France 117 per cent and in the United 
States 198 per cent. lS The problem is not therefore simply whether 
labour left Spanish agriculture faster between 1880 and 1960 than in 
Ireland or Italy, for example. The crucial point is that, compared with 
other western European countries, the very nature of Spain's agriculture 
meant that productivity growth was much more highly geared to 
improvements in labour-saving technologies (mechanisation) than to 
improvements in crop yields. 
Foreign trade 
From the late nineteenth. century, if not earlier, Spanish. agriculture 
eiijoyed a comparative' advantage ID the' production for exPort' 6fwk~~ 
oHveoil and citriisffiiiCHowevef~demana was often restricted becauSe 
~''''''''_''''''.d~''''{~~'~''-'-'-~".''.'m' ., ."," ", ,~ •• "--" .. ,, ". '. ", , _ '",. , . 
foreign governments wished to protect competing domestk,pr()ducts (in 
the ca'S'e~of wine), or because dose substitutes existed (iniiie case of 
olive oil). Only with citrus fruit was Spain able to increase output and 
maintain market share. Yet in terms of employment, it was the vine and 
olive which were far more imponant and here there were limits to profits 
on account of the large quantities of cheap and suitable land and labour. 
Furthermore, given the low opportunity costs of land, a fall in com-
modity prices was not usually met by taking plants out of production, 
but rather by cutting variable costs (mainly labour). The problem was 
therefore a tendency to overproduce. 
In the case of cereals and livestock, resources remained in production, 
not because the country enjoyed a comparative advantage, but rather 
because of the low opponunity costs of secano land. Although Spain 
18 O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992, tables 5 and 6). 
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protected its cereal fanners, so too did other countries, such as France 
and Germany.19 It is often argued that protection was greater in Spain 
than other countries on account of the political bargaining power of the 
larger landowners. However, it is also true that for most cereal land in 
Spain there were few alternatives, unlike that in the more temperate 
areas of Europe. If the fall in international grain prices at the end of the 
nineteenth century encouraged fanners in countries such as Denmark 
or England to switch resources out of grain and into livestock, this 
option was not available throughout much of the Mediterranean. As a 
result, possible changes in crop mix, or the introduction of intensive 
livestock, allowed many regions of central and northern Europe to 
adjust to the growing world economy in cereals quicker than in Spain. 
A measure of this competitive loss can be seen in that Spanish cereals 
represented 31 per cent of final output in c. 1910 when measured in 
pesetas, but only 23 per cent when measured in pounds sterling.20 As 
late as 1960, Lamartine Yates wrote that 'the secano provides the techni-
cal headache to which the scientists have as yet no adequate answer'. 21 
The secano in Spain covered approximately 80 per cent of the country's 
land mass. 
TecJ!nig,zL£ftq!!ge 
Finally, we have considered at length in this book the question of techni-
cal change. In 1960 Yates wrote that: 
A priori one would expect some narrowing of the gap between the more 
advanced and the less advanced countries, with the latter acquiring the new 
techniques and catching up the leaders. Not at all. The leaders of 1909-13 have 
increased most ... 22 
Howev-et.jthas, be~!l ,Il;l"gue,d th~t nlUch of the agricultural technology 
in use in northern EW'op~ :bag on.J.y liiv.it,e<f·~aevifucefoSpanisn·COii= 
ditions.~~ __ HaY~Il!L,~!!4,,1~·\lttan .have suggested, the directio~"~f t~~I§_~~ilLSllange 1I:P:4 i~ssp~ed_ ofimpl~entation areliKeIyto be 
c1eiermined by c:banges in relative prices of factor inputs and commodi-
tIes. Until the late nineteenth century the abundance of land md: the 
riseiD."'commodity prices ensured that growth in output was achieved 
through an extension of the area cultivated. F.r.omabout 1900 to 1936, 
.' '-~"''''''- .... -=,,,,,~y~ 
, ~ - .... ¥, 
19 See fi~ 8.1. In 1960 Spanish wheat was 26 per cent above international prices, in 
1963 It was 36 per cent above and, in 1966, it was 51 per cent above (OECD, 1969, p.261). 
20 O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992, p. 526). 
21 Yates (1960, p. 128). 
22 Ibid. (p. 195). 
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and again in the 1950S, the gove1'IlIIlent~Lc:lit.ect.and,indirecLsuppoJ,t of 
com~fr£!E:~_~~~~Ii,,~~ .~~a~_labiiio/.()f ,iIl,lP!9.Y..~Q.Plough,san<i mineral 
teiclllsers ~~r~J~~lQjt~(;ibyfarmers to exteQ.donce,more the.area culti-
Vaie(fi~ther thanJ()iroPrQY~ p:q,p,yields. This was the result of both 
medifficulties in improving crop yields using traditional seed varieties, 
and the fact that mechanisation offered an easier alternative to reducing 
unit costs. 
Despite stagnant cereal yields, mechanical technology was slow to be 
introduced in cereal farming prior to the First World War for a variety 
of reasons - for example, the presence of low wages, the low levels of 
human capital, lack of support industries, small fragmented farms and 
the relatively high cost of animals (chapter 7). That low wages continued 
to be a determining factor at the end of the period can be seen in figure 
12.1, which shows that Spanish agricultural wages were the second 
lowest in Europe (after Portugal)..L,Lan<i fragmentation, as we have seen, 
was also worse than in most :Europeancountries~'and land to labour 
ratios below the average. To measure international levels of human capi-
tal is difficult, and much debate exists over which variables are most 
relevant. Only half the population was literate as late as 1910, although 
by 1950 the figure had reached 83 per cent. 23 On a more practical level, 
if the number of motor vehicles per head of population can be con-
sidered as a proxy for the number of mechanics, then in 1960/2 Spain 
had only 11 per cent of the number in France and the United Kingdom, 
and 30 per cent of those in Italy.24 According to table 12.2, Spain had 
less horse power provided by tractors per 100 hectares than any of the 
seventeen countries. 
Spanish cereal fanners benefited from government price intervention, 
either indirectly through tariffs and import quotas, or directly through 
fixed domestic prices. As output was essentially increased by bringing 
more land into cultivation, and by the twentieth century costs were cut 
through mechanisation, there was little demand for government invest-
ment in research into biological technologies. This has led Barciela to 
note the 'almost total absence of agricultural research' in Spain.25 Yet 
some limited research did take place. In chapter 6 we saw that fanners 
in areas of traditional irrigation, such as Valencia, were adept at chang-
ing the crop mix and developing new seed varieties. Progress was con-
siderably slower in the areas of newer irrigation, such as the Ebro, but 
even here the role played by the experimental farm in Zaragoza can be 
considered vital. However, the predominance of the secano in Spain, 
23 Torte11a (1994a, table 6). 
2. Calculated from Mitchell (1992, pp. 4-8 and 718-21). 
25 Barciela (1986, p. 445, cited in Tortella, 1994b, p. 253). 
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Figure 12.1 Horsepower per head and cost of labour, European 
countries, 1966 
Source: Royal Commission on Farm MaChinery - Canada (no date) 
t~~!meLwitlLth.e.fw;.l ... ml!:tmQ!lt~t;.IDirQgatc:d" !J,J:el!-.s.Were.S1lll!-l1~ 
weantthat there. \\,a~ l\!ss 9!:;roaIldfof state. investment ill research and ' 
development compared tolllost other c:ount#e!l. As table 12.2 ~h~~s­
S'iiaiii was again bottorii' 'of i:heEur~p~~~ i~a~e, with the exception of 
Portugal, in the number of college-trained agricultural graduates per 
10,000 agricultural male workers. Given the low levels of research 
undertaken by the State, it was the growing links with large food pro-
ducers that provided farmers with the information and skills to increase 
both output and quality. This can be seen from the turn of the century 
in s~ch activities as sugar production and dairying (links with Nestle), 
but ItS real development and influence on diets had to await the late 
1950s and 1960s. 
From what has been said, it is clear that a major cause of Spain's 
sIOw-gtowor-otref' ffie""tweiitletlt century~-"iUid,'bydefii1ition, the' sk;w 
grOWili"ofagriculture, was ori..·.account of the twQ :Iost'decades-·i)f the 
!9..3.~~ •. ~~(:t!.2~~ Two reasons can be identified. First, the failure of a 
modernising Spain to adopt a more democratic system of government. 
The rapid growth of cities and the speed of rural outmigration in the 
interwar period created new demands and expectations. The use of price 
intervention as in cereals rather than other forms of income support 
(such as the use of cOQperatives), the failure to reform lease law, estab-
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lish an income tax or provide systematic poor relief all, in their own 
way, reflect the economic power of a minority being able to resist the 
pressures for reform. The same was true, as Pedro Fraile has shown, 
for industry, where business leaders were able to close markets from 
foreign competition over long periods.26 Spain was not unique in these 
matters, but the Civil War, instead of allowing sweeping changes, simply 
permitted a continuation of the power held by these classes.27 Only with 
the growing emphasis on industry, the opening up of markets and the 
possibility of international emigration from the late 1950s, was the rural 
exodus renewed. The backlog of technology available to cereal farmers 
implied that both rising real wages and declining terms of trade for the 
sector could be overcome, at least for the larger farms, through 
mechanisation. 
The second feature was the slow growth in trade, and especially the 
serious contraction that took place between the Depression of the 1930S 
and the Korean War. As is frequently mentioned, Spain suffered con-
siderably less than most other European countries during the 
Depression because of the small size of its external sector and its high 
tariffs. By contrast, the country was probably the last Western nation 
to recover from the slowdown in international trade after the Second 
World War. The cause is quite clear- the inability of the early Franco 
regime to resume normal trade agreements with other European states. 
As a result, Spanish agriculture in 1950 was probably more 'traditional' 
than it had been two decades earlier. These decades were essentially 
lost because the country had failed to establish a widely based demo-
cratic regime and because it was unable to continue the rapid structural 
changes that had been under way since the First World War. Even 
before Franco's death in 1975, Spain had become a modem society, 
and traditional agriculture was disappearing rapidly. Now the political 
transition to democracy was to be achieved, together with entry into the 
European Economic Community. Spain has since been faced increas-
ingly with modem agriculture'S dilemma: that of rapidly increasing pro-
ductivity creating ever-growing surpluses. 
26 Fraile (1991, especially chapter 6). 
27 This goes against Olson, who notes that political upheavals tend to remove 'growth-
repressing organi2ations and combinations' (Olson, 1982, p. 77). 
Appendix: Estimates of agricultural output 
and consumption in 
nineteenth-century Spain 
Historians of the nineteenth century face serious statistical problems in 
measuring Spanish agricultural output and productivity. 1 The Censo de 
Frutos y Manu/acturas of 1799, which is the most famous of the several 
attempts by the Spanish government between 1787 and 1803 to measure 
national agricultural output failed, partly on account of the frequent 
inertia of local representatives of the Crown, and partly because of their 
inability to determine accurately the cultivated area.2 Josep Fontana has 
demonstrated the weakness of the Censo de Frutos as a historical source, 
both on account of its production estimates and for the prices used.3 
The unpublished figures of the Junta General de Estadistica (hereafter 
JGE) for 1857 and 1859, and their 'correction' by Fermin Caballero, 
illustrate that relatively little had improved by the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. The JGE lamented their inability to obtain reliable information 
from local authorities and regarded their own estimates as far too low. 
Caballero's correction appears to have been a doubling of the quantities 
for most products, although for wheat he chose to increase it by 376 
per cent!4 
The creation of the Junta Consultiva Inspectora in 1883 (later to be 
the Junta Consultiva Agronomica - hereafter JCA) brought about 
renewed interest in the preparation of annual harvest estimates, 
although the newspaper None de Castilla had started publishing them 
for wheat in 1882. From 1891, annual estimates of the area cultivated, 
production and crop values are available for all the major cereals and 
1 In Spain, the tithe was not abolished until 1841, but the falling production curves in 
most series from the time of the Peninsular War are generally regarded as having been 
caused by a decline in enforcement rather than a simple fall in output (Canales, 1982, 
pp. 128--68). 
2 See the complaints of Polo y Catalina (1803) who had the unenviable task of organising 
the data for the Censo de Frutos, and Simpson (1989a, pp. 356--8). 
3 Fontana (1967). 
4 Tortella (1985, pp. 73-7). Another problem was that the harvest was one of the century's 
worst. 
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legumes, together with products of the vine and olive.5 If the 1880s 
estimates are definitely unreliable, those for the 1890S must also be used 
with caution. Although the statistics still hold a few surprises in the 
twentieth century, they do, in the words of GEHR, 'improve consist-
ently after 1898'.6 
The livestock censuses for 1750 (Crown of Castilla only), 1865, 1917, 
1929 and 1933 are usually considered reasonably accurate. Others exist 
(for example in 1799, 1859, 1891 and 1905) but give much less infor-
mation on how the figures were collected, provide no breakdown by 
municipality (which might allow more vigorous checking), and they are 
generally regarded as having been collected by less scientific means than 
for those years cited above. 7 
Given the limitations in the source material, the room for debate over 
the changes that took place in agricultural production during the 
nineteenth century is enormous. To measure changes in the volume of 
cereals, wine and olive oil produced between 1795 and 1895, Garrabou 
and Sanz used the Censo de Frutos and official estimates from the 1890s.8 
These sources show an annual average increase in gross cereal output 
of 0.62 per cent, with the increase for the main bread grains, wheat and 
rye, being 0.54 per cent, slightly below that for population at 0.57 per 
cent. According to these authors, this small decline in per capita output 
was offset by imports of wheat (equivalent to 10 per cent of domestic 
production by the end of the nineteenth century), the relative decline 
of rye consumption (an inferior grain), and the rapid growth in potato 
consumption, equivalent to 124 kilograms per person in 1902. Output 
of wine (must) increased by an annual 1.31 per cent and olive oil by 
1.39 per cent. However, as noted in chapter I, Garrabou and Sanz's 
estimates for wine in these years should really be 1.03 per cent, and the 
Censo de Frutos in any case is even less reliable for these two crops than 
for cereals. Although Garrabou and Sanz do not attempt to measure 
livestock output, they accept that numbers experienced a 'major' decline 
between 1750 and 1887/91.9 
A much more ambitious attempt is made by Prados de la Escosura 
who estimates demand for agricultural products to ascertain whether 
the contemporary figures for 1799, 1857, 1886/95 and 1903/12 are viable 
5 See Sanz (1981). 
6 GEHR (1983a, p. 246). See also GEHR (1991, pp. 31-3) and Simpson (1989a, pp. 359-
61). 
7 See GEHR (1978-9; and especially 1991, pp. 79-92). 
8 Garrabou and Sanz (1985, pp. 121-39). 
9 Ibid. (p. 117). 
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or not. The model he uses is similar to that used by Crafts and Jackson 
for eighteenth-century England, and consists of the following 
equation: 10 
1tD = n . 1tY + e . 1tR + 1tP 
where 1t is annual change, D the demand for agricultural produce (i.e. 
production minus exports plus imports), Y real per capita income, P 
population, R relative agricultural prices (i.e. agricultural prices deflated 
by the general price index) and nand e income and price elasticities of 
demand. 11 
The model itself contains a number of difficulties. First, there is a 
circularity in the reasoning, as the equation implies a knowledge 
of national income, which cannot be calculated unless agricultural 
production is previously known. 12 Second, the changes in demand 
are unlikely to be identical to changes in production. 13 Finally, it has 
to be assumed that there were no changes in income distribution, 
which would affect the demand for agricultural production. 14 Apart 
from these theoretical difficulties, economic historians have yet to 
find any information which might give us a reasonable idea of income 
and price elasticities for food products in nineteenth-century Spain. 
Information concerning per capita income is still deficient, and prices 
series are highly localised during the first half of the century. To 
reduce the possibility of error, Prados de la Escosura calculates both 
higher and lower bound figures, using different estimates of per capita 
income, income elasticities (0.7 and 1.0) and price elasticities (-0.5 
and -0.3). The results range from a growth in labour productivity of 
50 per cent between 1800 and 1910 on the one hand, to a small 
decline on the other. 15 
Prados de la Escosura's calculations based on contemporary figures 
are at the top end of his demand-based estimates and suggest that 
output virtually tripled over the century, with labour productivity 
increasing by slightly over a third. According to these calculations, 
output grew slowly between 1800 and 1857, but then quickened between 
1857 and 1903/12. This caused labour productivity to fall in the first 
period, followed by a rapid recovery during the second half of the 
10 Crafts (1976) and Jackson (1985). 
11 Prados de la Escosura (1988, p. 103). 
12 Tortella (1988, p. 15) and O'Brien (1985, p. 774). 
13 For France, see Runan (1978, pp. 714-28). 
14 Prados de la Escosura (1988, p. 122). 
15 Ibid. (cuadro 3.5). However, as Runan (1978, pp. 717-8) notes, income elasticity for 
food at the farm level is often much lower than at the retail level. 
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century.16 This scenario appears unlikely, especially given the problems 
facing farmers towards the end of the nineteenth century and beginning 
of the twentieth (phylloxera in viticulture, foreign competition for cereal 
growers and falling livestock numbers). Apart from the major difficulties 
already noted with nineteenth-century contemporary estimates and the 
demand model used by Prados de la Escosura, another difficulty is that 
his contemporary estimates are based on total output (i.e. they include 
seed and intermediate products), rather than final output. This reduces 
the problems facing the livestock sector in his estimates, thus exaggerat-
ing the increase in total output. 
More recently, Prados de la Escosura has recalculated agricultural 
final output from 1850.17 For crops between 1855 and 1882, estimates 
were obtained by using rail and water transport statistics of non-animal 
output, whilst after 1882 official production statistics were used. live-
stock was calculated based on the census figures in 1865, 1891 and 1905/ 
9. These new estimates show a slower growth in labour productivity 
between 1857 and 1903/12 than his earlier ones, at 41 per cent rather 
than 67 per cent. This is still appreciably greater than I argue in chapter 
I, and it is questionable whether greater commercialisation can be con-
sidered an accurate proxy for the growth in output. However, assuming 
that both Prados de la Escosura's original estimates for the period 1800 
to 1857 and his new estimates for 1857 to 1903/12 are correct, then 
labour productivity is shown to grow by only 20 per cent over 110 
years. IS 
Wrigley's attempts to estimate growth in agricultural labour pro-
ductivity in pre-industrial economies by examining changes in the rela-
tive size of the non-agricultural population is frustrated in the case of 
Spain by the poor quality of much of the census material. However, the 
evidence for a significant growth in the nineteenth century is lacking. If 
it is assumed that per capita consumption of food did not change, that 
international trade remained constant and that the agricultural popu-
lation was comprised of only those living in the countryside, then the 
fact that the urban population increased from around 11 per cent of 
total population in 1800 to 17 per cent in 1900 implies that agricultural 
productivity would have increased by just 7 per cent. 19 If these assump-
tions cannot be expected to hold, it is equally true that in Spain there 
16 Output grew by 35 per cent between 1799 and 1857, and 117 per cent between 1857 
and 19°3112. Labour productivity fell by 18 per cent, and rose by 67 per cent between 
the same dates (Prados de la Escosura, 1988, cuadro 3.8). 
17 Prados de la Escosura (1995, pp. 12-20). 
18 Prados de la Escosura (1988, cuadro 3.8; 1995, table 3.1). 
19 See Wrigley (1985, p. 168). Urban population is taken as being that of Spain's provincial 
capitals. 
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was not a significant number of workers employed in tasks other than 
agriculture living in rural areas, unlike England. 
In conclusion, if agricultural output grew significantly during the 
nineteenth century it was driven essentially by demand from population 
growth. Given this fact, and that agriculture employed approximately 
two-thirds of the labour force throughout the century, increases in 
labour productivity were towards the lower of Prados de la Escosura's 
estimates. 
The argument for a slow growth in agricultural output as presented in 
chapter 1 is based essentially on two arguments: a low level of per capita 
consumption of calories, and the lack of diversity in diets. As the methods 
used to calculate the food balance sheet have been discussed in detail else-
where, I shall concentrate here on the relationship between the supply of 
calories and the demands on them in a pre-industrial economy.20 The sec-
tion is heavily influenced by the pioneering work ofFogel. 
. To what extent can a diet of 2,096 calories per capita, or 2,733 calor-
Ies when measured by equivalent adult male units, be considered an 
adequate diet in an economy such as Spain's in 1900 where two-thirds 
of the active population were employed in agriculture?21 In the first 
instance some measure is required of the distribution of calories accord-
ing to income groups. Recent studies from less developed countries have 
reconstructed possible models for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Europe. Clearly the distribution of calories is less elastic than the con-
sumption of some individual foods (such as meat and fish). Following 
Fogel's estimate for France and England for the 1790s, I take a coef-
ficient of variation of 0·3, 'the best approximation in the light of current 
knowledge'. The distribution therefore is virtually identical to his esti-
mate for England in the 1790S (table 13.1). 
The human body's demand for calories can be broken down into 
three different categories. First, the amount of energy required while at 
rest - the basal metabolic rate (BMR). Second, energy required to eat 
and digest food, together with essential hygiene; and, finally, other 
~ctivities whose demand varies considerably. Simply Surviving, which 
mvolves the first two categories, is estimated at 1.27 BMR, although 
converting this figure into calories is not easy. For adult males between 
20 and 39, living in moderate climates, the BMR range is between 1,350 
20 Simpson (1989a). 
21 For the .2,~96 calories, see Simpson (1989a, cuadro 5). The conversion to equivalent 
male ~ts IS b~sed on age distribution as given in Nicolau (1989, p. 69) and coefficients 
of calone reqwrements from Fogel (cited in Bekaert, 1991, table 2). 
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Table 13.1. Estimated distribution of daily calories 
per equivalent adult male in England c. 1790 and 
Spain c. 1900 
Population Daily calorie 
decile consumption 
Highest 4,329 
Ninth 3,514 
Eighth 3,155 
Seventh 2,897 
Sixth 2,684 
Fifth 2,492 
Fourth 2,309 
Third 2,120 
Second 1,903 
First 1,545 
x = 2,700 calories per adult male. 
(sIX) = 0.3. 
Cumulative 
(%) 
100 
84 
71 
59 
48 
38 
29 
21 
13 
6 
Source: Fogel (1991, table 1.3) and see text. 
and 2,000 calories 'depending on height and weight'.22 In the case of 
Spain, it is likely that the figure was considerably nearer the lower figure 
in the nineteenth century. The limited information concerning heights 
shows that Spaniards were some of the shortest people in western 
Europe, and there is little reason to suppose that they carried excess 
weight.23 As a result, I assume that the BMR is equivalent to 1,350 
calories per adult male, making the survival diet (i.e. involving no work 
or leisure activity whatsoever) some 1,715 calories. 
When work and leisure activities are included, then the figure 
becomes considerably higher. Fogel suggests that for a 25-year-old male 
engaged in subsistence farming in contemporary Asia, 'a typical distri-
bution would be: BMR and maintenance 71 percent, work 21 percent 
(i.e. 5 hours), and discretionary activity 8 percent' .24 Converting this 
into BMR units might produce the following: maintenance (0.7HI.27) 
+ (0.28*5.0) + (0.08d.4), giving BMR as 2.06 units. If this is converted 
using the minimum number of calories required for BMR, the figure is 
2,800 calories per adult male/day, or slightly above our average 2,733 
22 FAOIWHOIUNU (1985, cited in Fogel, 1991, p. 41). 
23 For the short stature of Spanish males, see Fioud, Wachter and Gregory (1990, pp. 
20--7)· 
24 Fogel (1991, p. 41). 
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Table 13.2. Calorie consumption in nineteenth-century Europe 
Per capita Adult male equivalent 
Spain 1900 2,096 2,733 
England 1790 2,700 
Italy 1910/14 2,696 3,220 
France 1845154 2,370 3,078 
Belgium 18u 2,039 2,674 
1846 2,068 2,693 
Sources: Bekaert (1991, table 3); Fogel (1991, p. 44); Simpson (1989, cuadro 5); and 
Spina (1932, cited in Zamagni, 1989, table 5.6). 
figure for Spain in 1900. This figure cannot have been very different 
from that required in Spanish agriculture. 25 However, such a figure is 
significantly above what large numbers of the population were receiving, 
as shown in table 13.1. The bottom third of the population in particular 
appears to have had insufficient energy to have done more than 
an hour's hard physical work a day, and for most even that would 
have been impossible. According to Pogel, insufficient diets were 
widespread:26 
for many European nations prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
national production of food was at such low levels that the lower classes were 
bound to have been malnourished under any conceivable circumstance, and 
that the high disease rates of the period were not merely a cause of malnutrition 
but undoubtedly, to a considerable degree, a consequence of exceedingly poor 
diets. 
To compare calorie consumption across countries has its problems 
because of differences in methods of calculation.27 However, table 13.2 
suggests that per capita calorie availability in Spain in 1900 was not so 
different from that in other European countries at earlier periods during 
the nineteenth century. Poor diets did not disappear with industrialis-
ation - some 38 per cent of British volunteers to the Boer War were 
25 For example, on a base of 1,728 calories, five hours ploughing would require between 
905 and 1,526 additional calories, five hours weeding between 304 and 1,013 more, 
and five hours collecting and spreading manure would require 1,409 more (calculated 
from Fogel 1991, table 1.2). 
26 Ibid. (p. 40). 
27 First, a figure for food loss and wastage is sometimes omitted, and calories obtained 
from alcoholic beverages ignored. Second, no figures are included for such activities 
as hunting and scavenging. Because it is not known how representative a sample is for 
the country as a whole, estimates based on household expenditure must be treated with 
caution. 
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declared unfit, and Britain in 1914 'was still so chronically under-
nourished that for millions of soldiers and civilians wartime rations rep-
resented a higher standard of feeding than they had ever known 
before' .28 It therefore should not come as too much of a surprise to 
learn that in Spain at about the same time, the general population suf-
fered from an inadequate diet and that meat-eating was considered a 
luxury of the wealthy. 
28 Burnett (1989, p. 243). 
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